How we know what we intend

How do we know what our intentions are? It is argued that work on self-knowledge has tended to neglect the attitude of intention, and that an epistemological account is needed that is attuned to the specific features of that state. Richard Moran??s ??Authorship?? view, on which we can acquire self-knowledge by making up our minds, offers a promising insight for such an account: we do not normally discover what we intend through introspection. However, his formulation of the Authorship view, developed primarily with the attitude of belief in mind, is found wanting when applied to intention. An alternative account is proposed for knowledge of one??s own intentions that gives a central role to the mental act of deciding what to do. It is argued that we can come to know what we intend by making a decision about what to do and self-ascribing the content of that decision as our intended action.     

Elephant psychology: What we know and what we would like to know

Although elephants are well-known and one of the most popular species among people, their behavior and cognitive abilities have not been studied very extensively. But recently, more and more researchers are becoming interested in studying their cognition, particularly their general intelligence, including causal reasoning and mirror self recognition, memory, and numerical cognition. Although genetically elephants are more closely related to the small-brained aardvarks and manatees than to primates, they hold enormous potential in their cognitive skills. Also, studying their cognition is important from the point of view of animal welfare in captivity.     

Memory processes in elderly eyewitnesses: What we know and what we don't know

Research is reviewed on the memory abilities of elderly eyewitnesses. Two major issues are addressed: First, how credible are elderly witnesses? Second, how accurate are they? Despite negative stereotypes regarding elderly eyewitnesses, they do not necessarily lack credibility at trial. In terms of their memory performance, older witnesses are as accurate as young adults in many respects, but they are particularly vulnerable to misleading information that is presented after the witnessed event. Furthermore, their performance varies depending on the type of information that is sought and the manner in which their memory is assessed. Recommendations are made for improving the reliability of testimony that is offered by elderly eyewitnesses.     

Rational emotive behavior therapy research: What we know and what we need to know

Rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT) has achieved positive results in quantitative reviews of treatment outcome studies. In part because of methodological limitations of these studies, however, the generalizability of their favorable results to routine clinical practice is unknown. Also unknown are the clinical significance of outcomes achieved by REBT, the contribution made by its distinctive and specialized procedures, and the types of patients for whom REBT is particularly useful. Recommendations are provided for refining our knowledge of the effectiveness of REBT.     

What we know and what to do

This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A comprehensive solution requires rethinking the relationship between relevant information (what we know) and practical rankings of possibilities and actions (what to do). I argue that (i) relevant information determines whether considerations of value may be treated as reasons for actions that realize them and against actions that don’t, (ii) incorporating this normative fact requires a revision of the standard ordering semantics for weak (but not for strong) deontic necessity modals, and (iii) an off-the-shelf semantics for weak deontic necessity modals, due to von Fintel and Iatridou, which distinguishes “basic” and “higher-order” ordering sources, and interprets weak deontic necessity modals relative to both, is well-suited to this task. The prominence of normative considerations in our proposal suggests a more general methodological lesson: formal semantic analysis of natural language modals expressing normative concepts demands that close attention be paid to the nature of the underlying normative phenomena.     

No-harm contracts: a review of what we know

Few events in the practice of a mental health clinician can be as devastating as the suicide of a client. Although suicide is a rare occurrence, clinicians face assessment of clients' risk for harming themselves on a regular basis. One well-accepted and widely practiced intervention for suicidal ideation is the use of no-harm contracts (NHC), although opinions about NHCs range from enthusiasm to apathy. The existing research does not support the use of such contracts as a method for preventing suicide, nor for protecting clinicians from malpractice litigation in the event of a client suicide.     

Family demographics of clinically referred children: What we know and what we need to know

Published empirical studies were reviewed to establish family demographics of clinically referred children and adolescents. Data on parental marital status were collected from studies of referred and nonreferred children and adolescents in six empirical journals. Data on family socioeconomic status (SES) and child race or ethnicity were also collected. Based on 86 studies that presented parental marital status, 56.4% of clinically referred children and adolescents live with both their biological mother and biological father. Family SES data were difficult to summarize because of the different methods of presenting this information. When considering race and ethnicity, 86% of the children and adolescents in the clinical samples were Caucasian American. Of the studies that were originally reviewed, 80.4% did not include parental marital status and 36. 7% did not include SES, race, or ethnicity of the participants. There were no significant differences between journals in the rates of inclusion of family demographic data. In addition to revealing family demographic information about children and adolescents who participate in clinical research, these data highlight the lack of consistency in the presentation of family demographic data in published research. Suggestions are provided to help researchers colled and present meaningful family demographic data in clinical and nonclinical research with children and adolescents.This study was completed with support from the Division of Sponsored Research at the University of South Florida and preparation of this article was supported in part by National Institute of Mental Health Grant R29 49601-02 to the first author. We express our gratitude to Georgetta Bosco and Tracy Burbine for their diligent data collection in the library.     

Childhood obesity and social stigma: What we know and what we don't know

Evidence for the development of social stigma associated with body build in childhood, specifically obesity, was critically reviewed. Although there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that children hold a positive stereotype toward a mesomorph (normal) build when compared to other builds, and that this preference increases with age, studies have not convincingly shown a negative stereotype toward the endomorph or obese body build. Furthermore, the belief that obese children are generally discriminated against is without empirical verification. Specifically, it is unclear from the various empirical studies that examine self-esteem and body image, that the psychological consequences of obesity are debilitating. Studies which have noted disturbances in self-concept and body image have sampled clinical populations (youngsters seeking medically supervised reduction); and those studies which have examined nonclinical populations have not found psychological difficulties. Finally, potential moderators such as facial attractiveness × body build interactions, situational contexts, and degree of obesity are examined and new research directions are discussed.     

Acquiescing to intuition: Believing what we know isn't so

When people identify an error in their initial judgment, they typically try to correct it. But, in some cases, they choose not to—even when they know, in the moment, that they are being irrational or making a mistake. A baseball fan may know that he cannot affect the pitcher from his living room but still be reluctant to say “no‐hitter.” A person may learn that flying in an airplane is statistically safer than driving a car and still refuse to fly. Dual‐process models of judgment and decision making often implicitly assume that if an error is detected, it will be corrected. Recent work suggests, however, that models should decouple error detection and correction. Indeed, people can explicitly recognize that their intuitive judgment is wrong but, nevertheless, stick with it, a phenomenon known as acquiescence. My goals are to offer criteria for identifying acquiescence, consider why people acquiesce even when it incurs a cost, discuss how lessons that are learned in cases when acquiescence is clearly identified can be exported to cases when acquiescence may be harder to establish, and, more broadly, describe the implications of a model that decouples error detection and error correction.     

Syntactic processing in the human brain: what we know, what we don't know, and a suggestion for how to proceed

For every claim in the neuroimaging literature about a particular brain region supporting syntactic processing, there exist other claims implicating the target region in different linguistic processes, and, in many cases, in non-linguistic cognitive processes (e.g., Blumstein, 2009). We argue that traditional group analysis methods in neuroimaging may obscure functional specificity because of inter-subject anatomical variability (Fedorenko & Kanwisher, 2009). In Fedorenko, Hsieh, Nieto-Castanon, Whitfield-Gabrieli, and Kanwisher (2010) we presented a functional localizer that allows quick and reliable identification of key language-sensitive regions in each individual brain. This approach enables pooling data from corresponding functional regions across subjects rather than from the same locations in stereotaxic space that may differ functionally due to inter-subject anatomical variability. In the current paper we demonstrate that the individual-subjects functional localization approach is superior to the traditional methods in its ability to distinguish among conditions in a brain region’s response. This ability is at the core of all neuroimaging research and is critical for answering questions of functional specialization (e.g., does a brain region specialize for processing syntactic aspects of the linguistic signal), which is in turn essential for making inferences about the precise computations conducted in each brain region. Based on our results, we argue that supplementing existing methods with an individual-subjects functional localization approach may lead to a clearer picture of the neural basis of syntactic processing, as it has in some other domains, such as high-level vision (e.g., Kanwisher, 2010) and social cognition (e.g., Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003).     

What we know about what we have never heard: evidence from perceptual illusions

Are speakers equipped with preferences concerning grammatical structures that are absent in their language? We examine this question by investigating the sensitivity of English speakers to the sonority of onset clusters. Linguistic research suggests that certain onset clusters are universally preferred (e.g., bd>lb). We demonstrate that such preferences modulate the perception of unattested onsets by English speakers: Monosyllabic auditory nonwords with onsets that are universally dispreferred (e.g., lbif) are more likely to be classified as disyllabic and misperceived as identical to their disyllabic counterparts (e.g., lebif) compared to onsets that are relatively preferred across languages (e.g., bdif). Consequently, dispreferred onsets benefit from priming by their epenthetic counterpart (e.g., lebif-lbif) as much as they benefit from identity priming (e.g., lbif-lbif). A similar pattern of misperception (e.g., lbif-->lebif) was observed among speakers of Russian, where clusters of this type occur. But unlike English speakers, Russian speakers perceived these clusters accurately on most trials, suggesting that the perceptual illusions of English speakers are partly due to their linguistic experience, rather than phonetic confusion alone. Further evidence against a purely phonetic explanation for our results is offered by the capacity of English speakers to perceive such onsets accurately under conditions that encourage precise phonetic encoding. The perceptual illusions of English speakers are also irreducible to several statistical properties of the English lexicon. The systematic misperception of universally dispreferred onsets might reflect their ill-formedness in the grammars of all speakers, irrespective of linguistic experience. Such universal grammatical preferences implicate constraints on language learning.     

Telling what they want to know: participants tailor causal attributions to researchers' interests

Based on a conversational analysis of experimental procedures and consistent with the principle of relevance, we predicted that participants' verbal responses will be influenced by their tacit inferences about the researcher's epistemic goals, derived from their knowledge of the researcher's academic affiliation. We tested this prediction in a core area of social‐personality and cultural psychology, causal attribution. University students provided causal attributions about mass murder cases, while the questionnaire identified the researcher either as a social scientist or a personality psychologist. The results indicated that attributions were overall more situational than dispositional, and as predicted, this main effect was qualified by an interaction between conversational cue and type of attribution. Thus, participants gave relatively more situational explanations when the letterhead of the questionnaire identified the researcher as a social scientist compared to when the researcher was identified as a personality psychologist. The reverse pattern emerged for dispositional attributions. Methodological and conceptual implications are discussed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Seeing what we know and understand: How knowledge shapes perception

Expertise in object recognition, as in bird watching or X-ray specialization, is based on extensive perceptual experience and in-depth semantic knowledge. Although it has been shown that rich perceptual experience shapes elementary perception and higher level discrimination and identification, little is known about the influence of in-depth semantic knowledge on object perception and identification. By means of recording event-related brain potentials (ERPs), we show that the amount of knowledge acquired about initially unfamiliar objects modulates visual ERP components already 120 msec after object presentation, and causes gradual variations of activity in similar brain systems within a later timeframe commonly associated with meaning access. When perceptual analysis is made more difficult by blurring object pictures, knowledge has an even stronger effect on perceptual analysis and facilitates recognition. These findings demonstrate that in-depth knowledge not only affects involuntary semantic memory access, but also shapes perception by penetrating early visual processes traditionally held to be immune to such influences.     

Daydreaming to navigate the social world: What we know,what we don't know,and why it matters

A substantial portion of daily life is spent daydreaming—that is, engaged in thought independent of, and unrelated to, goals in the external environment. We argue that this naturally occurring, unconstrained cognition is a vital, but currently underappreciated, form of social cognition that enables navigation of the social world. First, we present the results of a meta‐analysis of neuroimaging studies which illustrate the shared neural basis of daydreaming and social cognition (including regions of the anterior temporal lobes and the posterior cingulate cortex). Second, we review evidence regarding the frequency, correlates, and adaptive outcomes of social daydreaming, cumulative findings that point to the adaptive value of imaging others during this offline state. We end by encouraging cross‐fertilization between daydreaming research and domains of social psychology (goal pursuit, social interactions, and close relationships), which we hope will foster mutually beneficial directions for understanding the role that unconstrained thinking plays in social life.     

Using what we know: Consequences of intentionally retrieving gist versus item-specific information

The effect of a prior gist-based versus item-specific retrieval orientation on recognition of objects and words was examined. Prior item-specific retrieval increased item-specific recognition of episodically related but not previously tested objects relative to both conceptual- and perceptual-gist retrieval. An item-specific retrieval advantage also was found when the stimuli were words (synonyms) rather than objects but not when participants overtly named objects during gist-based recognition testing, which suggests that they did not always label objects under general gist-retrieval instructions. Unlike verbal overshadowing, labeling objects during recognition attenuated (but did not eliminate) test- and interference-related forgetting. A full understanding of how retrieval affects subsequent memory, even for events or facts that are not themselves retrieved, must take into account the specificity with which that retrieval occurs.     

Knowing what we do not know about sexual orientation change efforts

Comments on the original article, "Guidelines for psychological practice with lesbian, gay, and bisexual clients," by the American Psychological Association (see record 2011-19419-001). The present authors notes that the APA has provided a very helpful document for those who do clinical work with individuals experiencing same-sex attractions. Psychologists no doubt need to be familiar with the literature described in these guidelines as a part of ethical practice. However, the present authors register concern regarding how the guidelines address sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE). They focus their critique on how the guidelines portray two issues pertaining to SOCE-effectiveness and harm-and conclude with a proposal to move the discussion forward via science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).