Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Shared emotions

Existing scientific concepts of group or shared or collective emotion fail to appreciate several elements of collectivity in such emotions. Moreover, the idea of shared emotions is threatened by the individualism of emotions that comes in three forms: ontological, epistemological, and physical. The problem is whether or not we can provide a plausible account of “straightforwardly shared” emotions without compromising our intuitions about the individualism of emotions. I discuss two philosophical accounts of shared emotions that explain the collectivity of emotions in terms of their intentional structure: Margaret Gilbert's plural subject account, and Hans Bernhard Schmid's phenomenological account. I argue that Gilbert's view fails because it relegates affective experience into a contingent role in emotions and because a joint commitment to feel amounts to the creation of a feeling rule rather than to an emotion. The problems with Schmid's view are twofold: first, a phenomenological fusion of feelings is not necessary for shared emotions and second, Schmid is not sensitive enough to different forms of shared concerns. I then outline my own typology that distinguishes between weakly, moderately, and strongly shared emotions on the basis of the participants’ shared concerns of different degree of collectivity, on the one hand, and the synchronization of their emotional responses, on the other hand. All kind of shared emotions in my typology are consistent with the individualism of emotions, while the question about “straightforward sharing” is argued to be of secondary importance.     

Identification with a wrongful subgroup and the feeling of collective guilt

The present study examined the relationship between group identification and the feeling of collective guilt. This study argued that identification with a subgroup of one's ingroup (subgroup identification) would predict the feeling of collective guilt better than identification with the whole ingroup (whole‐group identification). To manipulate the level of subgroup identification, we instructed participants to imagine the presence of a close friend (vs a friend of one's close friend) in a fictitious subgroup. In Experiment 1, we predicted and found that high subgroup identifiers experienced less collective guilt compared to low subgroup identifiers, regardless of their degree of whole‐group identification. In contrast, the results from Experiment 2 indicated that when the presence of the third party was made salient, high subgroup identifiers experienced more collective guilt in comparison to low subgroup identifiers. The importance of interpersonal connections for collective responsibility and the facilitating role of the third party for reconciliation of the intergroup conflicts are discussed.     

Mastering moral misery: Emotional and coping responses to intragroup morality (vs. competence) evaluations

In social groups, individuals are often confronted with evaluations of their behaviour by other group members and are motivated to adapt their own behaviour accordingly. In two studies we examine emotional responses towards, and perceived coping abilities with, morality vs. competence evaluations individuals receive from other in-group members. In Study 1, we show that evaluations of one's immoral behaviour primarily induce guilt, whereas evaluations of incompetent behaviour raise anger. In Study 2, we elaborate on the psychological process associated with these emotional responses, and demonstrate that evaluations of immorality, compared to incompetence, diminish group members’ perceived coping abilities, which in turn intensifies feelings of guilt. However, when anticipating an opportunity to restore one's self-image as a moral group member, perceived coping abilities are increased and the experience of guilt is alleviated. Together these studies demonstrate how group members can overcome their moral misery when restoring their self-image.     

Joint Commitments

I question the adequacy of Margaret Gilbert's account of collectivefeelings of guilt as collective judgments which do not necessarilyhave any phenomenological components. I question whether joint commitment theory in its present form helps us to understand orresolve social conflicts.     

Redeeming Apartheid's Legacy: Collective Guilt, Political Ideology, and Compensation

This paper reports two studies among white South African students on feelings of collective guilt about apartheid and attitudes to affirmative action. Study 1 reports on 21 in-depth interviews, Study 2 on results from 180 survey questionnaires. Substantial proportions of the participants in both studies displayed feelings of collective guilt. Among participants in both studies who identified strongly with white South Africans, some displayed strong feelings of collective guilt while others displayed no such feelings. Our survey data suggest that political ideology functions as a moderator. Strong feelings of guilt were found among students who identified strongly with white South Africans and defined themselves as liberals. If they defined themselves as conservatives then no feelings of collective guilt were observed. Strong feelings of collective guilt were accompanied by positive attitudes toward affirmative action. The influence of political ideology on attitudes toward affirmative action was mediated by collective guilt.     

Nostalgia for America's past can buffer collective guilt

This research examined when, and for whom, American collective nostalgia can relieve feelings of collective guilt. In the Pilot Study, path analyses revealed that national glorification is associated with collective nostalgia, and collective nostalgia is associated with lower collective guilt. Our experimental studies test the role of these variables in determining responses to the elevated salience of past ingroup harm doing. Collective nostalgia was associated with lower collective guilt especially after reminders of America's harm doing in Study 1 . In Study 2 we predicted and showed that reminders of American harm doing would evoke spontaneous collective nostalgia for participants high in national glorification. The remaining studies tested the hypothesis that collective nostalgia serves to buffer collective guilt. Collective guilt was lower after reminders of past harm doing for participants who engaged in collective nostalgia ( Study 3 ), and this was especially pronounced for participants high in national glorification ( Study 4 ).     

群体内疚:界定、心理机制、行动倾向及干预策略

当个体认为内群体为外群体受到的不道德伤害负有责任时会体验到群体内疚。该情绪常见的触发情境包括过往历史的伤害事件、当下的群际冲突、不公正的社会关系及未来的伤害事件。群体认同、内群体责任和不当性评估是影响群体内疚产生的三大心理机制。群体内疚会导致施害群体对受害群体表现出积极行动,如友善态度,冲突和解、群体补偿及群际支持。通过群体肯定、自我肯定、促进共同认同、强调内群体责任及展现已有补偿行为等干预策略可以引发施害群体的群体内疚。未来的研究应澄清群体内疚的成因机制,进一步探索群体内疚与补偿行为间的作用关系。     

With or without you: The paradoxical role of identification in predicting joint and ingroup collective action in intergroup conflict

While we have a rich understanding of the motivations of disadvantaged group members to act collectively with their group, especially the important role played by identification, we know less about the disadvantaged's motivations to engage in joint action with the advantaged. This research examines the role of identification in predicting joint and ingroup collective action in intergroup conflicts. Since joint action inherently diffuses the perception of “us versus them”, we propose that identification predicts ingroup action, but not joint action. We also examine conflict intensity as a moderator, and examine how changing identification is linked to change in support for joint action. We test these hypotheses in a three-wave longitudinal study in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Results support our hypotheses, demonstrating that identification positively predicts ingroup action but not necessarily joint action, and that when conflict intensifies, changes in identification are negatively related to joint action with outgroup members.     

Righteous or self‐righteous anger? Justice sensitivity moderates defensive outrage at a third‐party harm‐doer

While bystanders' outrage over moral transgressions may represent a genuine desire to restore justice, such expressions can also be self‐serving—alleviating guilt and bolstering one's moral status. Four studies examined whether individual differences in observer justice sensitivity (JS_O) moderate the degree to which outrage at third‐party harm‐doing reflects concerns about one's own moral identity rather than justice per se. Among participants low (vs. high) in JS_O, feelings of guilt predicted greater outrage and desire to punish a corporation's sweatshop labor practices (Studies 1 & 2). Furthermore, affirming one's personal moral identity reduced outrage and support for punishing a corporate harm‐doer among those low, but not high in JS_O (Studies 3 & 4). Similar moderation was absent for other forms of justice sensitivity and just world beliefs. Effects were not explained by negative affect, empathy, personal harm, or political orientation. Results suggest that JS_O uniquely differentiates defensive and justice‐driven moral outrage (150/150).     

Recounting the wages of self-appraised sinfulness: a research note on divorce,cohabitation, and guilt

This study examines the conditional effects of self-appraised sinfulness for divorce and cohabitation on feelings of guilt among Guam's predominantly Roman Catholic, Asian-Pacific population. Self-appraised sinfulness is a form of stigma resulting from one's internalization of religious doctrine and also indicates the strength of an individual's theological belief. Due to Guam's apparent acceptance of cohabitation and the non-acceptance of divorce by the Catholic Church, we predicted that the effects of sinful self-appraisal would result in greater feelings of guilt for divorced respondents and significantly lower feelings of guilt for cohabiting respondents. Our tests supported our predictions. The implications of our findings for theory and future research are also discussed.     

Plural Action Sentences and Logical Form: Reply to Himmelreich

This paper replies to Himmelreich's ‘The Paraphrase Argument Against Collective Actions’ [2017], which presents three putative counterexamples to the multiple agents analysis of plural action sentences. The paper shows that the argument from the first example, the discursive dilemma, fails because it relies crucially on a simplification of the target analysis, and that the others don't bear on the question because they turn out on examination to be about individual rather than group action sentences.     

The exemplary social emotion guilt: Not so relationship-oriented when another person repairs for you

Guilt is considered by many researchers to be the hallmark social emotion. Guilt theories perceive guilt to be a negative emotion with positive interpersonal consequences, and empirical research has shown guilt to motivate prosocial behaviours aimed at restoring the relationship with one's victims. The current research questions the relationship-oriented nature of this emotion. Five experiments reveal that when a person repairs the transgressor's damage caused to a victim, the transgressor's guilt feelings, reparative intentions, and prosocial behaviour decrease. These findings suggest that it is not the relationship with the victim that is important in the regulation of guilt feelings, but rather the reparative actions that have been undertaken. Implications for theory and behavioural research on guilt are discussed.     

Guilt and Child Soldiers

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child soldiers experience are not self-censure; rather their guilt arises from their attempts to come to terms with what they see as their own morally ambiguous motives. Their guilt is appropriate because it reaffirms their commitment to morality and facilitates their self-forgiveness.     

Shaping feelings in cyberspace: The case of Chinese seafarer-partners

Research has shown that expressing feelings online is subject to feeling rules much like those that govern offline environments. ‘Expressing feelings’, however, is different from ‘feeling feelings’. Does emotional interaction online change how individuals feel and, if so, in what ways? This paper addresses the question by examining a group of Chinese seafarer-partners' activities in an online group. Drawing upon emotion management theory, this paper shows that seafarer-partners in the group helped each other to reframe negative experiences in positive ways in order to suppress unpleasant feelings. It also reveals a corollary process of online emotion-shaping, namely, boosting positive feelings, by drawing upon the concept of collective effervescence. Both processes served to make seafarer-partners feel positive about their relationships. This paper thus extends previous research findings by demonstrating that online support also serves to shape how individuals feel and does so through two processes.     

Alignment and commitment in joint action

Important work on alignment systems has been applied to philosophical work on joint action by Tollefsen and Dale. This paper builds from and expands on their work. The first aim of the paper is to spell out how the empirical research on alignment may be integrated into philosophical theories of joint action. The second aim is then to develop a successful characterization of joint action, which spells out the difference between genuine joint action and simpler forms of coordination based on alignment. I begin by introducing the empirical research and two definitions of joint action. I then argue that instead of using this research in conjunction with Searle’s account of collective intentionality, as Tollefsen and Dale suggest, we would be better served by applying this research to Gilbert’s account of plural subjects. In the final sections I distinguish between alignment, coordination, and joint action, clarify the roles of joint commitment and sub-personal alignment in joint action, and argue that these concepts are both consistent and mutually supportive. Combining these two research programs gives us an account of joint action that does justice to both the empirical and philosophical research.     

When feeling bad makes you look good: Guilt,shame, and person perception

In two studies, we examined how expressions of guilt and shame affected person perception. In the first study, participants read an autobiographical vignette in which the writer did something wrong and reported feeling either guilt, shame, or no emotion. The participants then rated the writer's motivations, beliefs, and traits, as well as their own feelings toward the writer. The person expressing feelings of guilt or shame was perceived more positively on a number of attributes, including moral motivation and social attunement, than the person who reported feeling no emotion. In the second study, the writer of the vignette reported experiencing (or not experiencing) cognitive and motivational aspects of guilt or shame. Expressing a desire to apologise (guilt) or feelings of worthlessness (private shame) resulted in more positive impressions than did reputational concerns (public shame) or a lack of any of these feelings. Our results indicate that verbal expressions of moral emotions such as guilt and shame influence perception of moral character as well as likeability.     

Fear and guilt in proposers: Using emotions to explain offers in ultimatum bargaining

We argue that offers in bargaining are guided by the emotions that proposers anticipate when contemplating their offers. In particular, we reason that positive offers may be driven by fear and guilt, where fear is more related to the perceived consequences of having one's offer rejected, and guilt is more related to concerns for the opponents' outcomes. Two studies on ultimatum bargaining corroborate this view. In Study 1, we used two well‐documented manipulations to affect the consequences of having one's offer rejected and the initial entitlements of one's opponent. Both factors affected offers: Offers were higher when the consequences of having one's offer rejected were lower, and when the initial entitlements of one's opponent were higher. In agreement with our predictions, the former effect was mediated by anticipated fear and the latter by anticipated guilt. In Study 2, we directly manipulated both mediators. The findings further corroborate our reasoning by showing that both feelings also have a direct effect on ultimatum offers. These findings highlight the potential contribution of studying specific emotions in bargaining behavior. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moral duty or moral defence? The effects of perceiving shared humanity with the victims of ingroup perpetrated harm

Previous theory and research suggests that perceiving shared humanity with others should be a positive force for intergroup relations. The present research considers the alternative possibility, that notions of shared humanity might protect people from feelings of guilt over ingroup perpetrated harm by obscuring the ingroup's unique role in these events. Consistent with this idea, Study 1 (N = 58) found that perceiving shared humanity with a harmed outgroup was associated with less guilt and stronger expectations of forgiveness among members of the perpetrator group. Study 2 (N = 52) demonstrated that these effects only occurred when the moral integrity of the ingroup was open to question. When ingroup morality was instead secure, defensive use of humanity was not apparent. Together, these studies suggest that perceiving harmful ingroup actions as ‘only human’ can sometimes be a moral defence that absolves group members of feelings of responsibility for wrongdoing. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

当抗议遭遇挫折:集体行动失利情境下情绪反应对行动意愿的作用

在集体行动发展过程中,新的群际互动事件会对参与者心理及行为产生重要影响。本研究采取调查问卷与实验情境设计相结合的方法,考察了集体行动失利情境下参与者情绪体验对其未来行动意愿的影响,以及群体认同与群体效能对情绪的作用机制。研究结果显示:1)集体行动的消极结果会引发参与者愤怒与沮丧情绪体验,且愤怒情绪对其未来行动意愿有正向预测作用,沮丧情绪对其未来行动意愿有负向预测作用;2)群体认同与群体效能会影响群体成员因集体行动失利而产生的愤怒感与沮丧感,参与者对内群体的认同感越强,效能评估越高,在集体行动遭遇挫败时体验到的愤怒感就越强,体验到的沮丧感就越弱。本研究扩展了集体行动的情绪研究取向,并为探讨集体行动的动态演变提供了新的研究思路。