The Uncertainty Paradox: Perceived Threat Moderates the Effect of Uncertainty on Political Tolerance

People respond to dissimilar political beliefs in a variety of ways, ranging from openness and acceptance to closed‐mindedness and intolerance. While there is reason to believe that uncertainty may influence political tolerance, the direction of this influence remains unclear. We propose that threat moderates the effect of uncertainty on tolerance; when safe, uncertainty leads to greater tolerance, yet when threatened, uncertainty leads to reduced tolerance. Using independent manipulations of threat and uncertainty, we provide support for this hypothesis. This research demonstrates that, although feelings of threat and uncertainty can be independent, it is also important to understand their interaction.     

Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism or ideological extremity?

Three studies are conducted to assess the uncertainty- threat model of political conservatism, which posits that psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat are associated with political orientation. Results from structural equation models provide consistent support for the hypothesis that uncertainty avoidance (e.g., need for order, intolerance of ambiguity, and lack of openness to experience) and threat management (e.g., death anxiety, system threat, and perceptions of a dangerous world) each contributes independently to conservatism (vs. liberalism). No support is obtained for alternative models, which predict that uncertainty and threat management are associated with ideological extremism or extreme forms of conservatism only. Study 3 also reveals that resistance to change fully mediates the association between uncertainty avoidance and conservatism, whereas opposition to equality partially mediates the association between threat and conservatism. Implications for understanding the epistemic and existential bases of political orientation are discussed.     

个体的政治倾向及其变化机制

政治倾向是个体在意识形态上的定位, 可以分为自由主义和保守主义, 政治倾向使个体在认知和行为等方面存在显著差异。虽然个体的政治倾向相对稳定, 但也会受威胁的影响而变化。动机性社会认知理论认为威胁使所有人都变得更加保守, 恐惧管理理论认为威胁使个体更坚信自己原有的文化世界观, 使原有政治倾向更加明显。本文在深入分析讨论的基础上, 指出两种理论分歧的原因在于忽略了外部威胁与内部威胁的不同。内部威胁可加强人们原有的政治倾向, 外部威胁可使人们更趋向保守。未来研究应在内外部威胁影响政治倾向变化的机制、政治倾向的本土化研究以及促进不同政治倾向个体间的和谐关系上做出努力。     

Political conservatism as motivated social cognition

Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justification). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r = .50); system instability (.47); dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (-.32); uncertainty tolerance (-.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (-.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (-.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat.     

Interparty Attitudes in Chile: Coalitions as Superordinate Social Identities

This paper reports a survey (N  =  1,465) conducted in Chile that was conceived to understand the role of coalition identification as an important sociopsychological mechanism for promoting positive affects toward own-coalition party members in a multiparty system, above and beyond interparty political differences. Participants judged their own political party, parties within coalitions (fellow coalition members and opposing parties), and political coalitions as a whole on affective dimensions (trust, liking, and admiration). The results provide substantial support for the five hypotheses addressed in the study. Overall, perceived interparty distance and political identity threat had a negative impact on affect toward coalition party members. Above and beyond these effects, identification with the coalition positively predicted affect toward allies. Ingroup party affect was positively correlated with affect toward own-coalition party members and own coalition as a whole, but was not negatively associated with affect toward opposing-coalition parties. Moreover, the relationship between own-party affect and affect toward own-coalition party members was mediated by affect toward own coalition. Overall, evidence for the benefits of promoting coalition identification in a multiparty system is provided and discussed alongside the limitations and practical implications derived from the study.     

Collective Trauma From the Lab to the Real World: The Effects of the Holocaust on Contemporary Israeli Political Cognitions

This research tested whether chronic or contextually activated Holocaust exposure is associated with more extreme political attitudes among Israeli Jews. Study 1 (N = 57), and Study 2 (N = 61) found that Holocaust primes increased support for aggressive policies against a current adversary and decreased support for political compromise via an amplified sense of identification with Zionist ideology. These effects, however, were obtained only under an exclusive but not an inclusive framing of the Holocaust. Study 3 (N = 152) replicated these findings in a field study conducted around Holocaust Remembrance Day and showed that the link between Holocaust exposure, ideological identification, and militancy also occurs in real‐life settings. Study 4 (N = 867) demonstrated in a nationally representative survey that Holocaust survivors and their descendants exhibited amplified existential threat responses to contemporary political violence, which were associated with militancy and opposition to peaceful compromises. Together, these studies illustrate the Holocaustization of Israeli political cognitions 70 years later.     

Ideology: Its Resurgence in Social, Personality, and Political Psychology

ABSTRACT— We trace the rise, fall, and resurgence of political ideology as a topic of research in social, personality, and political psychology. For over 200 years, political belief systems have been classified usefully according to a single left–right (or liberal–conservative) dimension that, we believe, possesses two core aspects: (a) advocating versus resisting social change and (b) rejecting versus accepting inequality. There have been many skeptics of the notion that most people are ideologically inclined, but recent psychological evidence suggests that left–right differences are pronounced in many life domains. Implicit as well as explicit preferences for tradition, conformity, order, stability, traditional values, and hierarchy—versus those for progress, rebelliousness, chaos, flexibility, feminism, and equality—are associated with conservatism and liberalism, respectively. Conservatives score consistently higher than liberals on measures of system justification. Furthermore, there are personality and lifestyle differences between liberals and conservatives as well as situational variables that induce either liberal or conservative shifts in political opinions. Our thesis is that ideological belief systems may be structured according to a left–right dimension for largely psychological reasons linked to variability in the needs to reduce uncertainty and threat.     

Public Support for Political Compromise on a Volatile Racial Issue: Insight from the Survey Experiment

In 2000, South Carolina officials, after years of political wrangling over the flying of the Confederate flag over the state capitol, finally removed it, placing it at a Confederate monument on the statehouse grounds. Here, via iterative survey experimentation, I look at the public response to the political compromise required to bring down the flag. I show that the public did respond positively to the multifaceted compromise and that black flag opponents were much more likely than white flag proponents to support the compromise. I also show that more white flag proponents can be swayed to support the compromise if they understand that it is supported by a majority of South Carolinians, thus breaking their misperception of the issue. Flag proponents, however, do not respond more positively to compromise simply because it is the by‐product of white and black negotiations. The political process necessarily evokes competitive intergroup attitudes. Can we think about process in a way that redirects these attitudes and makes political compromise more acceptable?     

Framing Political Risks: Individual Differences and Loss Aversion in Personal and Political Situations

People are motivated to avoid losses. In the context of politics, studies consistently show that the threat of losses increases support for risky public policies more than the promise of gains. Here, we predict that this loss aversion is calibrated by individual differences related to one’s ability to accommodate resource loss, and we investigate how these individual differences moderate reactions to the threat of losses and the promise of gains. Results from large-N experiments consistently demonstrate that this moderation effect crucially depends on whether the resource loss relates to oneself or one’s group—whether the setting is personal or political. Consistent with classic assumptions, individuals with inferior abilities to cope with resource loss are more loss averse in personal settings. In political settings where group resources are threatened, effects reverse: Individuals with superior resources and a more central position within the group consistently respond more to the prospect of loss. As discussed, these findings have important implications for our understanding of why and for whom the threat of loss motivates risky personal and political choices. By consequence, the findings also shed novel light on the psychological underpinnings of recent risky political events.      

Political distrust,perceived threat,and intentions to engage in normative and violent collective action: A mixed-methods study

In three studies, we examined the role of distrust and perceived threat in intentions to engage in normative and violent non-normative collective action. A field-based qualitative study of 35 pro-democracy protestors during the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition protests revealed that perceived threat to Hong Kong values alongside distrust of political institutions spurred collective action engagement and support for defensive violent collection action. In Study 2, a questionnaire (N = 639) testing pro-democracy action intentions demonstrated direct paths on both normative and violent collective action intentions from distrust and threat. In Study 3 (N = 133), experimental trust and threat manipulations demonstrated a significant association between distrust and threat on violent collective action intentions and acceptance, and a significant interaction on acceptance of violent collective action. Our results reveal the importance of distrust and threat in attitudinal support for, and engagement in, collective action and their role in transitioning from non-violent to violent collective action.     

External Freedom in Kant's Rechtslehre: Political,Metaphysical1

External freedom is the central good protected in Kant's legal and political philosophy. But external freedom is perplexing, being at once freedom of spatio‐temporal movement and a form of noumenal or ‘intelligible’freedom. Moreover, it turns out that identifying impairments to external freedom nearly always involves recourse to an elaborated system of positive law, which seems to compromise external freedom's status as a prior, organizing good. Drawing heavily on Kant's understanding of the role of empirical ‘anthropological’information in constructing a Doctrine of Right, or Rechtslehre, this essay offers an interpretation of external freedom that makes sense of its simultaneous spatio‐temporality, dependence on positive law, intelligibility (or ‘noumenality’), and a priority. The essay suggests that this account of Kantian external freedom has implications both for politics and for the metaphysics of everyday objects and institutions.     

Subjective probabilities and values of socio-economic events at different degrees of uncertainty

Abstract.— The relationship between values (negative] positive) and subjective probabilities was studied. Stimuli consisted of unique socio-economic events represented in the political discussion in Finland. Uncertainty was measured as hesitation in estimating probabilities, The results indicated different relationships between values and probability estimates at different degrees of uncertainty. At certainty the relation was u-shaped, at some uncertainty the variables were nearly uncorrelated, and at uncertainty an linear relationship between values and subjective probabilities was found.     

The Central Role of Group-Based Hatred as an Emotional Antecedent of Political Intolerance: Evidence from Israel

In recent years, political scientists have shifted the focus of explaining political phenomena from the purely cognitive perspective to an integrated emotion-cognition one. Yet most studies which examine antecedents of political intolerance ignore the potential role played by "gut feelings" or group-based negative emotions in endorsing those attitudes. Moreover, even the few studies that deal with emotions and intolerance concentrate exclusively on the role of groups of emotions (positive vs. negative, dispositional vs. surveillance) or on basic emotions (anger or fear) and ignore the potential influence of more complex discrete emotions like hatred on political intolerance. Hence, the main goal of this study was to create a deeper understanding regarding the role of discrete negative emotions in increasing political intolerance among different groups of individuals in different contexts. In order to do so, the relations between political intolerance and three group-based negative emotions (hatred, anger, and fear) were tested by means of four large-scale nationwide surveys. Within the surveys, various intolerance measurement methods were used in various contexts (wartime vs. no-war/routine periods) and among individuals with different levels of political sophistication. Results, obtained via multiple regression analysis and structural equation modeling, show that: (1) Group-based hatred is the most important antecedent of political intolerance even when controlling for important intolerance inducers such as perceived threat. (2) Other group-based negative emotions like anger or fear influence political intolerance wholly through the mediation of hatred or perceived threat. (3) The role of group-based hatred in inducing political intolerance is more substantial in the face of heightened existential threat and among unsophisticated individuals than among sophisticated ones.     

Perceived Threat,Social Identification,and Psychological Well‐Being: The Effects of Political Conflict Exposure

Using data drawn from the adult population in Northern Ireland (N = 1,515), this article examines the relationship between perceived intergroup threat and psychological well‐being, taking into consideration the mediating role of social identification and the moderating role of political conflict exposure. Results by and large confirmed our predictions that perceived threat would be directly associated with poorer well‐being but would also exert a positive indirect effect on well‐being via increased social identification. However, these relationships were dependent on individuals' prior conflict exposure, such that the positive indirect relationship between perceived threat and psychological well‐being emerged only for two subpopulations: individuals who had high direct and high indirect exposure to conflict, and individuals who had low direct, but high indirect conflict exposure. No indirect effects emerged for individuals with relatively lower conflict exposure. Results are discussed with regard to their implications for research on the consequences of intergroup threat in political conflict settings and beyond.     

Disability and Domination: Lessons from Republican Political Philosophy

The republican ideal of non‐domination identifies the capacity for arbitrary interference as a fundamental threat to liberty that can generate fearful uncertainty and servility in those dominated. I argue that republican accounts of domination can provide a powerful analysis of the nature of legal and institutional power that is encountered by people with mental disorders or cognitive disabilities. In doing so, I demonstrate that non‐domination is an ideal which is pertinent, distinctive, and desirable in thinking through psychological disability. Finally, I evaluate republican strategies for contesting domination, focusing on the limits of contestatory democracy, and proposing a participatory alternative which better addresses problems of political agency in the mentally disordered and cognitively disabled.     

Threat as a Motivator of Political Activism: A Field Experiment

The research reported here examined the effects of two potential motivators of political activism—policy change threat and policy change opportunity—in a field experiment. Different versions of a letter were sent by a political lobbying organization to potential contributors. One version highlighted threats of undesirable policy changes, another version highlighted opportunities for desirable policy changes, and the third version did neither. Policy change threat increased the number of financial contributions made to the interest group, but policy change opportunity did not. Policy change opportunity increased the number of signed postcards returned to be sent to President Clinton, but policy change threat did not. These findings highlight the impact of interest group recruitment strategies on citizen responsiveness and demonstrate the need to account for sources of motivation in order to more fully understand when, why, and how citizens choose to become politically active.     

Political intolerance: the role of intergroup threat and negative intergroup emotion

This study investigated whether the perception of intergroup threat, and intergroup emotion, are related to political intolerance. One hundred and twenty three South African undergraduate students (females?=?76%; males?=?24%; White?=?65%; Coloured?=?24%; Indian?=?8%; Chinese?=?2%; mean age =?19.8, SD?=?3.03 years) were randomly assigned to either a heightened (n?=?68) or low intergroup threat condition (n?=?55). Data on intergroup threat, intergroup emotion and political intolerance were collected utilising a questionnaire. T-test effect comparisons including multiple regression analyses were computed to determine effects of intergroup threat and negative intergroup emotion on political intolerance. Results revealed negative intergroup emotion and perceived intergroup threat to predict political intolerance. Negative intergroup emotion mediated the relationship between perceived threat and political intolerance. These findings suggest that intergroup threat may lead to the rise of negative intergroup emotion which in turn creates an environment conducive to the development of political intolerance.     

Support for Anti‐Muslim Policies: The Role of Political Traits and Threat Perception

We explored how political beliefs and attitudes predict support for anti‐Muslim policies and extremist behavior in the United States following the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. A large sample completed measures of authoritarianism, social dominance orientation (SDO), generalized prejudice, identification with all humanity (IWAH), perceptions of Muslim threat, and support for anti‐Muslim policies and behaviors. These measures accounted for 73% of the variance in moderate anti‐Muslim policies and 55% of the variance in extreme anti‐Muslim policies. Authoritarianism and SDO directly and indirectly predicted support for anti‐Muslim policies, with their effects partially mediated by generalized prejudice, IWAH, and perceptions of Muslims as threatening. Threat both mediated and moderated the relationship between authoritarianism and anti‐Muslim policies. A negative interaction between authoritarianism and perceptions of Muslims as threatening predicted moderate anti‐Muslim policies, but a positive interaction predicted extreme anti‐Muslim policies. A tentative explanation is offered. Perceptions of Muslim threat was consistently a powerful predictor of anti‐Muslim policies and willingness to engage in extremist behaviors targeting Muslims. Programs to combat anti‐Muslim prejudice should consider the role of threat‐related stereotypes in expressions of anti‐Muslim prejudice.     

Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence

Ideology is a potent motivational force; human beings are capable of committing atrocities (as well as acts of generosity and courage) and sacrificing even their own lives for the sake of abstract belief systems. In this article, we summarize the major tenets of a model of political ideology as motivated social cognition (Jost et al. in Psychol Bull 129:339–375, 2003a, Psychol Bull 129:389–393, 2003b, Person Soc Psychol Bull 33:989–1007, 2007), focusing on epistemic, existential, and relational motives and their implications for left-right (or liberal-conservative) political orientation. We review behavioral evidence indicating that chronically and temporarily activated needs to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust are positively associated with conservatism (or negatively associated with liberalism). Studies from neuroscience and genetics suggest that right- (vs. left-) wing orientation is associated with greater neural sensitivity to threat and larger amygdala volume, as well as less sensitivity to response conflict and smaller anterior cingulate volume. These findings and others provide converging evidence for Jost and colleagues’ model of ideology as motivated social cognition and, more broadly, reflect the utility of an integrative political neuroscience approach to understanding the basic cognitive, neural, and motivational processes that give rise to ideological activity.     

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

Individuals are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs and opinions they have been exposed to; rather, they are attracted to belief systems that resonate with their own psychological needs and interests, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs to attain certainty, security, and social belongingness. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway ( 2003 ) demonstrated that needs to manage uncertainty and threat were associated with core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and acceptance of inequality. Since 2003 there have been far more studies on the psychology of left‐right ideology than in the preceding half century, and their empirical yield helps to address lingering questions and criticisms. We have identified 181 studies of epistemic motivation (involving 130,000 individual participants) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation (involving 360,000 participants). These databases, which are much larger and more heterogeneous than those used in previous meta‐analyses, confirm that significant ideological asymmetries exist with respect to dogmatism, cognitive/perceptual rigidity, personal needs for order/structure/closure, integrative complexity, tolerance of ambiguity/uncertainty, need for cognition, cognitive reflection, self‐deception, and subjective perceptions of threat. Exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks, governmental warnings, and shifts in racial demography—contribute to modest “conservative shifts” in public opinion. There are also ideological asymmetries in relational motivation, including the desire to share reality, perceptions of within‐group consensus, collective self‐efficacy, homogeneity of social networks, and the tendency to trust the government more when one's own political party is in power. Although some object to the very notion that there are meaningful psychological differences between leftists and rightists, the identification of “elective affinities” between cognitive‐motivational processes and contents of specific belief systems is essential to the study of political psychology. Political psychologists may contribute to the development of a good society not by downplaying ideological differences or advocating “Swiss‐style neutrality” when it comes to human values, but by investigating such phenomena critically, even—or perhaps especially—when there is pressure in society to view them uncritically.