A critical role for "affective neuroscience" in resolving what is basic about basic emotions.

Ortony and Turner (1990) asked "What's Basic About Basic Emotions," and they concluded "very little." They proceeded to advocate a "componential" or "mosaic" view of how emotional systems should be analyzed. Their thesis was flawed by their failure to consider the available neurobehavioral data. Genetically dictated brain systems that mediate affective-emotional processes do exist, even though there are bound to be semantic ambiguities in how we speak about these systems. This commentary summarizes key lines of evidence for coherently operating emotional systems in the brain and advocates the position that the issue of basic emotions can no longer be credibly discussed without adequate consideration of the relevant brain research in the area. The type of conceptual, logical analysis pursued by Ortony and Turner, in the absence of a thorough analysis of the available neurological data, is not an adequate basis for resolving what is basic about basic emotions.     

Basic emotions, relations among emotions, and emotion-cognition relations.

From the cognitive theory perspective that emotions are cognition dependent and contain cognitive components, Ortony and Turner (1990) questioned the validity of the concept of basic emotions. They argued that the so-called basic emotions were neither psychologically or biologically "primitive" nor "irreducible building blocks" for generating the "great variety of emotional experiences." In the biosocial theory tradition, researchers have identified multiple noncognitive activators of emotion and demonstrated the usefulness of defining the essential components of emotion as phenomena that do not require cognitive mediators or constituents. In this framework, emotions are seen as basic because their biological and social functions are essential in evolution and adaptation. Particular emotions are called basic because they are assumed to have innate neural substrates, innate and universal expressions, and unique feeling-motivational states. The great variety of emotional experiences is explained as a function of emotion-cognition interactions that result in affective-cognitive structures.     

Ought we to require emotional capacity as part of decisional competence?

The preceding commentary by Louis Charland suggests that traditional cognitive views of decision-making competence err in not taking into account patients' emotional capacities. Examined closely, however, Charland's argument fails to escape the cognitive bias that he condemns. However, there may be stronger arguments for broadening the focus of competence assessment to include emotional capacities, centering on the ways in which emotions aid humans in processing information. Before emotional capacities are added to the list of functions essential for decisional competence, though, the feasibility and utility of such a reorientation must be demonstrated.     

Toward integrating cognitive components with computational models of emotion using software design patterns

Computational models of emotion (CMEs) are software systems designed to imitate particular aspects of human emotions. The main purpose of this type of computational model is to capture the complexity of the human emotion process in a software system that is incorporated into a cognitive agent architecture. However, creating a CME that closely imitates the actual functioning of emotions demands to address some challenges such as (i) sharing information among independently developed cognitive and affective components, and (ii) interconnecting complex cognitive and affective components that must interact with one another in order to generate realistic emotions, which may even affect agents’ decision making. This paper proposes an architectural pattern aimed at cataloging and describing fundamental components of CMEs and their interrelationships with cognitive components. In this architectural pattern, external cognitive components and internal affective components of CMEs do not interact directly but are extended by including message exchange methods in order to use a publish-subscribe channel, which enables their intercommunication, thus attenuating issues such as software heterogeneity. This structural approach centralizes communication management and separates the inherent complexity of the cognitive and affective processes from the complexity of their interaction mechanisms. In so doing, it enables the design of CMEs’ architectures composed of independently developed affective and cognitive components. The proposed architectural pattern attempts to make progress in capturing the complex process of human emotions in a software system that adheres to software engineering best practices and that incorporates quality attributes such as flexibility and interoperability.     

Notes on "bioethics and sin" by Jean-Francois Collange.

Placing the notion of sin in the context of a meontic account of evil, and emphasizing the effect of sin on the sinner himself, this commentary exposes the insufficiency of restricting oneself to human efforts at atonement, and of thus underemphasizing the role of Christ. Collange's claim that the teaching of "predestination" is rooted in Paul and that the doctrine of merits and indulgences is rooted in Augustine is criticized, and Luther's "forensic" understanding is linked with Augustine, rather than with Paul. Collange's reduction of the concern for holiness to respect and trust is contrasted with holiness's essential context of loving unification with God. The commentary closes by exposing the unsatisfactory scantiness of Collange's treatment of cloning, health-care economy, and of the evils of life.     

Picturing the Soul: Moral Psychology and the Recovery of the Emotions

This paper draws from the resources of Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy to analyze the ethical status of the emotions at two related levels of reflection. Methodologically, it argues that a recovery of the emotions requires a revised notion of moral theory which affirms the basic orientation of consciousness to some notion of value or the good. Such a theory challenges many of the rationalist premises which in the past have led moral theory to reject the role of emotions in ethics. In particular, it acknowledges the centrality of moral psychology to ethics and reclaims the notion of consciousness rather than the will as the primary mode of human moral being. At a second, more substantive level, the paper explores the relation between the emotions and consciousness. Specifically, it defends a cognitivist and reflexive theory of the emotions which affirms a strong relation between the emotions and our evaluative beliefs. On this view, the emotions reflexively mediate our relation to objective value. In order to earn their cognitive status, however, the emotions must be tested in relation to a critical principle in order to guard against the egoistic tendencies of consciousness to build up images of reality to serve its own purposes. Therefore, a theory of the Good must be part of the critical content of a reflexive theory of the emotions.     

Emerging Insights Into the Nature and Function of Pride

ABSTRACT— Pride, a "self-conscious" emotion involving complex self-evaluative processes, is a fundamental human emotion. Recent research provides new insights into its nature and function. Like the "basic" emotions, pride is associated with a distinct, universally recognized, nonverbal expression, which is spontaneously displayed during pride experiences. Yet, pride differs from the basic emotions in its dependency on self-evaluations and in its complex structure, which is comprised of two theoretically and conceptually distinct facets that have divergent personality correlates and cognitive antecedents. In this article, we summarize findings from the growing body of research on pride and highlight the implications of this research for a broader understanding of emotions and social behavior.     

Emotions as social relationships

While emotions are usually treated as internal states, it is possible to view them as social relationships. From this perspective, the different emotions are not primarily understood in terms of facial expression, physiological pattern, hedonic tone, or level of arousal, but as different transformations of the relationship between person and other. To demonstrate the value of this approach, judgments of the similarity between different emotions were submitted to multidimensional scaling. It is shown that the resulting dimensions describe different aspects of the relation between self and other. These dimensions provide us with a taxonomy of emotions that makes some important distinctions between closely related emotions and leads to some interesting predictions about personality differences.The authors would like to thank David Stevens for his assistance with the statistical analysis, Eric de Rivera for drafting the three-dimensional figures, and James D. Laird and Shula Sommers for their helpful commentary.     

Young adults’ reactions to infant crying

AimTo determine whether young childless adults show negative emotions and cognitive disturbances when listening to infant crying, compared to other disturbing noises, and whether negative emotions and cognitive disturbances are associated.MethodsWe tested the cognitive performances and emotional reactions of 120 childless participants on a working memory task while being subjected to different disturbing noises including infant crying.ResultsParticipants had the least correct trials on the working memory task, and showed the most negative emotions, when hearing infant crying as compared to the other noises. Participants also showed less positive emotions when hearing infant crying as compared to working in silence. Overall, negative emotions were associated with less correct trials on the working memory task, except in the infant crying condition. Furthermore, cognitive performance and emotional reactions to infant crying were unrelated to personality characteristics.ConclusionNegative emotions and cognitive disturbances may be general adult responses to infant crying that are not limited to parents. These results suggest a broadly present human emotional and cognitive response to infant crying, that may underlie a general predisposition to care for infants in distress.     

The Pursuit of Happiness and Its Relationship to the Meta‐experience of Emotions and Culture

In this commentary, I provide a brief background of the meta‐experience of emotions, the philosophical and psychological literature on happiness, and further discuss the influence of culture on happiness. The meta‐experience of emotions implies that there are primary and secondary emotions (i.e., emotions about emotions), similar to the concept of meta‐cognitions. Primary and secondary emotions are closely associated with one's cultural background and happiness. Most scholars throughout history believe that happiness per se cannot be taught. However, it is possible to teach practices that lead to the path towards happiness. Promising strategies include loving‐kindness and compassion meditation. These strategies are based on Buddhist teachings, which are deeply rooted in a collectivistic culture. This illustrates the close association among emotions, approaches towards happiness, and cultural background.     

Explanatory pluralism in cognitive science

This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that "framework debate" in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science.     

Mencius's Vertical Faculties and Moral Nativism

This paper compares and contrasts Mencius's moral philosophy with recent development in cognitive science regarding mental capacity to understand moral rules and principles. Several cognitive scientists argue that the human mind has innate cognitive and emotive foundations of morality. In this paper, Mencius's moral theory is interpreted from the perspective of faculty psychology and cognitive modularity, a theoretical hypothesis in cognitive science in which the mind is understood as a system of specialized mental components. Specifically, Mencius's Four Beginnings (the basic human emotions that serve as the foundations of morality) are interpreted as vertical faculties, comparable to Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid's moral faculties.     

COMMENTS ON EGER'S "A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES"

Abstract. This commentary on Martin Eger's "A Tale of Two Controversies" focuses on three criticisms: first, the shifting status of the claims of creationism in the article; second, new developments in moral philosophy which run counter to Eger's discussion; and third, the inadequate treatment of pedagogical and curricular principles.     

Commentary on two articles concerning generalized and specific cognitive deficits

This is a commentary on essays in this journal issue by M. E. Strauss (2001) and R. A. Knight and S. M. Silverstein (2001) on research methodology for studying cognitive deficits. Concentrating mostly on Knight and Silverstein's article, the authors review the psychometric issues in the matched-task design, analyze Knight and Silverstein's "process-oriented" objections to that design, and scrutinize their methods for studying cognitive deficits, examining 2 of their empirical studies as examples of those methods.     

Contributions of contingencies in modern societies to "privacy" in the behavioral relations of cognition and emotion

The aim of this paper is to examine specific features of modern individualistic societies that contribute to "emotions" and "cognitions" becoming a matter of privacy. Although some behavior analysts identify emotions and cognitions as "private events," we argue with Skinner (1945) that cognitions and emotions are relations among events and that their origin is in public events in the contingencies of reinforcement maintained by other people. Guided by Elias (1939/1996), we suggest that the shift from feudal economies to market economies involved the increasing individualization of society's members. This individualizing process includes the socially maintained contingencies that bring some verbal responses under control of private stimulation and reduce the magnitude of some verbal responses to a covert level. Behavioral relations in which either stimuli or responses (or both) cannot be observed by others set the stage for a concept of "privacy." Changes in societal contingencies that gave rise to individualization and the attribution of privacy to cognitions and emotions are suggested to include the following: (a) increasing frequency of individual consequences that have no apparent or direct relevance to the group; (b) increasing numbers of concurrent contingencies and choice requirements; (c) conflicts between immediate and delayed consequences for the individual; and (d) conflicts between consequences for the individual and for the group.     

Editorial: Cognitive science and the understanding of emotions

Abstract

Within cognitive science emotions are likely to become increasingly important as we begin to understand more about systems with multiple goals that operate in imperfectly known environments. Whether cognitive science has insights into emotional processes to offer to people outside the discipline is a separate matter, but here too there are indications that the exploration of schemata, plans, and goals will give insights into the psychology of human emotions.     

A New View of Language, Emotion and the Brain

Linguistic theory since the Cognitive Revolution has followed one of the premises of that revolution by largely sidelining the issue of emotions and concentrating on those aspects of language that are more strictly cognitive. However, during the last two decades research in cognitive science, especially in neuropsychology, has begun to fill in the gaps left by the exclusion of emotions from cognitive research. This article proposes a model for applying the fruits of this new research in emotion to our understanding of language itself. Building on Karl Pribram`s integrated model of emotions and motivations, the presentation it offers a propositional explanation for how the emotions may have contributed to the emergence of symbolic formation and, ultimately, to every aspect of language from lexis to literature.

Top Ten Pressing Questions About the Development of Emotion Regulation

The papers in this special issue highlight the diversity of methods used to study the development of emotion regulation, and the substantial progress that has been made in understanding how children learn to manage strong emotions. This commentary poses 10 questions that focus on how developmental psychologists conceptualize emotions and regulation, measure emotions in research, and understand the interplay of individual and contextual variables. The discussion here outlines issues to guide future work; answers to these substantial questions will require much additional research.     

"KEEPING THE HEART": NATURAL AFFECTION IN JOSEPH BUTLER'S APPROACH TO VIRTUE

This essay considers eighteenth-century Anglican thinker Joseph Butler's view of the role of natural emotions in moral reasoning and action. Emotions such as compassion and resentment are shown to play a positive role in the moral life by motivating action and by directing agents toward certain good objects—for example, relief of misery and justice. For Butler, moral virtue is present when these natural affections are kept in proper proportion by the "superior" principles of the moral life—conscience, self-love, and benevolence—which involve the capacity for reasonable reflection. For contemporary thinkers, Butler's approach suggests that natural emotion should not be viewed as the enemy of moral reasoning; in fact, it challenges ethicists to pay attention to and account for the significant role of the emotions in the moral life.     

Conditional Reasoning and Emotional Experience: A Review of the Development of Counterfactual Thinking

What do human beings use conditional reasoning for? A psychological consequence of counterfactual conditional reasoning is emotional experience, in particular, regret and relief. Adults’ thoughts about what might have been influence their evaluations of reality. We discuss recent psychological experiments that chart the relationship between children’s ability to engage in conditional reasoning and their experience of counterfactual emotions. Relative to conditional reasoning, counterfactual emotions are late developing. This suggests that children need not only competence in conditional reasoning, but also to engage in this thinking spontaneously. Developments in domain general cognitive processing (the executive functions) allow children to develop from conditional reasoning to reasoning with counterfactual content and, eventually, to experiencing counterfactual emotions.