Causal decision theory

On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically, whether Harry is bald. In other words, vagueness is a type of indeterminacy. On the standard alternative, vagueness is a type of ignorance: if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then, even though it is metaphysically settled whether Harry is bald, we cannot know whether Harry is bald. On my view, vagueness is neither a type of indeterminacy nor a type of ignorance. Rather, it is sui generis.     

论亚里士多德的善

善是存在的本体。它是幸福。最完美的幸福是沉思。对于这种活动,人们不能够言说（称赞）。善是好。好是主体的私意的表达。这意味着善依据于主体的自愿、私意,并能够带来欢乐。善是真它陈述了现象的关系。真仅仅关注现象而不是作为存在的真正的善因此,真的善其实并不真。     

《老子》形而上学研究

善是道德价值。它是私意的表达。因此,《老子》认为,善恶是非不分,需要破除。言即知识,是对事实的陈述。它有所限定,即局限性,彼此有别,因此也要放弃。有即万物。有具有主体性。有即现象,为假,不是事物的本来。事物的本来即道。作为本来的道,即本、即生。作为本的道是某种可能性,故不可说。作为生的道,未能成形,故不可说。道不可道。假的有、巧的真、善的名都遮蔽了道：事物的本来。故需要反,即还原。     

Practical Skepticism and the Reasons for Action

There is nearly universal agreement that coercion is an evil. Even when it is necessary to avoid a greater evil or to attain some good, it is still a necessary evil. There is also nearly universal agreement that, other things being equal, one ought not to exercise coercion. Here the agreement ends. There is little agreement about just when coercion is justified. More surprisingly, there is little agreement about what coercion is. This latter controversy is more fundamental, and this paper is an attempt to shed some light on it.     

The Virtue of Epistemological Dualism

The article tries to answer the following question: what is the most promising epistemological strategy if my objective is the construction of a theory which gives me the opportunity to decrease the risk of getting to what is actually absolute, that is, to irreversible negative actions (irreversible as a theory might not be, but as an action often is)? The answer proposed is a form of epistemological dualism which means that I metaphysically believe (that is, I programmatically and systematically believe, without certainly knowing it) that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is dualistic. More specifically, I metaphysically believe that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is not saturated: in any theory there is an ideal error, because there is no theory which is totally saturated by reality, and any reality can actualize the ideal error, because there is no reality which is totally saturated by theory.     

The value problem and the nature of knowledge

Jason Baehr has argued that the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to motivate the value problem in epistemology. What he calls the “guiding intuition” is not completely general: our intuition does not reveal that knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and not strictly formal: the intuition is not merely the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. If he is right, the value problem (as we know it) is not a real problem. I will argue in this paper that he is wrong about the generality claim: knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and yet he is right about the formality claim—there is more to the intuition than just the abstract claim that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. What this amounts to, I will argue, is that there is still a value problem but that the guiding intuition can tell us how to solve it.     

Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.     

Two Conceptions of the Physical

The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception , it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object-based conception , it is plausible that (3) is true and (2) is false. the paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy.     

It's Personal—Or Not At All: On God as Love/r

Abstract : Henriksen discusses what it means that God is personal, with special regard to the claim that God is love. If God is love, God must be understood as personal. This approach is related to different elements concerning human life and human freedom, and how to engage in human life. Also the radical alternative is suggested: instead of understanding God as love, the alternative is considered that death is God (as the final and strongest power there is). This alternative shows that it is the most likely interpretation of actual human conduct to opt for the alternative that God is love. Hence, to understand God as love is part of what it means to relate humanely and with hope to what is taking place in human life.     

Cognition and motivation in emotion

The role of cognition--and to some extent motivation--in emotion, the ways meaning is generated, unconscious appraising, and the implications of this way of thinking for life-span development are addressed. It is argued that appraisal is a necessary as well as sufficient cause of emotion and that knowledge is necessary but not sufficient. This position is examined in light of what is known about emotions in infants and young children, the effects of drugs on acute emotions and moods, and recent patterns of thought about the brain in emotions. The discussion of how meaning is generated is the core of the article. Automatic processing without awareness is contrasted with deliberate and conscious processing, and the concept of resonance between an animal's needs and what is encountered in the environment is examined. The idea that there is more than one way meaning is achieved strengthens and enriches the case for the role of appraisal in emotion and allows the consideration of what is meant by unconscious and preconscious appraisal and the examination of how they might work.     

Men Under Scrutiny

It is a burning of the heart that I want; it is this burning that is everything, more precious than the empire of the world, because it calls God secretly in the night. —Rumi

A man who is not on fire is nothing; he is ridiculous, he is two-dimensional. He must be on fire even if he does make a fool of himself. A flame must burn somewhere, otherwise no light shines, there is no warmth, there is nothing. —C.G. Jung     

A Counterexample to A

The Direct Argument is an important argument for demonstrating that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism because it makes no presuppositions about the nature of free will. One of the inference rules employed in the Direct Argument is rule A: If a proposition is broadly logically necessary, then it is true and no one is, nor ever has been, even partially morally responsible for the fact that the proposition is true. While inference rule A is assumed by all parties to the debate, I demonstrate that the rule is invalid.     

Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?

On two standard views of vagueness, vagueness as to whether Harry is bald entails that nobody knows whether Harry is bald—either because vagueness is a type of missing truth, and so there is nothing to know, or because vagueness is a type of ignorance, and so even though there is a truth of the matter, nobody can know what that truth is. Vagueness as to whether Harry is bald does entail that nobody clearly knows that Harry is bald and that nobody clearly knows that Harry is not bald. But it does not entail that nobody knows that Harry is bald or that nobody knows that Harry is not bald. Hence, the two standard views of vagueness are mistaken.     

Thompson's Margaret Thatcher illusion: when inversion fails

It is argued that the whole face is more dominant than the individual features. In the case of a jumbled face the external pattern is dominant when a face is upright, whereas the internal pattern is dominant when a face is inverted.     

The origin of the after-effect of movement

Previous experimental work on the origin of the after-effect of seen movement is discussed and the relevance of the argument from transfer, which is generally used to demonstrate that the effect is central, is brought into question. The problem is reformulated in terms of whether a retinal contribution is necessary throughout the aftereffect and experiments are described which support the hypothesis that it is necessary. It is suggested that perception of the movement after-effect also involves normal movement perception, which itself is dependent on the integrity of cerebral functioning.     

A family of Gödel hybrid logics

In this paper, we define a family of fuzzy hybrid logics that are based on Gödel logic. It is composed of two infinite-valued versions called ${\mathsf{GH}}_{\infty }$ and ${\mathsf{WGH}}_{\infty }$, and a sequence of finitary valued versions ${({\mathsf{GH}}_n)}_{0<n<\infty }$. We define decision procedures for both ${\mathsf{WGH}}_{\infty }$ and ${({\mathsf{GH}}_n)}_{0<n<\infty }$ that are based on particular sequents and on a set of proof rules dealing with such sequents. As these rules are strongly invertible the procedures naturally allow one to generate countermodels. Therefore we prove the decidability and the finite model property for these logics. Finally, from the decision procedure of ${\mathsf{WGH}}_{\infty }$, we design a sound and complete sequent calculus for this logic.