Composition as pattern

Philosophical Studies - I argue for patternism, a new answer to the question of when some objects compose a whole. None of the standard principles of composition comfortably capture our natural...     

Particularism about Composition

Unwilling to adopt the radical ontologies that leading answers to van Inwagen's special composition question imply, Ned Markosian proposes that there is no true, non‐trivial, and finitely long answer to the SCQ. On my usage, this makes Markosian a particularist about composition. I argue that an improved version of Markosian's particularism fails because it cannot explain how sense perception justifies many of the ordinary‐object beliefs we base on it. I further argue that psychologists' research on object perception suggests that general principles govern how we perceptually discriminate unified wholes from mere pluralities, and this narrows the range of answers to the SCQ available to commonsense ontologists.     

Composition and the cases

Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry “foul”. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition (questions about when some things make up another). And ignoring composition is a mistake. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate theories of composition in defense of their views. And as it turns out, these strange cases are an interesting source of evidence for moderate theories of composition.     

Composition as Identity Doesn’t Settle the Special Composition Question1

Orthodoxy says that the thesis that composition is identity (CAI) entails universalism: the claim that any collection of entities has a sum. If this is true it counts in favour of CAI, since a thesis about the nature of composition that settles the otherwise intractable special composition question (SCQ) is desirable. But I argue that it is false: CAI is compatible with the many forms of restricted composition, and SCQ is no easier to answer given CAI than otherwise. Furthermore, in seeing why this is the case we reveal an objection to CAI: that it allows for the facts concerning what there is to be settled whilst leaving open the question about what is identical to what.     

Conceptual Conservatism and Contingent Composition

This paper proposes a novel answer to the Special Composition Question. In some respects it agrees with brutalism about composition; in others with universalism. The main novel feature of this answer is the insight I think it gives into what the debate over the Special Composition Question is about.     

Composition and transactive memory systems

A recurrent theme in research on socially distributed cognition is to establish the claim that the cognitive phenomenon of transactive memory is grounded in a specific mode of organization: mechanistic compositional organization. My topic is the confluence of transactive remembering or transactive memory systems (TMSs) and mechanistic compositional organization. In relation to this confluence, the paper scrutinizes the claim that the kind of organization grounding TMSs and/or tokens of transactive remembering takes the specific form of mechanistic compositional organization – at least as the latter is usually construed. It is argued (i) that the usual account of mechanistic compositional organization is based on a synchronic composition function, and (ii) that the organization of TMSs and/or transactive remembering is not well understood by way of synchronic composition. The positive account pursued is that TMSs and/or transactive remembering are better understood as grounded in a diachronic composition function.     

Body Composition And Human Sleep

It has been reported that fit atheletes have more slow wave sleep (SWS), sleep longer and have shorter sleep onset latencies than unfit individuals. However, we have shown that these differences are not a direct consequence of physical fitness. This suggests that the effect is due to more enduring characteristics of individuals. We report two experiments designed to test the hypothesis that individual differences in sleep are related to differences in body composition. The hypothesis was tested in two different experiments, each comparing independent groups of fit athletes with unfit non-athletes. In each experiment both sleep and a number of anthropometric variables were measured. Twenty-five fit and 22 unfit subjects were run in Experiment 1 and 17 fit and 17 unfit in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1 percentage fat was estimated from a skin fold method, while in Experiment 2 lean body mass (LBM) was estimated from 24 h. urinary creatinine. The results showed that percentage LBM was negatively related to SWS in fit subjects, while the amount of LBM and weight were negatively related in the unfit groups. When all subjects were combined within each experiment, significant negative correlations were found between SWS and both LBM and percentage LBM in Experiment 2. The results suggest that body composition influences SWS levels, but not other components of sleep.     

A Relevance Constraint on Composition

Whether certain objects compose a whole at a given time does not seem to depend on anything other than the character of those objects and the relations between them. This observation suggests a far-reaching constraint on theories of composition. One version of the constraint has been explicitly adopted by van Inwagen and rules out his own answer to the composition question. The constraint also rules out the other well-known moderate answers that have so far been proposed.     

Body Composition Changes in Menopausal Women

No abstract available for this article.     

《道枢》成书及其流传三题

道教重要内丹典籍<道枢>作者曾慥广采博收,约征引古道经100余种,涉及学者140多人;该书编撰体例独特,既辑录古人论述,又有作者评述,可谓准类书;历代共有11种史志、书目收录<道枢>,是书各种版本有所差异,需要参照使用.黄永锋,四川大学道教与宗教文化研究所博士后、厦门大学哲学系讲师.     

Composition as a Kind of Identity

Composition as identity, as I understand it, is a theory of the composite structure of reality. The theory’s underlying logic is irreducibly plural; its fundamental primitive is a generalized identity relation that takes either plural or singular arguments. Strong versions of the theory that incorporate a generalized version of the indiscernibility of identicals are incompatible with the framework of plural logic, and should be rejected. Weak versions of the theory that are based on the idea that composition is merely analogous to (one-one) identity are too weak to be interesting, lacking in metaphysical consequence. I defend a moderate version according to which composition is a kind of identity, and argue that the difference is metaphysically substantial, not merely terminological. I then consider whether the notion of generalized identity, though fundamental, can be elucidated in modal terms by reverse engineering Hume’s Dictum. Unfortunately, for realists about possible worlds, such as myself, who understand Hume’s Dictum in terms of duplicates, the elucidation never gets off the ground; for modal primitivists, the elucidation may succeed in capturing some general notion of identity, but it’s characterization is too general to target the particular notion of identity, tied to classical mereology, that is the object of my theorizing. In the end, I have little to offer the skeptic who claims not to understand the relevant notion of generalized identity, or not to take it to be compulsory in providing an account of the structure of reality.     

Mereological Composition and Plural Quantifier Semantics

Mereological universalists and nihilists disagree on the conditions for composition. In this paper, we show how this debate is a function of one’s chosen semantics for plural quantifiers. Debating mereologists have failed to appreciate this point because of the complexity of the debate and extraneous theoretical commitments. We eliminate this by framing the debate between universalists and nihilists in a formal model where these two theses about composition are contradictory. The examination of the two theories in the model brings clarity to a debate in which opponents frequently talk past one another. With the two views stated precisely, our investigation reveals the dependence of the mereologists’ ontological commitments on the semantics of plural quantifiers. Though we discuss the debate with respect to a simplified and idealized model, the insights provided will make more complex debates on composition more productive and deflationist criticisms of the debate less substantial.     

Composition in distributional models of semantics

Vector-based models of word meaning have become increasingly popular in cognitive science. The appeal of these models lies in their ability to represent meaning simply by using distributional information under the assumption that words occurring within similar contexts are semantically similar. Despite their widespread use, vector-based models are typically directed at representing words in isolation, and methods for constructing representations for phrases or sentences have received little attention in the literature. This is in marked contrast to experimental evidence (e.g., in sentential priming) suggesting that semantic similarity is more complex than simply a relation between isolated words. This article proposes a framework for representing the meaning of word combinations in vector space. Central to our approach is vector composition, which we operationalize in terms of additive and multiplicative functions. Under this framework, we introduce a wide range of composition models that we evaluate empirically on a phrase similarity task.     

Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition

Physicalism, as I treat it here, holds that every instance of causationreported by the special sciences is shadowed, even rivalled, by causation atthe level of microphysics. The reported 'cause' is embodied in one massive collection of microparticle events; the 'event' in another; the former brings about the latter in accordance with the laws of microphysics. I argue that while individual events in the 'cause' collection bring about individual events in the 'effect' collection, it does not follow, and typically is unbelievable, that the 'cause' collection itself brings anything about. For typically that collection is too sprawling and disconnected from the standpoint of microphysics to do anything. Causings reported by the special sciences can be traced only at that level. This is actually unsurprising, since the objects of such sciences are not mere parcels of microparticles, but genuine wholes with natures of their own.