Post Christian pastoral care: the wisdom of not knowing

Emergent religious pluralism leads many of us to reflect on pastoral care practices that have evolved mostly within the Judeo Christian tradition. This article makes public my reflections and offers ideas for a ministry of curiosity that is more conversant with an increasingly Post Christian society.     

Social Capital, Television, and the "Mean World": Trust, Optimism, and Civic Participation

Robert Putnam argues that much of the decline in social trust and civic engagement in the United States can be attributed to increased television viewing. People who watch a lot of television are likely to believe that the real world is as "mean" as the "television world," and hence withdraw their trust from other people and decline to participate in civic affairs. Using data from the GSS and other surveys, I show that it is not television that makes people less trusting, but optimism for the future that makes people more trusting. When measures of optimism were used as determinants of trust in the estimation of a simultaneous equation model, the effects of television vanished. There is no support for the argument that television makes us less trusting because of the content of the shows we watch, or for the argument that television makes us withdraw from civic engagement because of the amount of time consumed by viewing. In addition, no evidence for specific cohort effects was found.     

The threat of logical inversion and our need for philosophical attention: from thought-expression to discourse and discussion

Thought-expressions are not simply good; instead, they become good for us when they make sense, empower action, and support health. From time to time, we may need to (re)consider the difference between thought-expression and discourse, or thought-expression that really makes sense, and the difference between discourse and discussion, or a discourse-situation that makes genuine agreement or disagreement possible for us. In this essay, I explore a problem that D. Z. Phillips and Randy Ramal have termed “logical inversion,” and I argue that wherever logical inversions have gained a foothold in our thought-expressions, they threaten to render us incapable of authentic discourse and discussion by ensuring that we misunderstand the understandings of others such that we deceive ourselves and others by picturing the knowledge and truth of our perspective against an unreal background of conceivable falsehoods which we have falsely attributed to the perspectives of others. Where this has taken place, practices of philosophical attention and conceptual clarification are needed to help us move from a situation of endless thought expression toward authentic discourse and discussion.     

Personal identity: birth,death and the conditions of selfhood

Continental Philosophy Review - What makes us the same person across time? The different solutions to this problem known as personal identity can be divided into two camps: A numerical and a...     

Julian of Norwich: Problems of Evil and the Seriousness of Sin

Julian of Norwich emphasizes God’s eternal and unchanging love for humankind. Her visions show how God is not angry with our sins and so has no need to forgive us. God does not shame or blame us but excuses us and plans how to reward and compensate us for sin. In relation to Mother Jesus, we remain dear lovely children who need help, correction, and education. Although these remarks suggest to some that Julian must be “soft” on sin, that she has no adequate appreciation of the worthiness of God or the dignity of human nature, I argue that this is far from the case. On the contrary, she makes Divine worthiness axiomatic and urges readers to live into it. She relocates human dignity not in its intrinsic value but in our centrality to God’s plan. She measures the seriousness of sin in terms of the “real hard work” it takes to rear us up out of it: crucifixion for Christ, the hell of being a sinner and the crucifixion of life-long penance for us. Nevertheless, the brightness of her visions dominates with her assurance that despite the sin-produced sufferings of this present life, all will be well.     

Reading the Silences,Questioning the Terms: A Response to the Focus on Eighteenth-Century Ethics

It is striking that most of the essays in this Focus do not explore the specifically religious aspects of Enlightenment ethical thought. A principled reason for this may be found in a conception of religion that makes it hard for Enlightenment thinkers to seem religious at all. Neither does this conception fit anything that is likely to be a live option for most people today, and the now prevalent unpopularity of eighteenth-century piety and religious thought may blind us to important religious possibilities.     

Fantasy and mourning: heterogeneity, alterity, and discontinuity in the pastoral encounter

In exploring why the topic of fantasy has been absent from current pastoral care articles, the author draws from the work of Peter Homans and Eric Santner to inscribe the social dimensions of fantasy in the pastoral encounter, arguing that fantasy closes us off from radical change, difference, strangeness, and loss (discontinuity, heterogeneity, alterity, and mourning) while, paradoxically, opening us up to these excesses of life. Understanding the unconscious interpsychic role of fantasy makes these ever-widening dilemmas more psychologically transparent and even theologically transformational. Without this perspective, what often remains is a disappointing, unreflective, rationalized fiction of a stranger.     

Memory Acts: A Theory for the Study of Collective Memory in Everyday Life

History abounds in everyday life: It is in the discourse of the politician who makes a patriotic use of World War II, in the epic movie of medieval inspiration, in the latest museum opening in town, or in the magnet on your fridge that makes a humoristic use of advertisement posters from the 1950s. What tools can help us understand how history is used in these contexts, and with what purposes? And, more importantly perhaps, how to understand the effects these uses have on us? To answer these questions, this article proposes a framework to study the uses of collective memory in everyday life. After a short review of the history of collective memory, the concept of memory act is outlined, based on three theoretical traditions: James's pragmatism, Austin's speech acts, and Mead's social acts. They are used to argue that everyday uses of collective memory are better understood as intersubjective and discursive acts that are part of larger activities. Finally, some of the consequences of this theory are discussed.     

Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory

This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense of “possible”) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other “higher” animals do make such claims on us.     

The selective impairment of the phonological output buffer: evidence from a Chinese patient

We present a Chinese-speaking patient, SJ, who makes phonological errors across all tasks involving oral production. Detailed analyses of the errors across different tasks reveal that the patterns are very similar for reading, oral picture naming, and repetition tasks, which are also comparable to the error patterns of the phonological buffer deficit cases reported in the literature. The nature of the errors invites us to conclude that the patient's phonological output buffer is selectively impaired. Different from previously reported cases, SJ's deficits in oral production tasks are not accompanied by a similar impairment of writing performance. We argue that this dissociation is evidence that the phonological output buffer is not involved in writing Chinese words. Furthermore, the majority of SJ's errors occur at the onset of a syllable, indicating that the buffer has a structure that makes the onset more prone to impairment.     

论“理智”概念的实践维度——对杜威“理智”概念之实践性内涵的解读

理智(intelligence)是杜威实践哲学中一个极为重要的概念。但是这种重要性至今还没有被学界所重视,几乎没有人对这个概念进行详细的论述和研究。这使得人们在释读杜威哲学的时候,容易把其理智概念想当然地归结于经验的一种功能,或者简单地等同于大写的理性,从而出现许多偏颇和不清晰的地方。从这个角度来说,厘清杜威理智概念的真实内涵,成为客观地理解杜威哲学的一个关键性环节。而且,笔者认为,杜威在经验世界的基础上重新阐释了理智与经验、冲动、习惯、思虑以及行为选择之间的整体性关系,进而突出了理智的实践性的德性内蕴,使它与传统意义上的理性、智慧以及算计等概念有了一种本质的区别,成为杜威哲学超越传统二元论的一个关键因素。     

On the alleged ineffability of death

A number of recent theorists, all proceeding on the assumption that there is no afterlife, argue that the notion of one's own death defies comprehension in ways that have important implications. Some argue this "ineffability" of death precludes a rational decision to die. Dr. Edwin Shneidman maintains that it makes the notion of our own death unintelligible to each of us. In this paper, these arguments are criticized. It is maintained that death is not so inscrutible as these theorists would have us believe.     

RESPONSE TO WILLIAMS: SELFISHNESS IS NOT ENOUGH

Abstract. I agree with George Williams's most significant point: both questions and answers about our moral natures lie in our biological origins. He fails, however, to show that nature is morally evil and that therefore we should vigilantly resist it. The products of evolution are morally neutral, but the human moral sense is arguably a positive good. Morality is functional. It does not require ultimate justification in the sense of correspondence with or attack upon reality "out there." It is an adaptation "intended" to make us social, and sociality—with its sense of right and wrong—makes us fitter than otherwise     

Trump Cards and Klein Bottles: On the Collective of the Individual

This paper develops a neglected area in psychoanalytic theorizing: namely the collective aspects of individual subjectivity in the one-to-many object relationship. Using group theory allows us to describe this point of articulation between the individual and the group, allowing a more nuanced theoretical development of the social link in psychoanalysis. Subjectivity is inter-subjectivity in a radical way that extends beyond a singular one and singular other to pluralities of differences. We are both particles and waves; our subjectivity has a double provenance. This makes subjectivity inherently dynamic, inherently unstable, inherently dependent on groups of others, just as groups of others depend on the individuals that comprise them.     

Consciousness: mapping the theoretical landscape

What makes us conscious? Many theories that attempt to answer this question have appeared recently in the context of widespread interest about consciousness in the cognitive neurosciences. Most of these proposals are formulated in terms of the information processing conducted by the brain. In this overview, we survey and contrast these models. We first delineate several notions of consciousness, addressing what it is that the various models are attempting to explain. Next, we describe a conceptual landscape that addresses how the theories attempt to explain consciousness. We then situate each of several representative models in this landscape and indicate which aspect of consciousness they try to explain. We conclude that the search for the neural correlates of consciousness should be usefully complemented by a search for the computational correlates of consciousness.     

From the dreams of a generation to the theory of dreams: Freud's Roman dreams

In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud's interpretation of oedipal desires does not occur at the expense of historical and personal desires, which are always there as a backdrop. In the relentless examination of his own dreams that Freud makes in order to show the mechanisms inherent in all oneiric deformation, we are also led to another, specifically historical, aspect of the issue of Jewish emancipation, which he experiences at first hand. By analysing his own dreams, Freud not only shows us the mechanisms governing dream formation, but also develops a pointed critique of his contemporary society and its prejudices.     

Nature versus nurture: The simple contrast

We respond to the commentary of Franklin, Wright, and Davies (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology,102, 239-245 [2009]) by returning to the simple contrast between nature and nurture. We find no evidence from the toddler data that makes us revise our ideas that color categories are learned and never innate.     

Suicide in the Medically Ill

“The undiscover'd country, from whose bourn No traveler returns puzzles the will, And makes us rather bear those ills we have Than fly to others that we know not of?” (Hamlet III, i)     

Relational and Contextual Reasoning: Philosophical and Logical Aspects

This essay is a commentary on Helmut Reich's recently published book on relational and contextual reasoning (RCR). Reich's ideas are relevant in contexts of conflict, and they enable us to consider the notion of objectivity differently. He makes us see the constraints in individual perspectives. His book also can enable people to formulate problems of human concern in a wider and richer framework, which may lead to solutions not obtainable on the basis of binary logic.     

Perceptual Content,Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction

Our perceptual systems make information about the world available to our cognitive faculties. We come to think about the colors and shapes of objects because we are built somehow to register the instantiation of these properties around us. Just how we register the presence of properties and come to think about them is one of the central problems with understanding perceptual cognition. Another problem in the philosophy of perception concerns the nature of the properties whose presence we register. Among the perceptible properties are colors and shapes, for example, and there is a long philosophical tradition of drawing and refusing to draw metaphysical distinctions between them. This paper makes a claim about the information-theoretic approach to perceptual cognition in order to argue for a fundamentally epistemological distinction between colors and shapes. What makes shapes and colors seem so different to us is how we carry information about their presence around us. In particular, we can come to know more about the shapes on the basis of perceiving them than we can come to know about the colors. One interesting feature of how this distinction is drawn is that it partially vindicates Locke’s claim that our ideas of primary qualities like shapes resemble them in ways our ideas of colors do not.