Sometimes a noun is just a noun: comments on Bird, Howard, and Franklin (2000)

Bird, Howard, and Franklin (2000) have proposed a semantic-conceptual explanation of grammatical category-specific deficits that attributes impairments in noun and verb processing to two distinct mechanisms. According to their account, apparent deficits in verb production are not category specific, but rather result from the lower imageability of verbs compared to concrete nouns. Noun deficits are said to result from differences in the distribution of semantic feature types such that damage to sensory features results in disproportionate impairments in naming nouns, especially animate nouns, compared to verbs. However, this hypothesis, which we call the "extended sensory/functional theory" (ESFT), fails on several counts. First, the assumption that representations of living things are more heavily freighted with sensory features than are those of nonliving objects does not have any reliable empirical basis. Second, the ESFT incorrectly predicts associations between deficits in processing sensory features and living things or functional features and nonliving things. Finally, there are numerous cases of patients with grammatical category-specific deficits that do not seem to be consistent with damage at the semantic level. All of this suggests that the ESFT is not a useful model for considering grammatical (or semantic) category-specific deficits.     

Why g is not an adaptation: a comment on Kanazawa (2004)

In S. Kanazawa's evolutionary theory of general intelligence (g), g is presented as a species-typical information-processing mechanism. This conceptualization of g departs radically from the accepted conceptualization of g as a source of individual differences that is manifest in the positive manifold. Kanazawa's theory is thus problematic in the sense that it concerns a purely hypothetical, and empirically unsupported, conceptualization of g. The authors argue that an evolutionary account of g should address it as a source of individual differences--that is, in a manner that is consistent with the empirical support for g.     

Specific-word frequency is not all that counts in speech production: comments on Caramazza,Costa, et al. (2001) and new experimental data

A. Caramazza, A. Costa, M. Miozzo, and Y. Bi (2001) reported a series of experiments demonstrating that the ease of producing a word depends only on the frequency of that specific word but not on the frequency of a homophone twin. A. Caramazza, A. Costa, et al. concluded that homophones have separate word form presentations and that the absence of frequency-inheritance effects for homophones undermines an important argument in support of 2-stage models of lexical access, which assume that syntactic (lemma) representations mediate between conceptual and phonological representations. The authors of this article evaluate the empirical basis of this conclusion, report 2 experiments demonstrating a frequency-inheritance effect, and discuss other recent evidence. It is concluded that homophones share a common word form and that the distinction between lemmas and word forms should be upheld.     

God is not a person (an argument via pantheism)

This paper transforms a development of an argument against pantheism into an objection to the usual account of God within contemporary analytic philosophy (’Swinburnian theism’). A standard criticism of pantheism has it that pantheists cannot offer a satisfactory account of God as personal. My paper will develop this criticism along two lines: first, that personhood requires contentful mental states, which in turn necessitate the membership of a linguistic community, and second that personhood requires limitation within a wider context constitutive of the ’setting’ of the agent’s life. Pantheism can, I argue, satisfy neither criterion of personhood. At this point the tables are turned on the Swinburnian theist. If the pantheist cannot defend herself against the personhood-based attacks, neither can the Swinburnian, and for instructively parallel reasons: for neither doctrine is God in the material world; in the pantheist case God is identical with the world, in the Swinburnian case God transcends it. Either way both the pantheist and the Swinburnian are left with a dilemma: abandon divine personhood or modify the doctrine of God so as to block the move to personhood.

     

Multiple schedule component duration: a reanalysis of Shimp and Wheatley (1971) and Todorov (1972)

The tendency for relative response rate to approach matching as multiple schedule component duration decreases has been interpreted as confirming a prediction of Herrnstein's multiple schedule equation. However, the equation predicts that absolute response rate will decrease in both multiple schedule components as component duration decreases. The absolute response-rate data of two studies of component duration do not support this prediction; absolute rate either increased or remained relatively constant.     

Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable

We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non‐derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation for truth's inferiority is that it is not really an intrinsic good at all. It is intrinsically neutral.     

Attention capture while switching search strategies: Evidence for a breakdown in top-down attentional control

Whereas capture experiments typically repeat a single task many times, real world cognition is characterized by frequent switching. Lien, Ruthruff, and Johnston (2010) reported that the attentional control system can rapidly and fully switch between different search settings (e.g., red to green), with no carryover and no intertrial priming. The present study examined whether this impressive flexibility is possible even when the switch is not between different features along the same dimension, but between mutually incompatible search modes. On each trial, participants were prompted to find and identify the letter that was in a specific colour (feature search mode) or was uniquely coloured (singleton search mode). Within each block, search mode was either pure or mixed; the mixed blocks contained a fixed AABB search sequence (singleton-singleton-feature-feature) in Experiment 1 and a random sequence in Experiment 2. The target display was preceded by a noninformative cue display containing a nontarget colour singleton. In pure feature search blocks, these irrelevant singleton cues were generally unable to capture attention, replicating previous findings of “contingent capture”. In mixed blocks, however, irrelevant colour singletons captured attention on feature search trials. This breakdown indicates a limitation in the sharpness of attentional control following mode switches, which might be common in the real world.     

On choosing between movement sequences: comments on Rose (1988)

One method of investigating human motor programming is to determine how the choice reaction time for a memorized response sequence depends on the composition of that sequence as well as the other sequence that may be required. Using this method, Rose (1988) found that the total number of responses in the two possible response sequences predicts the choice reaction time to initiate either one. On the basis of this result, Rose claimed that the hierarchical editor (HED) model of motor programming, developed by Rosenbaum, Inhoff, and Gordon (1984), may have to be reevaluated. In this commentary I argue that Rose's results are inconsistent with a precursor of the HED model, not with the HED model itself, that the HED model actually provides a better fit to Rose's data than her total-number-of-responses model, that in general, choice reaction time does not increase with the total number of possible responses, and that structural relations between alternative movement sequences are the main determinants of choice reaction time. Taken as a whole, the results suggest that possible responses are not held in completely readied form before being selected for execution. A further implication is that the storage capacity of the motor output buffer (the MOB) is extremely limited.     

Old processes,new perspectives: Familiarity is correlated with (not independent of) recollection and is more (not equally) variable for targets than for lures

According to dual-process models of memory, recognition is subserved by two processes: recollection and familiarity. Many variants of these models assume that recollection and familiarity make stochastically independent contributions to performance in recognition tasks and that the variance of the familiarity signal is equal for targets and for lures. Here, we challenge these ‘common-currency’ assumptions. Using a model-comparison approach, featuring the Continuous Dual Process (CDP; Wixted & Mickes, 2010) model as the protagonist, we show that when these assumptions are relaxed, the model’s fits to individual participants’ data improve. Furthermore, our analyses reveal that across items, recollection and familiarity show a positive correlation. Interestingly, this across-items correlation was dissociated from an across-participants correlation between the sensitivities of these processes. We also find that the familiarity signal is significantly more variable for targets than for lures. One striking theoretical implication of these findings is that familiarity—rather than recollection, as most models assume—may be the main contributor responsible for one of the most influential findings of recognition memory, that of subunit zROC slopes. Additionally, we show that erroneously adopting the common-currency assumptions, introduces severe biases to estimates of recollection and familiarity.     

Aging, focus switching, and task switching in a continuous calculation task: evidence toward a new working memory control process

This study examined switching of the focus of attention in working memory in relation to global task switching in a continuous calculation task using two rules (midpoint and up-and-down) in a group of 25 younger adults and a group of 23 older adults. Age differences emerged in accuracy when participants worked on two strings simultaneously (necessitating a focus switch); focus switching did not interact with age in the response time domain. No age differences were obtained for global task switching. Ex-Gaussian decomposition showed a shift due to focus switching in all parameters, but a shift in leading edge only for task switching. The results suggest that task switching and focus switching rely on different processes, and that there is a specific age-related deficit in focus switching.     

Attention shifts and the Simon effect: a failure to replicate Stoffer (1991)

The Simon effect refers to the intrusion of an irrelevant spatial dimension in the selection of a response to a stimulus. Recently, Stoffer (1991) proposed a specific role for attention orienting in the Simon effect. According to Stoffer, attentional shifts from an initial fixation point to a stimulus location are associated with the generation of a spatial code which specifies the position of the stimulus in relation to the last attended location. This spatial code forms the basis for the Simon effect because it is used to specify the selection of the right or left response. Three experiments were performed to examine further the attention-shift hypothesis forwarded by Stoffer. Experiment 1 was an attempt to replicate Stoffer (1991), but failed to do so. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to optimize conditions for replicating crucial aspects of Stoffer's findings, but also failed to yield support for the attention-shift account.