Representation and the Intrapsychic: Cartesian Barriers to Empathic Contact

This paper argues for a radical relational perspective that explicitly challenges the notion of the intrapsychic and the related Cartesian assumptions of representationalism. Conceptual tools derived from the school of embodied cognition provide an alternative theoretical language that depicts a new understanding of experience as an emergent and distributed phenomenon of a dialogic communicative system. Clinical vignettes illustrate how this new ontology of experience promotes a therapeutic ambience that dissolves the barriers to empathic contact imposed by the retention of representational modes of thought.     

Minding Rachlin's Eliminative Materialism

Rachlin's teleological behaviorism eliminates the first-person ontology of conscious experience by identifying mental states with extended patterns of behavior, and thereby maintains the materialist ontology of science. An alternate view, informed by brain-based and externalist philosophies of mind, is shown also to maintain the materialist ontology of science, but without eliminating the phenomenology of consciousness. This view implies that to be judged human, machines not only must exhibit complicated temporally structured patterns of behavior, but also must have first-person conscious experience. Although confirming machine sentience is likely to be problematic, extended contact with a machine that results in a person interacting with it as if it were conscious could reasonably lead to the conclusion that for all intents and purposes it is.     

Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues

Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality (representation per se), transparency (immediacy of cognitive content consequent upon the unawareness of underlying representational processes), subjectivity (first-person perspective) or reflexivity (autonoetic awareness). However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible for operationalizing such a reflexive state. Current reliance by higher-order and intrinsic self-representational theories on self-representing data structures to achieve reflexive self-awareness is highly problematic, suggesting a solution in terms of a self-referential processing regime.     

How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis

Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, this very issue has not received much attention in the respective debates and when it has, typically the outlook has been skeptical or outright negative. In this paper, I argue that it is epistemologically possible for a group of individuals to literally share a single mental unit. In particular, I will put forward and defend what I shall call the zombie conception of group minds.     

Materialism and the Subjectivity of Experience

The phenomenal properties of conscious mental states happen to be exclusively accessible from the first-person perspective. Consequently, some philosophers consider their existence to be incompatible with materialist metaphysics. In this paper I criticise one particular argument that is based on the idea that for something to be real it must (at least in principle) be accessible from an intersubjective perspective. I argue that the exclusively subjective access to phenomenal contents can be explained by the very particular nature of the epistemological relation holding between a subject and his own mental states. Accordingly, this subjectivity does not compel us to deny the possibility that phenomenal contents are ontologically objective properties. First, I present the general form of the argument that I will discuss. Second, I show that this argument makes use of a criterion of reality that is not applicable to the case of subjective experience. Third, I discuss a plausible objection and give an argument for rejecting observation models of self-knowledge of phenomenal contents. These models fall prey to the homunculus illusion.     

Can ‘Downward Causation’ Save Free Will?

Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free will, together with assumptions implicit in his broader ontology, commit him to the implausible conclusion that determinism is incompatible with the existence of human persons.     

Emotions in action through the looking glass1

Abstract: The paper aims at highlighting how our primary understanding of others’ actions is rooted in the mirror mechanism. To this end, the anatomical architecture of the mirror neuron system for action will be outlined as well as its role in grasping goals and intentions in others’ motor behaviour. One further step through the looking glass of social cognition will be referring to the ubiquitous emotional colouring of actions and considering its links with the motor domain. This will allow a clearer perspective on the mechanism underlying our abilities for emotional understanding and on cases in which these abilities are amiss, as in autistic spectrum disorders.     

Psychological Science within a Three-Dimensional Ontology

The present paper outlines the nature of a three-dimensional ontology and the place of psychological science within this ontology, in a way that is partly similar to and partly different from that of Pérez-Álvarez. The first dimension is the material realities, and involves different levels (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.), where each level builds on a lower level but also involves the development of new emergent properties, in accordance with Bunge’s emergent materialism. Each level involves systems, with components, structures and mechanisms, and an environment. This dimension can be studied with natural scientific methods. The second dimension is the subjective-experiential realities, and refers to our subjective perspective on the world. In accordance with Husserl’s phenomenology, it is argued that this subjectivity does not exist in the world (i.e., should not be reified as an object among other objects), but represents a perspective on the world that we enter in our capacity as conscious human beings. Essential characteristics of this subjectivity (such as intentionality, temporality, embodiment, and intersubjectivity) can be explored by phenomenological methods. The third dimension is the social-constructional realities, and includes social institutions, norms, categories, theories, and techniques. It is argued that psychological science spans over all three dimensions. Although almost all psychological research by necessity starts from a problem formulation where the subjective-experiential dimension plays an essential role (either explicitly or implicitly), most of present-day psychological research clearly emphasizes the material dimension. It is argued that a mature psychological science needs to integrate all three dimensions.     

On the representational systems underlying prospection: Evidence from the event-cueing paradigm

The ability to think about the future-prospection-is central to many aspects of human cognition and behavior, from planning and decision making, to self-control and the construction of a sense of identity. Yet, the exact nature of the representational systems underlying prospection is not fully understood. Recent findings point to the critical role of episodic memory in imagining specific future events, but it is unlikely that prospection depends solely on this system. Using an event-cueing paradigm in two studies, we here show that specific events that people imagine might happen in their personal future are commonly embedded in broader event sequences-termed event clusters-that link a set of envisioned events according to causal and thematic relations. These findings provide novel evidence that prospection relies on multiple representational systems, with general autobiographical knowledge structures providing a frame that organizes imagined events in overarching event sequences. The results further suggest that knowledge about personal goals plays an important role in structuring these event sequences, especially for the distant future.     

Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism without Phenomenal Concepts

The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special characteristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their causal roles within a given system which entails their functional unanalysability. These features together with the encapsulated nature of low level complex processes giving rise to unstructured sensory representations readily explain those peculiarities of phenomenal consciousness which are usually taken to pose a serious problem for contemporary physicalism. I conclude that if those concepts which are related to the phenomenal character of conscious experience are special in any way, their characteristics are derivative of and can be accounted for in terms of the cognitive and representational features introduced in the present paper.     

How could phenomenal consciousness be involved in mental function?

In a phylogenetic perspective, the phenomenal and the functional aspects of consciousness cannot be separated because consciousness, as a phenomenal experience, must be causally effective. The hypothesis I propose is that the fundamental property of consciousness consists of a self-organizing process: the differentiation of a content. The differentiation of a content occurs on the basis of the relations internal to a representational whole, which behaves like a field and tends towards a condition of equilibrium. This hypothesis can be somehow considered an extension of Gestalt visual perceptual theory. Unlike neurocomputational processes, which are non-conscious and extrinsic to the representation, conscious processes are intrinsic to the representational whole. Consciousness, as an intrinsically self-organizing process interwoven with its phenomenal aspects, can be more than epiphenomenal and it can be involved in mental function. The paper then discusses the implications of this hypothesis for subjectivity and the explanatory gap.     

身体动作与语义加工:具身隐喻的视角

概念隐喻理论认为个体建立基于身体经验的具体概念和抽象概念之间的隐喻联结是人类特有的认知方式。不管是具体概念还是抽象概念,只要有具身隐喻联结的概念,其语义的理解便会受到具身启动效应的影响。大脑在加工动词或者含动词的句子时,不仅激活了语言中枢和运动皮层,且大脑随着个体是否执行与语义相应的动作、抽象概念的熟悉程度和其文本背景是否符合等因素而激活不同的神经回路。本文将对以上研究进行梳理与分析,旨在从具身隐喻的视角为身体动作影响语义加工的神经机制模型提供初步的思路。     

Prejudice,categorization and particularization: From a perceptual to a rhetorical approach

This paper seeks to offer an alternative approach to the study of prejudice than that based upon the notion of categorization which is currently influential in cognitive social psychology. It is argued that the categorization approach assumes the inevitability of prejudice and ignores the issue of tolerance. The assumptions of the categorization approach are criticized, and it is suggested that, by focusing on categorization as a cognitive process, it has overlooked an opposing process—that of particularization. The result has been a rather mechanical and bureaucratic model of cognition. A less mechanical view is possible if the relations between the two processes of categorization and particularization are considered from a rhetorical perspective, which examines the argumentative nature of thought. For theoretical and empirical reasons, this perspective does not equate prejudiced thinking with rigid categorization; instead a rhetorical approach permits a distinction between prejudice and tolerance on the basis of content, rather than form, and thereby avoids assuming the inevitability of prejudice.     

Unconscious Representations 2: Towards an Integrated Cognitive Architecture

The representational nature of human cognition and thought in general has been a source of controversies. This is particularly so in the context of studies of unconscious cognition, in which representations tend to be ontologically and structurally segregated with regard to their conscious status. However, it appears evolutionarily and developmentally unwarranted to posit such segregations, as, otherwise, artifact structures and ontologies must be concocted to explain them from the viewpoint of the human cognitive architecture. Here, from a by-and-large Classical cognitivist viewpoint, I show why this segregation is wrong, and elaborate on the need to postulate an ontological and structural continuity between unconscious and conscious representations. Specifically, I hypothesize that this continuity is to be found in the symbolic-based interplay between the syntax and the semantics of thought, and I propose a model of human information processing characterized by the integration of syntactic and semantic representations.     

Understanding the representational mind: A phenomenological perspective

This paper reflects on the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and scientific psychology. It tries to show how phenomenological results have relevance and validity for present-day cognitive developmental psychology by arguing that consciousness matters in the study of the representational mind. The paper presents some methodological remarks concerning empirical or applied phenomenology; it describes the conception of an exploratory developmental study with 3 to 9-year-old children viewing a complex pictorial display; it then illustrates how a phenomenological interpretation of the data works; in conclusion, it sketches a view of realism about conscious experiences which is taken to be inherent in the phenomenological perspective of understanding the representational mind.     

Subjectivity: Locating the First-Person in Being and Time

It is often held that, in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger's account of intentionality makes no essential reference to the first-person stance. This paper argues, on the contrary, that an account of the first-person, or 'subjectivity', is crucial to Heidegger's account of intelligibility (world) and so of the intentionality, or 'aboutness' of our acts and thoughts, that rests upon it. It first offers an argument as to why the account of intelligibility in Division I of Being and Time , based on a form of third-person self-awareness, provides a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for intentionality. It then shows that Heidegger provides a further necessary condition in his analysis of the collapse of the one-self in Division II. This condition is 'conscience', which is both a genuine first-person mode of self-awareness and, it is argued, the origin of reason as that which distinguishes factic 'grounds' from normative 'justifications'.     

Libido und psychische Energie

The authors investigate different definitions of “psychic energy” and “libido” as well as their critique. With regard to “psychic energy” it is shown that the critique relates in particular to the perspective of Brenner and others and not to Freud's definition. They argue that Freud uses the term “psychic energy” as a synonym for “libido” and not “libido” as a synonym for “psychic energy”. It is assumed that until 1914, Freud related “libido” to manifestations of bodily sexual tensions and afterwards to manifestations of sexual energy in the psychic field. The authors reject this change for epistemological reasons as well as Freud's attempt to use dynamic, economic considerations as an explanatory device. Freud's energy concept is inconsistent with the definition of energy in natural sciences, and, whereas the meta-psychological topographical, dynamic and structural viewpoints have a solid foundation in the representational world to which the psychoanalytic process affords unique access, this is not true of the economic viewpoint. It is claimed that bodily tensions exist in the representational world only in the form of affects, so that the economic viewpoint should, in the authors' opinion, be abandoned in favour of an affective one. In the context of the endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure as adduced by Freud, this viewpoint concentrates on the relationships between affects and the different elements of the representational world, thereby serving as the topoi of meta-psychological investigation dimensions.     

动机的目标理论

章对动机的目标研究领域的发展脉络、研究方法以及所取得的新近成果进行综述,总结各种目标理论的共同点和分歧,并对这一领域的未来发展方向做出了展望。作认为,目标理论将导致行为的情感因素、动机力量与认知过程有机结合,这体现了一种整合趋势;同时,目标理论强调目标对于人格功能、情绪以及健康的重要性,使得该领域的研究与社会生活密切相联。而这一研究领域的未来方向则是,探查动机倾向与个人目标之间的联结。