When Will Older Patients Follow Doctors’ Recommendations? Interpersonal Treatment,Outcome Favorability,and Perceived Age Differences1

Study participants were 104 older patients (M age = 76 years) who rated their last visit to a doctor. If they felt respectfully and honestly treated by the doctor, they were more willing to confide in a medical professional. If they received the information that they needed, they were more likely to follow the doctor's recommendations. However, if they perceived their doctor to be closer to them in age, respectful treatment was most closely related to compliance. If they perceived their doctor to be much younger than themselves, obtaining needed information was related most closely to compliance. The results illustrate the value of treating age as a salient social category that can shape older patients’ reactions to their medical visits.     

Identifying and understanding gaps in services for adults experiencing homelessness

Gaps between service needs and availability often prevent individuals with a history of homelessness from accessing services and reestablishing permanent housing. This paper examines self‐identified service utilization and service needs based on data collected from an urban sample (N = 577) of adults experiencing homelessness. This study found that individuals differ in their use and continued need of services depending on the reasons they identified as contributing to their homelessness. The majority reported that they learned of services through word of mouth, had difficulty accessing services due to limited transportation options, and were most likely to use services that were in convenient locations that fulfilled their needs and where they were treated with respect. These findings have implications for developing coordinated intakes and the development and dissemination of services aimed at assisting individuals experiencing homelessness.     

Affective Commitment to Congregations

This study identified four multidimensional factors that significantly influence affective commitment of church members to their congregations. The sample (N = 382) consisted of members of three congregations: Unitarian Universalist (UU), United Methodist (UMC), and Evangelical Free Church (EFC). Stepwise multiple regression—with affective commitment to the congregation treated as the dependent variable—revealed that committed members in all three congregations valued their churches as sources of spiritual experiences, but they wanted these experiences delivered to them efficiently. The importance attached to programs and services offered by their congregations appeared as a significant factor in only one congregation (UMC). Suggestions for additional research are offered.     

Defending internalists from acquired sociopaths

People who suffer brain damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM patients) have a puzzling psychological profile: they seem to retain high intellect and practical reasoning skills after their brain injuries, but continually make poor decisions in many aspects of their lives. Adina Roskies argues that their behavior is explained by the fact that, although VM patients make correct judgments about what they ought to do, they are entirely unmotivated by those judgments. Roskies thus takes VM patients to be real-world counterexamples to motivational internalism: the thesis that, necessarily, if S judges that she ought to φ in circumstances C, then S is somewhat motivated to φ in C. In this paper, however, I argue that the neuropsychological evidence that Roskies appeals to does not actually show that VM patients are entirely unmotivated by their normative judgments. Rather, I argue, the evidence suggests that VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals during practical deliberation. And this affords the internalist with a plausible explanation for VM patients’ behavior: because VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals, they are less motivated by their normative judgments than normals, which allows their decision-making to be overruled by their standing desires for greater and more immediate rewards.     

The Illusion-of-Transparency and Episodic Memory: Are People Egocentric or Do People Think that Lies are Easy to Detect?

The illusion-of-transparency seems like an egocentric bias, in which people believe that their inner feelings, thoughts and perspectives are more apparent to others than they actually are. In Experiment 1, participants read out true and false episodic memories to an audience. Participants over-estimated the number of people who would think that they were the liar, and they overestimated how many would correctly identify the liar. Experiment 2 found that with lessened task demands, and by using a scale of doubt, participants distinguished lies from truthful statements (albeit with a degree of error). Over the two experiments, results indicated that people have some ability to distinguish lies from truth (in illusion-of-transparency tasks), although people often overestimate this ability, and participants sometimes think their own lies are easier to detect than is really the case.     

Children's judgments about their own self‐knowledge: The role of disclosure to other

Previous research has suggested that children of 5/6 years fail to understand that they are the authority on their own self‐knowledge. That is, when asked questions like, ‘Who knows best when you are feeling tired?’, they tend to cite their mother rather than themselves. Here we report a study that, rather than asking about generalities (‘Who knows best what you are thinking?’), presented 5‐, 7‐ 9‐ and 11‐year‐children with hypothetical vignettes about specific circumstances in which they were described as either disclosing or not disclosing a specified state to their mother. Children were subsequently asked to judge who would best know the state. Over all age groups children were significantly more likely to identify themselves as authorities on their own self‐knowledge when states had not been disclosed to mother than when they had. However, in the case of disclosed states, young children (though not older ones) asserted that, ‘mum knows best’. These findings are interpreted as suggesting not that young children entirely fail to understand first person authority, but instead that they make the relatively sophisticated assumption that mothers' interpretive competence is greater than their own.     

Young Children Prefer and Remember Satisfying Explanations

Research with preschool children has shown that explanations are important to them in that they actively seek explanations in their conversations with adults. But what sorts of explanations do they prefer, and what, if anything, do young children learn from the explanations they receive? Following a preliminary study with adults (N = 67) to establish materials for use with children, we addressed this question using a seminaturalistic methodology. Four- and 5-year-olds (N = 69) were dissatisfied when receiving nonexplanations to their explanatory questions, but they were satisfied when receiving explanations, and their satisfaction varied appropriately across several levels of explanatory information. Moreover, using recall as a measure of learning, whereas children typically failed to recall nonexplanations, their recall of explanatory information was consistently high and also varied appropriately across differing levels of information provided. These results confirm that children not only actively seek informative explanations in their everyday conversational interactions with adults, but they selectively retain the answers they receive.     

Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism and the Consequences of Belief

John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility.     

Hempel’s Provisos and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ceteris Paribus</Emphasis> Clauses

The problem of ceteris paribus clauses and Hempel’s problem of provisos are closely-related difficulties. Both challenge advocates of accounts of scientific theories involving laws understood as universal generalizations, and they have been treated as identical problems. Earman and Roberts argue that the problems are distinct. Towards arguing against them, I characterize the relationship between Hempel’s provisos and one way of expressing ceteris paribus clauses. I then describe the relationship between the problems attributed to the clauses, suggesting that they form a single problem-cluster. However, Hempel’s way of formulating provisos and discussing what they involve entangles provisos with the problem of skepticism. This creates a departure in Hempel’s discussion of provisos from the distinctive problem of vacuity which characterizes the problem of ceteris paribus clauses, though for different reasons than Earman and Roberts suggest.     

Asymmetries in ethics

Ethical notions such as good and bad, are often treated as though they were ‘symmetric’ in the sense of having the same moral ‘weight’, one in a positive the other in a negative sense. I argue that they are in fact ‘asymmetric’ and that the negative members of such pairs of notions are more fundamental and definite, logically speaking, and operationally more important than the positive members. Detailed arguments are given to show this for some non‐moral notions, such as life and death, health and illness; some semi‐moral notions such as pleasure and pain; and finally for the moral notions of happiness, benevolence, right, and good and their negative counterparts. One of the intentions of the article is to show that a systematic view of such asymmetries may have consequences for one's view of the proper or desirable structure of a general theory of ethics: norms stating prohibitions and norms stating permissions will be seen to be, in a sense defined in the text, more fundamental and important than norms stating ('positive') obligations.     

Why does decreased likeability not deter adolescent bullying perpetrators?

This study examines why the lower likeability of bullying perpetrators does not deter them from engaging in bullying behavior, by testing three hypotheses: (a) bullying perpetrators are unaware that they are disliked, (b) they value popularity more than they value likeability, (c) they think that they have nothing to lose in terms of likeability, as they believe that their targets and other classmates would dislike them anyway, regardless of their behavior. The first two hypotheses were examined in Study 1 (1,035 Dutch adolescents, M _age = 14.15) and the third hypothesis was examined in Study 2 (601 Dutch adolescents, M _age = 12.92). Results from regression analyses showed that those higher in bullying were not more likely to overestimate their likeability. However, they were more likely than others to find being popular more important than being liked. Moreover, those higher in bullying were more likely to endorse the belief that the victimized student or the other classmates would have disliked a bullying protagonist (in vignettes of hypothetical bullying incidents) before any bullying started. These findings suggest that adolescent bullying perpetrators may not be deterred by the costs of bullying in terms of likeability, possibly because they do not value likeability that much (Hypothesis 2), and because they believe they hardly have any likeability to lose (Hypothesis 3).     

There must be a First: Why Thomas Aquinas Rejects Infinite,Essentially Ordered,Causal Series

Several of Thomas Aquinas's proofs for the existence of God rely on the claim that causal series cannot proceed in infinitum. I argue that Aquinas has good reason to hold this claim given his conception of causation. Because he holds that effects are ontologically dependent on their causes, he holds that the relevant causal series are wholly derivative: the later members of such series serve as causes only insofar as they have been caused by and are effects of the earlier members. Because the intermediate causes in such series possess causal powers only by deriving them from all the preceding causes, they need a first and non-derivative cause to serve as the source of their causal powers.     

SELMA THE JEWISH SEER: FEMALE PROPHECY AND BOURGEOIS RELIGION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY

This article discusses the importance of spiritualism and mysticism for nineteenth-century German Jews though the lens of a book about a Jewish female clairvoyant in 1830s Berlin. In 1838, Morris Wiener published Selma, die jüdische Seherin, a widely read story about his sister's miraculous healing and prophetic visions after being treated by a physician specializing in Mesmerism. This article proposes that we consider Selma's unusual story as an expression of nineteenth-century German Jews' experiences of bourgeois religion. In their attempt to prove that their religion was compatible with modern life, many German Jews sought to show not only how rational their religion was, as scholars have long emphasized, they also sought to demonstrate how spiritual Jews could be and to suggest that Judaism, like Protestantism and Catholicism, could engender multiple forms of mystical religiosity.     

What is the key to culturally competent care: Reducing bias or cultural tailoring?

Objective: To gain a better understanding as to whether disparities in patient–provider relationships arise from ethnic minority patients being treated differently than European American patients while they would prefer to be treated the same, or whether disparities arise when ethnic minority patients are treated the same as European American patients while they would prefer to be treated differently.

Method: African-American, Latina/Latino and European American community members were recruited to participate in one of 27 focus group discussions. Topics included what made a good or bad relationship with a doctor and what led one to trust a doctor. A thematic analysis was conducted using NVivo 10.

Results: Patients of all groups described experiences that reflected the concepts of patient-centred care, such as wanting a clinician who is attentive to patients’ needs. African-American patients reported experiences they viewed as discriminatory. Some African-American patients felt it was appropriate to racially/ethnically contextualise their care, and most Latina/Latino patients preferred language/culturally concordant clinicians.

Conclusion: Health care disparities might be reduced through a patient-centred approach to cultural competency training, general knowledge of the cultural context of clinicians’ patient population, and attention to the effects of racial bias and discrimination among both clinicians and non-clinical staff.     

FRAMING THE HUMAN CONDITION: THE EXISTENTIAL DILEMMA IN IRIS MURDOCH'S THE BELL AND MURIEL SPARK'S ROBINSON

One of the features of modernist and postmodernist novels is the way they interrogate classical metaphysics, in the spirit of what Habermas calls post‐metaphysical thinking, otherwise known as the post‐Enlightenment critique of the Enlightenment. As a literary prism, post‐metaphysical thinking is not anti‐metaphysical: it conducts its interrogation and still accommodates both secular and religious frames. Iris Murdoch and Muriel Spark are often compared but they interrogate classical metaphysics from different perspectives and for different purposes. In the nineteen‐fifties, Murdoch was an aspiring philosophical author who treated classical metaphysics as a canon of influential myth, while Spark was an aspiring theological author who had recently converted to Catholicism. Through a reading of The Bell and Robinson, both published in the same year, this article describes how the young Murdoch and Spark do what emerging literary authors of the nineteen‐fifties were expected to do: frame the human condition and reflect on its existential dilemma. With their different perspectives they both write within the same paradigm, or theory of mind; against symbolic backgrounds, and among significant dialogues, they make use of similar tropes. But Murdoch and Spark arrive at opposite positions on the relationship between imagination and reality, between logos and mythos, and ultimately on the nature of freedom and contingency.     

Age-related differences in metacognition for memory capacity and selectivity

ABSTRACT

Background: We compared two types of metacognitive monitoring in younger and older adults: metacognitive accuracy for their overall memory performance and their ability to selectively remember high-value information. Method: Participants studied words paired with point values and were asked to maximise their point score. In Experiment 1, they predicted how many words they would remember while in Experiment 2, they predicted how many points they would earn. Results: In Experiment 1, while younger adults were accurate in their predictions, older adults were overconfident in the number of words they would recall throughout the task. In Experiment 2, however, both younger and older adults were equally accurate when predicting the amount of points they would earn after some task experience. Conclusions: While younger adults may have higher metacognitive accuracy for their capacity, older adults can accurately assess their ability to selectively remember information, suggesting potentially separate metacognitive mechanisms that are differentially affected by aging.     

Bystanders’ affect toward bully and victim as predictors of helping and non-helping behaviour

The current study examined how children's relationship with the bully and victim impacted their reactions as bystanders. An ethnically diverse sample of 2,513 Canadian students in grades 4–7 responded to questions about their experiences of bullying, including the frequency with which they witnessed bullying at school. Approximately 89% of the sample reported witnessing bullying at school during the current school year. Subsequently, participants were asked to recall a specific bullying incident that they witnessed and describe: (1) their relationship with the bully and victim; (2) how they felt while witnessing; and (3) how they responded as a bystander. Compared to situations where they didn't know the victim, bystanders were more likely to intervene directly (e.g., try to stop the bully, comfort the victim) if they liked the victim, and less likely to tell an adult if they disliked the victim. Aggressive intervention was more common if the witness didn't like the bully, but also if they didn't like the victim compared to if they didn't know them. Regarding emotions, anger emerged as an especially powerful predictor of bystander defending, with youth being over five times more likely to try to stop the bullying or comfort the victim if they felt angry. Implications of these findings for the development of ecologically valid, anti-bullying interventions are discussed.     

The Truthmaking Argument Against Dispositionalism

According to dispositionalism, de re modality is grounded in the intrinsic natures of dispositional properties. Those properties are able to serve as the ground of de re modal truths, it is said, because they bear a special relation to counterfactual conditionals, one of truthmaking. However, because dispositionalism purports to ground de re modality only on the intrinsic natures of dispositional properties, it had better be the case that they do not play that truthmaking role merely in virtue of their being embedded in some particular, extrinsic causal context. This paper examines a recent argument against dispositionalism that purports to show that the intrinsicality of that relation cannot be maintained, due to the ceteris paribus nature of the counterfactuals that dispositions make‐true. When two prominent responses are examined, both are found wanting: at best, they require unjustified special pleading, and at worst, they amount to little more than ad hoc conceptual trickery. 1