Pāli studies in the west: Present state and future tasks

The Society of Jesus constitutes a remarkable example of permanence and universality; therefore it is an ideal laboratory for studying the troubled relations national institutions entertained with such a supranational congregation. In the first part of the paper the conflicting interests of both parties are analysed; it is then noticed that historically the expulsions form four successive waves and the question of contagion of anti-Jesuits policies is discussed. Furthermore it is shown (as far as permitted by available sources) that in each individual country the methods used in order to set up and to enforce the expulsions show a high degree of continuity over the course of three centuries.     

Al‐Ghazāli's evaluation of abu yazid al‐bistāmi and his disapproval of the mystical concepts of union and fusion

Abū Yazid al‐Bistāmi (d. 874 AD) was a renowned early sūfi who exerted a tremendous influence upon the doctrinal formulation of the sufism of medieval times. A highly controversial figure, he is venerated by some as a top‐ranking saint and sūfi, condemned by others as a notorious heretic, and there are still others who suspend judgement on him. More than 200 years after him al‐Ghazāli (1058‐1111 AD) flourished as the greatest sūfi of all times; he examined and evaluated the teachings of his sūfi predecessors including Abū Yazid. To determine his evaluation of Abū Yazid and his opinion on the related, well‐known concept of man's union with God at the highest peak of spirituality is the main aim of this paper. To achieve this aim al‐Ghazāli's citations from Abū Yazid's teachings on many basic doctrines of sufism, together with his explicit comments on them, are analysed in the second section of the paper, and he is found to have evaluated these teachings as of a very high grade and to have extolled Abū Yazid as a sūfi of the highest rank. The third section studies al‐Ghazāli's opinion on the most important aspect of Abū Yazid's teachings, i.e. his shatahāt or ecstatic utterances apparently expressive of union, fusion and divine indwelling. This began with a consideration of al‐Ghazāli's definition of two kinds of shath and his condemnation of them on the grounds of their harmful consequences. In connection with a study of his condemnation of the shatahāt of Abū Yazid and al‐Hallāj an investigation is made into his opinion on union and fusion. It is found that throughout his sūfi life he condemned them as false concepts. However Abū Yazid's shatahāt, which apparently mean union, fusion, etc. are interpreted in an orthodox manner, and he is adjudged an elect of the elect, a gnostic who reached the level of reality of realities, a perfect sūfi who attained to God. All the above findings are based on al‐Ghazāli's explicit comments on Abū Yazid. The fourth section of the paper deals with his implicit, indirect comments which also prove his appreciation of, and indebtedness to, Abū Yazid in respect of several central concepts of sufism.     

The development and use of the eight precepts for lay practitioners,Upāsakas and Upāsikās in Theravāda Buddhism in the West

Sometimes translating religious texts brings us up against the problem of scatological language. The author examines this problem in relation to a story of a former life of the Buddha and explores a variety of avenues for guidance on how to render gūtha ‘shit’ into English. This includes looking at Buddhist monastic law, which does not necessarily give us the guidance we might expect, and how the existing translation of this source of guidance illustrates the very problem in hand. The textual history and context of the story precludes some otherwise useful strategies for determining our translation and the best guide to the translator's hand in this instance turns out to be humour. The author makes a case that, employed judiciously, humour could become a useful hermeneutic tool for drawing meaning from religious literature. Along the way the author also reflects on the influence of the social context of the translator, including changes in British obscenity law, and on the possibility that academia is unconsciously constrained by unexamined assumptions of ‘decency’. Buddhist attitudes to language are also touched upon.     

Kālīghāṭ and the Fashioning of Middle-Class Modernities

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The upper middle classes have worked over the past century to transform the Hindu temple from a symbol of “backwardness” to a symbol of the...     

Vijñaptimātratā and the Abhidharma context of rarly Yogācāra

Contemporary accounts of early Mahāyāna Buddhist schools like the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra tend to portray them as generally antithetical to the Abhidharma of non‐Mahāyāna schools such as the Theravāda and the Sarvāstivāda. This paper attempts to locate early Yogācāra philosophical speculation firmly within the broader context of Abhidharma debates. Certain key Yogācāra concepts such as ālayavijñāna, vijñapti‐mātratā and citta‐mātra are discussed insofar as they relate to pre‐existing concepts and issues found in the Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika schools, with specific reference to the Abhidharmako?a and the corresponding bhāsya of Vasubandhu. Finally, some remarks are made about the, benefits of approaching the history of religious ideas without the benefits and distortions of hindsight, particularly as this relates to the attribution of an idealistic position to the early Yogācāra literature.     

Self-Awareness and the Integration of Pramāṇa and Madhyamaka

Buddhist theories of mind pivot between two distinct interpretative strands: (1) an epistemological tradition in which the mind, or the mental, is the foundation for valid knowledge and (2) a tradition of deconstruction, in which there is no privileged vantage point for truth claims. The contested status of these two strands is evident in the debates surrounding the relationship between epistemology (pramāna) and Madhyamaka that extend from India to Tibet. The paper will focus on two exemplars of these approaches in Tibet, those of ?ākya Chokden (shākya mchog ldan, 1428–1507) and Tsongkhapa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419).     

Prāmāṇyavāda in the Text Tātparyaṭīkā and Pariśuddhi

In the thirteenth century, Gaṅgeśapādhyāya of Mithilā wrote his magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi which marked the inception of the Navya- Nyāya School. It was from this time that the works of the Nyāya beginning with the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, and ending with Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamanjarī as well as Udayana’s Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi came to be designated as Prācīna-nyāya. We have elaborated the arguments of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana in order to support and prove the extrinsic nature of pramāṇa. In this paper, we have also shown that they have added extra strength to the views of the former Māsters—their predecessors by declaring that the inference (which is advanced by Bhāṣyakāra) is purged of fallacies of all sorts in the field of the validity of pramāṇa.

     

Avian Artistry: Decoding the Intertextuality Between Mahābhārata and Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa

International Journal of Hindu Studies - Why do four birds narrate the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa? Narrative enframement plays a crucial role in contextualizing Sanskrit...     

The importance of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

Volume 1. Hinayāna. Den tidlige indiske buddhisme. Volume 2. Mahāyāna. Den senere indiske buddhisme. Christian Lindtner, 1998, Copenhagen, Spektrum/Forum Publishers, Vol. 1: 228 pp., ISBN 87 7763 170 6; Vol. 2: 256 pp., ISBN 87 7763 174 9     

Mental Pain in the Mahābhārata

International Journal of Hindu Studies - A number of passages in the Mahābhārata draw the distinction between bodily pain (?ārīra? du?kham) and mental pain...     

God, Time and the Kalām Cosmological Argument

The Kalām cosmological argument deploys the following causal principle: whatever begins to exist has a cause. Yet, under what conditions does something ‘begin to exist’? What does it mean to say that ‘X begins to exist at t’? William Lane Craig has offered and defended various accounts that seek to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for when something ‘begins to exist.’ I argue that all of the accounts that William Lane Craig has offered fail on the following grounds: either they entail that God has a cause or they render the Kalām argument unsound. Part of the problem is due to Craig’s view of God’s relationship to time: that God exists timelessly without creation and temporarily with creation. The conclusion is that Craig must abandon either the Kalām argument or his view of God’s relationship to time; he cannot consistently hold both.