On the explanatory power of hallucination

Pautz (Perceiving the world , 2010) has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.

     

Ambiguity aversion: the explanatory power of indeterminate probabilities

Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem in terms of a psychological effect: ambiguity aversion. The ‘comparative ignorance’ hypothesis articulates how this effect works and explains why it is important to an understanding of the typical pattern of responses associated with Ellsberg’s two-color problem. In the first part of this article we challenge Fox and Tversky’s explanation. We present first an experiment that extends Ellsberg’s two-color problem where certain predictions of the comparative ignorance hypothesis are not confirmed. In addition the hypothesis seems unable to explain how the subjects resolve trade-offs between security and expected pay-off when vagueness is present. Ellsberg offered an explanation of the typical behavior elicited by his examples in terms of these trade-offs and in section three we offer a model of Ellsberg’s trade-offs. The model takes seriously the role of imprecise probabilities in explaining Ellsberg’s phenomenon. The so-called three-color problem was also considered in Fox and Tversky (1995). We argue that Fox and Tversky’s analysis of this case breaks a symmetry with their analysis of the two-color problem. We propose a unified treatment of both problems and we present a experiment that confirms our hypothesis.     

The explanatory power of theism

Special thanks to Alvin Plantinga, Michael Detlefsen and William Alston for many helpful suggestions.     

Explanations in cognitive science: unification versus pluralism

The debate between the defenders of explanatory unification and explanatory pluralism has been ongoing from the beginning of cognitive science and is one of the central themes of its philosophy. Does cognitive science need a grand unifying theory? Should explanatory pluralism be embraced instead? Or maybe local integrative efforts are needed? What are the advantages of explanatory unification as compared to the benefits of explanatory pluralism? These questions, among others, are addressed in this Synthese’s special issue. In the introductory paper, we discuss the background of the questions, distinguishing integrative theorizing from building unified theories. On the one hand, integrative efforts involve collaboration between various disciplines, fields, approaches, or theories. These efforts could even be quite temporary, without establishing any long-term institutionalized fields or disciplines, but could also contribute to developing new interfield theories. On the other hand, unification can rely on developing complete theories of mechanisms and representations underlying all cognition, as Newell’s “unified theories of cognition”, or may appeal to grand principles, as predictive coding. Here, we also show that unification in contemporary cognitive science goes beyond reductive unity, and may involve various forms of joint efforts and division of explanatory labor. This conclusion is one of the themes present in the content of contributions constituting the special issue.

     

Examining incremental explanatory power in accounting for worry severity: negative metacognitive beliefs uniquely predict worry severity following a worry episode

Background and Objectives: Contemporary conceptual models posit that different core variables contribute to worry, including intolerance of uncertainty (IU), metacognitive beliefs, and experiential avoidance. To date, a concurrent investigation of the incremental explanatory power of these variables in accounting for worry severity remains unexamined. The present study sought to address that gap in the literature.

Design/Methods: Participants endorsing frequent worry (N?=?127) completed self-report measures assessing IU, metacognitive beliefs, and experiential avoidance during an online session. Participants later attended an in-person lab-based session where they completed a worry episode and in-vivo worry severity was assessed following the worry episode.

Results: IU, negative metacognitive beliefs, and experiential avoidance each shared a bivariate association with post-episode worry severity. However, in multivariate analyses, only baseline worry severity and negative metacognitive beliefs surrounding the dangerousness and uncontrollability of worry predicted post-episode worry severity.

Conclusions: The present results further underscore links between negative metacognitive beliefs and worry.     

The explanatory power of local miracle compatibilism

Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological principle, arguing that it is not always capable of explaining our inability to do otherwise. In response to this challenge, I point out that this principle is part of a defense against the charge that local miracle compatibilists are committed to outlandish claims. Thus it is not surprising that the principle, by itself, will often fail to explain our inability to do otherwise. I then suggest that in many situations in which we are unable to do otherwise, this can be explained by the compatibilist’s analysis of ability, or his criteria for the truth of ability claims. Thus, the failure of his nomological principle to explain the falsity of certain ability claims is no strike against local miracle compatibilism.     

The explanatory power of the substance view of persons.

The purpose of this essay is to offer support for the substance view of persons, the philosophical anthropology defended by Patrick Lee in his essay. In order to accomplish this the author (1) presents a brief definition of the substance view; (2) argues that the substance view has more explanatory power in accounting for why we believe that human persons are intrinsically valuable even when they are not functioning as such (e.g., when on is temporarily comatose), why human persons remain identical to themselves over time, and why it follows from these points that the unborn are human persons; and (3) responds to two arguments that attempt to establish the claim that the early human being is not a unified substance until at least fourteen days after conception.     

Rethinking the explanatory power of dynamical models in cognitive science

In this paper I offer an interventionist perspective on the explanatory structure and explanatory power of (some) dynamical models in cognitive science: I argue that some “pure” dynamical models – ones that do not refer to mechanisms at all – in cognitive science are “contextualized causal models” and that this explanatory structure gives such models genuine explanatory power. I contrast this view with several other perspectives on the explanatory power of “pure” dynamical models. One of the main results is that dynamical models need not refer to underlying mechanisms in order to be explanatory. I defend and illustrate this position in terms of dynamical models of the A-not-B error in developmental psychology as elaborated by Thelen and colleagues, and dynamical models of unintentional interpersonal coordination developed by Richardson and colleagues.     

从“想”到“做”——卢比孔模型的解释力和应用

卢比孔模型包括四个阶段(前决策、前行动、行动和后行动)、三种意向(目标、执行和评价)及调控机制,旨在勾画愿望如何转换为具体行动。过往的研究聚焦于心理定势和执行意向,近年则扩及于消费和健康心理学等领域中。透过对照何谓好理论的准则及检视其他动机理论的局限,卢比孔模型的优点呈现为建构上的简约,能区分动机和意志过程并体现其复杂性,且应用广泛。针对此模型的拓展,可就往昔被忽略的环节进行更细致的研究。     

Eliminating national stereotypes: Direct versus indirect disconfirmation of beliefs in covariation

Two modes of disconfirmation of national stereotypes were compared. It was hypo-thesized that stereotypes should be revised either by stereotype-inconsistent cases from the primary target (i.e., direct disconfirmation) or by instances which belong to an alternative target but possess features stereotypic of the primary target (indirect disconfirmation). It was further predicted that politically liberal individuals would show greater change in their national stereotypes than conservatives. Two experiments were conducted in which the salience of directly and indirectly disconfirming information regarding different nations was manipulated. The results indicated that indirect disconfirmation generally had as much impact as direct disconfirmation, but that the effects were particularly visible among liberal participants. Conservatives tended to respond in a reactive manner which preserved or exaggerated their original views. A new theoretical framework for the study of stereotype change and implications for its application were discussed.     

The accuracy of roommate ratings of behaviors versus beliefs

We evaluated the accuracy of peer ratings of roommates’ personality characteristics, against roommate self-ratings, as a function of rating domain observability. Instead of the usual ratings of broad personality traits, however, our domains represented peer ratings of narrow exemplars of personality traits. Specifically, we compared roommate ratings on (a) observable trait-related behaviors with (b) unobservable trait-related attitudes or beliefs. We observed greater self-peer agreement in rating behaviors, in general, than in rating beliefs. We also observed greater tendency of raters to adopt an assumed similarity heuristic when judging their roommates’ attitudes and beliefs than their behaviors. We discuss the contribution of these findings to understanding the determinants of accuracy in personality judgments and developing best practices for personality assessment.     

The roots of violence: converging psychoanalytic explanatory models for power struggles and violence in schools

This paper demonstrates that several psychoanalytic models taken together converge to collectively explain school violence and power struggles better than each does alone. Using my own experience in doing psychoanalytically informed community intervention, I approach the problem of school violence from a combination of Adlerian, Stollerian, dialectical social systems, and Klein-Bion perspectives. This integrated model is then applied to the Columbine High School massacre in Littleton, Colorado.     

Use of prior beliefs in the assignment of causal roles: Causal powers versus regularity-based accounts

There is a tradition of models of causal judgment in which causes and other causal roles are defined and identified in terms of empirical patterns of association with effects. In the present experiments, results conflicting with the predictions of such models were obtained. In one experiment, subjects judged that an interpretation in which a factor constantly present was identified as the cause was more likely than was an interpretation in which a perfect positive covariate was identified as the cause. In a second experiment, possible effects of prior beliefs about covariation were controlled and similar findings were obtained in two out of three scenarios. These results favor the idea that people make causal judgments by applying preexisting beliefs framed in terms of causal concepts, such as causal powers, and in ways that cannot be accounted for by models in the empiricist tradition.     

Editorial: minding the (explanatory) gap

‘I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran’, says the robust and bluff believer, Francis Bacon, as the studio manager reaches to switch off the sound on his Elizabethan cultural perceptions, ‘than that this universal frame is without a mind... God never wrought miracle, to convince atheism, because his ordinary works convince it...’. ‘It is true’, he goes on, ‘that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion’. Bacon assumes that the atheist rejects ‘religion’, not just belief in God: no middle term is readily available to him. There is a lingering nuance that ‘atheism’ is ‘shallow’ in its rejection of ‘religion’, which we can register, and even deploy, without thereby endorsing theism: can now insist that the rejection of theism is not yet atheism. Or can we? This is familiar enough stuff for Buddhists, who seem typically in their ‘non-theism’ to represent an agnosticism of indifference rather than of perplexity. But we need to recall why it might seem contentious, and revisiting the scene of religious perplexity can be salutary, since religious dialogue is not apologetic opposition but imaginativeengagement.     

Patterns of engagement: the relationship between efficacy beliefs and task engagement at the individual versus collective level

This study examines the relationship between efficacy beliefs and task engagement in and over time, at both the individual and collective levels. We conducted latent growth curve analyses using data from 372 university students (individual level) who were assigned to one of 79 e‐work groups (collective level). The participants carried out three collaborative tasks in a laboratory setting. Results reveal, at both levels, that the level of task engagement of participants and groups with high initial levels of efficacy beliefs remained stable, whereas the level of task engagement of participants and groups with low initial levels of efficacy beliefs decreased significantly over time. Moreover, the relationships linking the parallel constructs were functionally equivalent across levels. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed from the perspective of Bandura's social cognitive theory.     

Hypothetical identities: Explanatory problems for the explanatory argument

Recently, several philosophers have defended an explanatory argument that supposedly provides novel empirical grounds for accepting the type identity theory of phenomenal consciousness. They claim that we are justified in believing that the type identity thesis is true because it provides the best explanation for the correlations between physical properties and phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine the actual role identities play in science and point out crucial shortcomings in the explanatory argument. I show that the supporters of the argument have failed to show that the identity thesis provides a satisfactory explanation for the correlations between physical and phenomenal properties. Hence, the explanatory argument, as it stands, does not provide new grounds for accepting the type identity theory.