Action influences spatial perception: Neuropsychological evidence

We present neuropsychological evidence indicating that action influences spatial perception. First, we review evidence indicating that actions using a tool can modulate unilateral visual neglect and extinction, where patients are unaware of stimuli presented on one side of space. We show that, at least for some patients, modulation comes about through a combination of visual and motor cueing of attention to the affected side (Experiment 1). Subsequently, we review evidence that action‐relations between stimuli reduce visual extinction; there is less extinction when stimuli fall in the correct colocations for action relative to when they fall in the incorrect relations for action and relative to when stimuli are just associatively related. Finally, we demonstrate that action relations between stimuli can also influence the binding of objects to space, in a patient with Balint's syndrome (Experiment 2). These neuropsychological data indicate that perception–action couplings can be crucial to our conscious representation of space.     

Predicting others’ actions: evidence for a constant time delay in action simulation

Recent evidence indicates that humans can precisely predict the outcome of occluded actions. It has been suggested that these predictions arise from a mental simulation which might run in real-time. The present experiments aimed to specify the time course of this simulation process. Participants watched transiently occluded point-light actions and the temporal outcome after occlusion was manipulated. Participants were instructed to judge the temporal coherence of the action after a short (Experiment 1) and a long occlusion period (Experiment 2). Both experiments revealed a comparable negative point of subjective equality (PSE), indicating that action simulation took constantly longer than the observed action itself. Such a temporal error was not present when inverted actions were used, (Experiment 3) ruling out a pure visually driven effect. The results suggest that the temporal error is due to costs arising from a switch from action perception to an internal simulation process involving motor representations.     

Action-effect binding by observational learning

The acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations plays a central role in the ability to intentionally control actions. Humans learn about actions not only through active experience, but also through observing the actions of others. In Experiment 1, we examined whether action–effect associations can be acquired by observational learning. To this end, participants observed how a model repeatedly pressed two buttons during an observation phase. Each of the buttonpresses led to a specific tone (action effect). In a subsequent test phase, the tones served as target stimuli to which the participants had to respond with buttonpresses. Reaction times were shorter if the stimulus–response mapping in the test phase was compatible with the action–effect association in the observation phase. Experiment 2 excluded the possibility that the impact of perceived action effects on own actions was driven merely by an association of spatial features with the particular tones. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the presence of an agent is necessary to acquire novel action–effect associations through observation. Altogether, the study provides evidence for the claim that bidirectional action–effect associations can be acquired by observational learning. Our findings are discussed in the context of the idea that the acquisition of action–effect associations through observation is an important cognitive mechanism subserving the human ability for social learning.     

Processing abstract language modulates motor system activity

Embodiment theory proposes that neural systems for perception and action are also engaged during language comprehension. Previous neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies have only been able to demonstrate modulation of action systems during comprehension of concrete language. We provide neurophysiological evidence for modulation of motor system activity during the comprehension of both concrete and abstract language. In Experiment 1, when the described direction of object transfer or information transfer (e.g., away from the reader to another) matched the literal direction of a hand movement used to make a response, speed of responding was faster than when the two directions mismatched (an action-sentence compatibility effect). In Experiment 2, we used single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation to study changes in the corticospinal motor pathways to hand muscles while reading the same sentences. Relative to sentences that do not describe transfer, there is greater modulation of activity in the hand muscles when reading sentences describing transfer of both concrete objects and abstract information. These findings are discussed in relation to the human mirror neuron system.     

Body part representations in verbal semantics

Embodied theories of language propose that word meaning is inextricably tied to—grounded in—mental representations of perceptual, motor, and affective experiences of the world. The four experiments described in this article demonstrate that accessing the meanings of action verbs like smile, punch, and kick requires language understanders to activate modality-specific cognitive representations responsible for performing and perceiving those same actions. The main task used is a word-image matching task, where participants see an action verb and an image depicting an action. Their task is to decide as quickly as possible whether the verb and the image depict the same action. Of critical interest is participants’ behavior when the verb and image do not match, in which case the two actions can use the same effector or different effectors. In Experiment 1, we found that participants took significantly longer to reject a verb-image pair when the actions depicted by the image and denoted by the verb used the same effector than when they used different effectors. Experiment 2 yielded the same result when the order of presentation was reversed, replicating the effect in Cantonese. Experiment 3 replicated the effect in English with a verb-verb near-synonym task, and in Experiment 4, we once again replicated the effect with learners of English as a second language. This robust interference effect, whereby a shared effector slows discrimination, shows that language understanders activate effector-specific neurocognitive representations during both picture perception and action word understanding.     

Planning to reach for an object changes how the reacher perceives it

Three experiments assessed the influence of the Ebbinghaus illusion on size judgments that preceded verbal, grasp, or touch responses. Prior studies have found reduced effects of the illusion for the grip-scaling component of grasping, and these findings are commonly interpreted as evidence that different visual systems are employed for perceptual judgment and visually guided action. In the current experiments, the magnitude of the illusion was reduced by comparable amounts for grasping and for judgments that preceded grasping (Experiment 1). A similar effect was obtained prior to reaching to touch the targets (Experiment 2). The effect on verbal responses was apparent even when participants were simply instructed that a target touch task would follow the verbal task. After participants had completed a grasping task, the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion remained for a subsequent verbal-response judgment task (Experiment 3). Overall, the studies demonstrate strong connections between action planning and perception.     

When language gets emotional: Irony and the embodiment of affect in discourse

Although there is increasing evidence to suggest that language is grounded in perception and action, the relationship between language and emotion is less well understood. We investigate the grounding of language in emotion using a novel approach that examines the relationship between the comprehension of a written discourse and the performance of affect-related motor actions (hand movements towards and away from the body). Results indicate that positively and negatively valenced words presented in context influence motor responses (Experiment 1), whilst valenced words presented in isolation do not (Experiment 3). Furthermore, whether discourse context indicates that an utterance should be interpreted literally or ironically can influence motor responding, suggesting that the grounding of language in emotional states can be influenced by discourse-level factors (Experiment 2). In addition, the finding of affect-related motor responses to certain forms of ironic language, but not to non-ironic control sentences, suggests that phrasing a message ironically may influence the emotional response that is elicited.     

动作理解因境而异:动作加工中情境信息的自动整合

针对动作理解的机制,模拟论主张大脑自发模拟他人的动作,就相同的动作其理解也相同,而理论论则认为人们基于合理性原则对他人动作进行推理,相同的动作发生在不同的情境时会有不同的理解。但以往研究所采用动作材料的运动学特性和发生情境存在共变,其难以区分动作理解是支持模拟论还是理论论。通过两项实验,采用动画制作技术来产生有无约束情境下的追逐动作,以指示动作加工过程的脑电μ抑制为指标,对前述两种观点进行了检验。其中,在约束情境中存在障碍物,追逐者需改变运动方向以绕过障碍物,从后方逐渐趋近目标;而无约束情境中不存在障碍物,但追逐者依然保持与存在约束情景下相同的运动模式。结果发现,当追逐动作发生在存在约束的情境时,其基于合理性原则推测可获得清晰的动作目标,该条件下的μ抑制程度高于不存在约束情境的条件(实验1);而当仅追逐者运动,即趋近的目标不确定时,虽然有约束和无约束情境间的物理差异与实验1相同,但条件间μ抑制的差异消失(实验2);且上述μ抑制并非与注意相关的枕叶α活动的泛化。该结果提示,动作发生的情境信息影响人们对动作的理解,即基于推理过程理解动作,支持理论论观点。     

语言和文化影响颜色认知：直接语言效应抑或间接语言效应?

语言和文化对颜色认知的影响存在着直接语言效应和间接语言效应的争论。直接语言效应是指在识记颜色时人先将颜色转换成颜色名称, 再认时通过匹配保留在记忆中的颜色词与目标颜色名称来完成任务。颜色类别知觉是语言策略的结果。间接语言效应是指语言和文化塑造颜色知觉表征, 形成了一个曲形颜色知觉空间, 将人们的注意引向语言和文化定义的颜色类别分界。即使没有语言策略的参与, 类别效应也会出现。颜色文化是民族文化的重要组成部分。绿色和红色在维吾尔族和汉族的语言和文化中分别具有重要的意义。采用颜色相似性判断、颜色分类和颜色再认任务, 考察维吾尔族和汉族的大学生对红、绿的认知, 探查语言和文化对颜色认知的影响及其性质。结果表明, 与汉族相比, 维吾尔族对绿色的辨认、分类和再认存在反应优势, 对红色认知存在反应劣势。与颜色辨认反应比, 两个民族的颜色再认反应时显著长。整个研究表明, 语言和文化对颜色认知的影响存在着间接语言效应, 语言与文化塑造个体的颜色知觉空间。     

Does own experience affect perception of others’ actions in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)?

Anticipating another’s actions is an important ability in social animals. Recent research suggests that in human adults and infants one’s own action experience facilitates understanding and anticipation of others’ actions. We investigated the link between first-person experience and perception of another’s action in adult tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella spp., formerly Cebus apella spp.). In Experiment 1, the monkeys observed a familiar human (actor) trying to open a container using either a familiar or an unfamiliar action. They looked for longer when the actor tried to open the container using a familiar action. In Experiment 2, the actor performed two novel actions on a new container. The monkeys looked equally at the two actions. In Experiment 3, the monkeys were trained to open the container using one of the novel actions in Experiment 2. After training, we repeated the same procedure as in Experiment 2. The monkeys looked for longer when the actor manipulated the container using the action they had practiced than when she used the unfamiliar action. These results show that knowledge derived from one’s own experience impacts perception of another’s action in these New World monkeys.     

The potentiation of two components of the reach-to-grasp action during object categorisation in visual memory

Stimulus-Response Compatibility Effects have been reported for several components of the reach-to-grasp action during visual object recognition [Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (1998). On the relations between seen objects and components of potential actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24, 830-846; Ellis, R., & Tucker, M. (2000). Micro-affordance: The potentiation of actions by seen objects. British Journal of Psychology, 91, 451-471; Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (2001). The potentiation of grasp types during visual object categorization. Visual Cognition, 8, 769-800; Creem, S. H., & Proffitt, D. R. (2001). Grasping objects by their handles: A necessary interaction between cognition and action. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27, 218-228; Craighero, L. Bello, A. Fadiga, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (2002). Hand action preparation influences the responses to hand pictures. Neuropsychologia, 40, 492-502]. The present study investigates compatibility effects for two elements of reach-to-grasp action during the visual mental imagery of objects-the compatibility of an object for grasping with a power and precision grasp, and the orientation of an object (left/right) for grasping by a particular hand (left/right). Experiment 1 provides further evidence for compatibility effects of a 'seen' object for grasping with a power and precision grasp. The experiment shows that compatibility effects are obtainable when an object is presented in an array of four objects and not just on its own. Experiment 2 provides evidence that compatibility effects of an object for grasping with a power and precision grasp can also be observed when participants make an action response to an object 700 ms after it has been removed from view. Experiment 3 investigates compatibility effects for the orientation of an object for grasping by a particular hand during visual mental imagery, but finds no evidence for such effects. The findings are discussed in relation to two arguments put forward to reconcile ecological and representational theories of visual object recognition.     

Action Generalization Across Group Members: Action Efficiency Matters

Actions are usually generalized among social group members. Importantly, the efficiency of an action with respect to achieving an external target determines action understanding, and it may have different degrees of social relevance to social groups. Thus, this study explored the role of action efficiency in action generalization. We used computer animations to simulate actions in social groups initiated by visual action cues or category labels, and we measured differences in response times between identifying actions that were and were not consistent with group members, without explicit requirements regarding generalization. It was found that in both visually introduced and explicitly labeled social groups, when the group members acted inefficiently toward the external object, perceivers identified group-consistent actions faster than group-inconsistent actions, indicating that the exemplars' common inefficient actions are generalized to the unknown ingroup member, accordingly facilitating the identification of expected consistent inefficient action (Experiment 1). As this effect was not present when removing social group cues, it was determined to be specific to social groups (Experiment 2). Importantly, such generalization was not observed when the identical action was deemed efficient toward the external object (Experiment 3) and was specific to the demonstration of the action being completed by multiple group members rather than being repeated twice by one group member, supporting the group-based inference and ruling out the possibility of the increased memorability of inefficient actions leading to more generalization relative to efficient actions (Experiment 4). Therefore, the efficiency of an action bounds the generalization of the action across social group members through a process that is spontaneous and implicit. This constrained action generalization may be due to inefficient actions being represented as culture-specific conventional forms.     

Perceptual resonance: action-induced modulation of perception

A direct relationship between perception and action implies bi-directionality, and predicts not only effects of perception on action but also effects of action on perception. Modern theories of social cognition have intensively examined the relation from perception to action and propose that mirroring the observed actions of others underlies action understanding. Here, we suggest that this view is incomplete, as it neglects the perspective of the actor. We will review empirical evidence showing the effects of self-generated action on perceptual judgments. We propose that producing action might prime perception in a way that observers are selectively sensitive to related or similar actions of conspecifics. Therefore, perceptual resonance, not motor resonance, might be decisive for grounding sympathy and empathy and, thus, successful social interactions.     

语言标签和自我关联对新颖客体类别知觉的影响

类别知觉(Categorical perception)是人类最基本的认知活动之一, 探讨语言对类别知觉的影响是心理语言学领域的热门话题之一。在这个研究的3个实验中, 分别在高、低不同的语言标签表征强度下、高、低不同的客体自我关联程度下观察新颖客体类别知觉的过程。研究发现, 语言标签表征程度的增强可促进新颖客体类别知觉的右视野优势效应; 客体与自我关联程度的提高会促进左、右视野的类别知觉效应; 语言标签的表征程度和客体与自我关联程度同时增强时, 语言标签的作用依旧表现出来, 但与自我关联的影响产生权衡分配, 且其影响力并不足以产生右视野优势效应。     

Temporal perception is enhanced for goal-directed biological actions

ABSTRACT

Research into the visual perception of goal-directed human action indicates that human action perception makes use of specialized processing systems, similar to those that operate in visual expertise. Against this background, the current research investigated whether perception of temporal information in goal-directed human action is enhanced relative to similar motion stimuli. Experiment 1 compared observers’ sensitivity to speed changes in upright human action to a kinematic control (an animation yoked to the motion of the human hand), and also to inverted human action. Experiment 2 compared human action to a non-human motion control (a tool moved the object). In both experiments observers’ sensitivity to detecting the speed changes was higher for the human stimuli relative to the control stimuli, and inversion in Experiment 1 did not alter observers’ sensitivity. Experiment 3 compared observers’ sensitivity to speed changes in goal-directed human and dog actions, in order to determine if enhanced temporal perception is unique to human actions. Results revealed no difference between human and dog stimuli, indicating that enhanced speed perception may exist for any biological motion. Results are discussed with reference to theories of biological motion perception and perception in visual expertise.     

Subchance perception: Anxious,non-defensive individuals identify subliminally-presented positive words at below-chance levels

People who chronically experience anxiety are biased towards subliminally-presented negative information. Recent research has shown that they may also avoid subliminally-presented positive information. However, these findings are equivocal due to the limitations of previous paradigms and measures. This paper reports two experiments demonstrating that highly anxious, non-defensive individuals exhibit subchance perception when attempting to identify subliminally-presented positive words; that is, they identify such words with accuracy rates that are below chance (guessing). Participants attempted to identify masked positively and negatively valenced words that had been presented briefly (6.4 ms) in a two-alternative forced-choice paradigm. In Experiment 1, persons high in trait anxiety and low in defensiveness identified positive words at below-chance levels and negative words at above-chance levels. No other participant-group’s performance differed from chance. In Experiment 2, persons high in trait anxiety and low in defensiveness again exhibited subchance perception of positive words when responding quickly. This represents the clearest evidence to date that anxious, non-defensive individuals systematically avoid subliminally-presented positive information.     

Subchance perception: Anxious, non-defensive individuals identify subliminally-presented positive words at below-chance levels

People who chronically experience anxiety are biased towards subliminally-presented negative information. Recent research has shown that they may also avoid subliminally-presented positive information. However, these findings are equivocal due to the limitations of previous paradigms and measures. This paper reports two experiments demonstrating that highly anxious, non-defensive individuals exhibit subchance perception when attempting to identify subliminally-presented positive words; that is, they identify such words with accuracy rates that are below chance (guessing). Participants attempted to identify masked positively and negatively valenced words that had been presented briefly (6.4 ms) in a two-alternative forced-choice paradigm. In Experiment 1, persons high in trait anxiety and low in defensiveness identified positive words at below-chance levels and negative words at above-chance levels. No other participant-group’s performance differed from chance. In Experiment 2, persons high in trait anxiety and low in defensiveness again exhibited subchance perception of positive words when responding quickly. This represents the clearest evidence to date that anxious, non-defensive individuals systematically avoid subliminally-presented positive information.     

Configural information is processed differently in human action

Recent evidence indicates that observers' sensitivity to configural information in dynamic human action is disrupted when action is inverted, whereas sensitivity to featural action information is not. The current research involved two experiments that expand upon this basic finding. Experiment 1 revealed that featural and configural action information are processed similarly in static representations of action as in dynamic action. Experiment 2 indicated that configural processing is uniquely sensitive to orientation only in human action as compared to a similar control stimulus. These findings further support the idea that the perception of action recruits specialized orientation-specific configural processing, and parallel similar findings in face perception and visual expertise.     

Infants' association of linguistic labels with causal actions

Six experiments examined infants' ability to associate nonsense words with 2 causal actions: pushing and pulling. Although Experiment 1 found that 14-month-olds failed to form word-action associations, 18-month-olds in Experiment 2 provided reliable evidence of doing so. Additional experiments explored why 14-month-olds may not have formed such an association. Experiment 3 examined 14-month-olds' ability to discriminate a change in either the action or the label when the other element was held constant. Infants discriminated the change in label but not the change in action. When the language labels were replaced with music (Experiments 4-6), 14-month-old infants responded in terms of and discriminated between pushing and pulling. These results, in comparison with those from Experiments 1 and 3, suggest that for 14 month-olds, attempting to associate labels with actions may interfere with their discrimination of similar actions.