日常生活事件时间关系推理的初步研究

对时间推理的研究主要有两种范式,习俗周期性时间推理和时间关系推理。以往大多数研究集中在习俗周期性时间推理上,而时间关系推理研究则相对薄弱。本研究在以往研究的基础上,对日常生活事件的时间关系推理进行了研究。实验设计考虑了推理任务的模型数量、前提数量、无关前提以及有无肯定答案等因素,形成了六类推理任务。研究发现:推理任务的模型数量、前提数量、无关前提、是否有肯定答案以及推理者时间维度上的人格特征等都会影响个体的时间关系推理;被试一般是以呈现的前提顺序来表征推理任务的。但是,当被试意识到无关信息时,可以从整体上表征问题。     

阅读理解中的预期推理

从工作记忆能力的个体差异的角度,探讨阅读描述日常生活事件的段落时预期推理过程的资源分配特点,及其与阅读焦点转移的关系。结果表明,（１）预期推理可以维持较长时间。（２）工作记忆能力强的被试进行预期推理的范围较广;而工作记忆能力较弱的被试推理范围较小。（３）工作记忆能力较弱者对每一个项目的激活量较大。（４）对于非常熟悉的事件,预期推理不受焦点转移的影响。     

预期推理在长时记忆中的表征形式

该研究采用移动窗口技术,通过两个实验研究探讨在高低不同竞争条件下预期推理结果在长时记忆中的表征形式。实验结果表明,预期推理在长时记忆中的表征形式依赖于文本中预期推理的引发语境,在不同竞争强度的预期语境中,预期推理的结果在长时记忆会以不同的形式进行表征。在低竞争条件下,预期推理的结果以确定的形式表征;只有在高竞争条件下,预期推理的结果才会以假定的形式进行表征。     

推理与工作记忆

系统地总结了推理与工作记忆的研究进展,具体包括：（1）工作记忆的含义及其在推理中作用的相关研究;（2）推理与工作记忆关系的理论模型;（3）不同类型推理与工作记忆的实验研究;（4）推理与工作记忆的认知神经研究;（5）推理与工作记忆的未来研究展望     

概率的不同表征对贝叶斯推理的影响的研究

该研究以贝叶斯推算、判断为实验任务,探讨了三种概率表征(百分比、自然频率、概率词)、三种概率规则认识水平对贝叶斯推理的影响,结果表明:1)概率词表征的贝叶斯推算实质是判断过程。2)在三种概率表征中,频率表征更适合于正确完成贝叶斯推理,但存在学科背景的差异。3)贝叶斯推理使用的策略有正确规则、错误规则、命题知识、概率简捷式、直觉和个人意愿六种。4)贝叶斯判断的正确率高于贝叶斯推算,个体在贝叶斯判断上使用的正确规则多于贝叶斯推算过程。     

熟悉主题说明文阅读推理加工的认知神经机制

采用功能磁共振成像(Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, fMRI)技术对熟悉主题说明文阅读过程因果推理加工进行研究, 探讨说明文阅读过程中读者是否能够自发进行因果推理加工, 以及阅读焦点的存在是否会对说明文阅读过程中的因果推理加工产生影响。结果表明, 读者在熟悉主题说明文阅读过程中能够自动进行推理加工, 负责推理加工的主要脑区为额叶(尤其是额下回)、顶叶下部及双侧楔前叶等区域。在熟悉主题说明文阅读过程中, 阅读焦点的存在一定程度上使读者的认知加工资源集中在对与焦点相关的推理关系的加工上。     

四卡片作业的困难原因及推理过程的研究

本文主要介绍现代认知心理学关于四卡片问题的困难原因及推理过程的实验研究。解决四卡片作业困难的原因主要有：作业的抽象性、证实倾向、匹配倾向和对命题的错误表征；其推理过程的理论解释主要有语义规则观、具体知识经验观、心理模型的建构及实际推理图式理论。本文着重介绍了实际推理图式理论以及据此所做的迁移研究。     

儿童推理能力的新发现——儿童的道义推理

逻辑推理是人类特有的能力。人们利用推理可以从已知知识中推出新知识，从事实或假设中得到新结论。掌握正确的逻辑推理规则无疑会提高人分析和解决问题的能力。正因为推理能力对人类的重要性，心理学对人的推理的研究从未中断过。     

贝叶斯推理研究的三个层次

从纵向发展来看, 近年来贝叶斯推理研究从重推理问题轻推理者因素(关注频率信息和图表呈现的促进效应, 推理问题内容对推理的影响, 生态效度等), 逐渐转向重视推理者因素(知识背景, 主体关联性程度等)和推理过程, 最后发展到将推理问题、推理者和推理过程整合的趋势; 从横向发展来看, 各个纵向发展的阶段内部也有横向发展阶段, 整个研究结构呈立体状。未来的研究应进一步结合推理材料、推理过程考察推理者因素如焦虑、认知风格、元认知和工作记忆等对贝叶斯推理的影响, 并利用新的研究手段如ERP、眼动仪等探索和验证贝叶斯推理的影响因素及其认知加工过程。     

文本阅读过程中目标焦点的预期推理

探讨文本阅读过程中目标焦点是否引起即时的预期推理。采用移动窗口技术,让被试阅读16篇含有目标信息的记叙文。实验1和实验2探讨已进入长时记忆中的尚未实现的目标是否作为阅读的焦点对阅读目标行为进行预期推理。实验3探讨已经实现的目标是否作为阅读的焦点对阅读目标行为产生预期作用。实验结果表明,对目标的预期推理是可以即时发生的,在目标未实现的情况下,读者会对目标信息进行预期推理;在目标已经实现的情况下,读者对有关目标的信息不产生预期推理。     

Reasoning About Relations: Spatial and Nonspatial Problems

Two experiments investigated the mental representation of spatial and nonspatial two-dimensional problems. The experiments were designed to contrast opposite predictions of the model theory of reasoning and the formal rules of inference theories. Half of the problems required more inferential steps but only one model, whereas the other half required fewer inferential steps but two models. According to the inference rules, theory problems that require more inferential steps should be harder, whereas the model-based theory predicts that problems that require two models should be harder. In Experiments 1a and 1b we measured the problem solving time and the percentage of errors. In Experiments 2a and 2b the problems were presented segmented in two different displays. We measured the comprehension time for each display, the question answering times, and the percentage of errors. The results of all experiments supported the model theory predictions in both spatial and nonspatial domains.     

Labeling bias and categorical induction: generative aspects of category information

When a person is characterized categorically with a label (e.g., Linda is a feminist), people tend to think that the attributes associated with that person are central and long lasting (S. Gelman & G. D. Heyman, 1999). This bias, which is related to category-based induction and stereotyping, has been thought to arise because a category label (e.g., feminist) activates the dominant properties associated with the representation of the category. This explanation implies that categorical information influences inferential processes mainly by conjuring up main attributes or instances represented in the category. However, the present experiments reveal that this attribute-based explanation of induction does not provide a complete picture of inferential processes. The results from 3 experiments suggest that category information can affect inferences of attributes that are not directly related to the category, suggesting that categories not only activate likely attributes but also help integrate unlikely or even unrelated attributes.     

Supposition and representation in human reasoning

We report the results of three experiments designed to assess the role of suppositions in human reasoning. Theories of reasoning based on formal rules propose that the ability to make suppositions is central to deductive reasoning. Our first experiment compared two types of problem that could be solved by a suppositional strategy. Our results showed no difference in difficulty between problems requiring affirmative or negative suppositions and very low logical solution rates throughout. Further analysis of the error data showed a pattern of responses, which suggested that participants reason from a superficial representation of the premises in these arguments and this drives their choice of conclusion. Our second experiment employed a different set of suppositional problems but with extremely similar proofs in terms of the rules applied and number of inferential steps required. As predicted by our interpretation of reasoning strategies employed in Experiment 1, logical performance was very much higher on these problems. Our third experiment showed that problems that could be solved by constructing an initial representation of the premises were easier than problems in which this representation was not sufficient. This effect was independent of the suppositional structure of the problems. We discuss the implications of this research for theories of reasoning based on mental models and inference rules.     

The Interpretation of Anaphoric Noun Phrases Time Course, and Effects of Overspecificity

Two experiments investigated the interpretation of anaphoric noun phrases, and in particular those thatcould only be linked to their antecedents via knowledge-based inferences. The first experiment showed that much of the inferential processing was carried out as the anaphoric noun phrase was read, although there was some indication that inferential processing continued to the end of the clause. The second experiment attempted to establish why anaphoric noun phrases that are more specific than their antecedents cause problems. It showed that the difficulty did not lie in adding the extra information carried by the anaphor to the representation of the referent. Rather, we suggest, putting extra information in the anaphoric noun phrase disrupts the process of linking that noun phrase to its antecedent.     

The role of representational volatility in recognizing pre- and postchange objects

Theories relating attention to change blindness (CB) imply that representations of objects in the focus of attention are stable and coherent. However, CB occurs for objects in the focus of attention. Here, we explore this apparent contradiction and the possibility that changes can be detected without having a complete and stable representation of the prechange object. The first experiment required observers to recognize a prechange object and a postchange object after viewing arrays of various sizes in which the prechange object was replaced by the postchange object after a brief delay. Results indicated that the representation of the prechange object was strong enough to cue a change but not strong enough to support accurate recognition. The remaining experiments demonstrated that the representation of the prechange object is volatile in that a shift in the display or the presence of a postchange object can disrupt the representation. These findings add to current theories of attention and representations by showing that attention may result in volatile representations that can support change detection without supporting accurate recognition.     

Cognitive processes operating in hindsight

The aim of this investigation was to study the cognitive processes involved in the "knew-it-all-along" effect, especially in regard to use of inferential processes. The results of three experiments showed that the magnitude of the phenomenon did not increase with more use of inferential processes. It is proposed that only under misleading circumstances do inferential processes associated with overconfidence increase the magnitude of the phenomenon. For a majority of the tasks introspectively classified as solved by pure guessing, the hindsight phenomenon entirely disappeared whereas "intuition" tasks lead to the strongest bias. The results are generally consistent with the accuracy-assessment model (A. Winman et al. , 1998).     

An ERP investigation of conditional reasoning with emotional and neutral contents

In two experiments we investigate conditional reasoning using event-related potentials (ERPs). Our goal was to examine the time course of inference making in two conditional forms, one logically valid (Modus Ponens, MP) and one logically invalid (Affirming the Consequent, AC). We focus particularly on the involvement of semantically-based inferential processes potentially marked by modulations of the N400. We also compared reasoning about emotional and neutral contents with separate sets of stimuli of differing linguistic complexity across the two experiments. Both MP and AC modulated the N400 component, suggesting the involvement of a semantically-based inferential mechanism common across different logical forms, content types, and linguistic features of the problems. Emotion did not have an effect on early components, and did not interact with components related to inference making. There was a main effect of emotion in the 800–1050 ms time window, consistent with an effect on sustained attention. The results suggest that conditional reasoning is not a purely formal process but that it importantly implicates semantic processing, and that the effect of emotion on reasoning does not primarily operate through a modulation of early automatic stages of information processing.     

Cue competition effects in human causal learning

Five experiments involving human causal learning were conducted to compare the cue competition effects known as blocking and unovershadowing, in proactive and retroactive instantiations. Experiment 1 demonstrated reliable proactive blocking and unovershadowing but only retroactive unovershadowing. Experiment 2 replicated the same pattern and showed that the retroactive unovershadowing that was observed was interfered with by a secondary memory task that had no demonstrable effect on either proactive unovershadowing or blocking. Experiments 3a, 3b, and 3c demonstrated that retroactive unovershadowing was accompanied by an inflated memory effect not accompanying proactive unovershadowing. The differential pattern of proactive versus retroactive cue competition effects is discussed in relationship to amenable associative and inferential processing possibilities.     

INTUITIONS AS INFERENTIAL JUDGMENTS*

According to philosophical orthodoxy, intuitions are perception‐like in that they provide us with non‐inferential justification. In this paper, I present four arguments to show that orthodoxy is mistaken: Intuitions, as used in thought experiments, are inferential judgments, that is the results of inferential transitions that are inferentially justified (if justified at all). The discussion will shed light on the nature of intuition but also on the nature of inference.     

Mode Transition and Change in Variable Use in Perceptual Learning

Runeson, Juslin, and Olsson (2000) proposed (a) that perceptual learning entails a transition from an inferential to a direct-perceptual mode of apprehension, and (b) that relative confidence—the difference between estimated and actual performance—indicates whether apprehension is inferential or direct. In 3 experiments participants received feedback on judgments of force; the results replicated Runeson et al.'s observed decrease in overconfidence but showed more overconfidence. Relative confidence depended on how performance was defined. An attempt to manipulate confidence failed, but trait confidence affected relative confidence. It was concluded that overconfidence does not necessarily signal inferential functioning and that a decrease in overconfidence might occur in a direct-perceptual mode. A theory of learning within the direct-perceptual mode, in addition to learning through a mode transition, appears necessary.