Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink

Several theories of the neural correlates of consciousness assume that there is a continuum of perception, associated with a gradual change in the intensity of brain activation. But some models, considering reverberation of neural activity as necessary for conscious perception, predict a sharp nonlinear transition between unconscious and conscious processing. We asked participants to evaluate the visibility of target words on a continuous scale during the attentional blink, which is known to impede explicit reports. Participants used this continuous scale in an all-or-none fashion: Targets presented during the blink were either identified as well as targets presented outside the blink period or not detected at all. We suggest that a stochastic nonlinear bifurcation in neural activity underlies the all-or-none perception observed during the attentional blink.     

Mental time travel into the past and the future in healthy aged adults: an fMRI study

Remembering the past and envisioning the future rely on episodic memory which enables mental time travel. Studies in young adults indicate that past and future thinking share common cognitive and neural underpinnings. No imaging data is yet available in healthy aged subjects. Using fMRI, we scanned older subjects while they remembered personal events (PP: last 12 months) or envisioned future plans (FP: next 12 months). Behaviorally, both time-periods were comparable in terms of visual search strategy, emotion, frequency of rehearsal and recency of the last evocation. However, PP were more episodic, engaged a higher state of autonoetic consciousness and mental visual images were clearer and more numerous than FP. Neuroimaging results revealed a common network of activation (posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, prefrontal cortex, hippocampus) reflecting the use of similar cognitive processes. Furthermore, the episodic nature of PP depended on hippocampal and visuo-spatial activations (occipital and angular gyri), while, for FP, it depended on the inferior frontal and lateral temporal gyri, involved in semantic memory retrieval. The common neural network and behavior suggests that healthy aged subjects thought about their future prospects in the past. The contribution of retrospective thinking into the future that engages the same network as the one recruited when remembering the past is discussed. Within this network, differential recruitment of specific areas highlights the episodic distinction between past and future mental time travel.     

脑的感知觉无意识加工及其研究进展

该文从无意识加工与认知、脑结构,神经网络的关系等三个层面,阐述了近年来认知神经科学在无意识研究方面的进展。主要就无意识与意识的相互转化、无意识加工与认知层次、脑结构之间的关联性、突触的联结方式等问题进行了讨论,并对认知神经科学如何研究无意识与意识问题提出展望,     

冲突适应独立于意识：来自行为和ERP的证据

尽管已有研究发现诸如抑制控制和任务转换等认知控制功能独立于意识, 但是对冲突适应是否需要意识的参与目前还存在激烈的争论。为了进一步探讨此问题, 本研究记录了18名被试在完成箭头偏对比掩蔽任务(meta-contrast masking task)时的行为和脑电数据。结果显示, 在有意识和无意识条件下在反应时和额中N2和中顶P3波幅上均表现出了显著的冲突适应效应。这不仅表明冲突控制独立于意识, 而且也表明先前无意识经验对人类信息加工系统的适应性调节作用。本研究对认识认知控制和意识的本质具有重要意义, 也为建构认知控制与意识关系的理论提供了启示。     

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.     

The neural correlates of conscious experience: an experimental framework

Demonstrating that neural activity ‘represents’ physical properties of the world such as the orientation of a line in the receptive field of a nerve cell is a standard procedure in neuroscience. However, not all such neural activity will be associated with the mental representations that form the contents of consciousness. In some cases, such as when patients with blindsight correctly ‘guess’ the location of a stimulus, neural activity is associated with physical stimulation and with appropriate behaviour, but not with awareness. To identify the neural correlates of conscious experience we need to identify patterns of neural activity that are specifically associated with awareness. Experiments aimed at making such identifications require that subjects report some aspect of their conscious experience either verbally or through some pre-arranged non-verbal report while neural activity is measured. If there is some characteristic neural signature of consciousness, then this should be distinguishable from the kinds of neural activity associated with stimulation and/or behaviour in the absence of awareness. It remains to be seen whether the neural signature of consciousness relates to the location of the neural activity, the temporal properties of the neural activity or the form of the interaction between activity in different brain regions.     

Thirteen days: Joseph Delboeuf versus Pierre Janet on the nature of hypnotic suggestion

The problem of post‐hypnotic suggestion was introduced in 1884. Give a hypnotic subject the post‐hypnotic command to return in 13 days. Awake, the subject remembers nothing yet nonetheless fulfills the command to return. How then does the subject count 13 days without knowing it? In 1886, Pierre Janet proposed the concept of dissociation as a solution, arguing that a second consciousness kept track of time outside of the subject's main consciousness. Joseph Delboeuf, in 1885, and Hippolyte Bernheim, in 1886, proposed an alternative solution, arguing that subjects occasionally drifted into a hypnotic state in which they were reminded of the suggestion. This article traces the development of these competing solutions and describes some of Delboeuf's final reflections on the problem of simulation and the nature of hypnosis. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

An experimental investigation of thought suppression

An experiment investigating the hypothesis that trying to suppress a thought will lead to an immediate and/or delayed increase in its occurrence is reported. Normal subjects listened to a taped story and then verbalized their stream of consciousness during two consecutive time periods. During the first period, one group (suppression) were asked not to think about the tape while two other groups (controls) were asked to think about anything or think about anything including the tape. During the second period, all three groups were instructed to think about anything. Results from the first period failed to support the immediate enhancement hypothesis as the suppression group reported less thoughts about the tape than the controls. However, results from the second period supported the delayed (rebound) hypothesis as subjects who had previously suppressed reported more thoughts about the tape than subjects who had not. The theoretical, methodological, and clinical implications of these results are discussed.     

错误相关负波的神经起源及其影响因素

与个体做出错误反应相伴的错误相关ERP成分叫错误相关负波 (error-related negativity, ERN),当前冲突监控理论、表征失匹配理论和强化学习理论从不同的角度对ERN的神经机制进行解释,各理论间并非完全相互排斥。目前大部分研究认为ERN定位于扣带回,部分研究则出现其它脑区的激活,然而,扣带回与其它脑区存在复杂的神经功能联系,ERN 电位很可能是多个脑区电活动在头颅的综合表现,而非某一脑区的单独表现。ERN的神经机制受到实验任务、被试年龄及其意识水平等因素的影响。未来要推动实验室研究走向临床应用,发现与诊断脑电波异常的病人和毒品易复吸人群。     

From sensory processes to conscious perception

In recent years, cognitive neuroscientists have began to explore the process of how sensory information gains access to awareness. To further probe this process, event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used while testing subjects with a paradigm known as the "attentional blink." In this paradigm, visually presented information sporadically fails to reach awareness. It was found that the magnitude and time course of activation within the anterior cingulate (BA 32), medial prefrontal cortex (BA 9), and frontopolar cortex (BA 10) predicted whether or not information was consciously perceived during the critical period for the attentional blink. These results are discussed in light of a neural framework for conscious processing.     

一种混合型前瞻记忆的干扰效应的神经机制

采用3（任务类型）×2（时段）被试内实验设计,对比一种混合型前瞻记忆（MPM）和基于事件的前瞻记忆（EBPM）在不同时段对进行中任务的干扰效应的神经机制。结果表明,在目标出现的时段,MPM对进行中任务有干扰效应,额区电极最活跃,额区电压最高,而在非目标时段MPM无干扰效应,但刺激出现后200-300ms额区电极较活跃。说明前瞻记忆任务在大脑中可能处于较高的激活状态,额叶灵活地调配意识的不同状态在前瞻记忆加工中参与的程度和时段。     

Brain stimulation and conscious experience

Libet discovered that a substantial duration (> 0.5-1.0 s) of direct electrical stimulation of the surface of the somatosensory cortex at threshold currents is required before human subjects can report that a conscious somatosensory experience had occurred. Using a reaction time method we confirm that a similarly long stimulation duration at threshold currents is required for activation of elementary visual experiences (phosphenes) in human subjects following stimulation of the surface of the striate cortex. However, the reaction times for the subject to respond to the cessation of the visual experience after the end of electrical stimulation could be as brief as 225-242 ms. We also carried out extensive studies in cats under a variety of anesthetic conditions using the same electrodes and parameters of stimulation employed in the human studies to study the patterns of neuronal activity beneath the stimulating surface electrode. Whereas sufficiently strong currents can activate neurons within milliseconds, stimulating currents close to threshold activate sustained neural activity only after at least 350-500 ms. When currents are close to threshold, some neurons are inhibited for several hundreds of millisecond before the balance between inhibition and excitation shifts towards excitation. These results suggest that the prolonged latencies, i.e., latencies beyond 200-250 ms, for the emergence of conscious experience following direct cortical stimulation result from a delay in the sustained activation of underlying cortical neurons at threshold currents rather than being due to any unusually long duration in central processing time. Intracellular records from cortical neurological cells during repetitive electrical stimulation of the surface of the feline striate cortex demonstrate that such stimulation induces a profound depolarizing shift in membrane potential that may persist after each stimulus train. Such a depolarization is evidence that extracellular K+ concentrations have increased during electrical stimulation. Such an increase in extracellular K+ progressively increases cortical excitability until the threshold for sustained activation of cortical neurons is reached and then exceeded. Consequently, the long latency for threshold activation of cortical neurons depends upon a dynamically increasing cortical facilatory process that begins hundreds of milliseconds before there is sustained activation of such neurons. In some cases, this facilatory process must overcome an initial stimulus-induced inhibition before neuronal firing commences.     

EEG and fMRI agree: Mental arithmetic is the easiest form of imagery to detect

fMRI and EEG during mental imagery provide alternative methods of detecting awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) without reliance on behaviour. Because using fMRI in patients with DOC is difficult, studies increasingly employ EEG. However, there has been no verification that these modalities provide converging information at the individual subject level. The present study examined simultaneous EEG and fMRI in healthy volunteers during six mental imagery tasks to determine whether one mental imagery task generates more robust activation across subjects; whether activation can be predicted from familiarity with the imagined activity; and whether EEG and fMRI converge upon the same conclusions about individual imagery performance. Mental arithmetic generated the most robust activation in the majority of subjects for both EEG and fMRI, and level of activation could not be predicted from familiarity, with either modality. We conclude that overall, EEG and fMRI agree regarding individual mental imagery performance.     

A TMS study of the ventral projections from V1 with implications for the finding of neural correlates of consciousness

The study of subliminal perception in normal and brain lesioned subjects has long been of interest to scholars studying the neural mechanisms behind conscious vision. Using brief durations and a developed methodology of introspective reporting, we present an experiment with visual stimuli that gives rise to little or no subliminal perception under normal viewing conditions. Coupled with transcranial magnetic stimulation, however, we find a dissociation between correctness and conscious awareness. Furthermore, we find support for the hypothesis that the ventral projection streams from V1 are necessary for visual consciousness.     

The unity of consciousness: subjects and objectivity

This paper concerns the role that reference to subjects of experience can play in individuating streams of consciousness, and the relationship between the subjective and the objective structure of consciousness. A critique of Tim Bayne’s recent book indicates certain crucial choices that works on the unity of consciousness must make. If one identifies the subject of experience with something whose consciousness is necessarily unified, then one cannot offer an account of the objective structure of consciousness. Alternatively, identifying the subject of experience with an animal means forgoing the conceptual connection between being a subject of experience and having a single phenomenal perspective.     

The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach

In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible for her to easily obtain as much information as she may need. The argument for this account of consciousness' functional role will proceed in three main stages. First, the phenomenological approach to consciousness as peripheral self-awareness will be expounded and endorsed. Second, an account of the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness will be offered. Finally, the account of the functional role of peripheral self-awareness will be obtained by straightforward extension from the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

情绪面孔的意识神经相关物及其无意识自动加工：来自事件相关电位的证据

意识的神经相关物尚有争议, 且个体能否无意识自动检测视觉环境变化尚不清楚。本研究采用非注意视盲范式操控视觉意识, 并引入具有社会信息的情绪面孔, 探讨意识的神经相关物以及视觉意识与自动检测变化机制的关系。在A阶段, 部分被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于无意识水平; 在B阶段, 所有被试对任务无关的情绪面孔处于意识水平; 在C阶段, 所有被试对任务相关的情绪面孔处于意识水平。结果显示, 任务无关的情绪面孔的意识过程诱发视觉意识负波(visual awareness negativity, VAN)、晚期正成分(late positivity, LP)和晚期枕区正成分(late occipital positivity, LOP)。此外, 无意识的情绪面孔能诱发视觉失匹配负波(visual mismatch negativity, vMMN), 且其幅值不受意识影响, 但是受任务相关性调制。这些结果提示对情绪面孔的视觉意识在不同的时间进程上有不同的ERP指标——VAN反映早期知觉经验, 而LP和LOP反映晚期意识过程, 而且面孔情绪信息的自动加工独立于视觉意识, 但是受视觉注意调制。     

Identifying hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species

Most early studies of consciousness have focused on human subjects. This is understandable, given that humans are capable of reporting accurately the events they experience through language or by way of other kinds of voluntary response. As researchers turn their attention to other animals, "accurate report" methodologies become increasingly difficult to apply. Alternative strategies for amassing evidence for consciousness in non-human species include searching for evolutionary homologies in anatomical substrates and measurement of physiological correlates of conscious states. In addition, creative means must be developed for eliciting behaviors consistent with consciousness. In this paper, we explore whether necessary conditions for consciousness can be established for species as disparate as birds and cephalopods. We conclude that a strong case can be made for avian species and that the case for cephalopods remains open. Nonetheless, a consistent effort should yield new means for interpreting animal behavior.     

A global workspace model for phenomenal and access consciousness

Both the global workspace theory and Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, are central in the current debates about consciousness and the neural correlates of consciousness. In this article, a unifying global workspace model for phenomenal and access consciousness is proposed. In the model, recurrent neural interactions take place in distinct yet interacting access and phenomenal brain loops. The effectiveness of feedback signaling onto sensory cortical maps is emphasized for the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Two forms of top-down attention, attention for perception and attention for access, play differential roles for phenomenal and access consciousness. The model is implemented in a neural network form, with the simulation of single and multiple visual object processing, and of the attentional blink.     

Millisecond-accurate synchronization of visual stimulus displays for cognitive research

A widely adopted approach in cognitive psychology research is to analyze changes in the response time to a stimulus onset in order to infer information about the cognitive functioning of a subject being tested. But current techniques have inherent variations in the timing between stimulus activation and stimulus display of up to tens of milliseconds, thereby introducing significant errors when response time or the latency of neural responses is measured. This article presents a novel yet easy-to-implement solution for improving resolution in the synchronizing of stimulus activation and stimulus display. Unlike traditional methods in which the stimulus onset is set as the time at which the routine for displaying the stimulus is called, this approach uses DirectX to monitor the scan line of CRTs and sets the stimulus onset to the time at which the scan line arrives at the position where the stimulus is to be drawn. This approach removes the uncertainty involved in having a time delay between the activation of the display routine and the actual time at which the display occurs, improving the accuracy of response time and latency period measurements to within 200 μsec. With a specially developed driver, this solution can generate a trigger signal synchronized precisely with the stimulus onset in all popular Windows systems (including Windows 2000/XP).