Space- and object-based attention depend on motor intention

The authors investigated the impact of different motor demands on space- and object-based attention allocation. Responses to targets were either lifting a finger, or pointing to the target, or grasping a clay object placed on the target location. Reaction times and movement times were recorded to assess covert and overt attention, respectively. Both reaction times and movement times showed more space-based attention for pointing than for finger lifting and more object-based attention for grasping than for pointing. That result supports the view that visual selectivity is tuned to specific motor intentions (H. Bekkering & F. W. Neggers, 2002) and illustrates the tight coupling of perception and action.     

Understanding other people's actions: intention and attention

This study investigated the extent to which observation of an action performed by a human actor or a robotic arm may kinematically prime the performance of an observer subsequently required to perform a similar action. In Experiment 1, an actor reached for a target presented in isolation or flanked by a distractor object. Subsequently, an observer was required to perform a similar action toward the target object, but always in the absence of the distractor. The kinematics of both the human actor and the observer were affected by the presence of the distractor. Unexpectedly, similar effects were found in the observer's kinematics during the trials in which the actor was seated in front of the observer but no action was demonstrated (catch trials). Results from 4 subsequent experiments suggest that the motor intentions of the actor can be inferred by monitoring his or her gaze. To support this conclusion, results are discussed in terms of recent work spanning many disciplines involved in combining gaze direction and body movements.     

Effects of intention and learning on attention to information in dynamic touch

The current research distinguishes two types of attention shifts: those entailed by perceptual learning and those entailed by changing intention. In perceptual learning, participants given feedback have been shown to gradually shift attention toward the optimal (i.e., specifying) information variable for the task. A shift in variable use is also expected when intention changes, because an intention to perceive some property entails attunement to information about that property. We compared the effects of feedback and intention in a dynamic (kinesthetic) touch task by representing both as changes of locus in an information space of inertial variables. Participants wielded variously sized, unseen, rectangular parallelepipeds and made length or width judgments about them. When given feedback, participants made gradual attentional shifts toward the optimal variable, which demonstrates the education of attention. When asked to report a new property, participants made large attentional jumps to the ballpark of the optimal variable for the new property. Exploratory movements were measured on 6 participants and were found to differ as a function of intention and to change with learning.     

Context-specific prospective-memory processing: Evidence for flexible attention allocation adjustments after intention encoding

Prospective memory (PM) is remembering to fulfill intentions in the future. Interference of unfulfilled intentions with ongoing activities reflects the allocation of attention to the PM task. Prior research has shown that, when people know in which specific context PM cues will occur, attention allocation is adaptive, with slower responses in the PM-relevant context. We examined whether people flexibly adjust their attention allocation when the PM–context association is unknown at intention encoding and must be learned on-task. Different stimulus shapes represented contexts in an ongoing task, with PM cues only occurring in trials with one specific shape. Participants informed about the PM-relevant shape responded more slowly on trials with this shape. Participants instructed that only one, unspecified shape was PM-relevant learned the PM–context association and also allocated attention flexibly, depending on context relevance. However, participants with no context-related information at intention encoding failed to learn the PM–context association, resulting in inflexible attention allocation and poorer PM performance. The present study provides evidence that people can flexibly update their attention-allocation policy, and thereby optimize their PM performance after initial intention encoding, but self-guided learning of intention–context associations appears to be limited.     

Adaptation to tempo changes in sensorimotor synchronization: Effects of intention, attention, and awareness

Adaptation to tempo changes in sensorimotor synchronization is hypothesized to rest on two processes, one (phase correction) being largely automatic and the other (period correction) requiring conscious awareness and attention. In this study, participants tapped their finger in synchrony with auditory sequences containing a tempo change and continued tapping after sequence termination. Their intention to adapt or not to adapt to the tempo change was manipulated through instructions, their attentional resources were varied by introducing a concurrent secondary task (mental arithmetic), and their awareness of the tempo changes was assessed through perceptual judgements. As predicted, period correction was found to be strongly dependent on all three variables, whereas phase correction depended only on intention.     

Towards computational models of intention detection and intention prediction

Intention recognition is one of the core components of mindreading, an important process in social cognition. Human beings, from age of 18 months, have been shown to be able to extrapolate intentions from observed actions, even when the performer failed at achieving the goal. Existing accounts of intention recognition emphasize the use of an intent (plan) library, which is matched against observed actions for recognition. These therefore cannot account for recognition of failed sequences of actions, nor novel actions. In this paper, we begin to tackle these open questions by examining computational models for components of human intention recognition, which emphasize the ability of humans to detect and identify intentions in a sequence of observed actions, based solely on the rationality of movement (its efficiency). We provide a high-level overview of intention recognition as a whole, and then elaborate on two components of the model, which we believe to be at its core, namely, those of intention detection and intention prediction. By intention detection we mean the ability to discern whether a sequence of actions has any underlying intention at all, or whether it was performed in an arbitrary manner with no goal in mind. By intention prediction we mean the ability to extend an incomplete sequence of actions to its most likely intended goal. We evaluate the model, and these two components, in context of existing literature, and in a number of experiments with more than 140 human subjects. For intention detection, our model was able to attribute high levels of intention to those traces perceived by humans as intentional, and vice versa. For intention prediction as well, our model performed in a way that closely matched that of humans. The work highlights the intimate relationship between the ability to generate plans, and the ability to recognize intentions.     

Mental disorders and suicidal intention

This paper continues a previous report (Litman, 1984) in exploring the use of psychological autopsies to clarify intention in suicide; clinical experience is compared with courtroom experience. The certification of suicide requires a judgment that the deceased intended to use his or her own death to resolve his or her problems of living, as demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence. Now that suicide has been decriminalized, the issue of "sane or insane" in insurance contracts has probably become irrelevant. Mental disorders are important as part of the suicide constellation, as one element of many interacting factors. The capacity to have the intent to commit suicide--that is, to understand the physical nature of one's own death--is lost due to mental disorders only under special and unique circumstances.     

Shared intention and personal intentions

This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.     

Conscious intention and motor cognition

The subjective experience of conscious intention is a key component of our mental life. Philosophers studying 'conscious free will' have discussed whether conscious intentions could cause actions, but modern neuroscience rejects this idea of mind-body causation. Instead, recent findings suggest that the conscious experience of intending to act arises from preparation for action in frontal and parietal brain areas. Intentional actions also involve a strong sense of agency, a sense of controlling events in the external world. Both intention and agency result from the brain processes for predictive motor control, not merely from retrospective inference.     

Depth of intention

The paper attempts to reconstruct some notions of Naess's semantics, and at the same time to relate them to more recent developments. On Naess's view, there is no such thing as a language in the sense of a shared structure which determines clear‐cut literal meanings like Fregean Gedanken or propositions. We use words, and try to interpret each other; but there is no a priori or intuitive basis for secure and precise knowledge about language. Interpretation or understanding, as well as thinking and perception, involve discrimination at higher or lower levels. There is neither a ceiling of crystal‐clear propositions nor a floor of ‘given’ sensations or ‘objective’ stimuli independent of categorizations and discriminations, which might serve as a bridge for translation or interpretation between the conceptual‐perceptual schemes of individuals. The notions of ‘concept’, ‘conceptual framework’, ‘situation’, ‘situation type’ and ‘proposition’ are defined, with some reliance on Barwise and Perry's situation semantics. Two notions of accessibility of situation types are defined; one as constructibility of the type at a given level of discrimination, i.e. in terms of objects discerned and concepts discriminated; the other as intelligibility of the type. Intelligibility entails constructibility, but not conversely. A type of situation may be constructible at some person's level of discrimination, but not coherently intelligible to him. On this basis, a logic of senses or truth‐conditions for uses of expressions is developed, and a logic of interpretations of uses. The central notions of Naessian semantics are defined: ambiguity and direction of interpretation, level of discrimination and depth of intention.     

A logic of intention and attempt

We present a modal logic called (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of , we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.     

The intentionality of intention and action

This article presents a sketch of a theory of action. It does so by locating the relation of intention to action ‐vithin a general theory of Intentionality. It introduces a distinction between ptiorintentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally self‐referential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they allow suggested solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the accordion effect, basic actions, etc.); the demonstration of striking similarities between the logical structure of intentional action and the logical structure of perception; and the construction of an account of simple actions. A successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists of an intention in action together with the bodily movement or state of the agent which is its condition of satisfaction and which is caused by it. The account is extended to complex actions.     

Disentangling behavioral intention and behavioral expectation

Social psychologists have extensively researched behavioral intention and its relation to future behavior, usually within the framework of M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen's (1975, Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley) theory of reasoned action. However, the field has confounded two separate constructs while investigating intention: behavioral intention (BI) and what P. R. Warshaw, B. H. Sheppard, and J. Hartwick (in press, in R. Bagozzi (Ed.), Advances in marketing communication, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press) have coined behavioral expectation (BE), which is the individual's self-prediction of his or her future behavior. In this paper we define both constructs and explain how they differ in terms of the processes by which they are formed, their roles in determining behavior, and their utilities as behavioral predictors. We propose that behavioral expectation is the more accurate overall predictor since many common behaviors are unreasoned (i.e., mindless or habitual) behaviors, goal-type actions, or behaviors where the individual expects his or her intention to change in a foresseable manner. These are all cases where present intention (BI) is not the direct determinant of behavior but where the individual may be capable of appraising whatever additional determinants exist and of including them within his or her behavioral expectation. A study (N = 197) is reported in which student subjects received either a BE (n = 113) or a BI (n = 84) version of a questionnaire pertaining to their performance of 18 common behaviors. Overall, behavioral expectation was the better predictor of self-reported performance.