Relational Autonomy,Liberal Individualism,and the Social Constitution of Selves

Philosophical Studies -     

Androgeny,Flexibility, and Individualism

Questionnaire data from 195 college students were examined to clarify the relationships among masculinity, femininity, and androgyny and self-perceived flexibility and individualism. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and hiearchical regression showed no evidence for unique positive "androgyny" effects, while higher masculinity was associated with flexibility and individualism, particularly among women. Contrary to expectations, "androgynous" men were more rigid and conforming, while the cross-typed were most flexible and independent.     

Individualism, Communitarianism and Consensus

There is a contemporary conflict between individualistic andcommunitarian conceptions of rationality. Robert Goodin describes it asa conflict between an enlightenment individualistic conception of a``sovereign artificer'' and ``a socially unencumbered self'' ascontrasted with the communitarian conception of a ``socially embeddedself'' whose identity is formed by his or her community. Should wejustify and explain rationality individualistically or socially? This isa false dilemma when consensus is reached by a model articulated byKeith Lehrer and Carl Wagner. According to this model, the consensusresults from the positive weights individuals give to others and use tocontinually average and, thus, aggregate their allocations. Aggregationconverges toward a consensus in which the social preference and theindividual preferences become identical. The truth of communitarianismis to be found in the aggregate and the truth of individualism in theaggregation. The original conflict dissolves in rational consensus.     

个人主义方法的重新审视

个人主义及其方法,是近代尤其是当代具有影响的伦理思想及其方法。对于其产生与发展颇具争议：一方面,个人主义的方法原则把人从社会中剥离出来,使他成为周围事物和他自己的惟一评判,赋予他不断膨胀的权利;另一方面,它也为遭到长期压迫的人类思想提供了呼吸的空间和活动的范围,使一个人可以满怀尊严,能够亲自解决自己的幸福与命运问题。     

Individualism,causal powers,and explanation

Versions of this paper were presented at the 17th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in June 1991, at Cornell University in October 1991, and at Queen's University in January 1992; I thank Terence Horgan and Carl Ginet, respectively, for their comments on the first two of these occasions. I would also like to thank Terence Irwin, Sydney Shoemaker, Bob Stalnaker, Ed Stein, and J. D. Trout for comments on earlier versions of the paper, and Joe Moore, Dave Robb and Sergio Sismondo for useful discussion.     

The Myth of Closure

Therapies for grief and loss have traditionally focused on the work of grieving. The goal was to reach an endpoint, now popularly called closure. There are, however, many people who, through no fault of their own, find a loss so unclear that there can be no end to grief. They have not failed in the work of grieving, but rather have suffered ambiguous loss, a type of loss that is inherently open ended. Instead of closure, the therapeutic goal is to help people find meaning despite the lack of definitive information and finality. Hope lies in increasing a family's tolerance for ambiguity, but first, professionals must increase their own comfort with unanswered questions. In this article, the authors, one a poet, the other a family therapist and theorist, offer a unique blending of theory, reflection, and poetry to experientially deepen the process of self‐reflection about a kind of loss that defies closure.     

The Divorce Myth

This article argues that counselors need to disengage themselves from the prevailing cultural attitude that divorce has inherent power to make people unhappy. Within this context, consideration is given to counseling couples with children.     

The Mediation Myth

The mediation myth is the false belief that mediation is actually estimated in the typical mediation analysis. This myth is based on a trifecta of shortcomings: (1) the typical mediation study relies on an inadequate design; (2) the researcher uses a flawed analysis strategy; and (3) there is scant attention to assumptions that are required when estimating mediation. These problems stem from overgeneralizing the classical product method for estimating mediation and overreliance on statistical significance testing as a decision criterion in mediation analysis. The goals of this article are to (1) raise awareness of these difficulties among researchers and (2) provide a roadmap about design and analysis options for a more rigorous and scientifically valid approach to mediation analysis.     

Individualism, Externalism and Idiolectical Meaning

Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of it. I here show that a conception of idiolectical meaning is possible that accepts the “anti-internalism” of the first claim while rejecting (what I shall refer to as) the “anti-individualism” of the second. According to this conception, externally constituted idiolectical meaning supervenes on idiolectical understanding. I begin by trying to show that it is possible to disentangle anti-internalist and anti-individualist strands of argument in Hilary Putnam’s well-known and widely influential “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Having once argued that the latter strand of argument is not cogent, I then try to show that individualism (in the sense above) can be reconciled with perhaps the most plausible reconstruction of Putnam’s well-known and widely accepted “indexical” theory of natural kind terms. Integral to my defense of the possibility of an individualist externalism about idiolectical meaning are my efforts to demonstrate that, pace Putnam, there is no “division of linguistic labor” when it comes to the fixing the meanings of such terms in a speaker’s idiolect. The fact that average speakers sometimes need defer to experts shows that not reference, but only reliable recognition of what belongs in the extension of a natural kind term is a “social phenomenon.”

Wittgenstein (1958, 14).

     

后现代性的神话

当哲学本身在两个连续的阶段中变成反身的时，会使我们回想起现代性中存在着神话结构的可能性。首先，由于康德批判的转向，哲学丧失了本身的“清白”，并且对其自身的可能性的条件发生了质疑。其次，由于“后现代的”转向，哲学研究变成了“实     

The Myth of Reverse Compositionality

In the context of debates about what form a theory of meaning should take, it is sometimes claimed that one cannot understand an intersective modifier-head construction (e.g., ‘pet fish’) without understanding its lexical parts. Neo-Russellians like Fodor and Lepore contend that non-denotationalist theories of meaning, such as prototype theory and theory theory, cannot explain why this is so, because they cannot provide for the ‘reverse compositional’ character of meaning. I argue that reverse compositionality is a red herring in these debates. I begin by setting out some positive arguments for reverse compositionality and showing that they fail. Then I show that the principle of reverse compositionality has two big strikes against it. First, it is incompatible with all theories of meaning on the market, including the denotationalism favored by neo-Russellians. Second, it explains nothing that is not already explained by its venerable predecessor, the principle of (forward) compositionality.