Catholic Identity in Contemporary Ireland: Belief and Belonging to Tradition1

Holy Catholic Ireland is changing rapidly. Irish Catholics no longer have the same devotion to the Church that their parents had. While institutional affiliation and levels of belief remain high, there has been a decline in practice, particularly in the number going to Mass. This article analyses recent changes in Catholic belief and practice, compares them with trends among other European Catholics, and links them to findings from a qualitative study of Contemporary Irish Identities. The changes in Irish Catholic religiosity can be associated with an ongoing detachment from the institutional church. An orthodox adherence to institutional rules and regulations appears to be giving way to a collective identification with a religious heritage. What was once defined as?á?la carte Catholicism seems to be giving way to a smorgasbord approach in which Catholics not only pick and choose which institutional rules, beliefs, and practices they prefer, but increasingly mix these with ingredients from other religious traditions. These findings suggest a new typology of Irish Catholics.     

信念的组合性与信念的形而上学

20世纪以来,关于信念的形而上学研究,主要有表征主义和倾向论两条基本路径。基于对信念的组合性特征的阐明,一方面,组合性是信念的构成性条件;另一方面,组合性不是信念的构成性条件,因为典型的物理倾向和心理倾向都不具有组合性,而且,一个组合性的倾向谓词不必然谓述一个组合的倾向。因此,在形而上学上,信念不是倾向。进而,考虑到表征主义能够为信念的组合性提供最佳解释,论文主张,信念的组合性特征是支持信念表征主义的有力理由。     

Male Reference Group Identity Dependence: Support for Construct Validity

This research study examined correlates of male identity statuses as postulated in Wade's (1998) theory of male reference group identity dependence. The Reference Group Identity Dependence Scale (RGIDS; Wade & Gelso, 1998) was correlated with measures of identity aspects (personal, social, and collective), belongingness, and a universal-diverse orientation. Based on the responses of 172 predominantly middle-class undergraduate college men (59% White, 15% Asian American or Pacific Islander, 13% African American, 4% Hispanic, and 9% other race/ethnicity, e.g., biracial, Arab American, Egyptian American), as predicted, the No Reference Group status negatively related to collective identity and social connectedness; the Reference Group Dependent status positively related to social identity and social connectedness; and the Reference Group Nondependent status positively related to personal identity, collective identity, social connectedness, and a universal-diverse orientation toward others.     

The Theory of Male Reference Group Identity Dependence: Roles of Social Desirability, Masculinity Ideology, and Collective Identity

Data from 118 college men from the southeastern United States (U.S.) were analyzed using zero-order and partial correlations to test male reference group identity dependence theory’s propositions regarding the relations of male reference group identity attitudes (i.e., no reference group, reference group dependent, reference group nondependent similarity, and reference group nondependent diversity) with traditional masculinity ideology and dimensions of men’s gender-based collective identity (i.e., affirmative evaluation of collective identity, importance of collective identity). Male reference group identity attitudes yielded theoretically-consistent relations with the affirmative evaluation and importance of collective identity. Specifically, the no reference group attitudes were correlated negatively whereas nondependent diversity attitudes were correlated positively with affirmative evaluation; the group dependent attitudes were correlated positively with importance of collective identity; and the nondependent similarity attitudes were correlated positively with both affirmative evaluation of collective identity and the importance of collective identity. This pattern reveals the differential salience of collective identity dimensions in male reference group identity attitudes, suggesting that group dependent attitudes reflect importance of collective identity without an evaluation valence, nondependent diversity attitudes reflect affirmative evaluation whereas the no reference group attitudes reflect nonaffirmative evaluation of collective identity, and nondependent similarity attitudes involve both affirmative evaluation and importance of collective identity. Additional findings added to prior data suggesting reevaluation of the posited role of traditional masculinity ideology in male reference group identity theory. The pattern of findings was not changed by controlling for self-deceptive enhancement and impression management dimensions of social desirability.     

Necessary a Posteriori Identity Truths: Fregeanism Beats Direct Reference Theory

I argue that Fregeanism with respect to proper names—the view that modes of presentation are relevant to the contents of proper names—is able to account for the thesis that there are necessarily true a posteriori identity propositions such as the one expressed in “Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus”, whereas the Direct Reference Theory—according to which the semantic function of certain expressions, e.g., proper names, is only to pick out an object (referent)—is able to deal with only their necessary truth. Thus, at least in so far as necessarily true a posteriori identity propositions are concerned, Fregeanism should be preferred to the Direct Reference Theory.     

Social Identity versus Reference Frame Comparisons: The Moderating Role of Stereotype Endorsement

Two studies tested the prediction that belief in a negative stereotype about an in-group will cause members to shift from viewing their in-group as a social identity to viewing it as a frame of reference. The stereotype that was the focus of inquiry was the belief that women have less aptitude at math and spatial tasks than do men. In both studies, female participants took a test of math and spatial ability and then received social comparison information about their abilities relative to a male and a female confederate. In Study 1, participants felt enhanced when the two women outperformed the male confederate, even when this meant that the participants themselves performed worse than the other woman. If participants were first reminded of the negative stereotype, however, they felt best when they outperformed the other woman, even if this meant that the two women performed worse than the man. Study 2 showed that the effects of stereotype activation were especially pronounced among female participants who showed moderate to high levels of stereotype endorsement. These findings suggest that belief in stereotypes about the in-group can lead to in-group comparison and contrast, even in contexts in which a group member's ability level challenges the validity of the stereotype.     

Associations Between Mixed-Gender Friendships,Gender Reference Group Identity and Substance Use in College Students

We investigated the associations between same-gender friendship, gender reference group identity, and substance use in college students (54 % male, M age?=?19.23, SD?=?1.23) from the northeastern United States using an online survey. Male students reported greater weekly marijuana, but not alcohol use than female students. Regression analyses revealed that having a greater proportion of same-gender friendships was associated with greater weekly alcohol use for male students and lesser weekly alcohol and marijuana use for female students. Gender reference group identity was negatively associated with weekly marijuana use for male and female students. For female students, gender reference group identity mediated the association between proportion of same-gender friendships and weekly marijuana use. Our study highlights the importance of considering the social context (e.g., the gender of friends) and individual variables relating to gender (e.g. gender reference group identity) in substance use research. Our findings fit within social constructionist models of social development that suggest participation in gendered contexts (e.g., same-gender or other-gender-peer contexts) over time cue gender-typed behaviors such as using marijuana.     

Belief and the Error Theory

A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.     

Justified Belief from Unjustified Belief

Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification (JFJ): a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially justified belief that is more permissive and more complex than JFJ.     

Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief

What are the conditions under which suspension of belief—or suspension, for short—is justified? Process reliabilists hold that our beliefs are justified if and only if these are produced or sustained by reliable cognitive processes. But they have said relatively little about suspension. Perhaps they think that we may easily extend an account of justified belief to deal with justified suspension. But it's not immediately clear how we may do so; in which case, evidentialism has a distinct advantage over reliabilism. In this paper, I consider some proposals as to how process reliabilists might seek to account for justified suspension. Although several of these proposals do not work, two are promising. The first such proposal appeals to the notion of propositional justification; the second involves weaving evidentialist elements into reliabilism. I'll argue that the second proposal is better than the first.     

Belief and the basis of meaning

A theory of radical interpretation gives the meanings of all sentences of a language, and can be verified by evidence available to someone who does not understand the language. Such evidence cannot include detailed information concerning the beliefs and intentions of speakers, and therefore the theory must simultaneously interpret the utterances of speakers and specify (some of) his beliefs. Analogies and connections with decision theory suggest the kind of theory that will serve for radical interpretation, and how permissible evidence can support it.     

Belief and aims

Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395?C405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in fact compatible with belief??s genuinely having an aim. I argue, based on consideration of what is involved in pursuing an aim, that Steglich-Petersen??s reply fails. I suggest that the defender of the idea that belief has an aim should instead reject the claim of exclusivity, and I sketch how this can be done.     

Belief and believing

Conclusion This essay has been somewhat programmatic in quality but that is not accidental. It has tried to identify some elements, historical and philosophical, that might provide a context within which an adequate discussion of the concept of belief and its recent diverse employment might be measured. Not very much has been solved, but perhaps some issues have become clearer.