Generic Response Classes And Relational Frame Theory: Response To Hayes And Barnes-Holmes.

Hayes and Barnes‐Holmes (2004) assert that the concept of a topographically unconstrained response class, the concept that carries the explanatory burden of relational frame theory, appeals to no new principles. Operants are properly defined functionally. I argue that they have stretched the concept of the generic response class beyond its appropriate limits. Skinner conceived of response classes as empirically defined units, mutually interchangeable in quantitative functions. The notion of overarching, generalized operants is an uncritical, analogical extension of this concept. I hold that the conceptual work of relational frame theory is incomplete, that a statement of principle is necessary, even if not new. Finally, I distinguish a supposed commitment to a philosophical “mediationism” from a valid inquiry about mediating behavior; that is, behavior with stimulus products that participate in the control of the behavior of primary interest.     

Researching Grief: Cultural,Relational, and Individual Possibilities

This review of the author’s writings on grief focuses on cross-cultural research, research with 19th-century diaries, and qualitative interview studies of couples and families. The cross-cultural studies show that there are strong cultural differences in how people grieve. The diary data show that some people cycle into and out of intense grieving, even for years after a death, and the cycling is governed partly by what they do to control emotions and what they encounter that reminds them of their loss. The interview studies make clear that grieving is, for many people, relational, so looking only at individual grieving we miss much of the relational dynamics that are central to the experience of grieving for many people.     

Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess

I consider the evolution of our relational ideal—its implications for our therapeutic goals, our patients, and for ourselves. Who do we aim to be in the consulting room? How do we view our patient—her potential and her limitations? What are the clinical goals of a relational analysis? What might those goals occlude? In this context I address the historical excesses of our ideal and the ways we may have gone too far.     

Relational risk‐taking,men and affairs

This paper is about clinical work with heterosexual men who have had affairs which have ended and who wish to resume the relationship with their partners. An approach is proposed which emphasizes the exploration and development of relational risk‐taking by the men concerned. A rationale and ideas for involvement of the partners of the men is also addressed.     

Relational integration, inhibition, and analogical reasoning in older adults

The difficulty of reasoning tasks depends on their relational complexity, which increases with the number of relations that must be considered simultaneously to make an inference, and on the number of irrelevant items that must be inhibited. The authors examined the ability of younger and older adults to integrate multiple relations and inhibit irrelevant stimuli. Young adults performed well at all but the highest level of relational complexity, whereas older adults performed poorly even at a medium level of relational complexity, especially when irrelevant information was presented. Simulations based on a neurocomputational model of analogical reasoning, Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA), suggest that the observed decline in reasoning performance may be explained by a decline in attention and inhibitory functions in older adults.     

Subjectivism and Relational Good

In this paper, a distinctly subjectivist analysis of the nature of relational goodness or goodness for is proposed. Like the generic subjectivist analysis of value, the proposal is to analyse value in terms of attitudes. Specifically, the proposed analysis of goodness for appeals to a special kind of attitude: namely, so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. Unlike other analyses in the literature that have appealed to this kind of attitude, the analysis proposed here is not a fitting-attitude analysis. Rather than appealing to for-someone’s-sake attitudes that it is fitting to have or that there are reasons to have, the proposed analysis takes actually held for-someone’s-sake attitudes to ground or constitute goodness for (relative to the subject who holds the attitude). The analysis should be attractive to those already within the subjectivist camp. One of its appeals is that it is a special case of a general subjectivist approach to values, thus showing that subjectivism provides the resources to analyse relational values.     

Relational Remembering and Oppression

This paper begins by discussing Sue Campbell's account of memory as she first developed it in Relational Remembering: Rethinking the Memory Wars and applied it to the context of the false memory debates. In more recent work, Campbell was working on expanding her account of relational remembering from an analysis of personal rememberings to activities of public rememberings in contexts of historic harms and, specifically, harms to Aboriginals and their communities in Canada. The goal of this paper is to draw out the moral and political implications of Campbell's account of relational remembering and thereby to extend its reach and application. As applied to Aboriginal communities, Campbell's account of relational remembering confirms but also explains the important role that Canada's Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission (IRS TRC) is poised to play. It holds this promise and potential, however, only if all Canadians, Aboriginal and non‐Aboriginal, engage in a process of remembering that is relational and has the goal of building and rebuilding relationships. The paper ends by drawing attention to what relational remembering can teach us about oppression more generally.     

Sacrifice and Relational Well-Being

ABSTRACT

The well-being account of sacrifice says that sacrifices are gross losses of well-being. This account is attractive because it explains the relationship between sacrifice and moral obligation. However, sacrifices made on behalf of loved ones may cause trouble for the account. Loving sacrifices occur in a context where the agent’s well-being and the beneficiary’s well-being are intertwined. They present a challenge to individualism about well-being. Drawing inspiration from feminist philosophers and bioethicists, I argue that a notion of ‘relational well-being’, analogous to ‘relational autonomy’, can help account for loving sacrifices without either undermining the well-being theory of sacrifice or minimizing the very real sacrifices made in caregiving situations.     

Relation,Virtue, and Relational Virtue: Three Concepts of Caring

This essay breaks new ground in defending the view that contemporary care‐based ethics and early Confucian ethics share some important common ground. Luo also introduces the notion of relational virtue in an attempt to bridge a conceptual gap between relational caring ethics and agent‐based virtue ethics, and to make the connections between the ethics of care and Confucian ethics philosophically clearer and more defensible.     

Relational Entitlement,Early Recollections of Parental Care,and Attachment Orientation

The present study examined whether inadequate parental care has a long-term impact on pathological relational entitlement in romantic relations, and whether this impact is mediated by insecure attachment style. Our cohort of 335 Israeli adults completed Sense of Relational Entitlement (SRE), Experience in Close Relationships (ECR), and Parental Bonding Instrument (PBI) questionnaires. The results generally supported our hypotheses. Avoidant attachment style fully and negatively mediated the link between maternal adequate care and SRE total entitlement. Anxious attachment style fully and negatively mediated the link between PBI paternal adequate care and SRE total entitlement. Women were found to report more relational entitlement. These results support the notion that pathological relational entitlement has its roots in recollections of early parental care and attachment experiences. The results of the study are discussed in the context of adult attachment and romantic relationships.     

Artificial Intelligence,Responsibility Attribution,and a Relational Justification of Explainability

Science and Engineering Ethics - This paper discusses the problem of responsibility attribution raised by the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. It is assumed that only humans can be...     

Relational Services

Recent research projects have looked for social innovations, i.e., people creating solutions outside the mainstream patterns of production and consumption. An analysis of these innovations indicates the emergence of a particular kind of service configuration—defined here as relational services—which requires intensive interpersonal relations to operate. Based on a comparative analysis between standard and relational services, we propose to the Service Design discipline an interpretative framework able to reinforce its ability to deal with the interpersonal relational qualities in services, indicating how these qualities can be understood and favored by design activities, as well as the limits of this design intervention. Martin Buber’s conceptual framework is presented as the main interpretative basis. Buber describes two ways of interacting (“I-Thou” and “I-It”). Relational services are those most favoring “I-Thou” interpersonal encounters.

Data,Dreams, and Drives: Interpersonal and Relational Innovations in Perspective

My fundamental approach is to first explore the most concrete understanding of any clinical phenomenon. Only after this consideration of the concrete do I go on to consider metaphoric or symbolic meanings. I assume there are specific facts to be discovered about our patients and that those facts are significant in the patient’s psychology. With patients experiencing panic attacks, a detailed interview may reveal a life situation in which the patient should be afraid but does not connect the danger with the symptom. With dreams, this approach endorses a combined intersubjective and objective approach, searching for how a dream may depict a real problematic situation for the dreamer that is being dissociated. Finally, disagreeing with Greenberg and Mitchell that combined drive-relational models do not work, I propose a model of multiple drives that can each be connected with different self-states.