Olfactory cues are more effective than visual cues in experimentally triggering autobiographical memories

Folk wisdom often refers to odours as potent triggers for autobiographical memory, akin to the Proust phenomenon that describes Proust’s sudden recollection of a childhood memory when tasting a madeleine dipped into tea. Despite an increasing number of empirical studies on the effects of odours on cognition, conclusive evidence is still missing. We set out to examine the effectiveness of childhood and non-childhood odours as retrieval cues for autobiographical memories in a lab experiment. A total of 170 participants were presented with pilot-tested retrieval cues (either odours or images) to recall childhood memories and were then asked to rate the vividness, detail, and emotional intensity of these memories. Results showed that participants indeed reported richer memories when presented with childhood-related odours than childhood-related images or childhood-unrelated odours or images. An exploratory analysis of memory content with Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count did not reveal differences in affective content. The findings of this study support the notion that odours are particularly potent in eliciting rich memories and open up numerous avenues for further exploration.     

Memory conjunction errors for autobiographical events: more than just familiarity

Two diary studies investigated the prevalence of memory conjunction errors for real-life events. In both studies, participants completed detailed diary pages over the course of several weeks. Participants in both diary studies committed memory conjunction errors on a later recognition memory test. In the second diary study participants also made remember/know judgements. For a large proportion of their memory conjunction errors participants indicated that they "remembered" the event occurring in that context. These diary studies demonstrate that memory conjunction errors do occur for autobiographical memories, and these errors can seem compelling.     

Language is never enough: memories are more than words reveal

In this commentary I discuss the work by Fivush and Schwarzmueller (1998) including some methodological limitations to their study. It is perhaps because of these limitations that the data do not provide support for their linguistic hypothesis concerning the onset of autobiographical memory. The data do, however, address important issues in the study of autobiographical memory, particularly in terms of very long-term retention and reconstruction of unique (and perhaps distinctive) events that are pleasant. This is a welcome change from the typical studies of recall of distinctive life events in which the target event is one that revolves around unpleasant medical procedures. Future research efforts should continue along these lines, although alternative suggestions are made for which theoretical issues need to be addressed and new measures developed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory conjunction errors for autobiographical events: More than just familiarity

Two diary studies investigated the prevalence of memory conjunction errors for real‐life events. In both studies, participants completed detailed diary pages over the course of several weeks. Participants in both diary studies committed memory conjunction errors on a later recognition memory test. In the second diary study participants also made remember/know judgements. For a large proportion of their memory conjunction errors participants indicated that they “remembered” the event occurring in that context. These diary studies demonstrate that memory conjunction errors do occur for autobiographical memories, and these errors can seem compelling.     

Manipulating cues in involuntary autobiographical memory: Verbal cues are more effective than pictorial cues

In two experiments, pictorial cues were compared with their verbal labels to assess their effectiveness in eliciting involuntary autobiographical memories. Cues were relatively complex in Experiment 1 (e.g., relaxing on a beach) and simple objects in Experiment 2 (e.g., a ball). In both experiments, participants went through a vigilance task in which they were presented with frequent nontarget and rare target visual stimuli. Pictures or their corresponding verbal labels were also displayed on both target and nontarget stimuli, but participants were told that these were irrelevant to the task. They were asked to interrupt the vigilance task whenever they became aware of task-unrelated mental contents and to report them. In both experiments, more involuntary memories were elicited in the verbal cue condition, rather than in the pictorial cue condition. This result is discussed in relation to previous work that highlighted the greater effectiveness of verbal cues in memory tasks.     

Animates are better remembered than inanimates: further evidence from word and picture stimuli

In three experiments, we showed that animate entities are remembered better than inanimate entities. Experiment 1 revealed better recall for words denoting animate than inanimate items. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with the use of pictures. In Experiment 3, we found better recognition for animate than for inanimate words. Importantly, we also found a higher recall rate of “remember” than of “know” responses for animates, whereas the recall rates were similar for the two types of responses for inanimate items. This finding suggests that animacy enhances not only the quantity but also the quality of memory traces, through the recall of contextual details of previous experiences (i.e., episodic memory). Finally, in Experiment 4, we tested whether the animacy effect was due to animate items being richer in terms of sensory features than inanimate items. The findings provide further evidence for the functionalist view of memory championed by Nairne and coworkers (Nairne, 2010; Nairne & Pandeirada, Cognitive Psychology, 61:1–22, 2010a, 2010b).     

Telling and the remembered self: linguistic differences in memories for previously disclosed and previously undisclosed events

Prior work suggests that disclosing experiences may provide people with more distance, more positive emotion, greater cognitive elaboration, and greater certainty regarding those experiences. Two studies (n=58 undergraduates and n=123 community-living adults) examined linguistic indicators of such differences between previously disclosed and previously undisclosed memories elicited on subsequent, solitary occasions using the LIWC text analysis program (Pennebaker & Francis, 1999). Disclosure was associated with differences in the linguistic features of subsequent memories. Potential mechanisms and implications of those differences are discussed.     

Angry faces are more resistant to forgetting than are happy faces: directed forgetting effects on the identity of emotional faces

Using the item-method directed forgetting paradigm (i.e. intentionally forgetting specified information), we examined directed forgetting of facial identity as a function of facial expression and the sex of the expresser and perceiver. Participants were presented with happy and angry male and female faces cued for either forgetting or remembering, and were then asked to recognise previously studied faces from among a series of neutral faces. For each recognised test face, participants also recalled the face’s previously displayed emotional expression. We found that angry faces were more resistant to forgetting than were happy faces. Furthermore, angry expressions on male faces and happy expressions on female faces were recognised and recalled better than vice versa. Signal detection analyses revealed that male faces gave rise to a greater sensitivity than female faces did, and male participants, but not female participants, showed greater sensitivity to male faces than to female faces. Several theoretical implications are discussed.     

Infant discrimination of faces in naturalistic events: actions are more salient than faces

Despite the fact that faces are typically seen in the context of dynamic events, there is little research on infants' perception of moving faces. L. E. Bahrick, L. J. Gogate, and I. Ruiz (2002) demonstrated that 5-month-old infants discriminate and remember repetitive actions but not the faces of the women performing the actions. The present research tested an attentional salience explanation for these findings: that dynamic faces are discriminable to infants, but more salient actions compete for attention. Results demonstrated that 5-month-old infants discriminated faces in the context of actions when they had longer familiarization time (Experiment 1) and following habituation to a single person performing 3 different activities (Experiment 2). Further, 7-month-old infants who have had more experience with social events also discriminated faces in the context of actions. Overall, however, discrimination of actions was more robust and occurred earlier in processing time than discrimination of dynamic faces. These findings support an attentional salience hypothesis and indicate that faces are not special in the context of actions in early infancy.     

Defending or relinquishing belief in occurrence for remembered events that are challenged: A social-cognitive model

We describe a social-cognitive model explaining processing of cognitive dissonance resulting from being told by someone that a vividly remembered event did not actually occur. The model proposes that receiving challenges to one's recollection of events results in both intrapersonal and interpersonal cognitive dissonance. Rememberers process intrapersonal dissonance by weighing features of memory representations against the qualities of the feedback, and they process interpersonal elements by weighing the potential costs of agreeing or disagreeing with the challenger within the social dynamics of the relationship. To resolve the dissonance, people will either maintain or reduce belief in occurrence for the event, and will agree or disagree with the challenger. We explore factors that can influence dissonance and how they impact the rememberers' beliefs in occurrence of the event and their interaction with challengers in terms of defending or relinquishing their memory, and we discuss preliminary data confirming some of these factors.     

A comparison of dimensional models of emotion: Evidence from emotions,prototypical events,autobiographical memories,and words

The intensity and valence of 30 emotion terms, 30 events typical of those emotions, and 30 autobiographical memories cued by those emotions were each rated by different groups of 40 undergraduates. A vector model gave a consistently better account of the data than a circumplex model, both overall and in the absence of high-intensity, neutral valence stimuli. The Positive Activation – Negative Activation (PANA) model could be tested at high levels of activation, where it is identical to the vector model. The results replicated when ratings of arousal were used instead of ratings of intensity for the events and autobiographical memories. A reanalysis of word norms gave further support for the vector and PANA models by demonstrating that neutral valence, high-arousal ratings resulted from the averaging of individual positive and negative valence ratings. Thus, compared to a circumplex model, vector and PANA models provided overall better fits.     

Neutral details associated with emotional events are encoded: evidence from a cued recall paradigm

Enhanced emotional memory often comes at the cost of memory for surrounding background information. Narrowed-encoding theories suggest that this is due to narrowed attention for emotional information at encoding, leading to impaired encoding of background information. Recent work has suggested that an encoding-based theory may be insufficient. Here, we examined whether cued recall—instead of previously used recognition memory tasks—would reveal evidence that non-emotional information associated with emotional information was effectively encoded. Participants encoded positive, negative, or neutral objects on neutral backgrounds. At retrieval, they were given either the item or the background as a memory cue and were asked to recall the associated scene element. Counter to narrowed-encoding theories, emotional items were more likely than neutral items to trigger recall of the associated background. This finding suggests that there is a memory trace of this contextual information and that emotional cues may facilitate retrieval of this information.     

Children’s autobiographical memories across the years: Forensic implications of childhood amnesia and eyewitness memory for stressful events

This is a review of two bodies of research conducted by myself and my colleagues that is relevant to child witness issues, namely childhood amnesia and children’s eyewitness memory for stressful events. Although considerable research over the years has investigated the phenomenon of childhood amnesia in adults, only recently has it begun to be investigated in children. For them, the age of earliest memory is a moving target over their early years. However, there is nonetheless both variation between children in how early their first memories are as well as variation between memories in terms of likelihood of being retained, and some factors influencing both are explored. In terms of eyewitness memory for stressful events, 2–13-year-old children who had been injured seriously enough to require emergency room medical treatment were interviewed. Long-term memory for these stressful events was traced, and factors influencing that retention were investigated. The findings from both areas of research have implications for developmental forensic psychology.     

Humble persons are more helpful than less humble persons: Evidence from three studies

Connections between humility and other prosocial qualities led us to develop a humility–helpfulness hypothesis. In three studies, humble persons were more helpful than less humble persons. In Study 1, participants (n?=?117) completed self-report measures of humility, the Big Five, and helpfulness. In Study 2, participants (n?=?90) completed an implicit measure of humility and were presented with an unexpected opportunity to help someone in need. In Study 3, participants (n?=?103) completed self-report and implicit measures of humility and were presented a similar helping opportunity. Humility and helpfulness correlated positively when personality and impression management were controlled. Humble participants helped more than did less humble participants even when agreeableness and desirable responding were statistically controlled. Further, implicit humility uniquely predicted helping behavior in an altruistic motivation condition.     

Visual search for schematic emotional faces: Angry faces are more than crosses

Recent studies of the face in the crowd effect, the faster detection of angry than of happy faces in visual search, suggest that for schematic faces it reflects on perceptual features like inward pointing lines rather than on emotional expressions. Removing a potential confound, Experiments 1–2 replicate the preferential detection of stimuli with inward pointing lines, but Experiment 2a indicates that a surrounding circle is required for the effect to emerge. Experiments 3–7 failed to find evidence for faster detection of schematic faces comprising only the elements critical for the faster detection of angry faces according to a low level visual feature account, inward tilted brows and upturned mouth. Faster detection of anger was evident if eyes or eyes and noses were added, but only if their placement was consistent with the first order relations among these elements in a human face. Drawing the critical elements in thicker, higher contrast lines also led to an anger advantage, but this was smaller than that seen for the complete faces. The present results suggest that, while able to support faster target detection, a prevalence of inward pointing lines is not sufficient to explain the detection advantage of angry schematic faces.     

Two spatial memories are not better than one: evidence of exclusivity in memory for object location

This paper studies the dynamics of attempting to access two spatial memories simultaneously and its implications for the accuracy of recall. Experiment 1 demonstrates in a range of conditions that two cues pointing to different experiences of the same object location produce little or no higher recall than that observed with a single cue. Experiment 2 confirms this finding in a within-subject design where both cues have previously elicited recall. Experiment 3 shows that these findings are only consistent with a model in which two representations of the same object location are mutually exclusive at both encoding and retrieval, and inconsistent with models that assume information from both representations is available. We propose that these representations quantify directionally specific judgments of location relative to specific anchor points in the stimulus; a format that precludes the parallel processing of like representations. Finally, we consider the apparent paradox of how such representations might contribute to the acquisition of spatial knowledge from multiple experiences of the same stimuli.     

Dreams are more negative than real life: Implications for the function of dreaming

Dream content studies have revealed that dream experiences are negatively biased; negative dream contents are more frequent than corresponding positive dream contents. It is unclear, however, whether the bias is real or due to biased sampling, i.e., selective memory for intense negative emotions. The threat simulation theory (TST) claims that the negativity bias is real and reflects the evolved biological function of dreaming. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis of the TST that threatening events are overrepresented in dreams, i.e., more frequent and more severe in dreams than in real life. To control for biased sampling, we used as a baseline the corresponding negative events in real life rather than the corresponding positive events in dreams. We collected dream reports (N=419) and daily event logs (N=490) from 39 university students during a two-week period, and interviewed them about real threat experiences retrievable from autobiographical memory (N=714). Threat experiences proved to be much more frequent and severe in dreams than in real life, and Current Dream Threats more closely resembled Past than Current Real Threats. We conclude that the TST's predictions hold, and that the negativity bias is real.