Testosterone facilitates the sense of agency

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to feelings of being in control of one’s actions. Evidence suggests that SoA might contribute towards higher-order feelings of personal control – a key attribute of powerful individuals. Whether testosterone, a steroid hormone linked to power in dominance hierarchies, also influences the SoA is not yet established. In a repeated-measures design, 26 females participated in a double-blind, placebo-controlled trial to test the effects of 0.5 mg testosterone on SoA, using an implicit measure based upon perceived shifts in time between a voluntary action and its outcome. Illusions of control, as operationalized by optimism in affective forecasting, were also assessed. Testosterone increased action binding but there was no significant effect on tone binding. Affective forecasting was found to be significantly more positive on testosterone. SoA and optimistic expectations are basic manifestations of power which may contribute to feelings of infallibility often associated with dominance and testosterone.     

Intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency

Sense of agency, a feeling of generating actions and events by oneself, stems from action–outcome congruence. An implicit marker of sense of agency is intentional binding, which is compression of subjective temporal interval between action and outcome. We investigated relationships between intentional binding and explicit sense of agency. Participants pressed a key triggering auditory (Experiment 1) or visual outcome (Experiment 2) that occurred after variable delays. In each trial, participants rated their agency over the outcome and estimated the keypress–outcome temporal interval. Results showed that delays decreased agency ratings and intentional binding. There was inter-individual correlation between sensitivities to outcome delay (i.e., regression slope) of agency rating and intentional binding in the auditory but not visual domain. Importantly, we found intra-individual correlations between agency rating and intentional binding on a trial-by-trial basis in both outcome modalities. These results suggest that intentional binding coincides with explicit sense of agency.     

Induced power changes the sense of agency

Power differentials are a ubiquitous feature of social interactions and power has been conceptualised as an interpersonal construct. Here we show that priming power changes the sense of agency, indexed by intentional binding. Specifically, participants wrote about episodes in which they had power over others, or in which others had power over them. After priming, participants completed an interval estimation task in which they judged the interval between a voluntary action and a visual effect. After low-power priming, participants judged intervals to be significantly longer than judgments after high-power or no priming. Thus, intentional binding was significantly changed by low-power, suggesting that power reduces the sense of agency for action outcomes. Our results demonstrate a clear intrapersonal effect of power. We suggest that intentional binding could be employed to assess agency in individuals suffering from anxiety and depression, both of which are characterised by reduced feelings of personal control.     

Outcome processing and the sense of agency

People can distinguish outcomes they cause from those they do not; that is, they are quite able to sense self-agency in outcomes. A well-received idea is that the sense of agency is produced by a comparison between a predicted outcome and the actual outcome that occurs. While research has generally focused on understanding predictive representations and the comparison process, less work has been done on the actual outcomes and, in particular, how these are perceived or apprehended. Here, we studied this issue. In two experiments, we found outcomes are continuously, as opposed to partially, sampled throughout their span. Specifically, we found that prediction-inconsistent signals embedded within otherwise prediction-consistent outcomes were able to influence agency ratings, and this was true whether the contrary signals were embedded early or late in the outcome.     

The time windows of the sense of agency

The sense of agency depends on some internal cues that derive from action control, as well as external cues like contextual information and prior information (degree of contingency between an action and is effect). We assessed whether external agency cues are combined with internal agency cues to affect the sense of agency. In two experiments participants performed a movement (button press) that elicited, after a varying delay, an effect (ball appearing on a screen), and reported their sense of agency over the effect (full, partial or no-agency) while internal cues (premotor information) and external cues (contextual and prior information) were manipulated. We assessed the effect of agency cues on the delays at which the sense of agency varied. The delays were increased with premotor signals but were decreased with contextual information. These findings favour a model of integration of internal and external agency cues over time.     

Experience of agency and sense of responsibility

The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes using the intentional binding effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) as an implicit, quantitative measure related to sense of agency. We studied the time at which people perceived simple manual actions and their effects, when these actions were embedded in scenarios where their actions had unpredictable consequences that could be either moral or merely economic. We found an enhanced binding of effects back towards the actions that caused them, implying an enhanced sense of agency, in moral compared to non-moral contexts. We also found stronger binding for effects with severely negative, compared to moderately negative, values. A tight temporal association between action and effect may be a low-level phenomenal marker of the sense of responsibility.     

The illusion of external agency

People typically underestimate their capacity to generate satisfaction with future outcomes. When people experience such self-generated satisfaction, they may mistakenly conclude that it was caused by an influential, insightful, and benevolent external agent. In three laboratory experiments, participants who were allowed to generate satisfaction with their outcomes were especially likely to conclude that an external agent had subliminally influenced their choice of partners (Study 1), had insight into their musical preferences (Study 2), and had benevolent intentions when giving them a stuffed animal (Study 3). These results suggest that belief in omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent external agents, such as God, may derive in part from people's failure to recognize that they have generated their own satisfaction.     

施动感双层结构的发展

施动感是个体在自主运动过程中对自身行为产生的主体性体验,揭示其发展过程对了解自我意识的形成具有重要意义。三阶段模式全面概括了施动感的发展过程。婴儿形成动作预测、建立动作-效果联结以及与养育者良好的人际互动对施动感的发展起着重要作用。未来施动感发展研究应从多种施动感生成理论出发,改进婴幼儿施动感的测量范式,探索施动感发展与社会认知发展、自闭症症状的关联。     

The impact of eye contact on the sense of agency

Recent research suggests that eye contact can lead to enhanced self-awareness. A related phenomenon, the sense of agency deals with the notion of the self as the origin of our actions. Possible links between eye contact and agency have been so far neglected. Here, we investigated whether an implicit sense of agency could be modulated by eye gaze. We asked participants to respond (button press) to a face stimulus: looking or not at the participant (experiment 1); or displaying distinct eye gaze before or after a mask (experiment 2). After each trial, participants estimated the time between their key press and the ensuing effects. We found enhanced intentional binding for conditions that involved direct compared to averted gaze. This study supports the idea that eye contact is an important cue that affects complex cognitive processes and suggests that modulating self-processing can impact the sense of agency.     

Effect of distorted visual feedback on the sense of agency

It has been hypothesized that an internal model is involved in controlling and recognizing one's own actions (action attribution). This results from a comparison process between the predicted sensory feedback of the action and its real sensory consequences. The aim of the present study is to distinguish the respective importance of two action parameters (time and direction) on such an attribution judgment. We used a device that allows introduction of discordance between the movements actually performed and the sensory feedback displayed on a computer screen. Participants were asked to judge whether they were viewing 1) their own movements, 2) their own movements modified (spatially or temporally displaced), or 3) those of another agent (i.e, the experimenter). In fact, in all conditions they were only shown their own movements either unaltered or modified by varying amounts in space or time. Movements were only attributed to another agent when there was a high spatial discordance between participants' hand movements and sensory feedback. This study is the first to show that the direction of movements is a cardinal feature in action attribution, whereas temporal properties of movements play a less important role.     

Intentional binding and the sense of agency: a review

It is nearly 10 years since Patrick Haggard and colleagues first reported the 'intentional binding' effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). The intentional binding effect refers to the subjective compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory consequence. Since the first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating array of studies has accumulated. Much of the interest in intentional binding comes from the promise to shed light on human agency. In this review we survey studies on intentional binding, focusing, in particular, on the link between intentional binding and the sense of agency (the experience of controlling action to influence events in the environment). We suggest that, whilst it is yet to be fully explicated, the link between intentional binding and the sense of agency is compelling. We conclude by considering outstanding questions and future directions for research on intentional binding.     

Shoulder joint position sense improves with external load

Joint position sense (JPS) is important in the maintenance of optimal movement coordination of limb segments in functional activities. Researchers have shown that the sensitivity of musculotendinous mechanoreceptors increases as muscle activation levels increase. In the present study, when 25 participants tried to replicate the same presented position, both vector and elevation angle repositioning errors decreased linearly as the external load increased up to 40% above unloaded shoulder torque. However, external load had no effect on plane repositioning error. The results indicated that JPS increased under conditions of increasing external load but only in the direction of the applied load. That finding indicates that JPS acuity improves as muscle activation levels increase.     

Exploring implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency

Sense of agency refers to the sense of initiating and controlling actions in order to influence events in the outside world. Recently, a distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency has been proposed, analogous to distinctions found in other areas of cognition, notably learning. However, there is yet no strong evidence supporting separable implicit and explicit components of sense of agency. The so-called ‘Perruchet paradigm’ offers one of the few convincing demonstrations of separable implicit and explicit learning systems. We adopted this approach to evaluate the implicit–explicit distinction in the context of a simple task in which outcomes were probabilistically caused by actions. In line with our initial predictions, we found evidence of a dissociation. We discuss the implications of this result for theories of sense of agency.     

主动控制感的测量及认知神经机制

主动控制感指预计动作和实际感觉反馈匹配会产生一种控制自己动作、作用于环境的主观体验, 是人类心理活动的基本特征之一。本文系统介绍主动控制感的测量方式, 尤其是主动动作的时间压缩效应这一内隐手段; 并从主观意识、动作的发生方式和动作结果特征三个方面探讨主动控制感的影响因素。基于动作的比较器模型, 解释主动控制感的产生原因; 并提供了主动控制感的认知神经脑机制的证据, 强调额叶和顶叶在主动控制感中的作用。未来研究应该更加注重外显与内隐测量的一致性, 特殊群体以及主动控制感的脑网络研究。     

Inferring sense of agency from the quantitative aspect of action outcome

The sense of agency refers to an experience in which one’s own action causes a change in environment. It is strongly modulated by both the contingency between action and its outcome and the consistency between predicted and actual action outcomes. Recent studies have suggested that the action outcome can retrospectively modulate action awareness. We suspect that the sense of agency can also be retrospectively modulated. This study examined whether the quantity of action outcome could influence the sense of agency. The participants’ task was to trigger dot motion in a display and rate the extent to which they could control the initiation of dot motion. Independently of both the temporal contiguity between action and its outcome and the consistency between predicted and actual action outcomes, the speed of dot motion as an action’s outcome strongly influenced the sense of agency rating. The present study suggests that the sense of agency stems partly from the inference of action efficiency based on the quantitative aspect of action outcome.     

The relation between the sense of agency and the experience of flow

This article investigates the relation between people’s feelings of agency and their feelings of flow. In the dominant model describing how people are able to assess their own agency—the comparator model of agency—when the person’s intentions match perfectly to what happens, the discrepancy between intention and outcome is zero, and the person is thought to interpret this lack of discrepancy as being in control. The lack of perceived push back from the external world seems remarkably similar to the state that has been described as a state of flow. However, when we used a computer game paradigm to investigate the relation between people’s feelings of agency and their feelings of flow, we found a dissociation between these two states. Although these two states may, in some ways, seem to be similar, our data indicate that they are governed by different principles and phenomenology.     

Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency

Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one’s own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an intentional binding paradigm, in which we distinguished between immediate (proximal) intention, as usually investigated, and longer standing (distal) intention. The results showed that the binding effect was significantly enhanced for distal intentions compared to proximal intentions, indicating that the former leads to stronger sense of agency. Our finding provides empirical support for a crucial distinction between at least two types of intention when addressing the efficacy of conscious intentions.     

主动控制感在大脑表征中的时空标记

主动控制感是主动动作过程中产生的控制自身动作, 进而控制外部环境的主观体验。构成动作主动控制感的核心要素是主观意图与结果反馈。本研究试图通过操控这两个核心要素的不同属性, 借助脑磁图等技术, 探寻主动控制感在大脑额-顶为主的脑网络中前-后馈的作用方式及时空特异性标记, 并建构新的认知神经理论模型。这将有利于理解人类动作的产生及后效、为相关精神类疾病的临床诊断提供更加客观的参照标准。     

Discrepancy between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency: Implications for sense of agency and its disorders

The sense of agency refers to the feeling of authorship that “I am the one who is controlling external events through my own action”. A distinction between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency has been proposed theoretically. However, there has not been sufficient experimental evidence to support this distinction. We have assessed separate explicit and implicit agency measures in the same population and investigated their relationships. Intentional binding task was employed as an implicit measure and self-other attribution task as an explicit measure, which are known to reflect clinical symptoms of disorders in the sense of agency. The results of the implicit measure and explicit measure were not correlated, suggesting dissociation of the explicit judgement of agency and the implicit feeling of agency.