Traversing Narcissistic Pathways: From Freud to Present Times

This article begins with Freud’s struggles in dealing with the concept of transference. His struggles were particularly acute with certain types of narcissistic patients. The view presented is that Freud, in some ways, was prototypic of the type of struggles that contemporary analysts have in allowing transference manifestations to effloresce. Kohut is seen as advancing the struggle and setting a new boundary for analyzability that allowed analysts to begin to move into the patient’s world. Bach, Winnicott, Bion, and Klein are then pictured as moving the boundary in a manner that allowed for a greater range of patients to survive in the analytic situation. The difficulties in allowing the transference, and particularly narcissistic and fragmentary transferences, to unfold are discussed in the light of several clinical examples.     

The clinical revolution of the ‘wise baby’

In an historical context focused on a close examination of the complex relationship between Freud and Ferenczi, the author shows Ferenczi's contribution to the evolution of psychoanalysis. He describes how his ideas and his therapeutic sensitivity anticipated modern clinical thought (for example, Winnicott and Bion), especially the understanding of borderline and narcissistic pathology. The paper considers the following topics: transference and countertransference; early affectivity; the different psychic trauma; phenomena connected with dissociation; the healing factor of the analysis.     

The transference neurosis in Freud's writings

This paper reviews the evolution of the concept of transference neurosis in Freud's writings. It suggests that the language in which the concept of the transference neurosis is originally expressed by Freud includes an idea of the analyst as aggressively pursuing the analytic cure by waging a solitary battle against the patient's disease. With the representation of the death drive and the larger role accorded to sadism as its external manifestation in Freud's revised drive theory of 1920, the patient becomes the ally; resistance, in the sense of the conservative forces, not disease, in the sense of libidinal conflict, becomes the enemy. It is thus difficult to speak of a transference neurosis in the circumscribed way Freud originally meant it, and he ceased to use the term after 1926 rather than redefine it to fit his broader perspective. In this broader perspective, relative resolution of conflict replaced radical liberation of the patient from disease. That Freud did not redefine the term does not imply that he discarded it, or that we necessarily should. This paper suggests that Freud implied a functional distinction between transference as transforming agent and transference neurosis as result of that transformation. That distinction defines psychoanalytic cure in terms of the understanding of a symbolic transformation which is, through the transference neurosis, reexperienced as part of the psychoanalytic process.     

Love, drive and desire in the works of Freud, Lacan and Proust

Both Freud and Lacan have made love the object of scientific enquiry, which is in itself remarkable, since we usually turn this subject over to literary and philosophical treatment. This article discusses Freud and Lacan's contributions to the psychology of love through dialogue with Marcel Proust's seminal novel, Remembrance of Things Past, with special emphasis on the middle sections. The point of departure is love's manifestation in the analytical situation. Freud has described transference love as both resistance and as an extreme variant of normal falling in love, to which Lacan adds the deceptive character of transference. From transference love the investigation continues to the contradictions Freud has described in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality as love's affectionate and sensual currents. Lacan contributes the concept of desire, which must be distinguished from drive and love. The differentiation between desire, drive and love introduces the perspective necessary for a psychoanalytic reading of Proust's opus. The main objective is a reading of the protagonists, Albertine and the Baron de Charlus, as representatives of the vicissitudes of love and drive, respectively.     

Racial fantasies and the primal scene of miscegenation

The primal scene, theorized by Freud in his case history of the Wolf Man, is a fantasy scenario thoroughly embedded in social relations. While pursuing his analysis of oedipal structures in the Wolf Man's case history, Freud overlooked social relations, downplaying the importance of racial and class difference in the Wolf Man's sexual etiology. In this essay, I trace the circulation of two fantasy structures: 'the primal scene of miscegenation' and 'A black man is being beaten,' both of which structure desire in both Freud 's era and our own. I interpret Fanon's work on racial subjectivity alongside Freud 's theory of fantasy to elucidate the interconnected nature of racial and sexual difference in both Freud and Fanon's theories. The racial fantasies proposed in this essay have application to clinical settings, where they may structure transference and countertransference.     

Anna Freud's Analysis by Her Father: The Assault on the Self

Sigmund Freud's analysis of his daughter, Anna, continues to create many troubling questions: For example, in terms of his own theory did Freud envisage the transference reactions of his daughter in her analysis with him? How are we to understand Anna Freud as a well-trained analyst in terms of the inevitable limitations of her analytic experience with her father? Menaker explores the ethical effects of this analysis in regard to fundamental problems in psychoanalytic theory and therapy.     

On Trygve Braatøy’s concept of analytic love. An assumption on the actuality of one of the pioneers in Norwegian psychoanalysis

Is analysis still a cure of love? And is the analyst’s love and warm feelings for his patient a prerequisite for doing psychoanalysis? Trygve Braatøy addresses these complex matters in his book from 1954. The concept of love and its relation to sexuality is discussed, and how to understand love in the analytic setting. His points of view are compared with Freud’s and those of some second-generation analysts, his Norwegian colleagues and contemporary analysts, as well as modern writers. Braatøy defines himself as a true Freudian, but his clinical theory regarding love and countertransference has strong resemblances to Rank and Ferenczi and his followers, both in Europe and USA. Braatøy sums up that the therapist’s capacity to love and have a surplus of warmth ought to be the most prominent factor when selecting candidates for psychoanalytic training. Braatøy is a modern writer, with his ideas founded on clinical experience and intuition.     

The deconstruction of primary narcissism

The author examines Winnicott ’s contribution to Freud ’s concept of primary narcissism. In Mourning and melancholia, Freud laid the foundations for this contribution, but it was Winnicott who turned it into a clinically useful concept. There are three of Winnicott’s ideas that can be seen as preliminary stages to his theory of transitional phenomena and illusion. They serve as an introduction to thinking about the analysis of the analysand ’s primary narcissism and the theoretical prerequisites that make the interpretation of primary narcissism possible. Through the exploration of three main points in Winnicott’s writings the author shows how Winnicott’s conceptualizations are both new and a continuation of Freud ’s thinking. His ideas are thus part of the overall theoretical pattern of Freud ’s metapsychology. The three main points are as follows: 1. In bringing maternal care and the presence of the psychic environment into the construction of primary narcissism, Winnicott made it possible to analyse narcissism. His ideas enable us to stand back from the characteristic solipsism of narcissism, which holds that everything comes from the self and only from the self. The latter concept tends to eliminate the role of the object and environment in the construction of the self. At the same time, by deconstructing the way in which the self is infiltrated by a certain number of narcissistic postulates, Winnicott made it possible to interpret the theory of narcissism itself. 2. Between the individual and the sense of self, Winnicott inserted the maternal object and her function as a mirror of affects who acts as a medium for the organization of self-identity. Primary identity is established through the construction and elimination of a narcissistic identification that becomes meaningful in the context of a primary homosexual relationship functioning as a ‘double’. 3. A process of differentiation that governs the discovery of the object is in a dialectical relationship with narcissistic identification. That process can be understood only in terms of the responses made by the primary psychic environment to the baby’s primary aggression.     

Reconstructing the Sacred: Evolving Conceptualizations of Religious Faith in Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice

Freud's original understanding of religion was categorically depreciative, and tended to portray religious faith in exclusively western and patriarchal terms (S. Freud, 1913/1989, 1927/1989). More recently, many of Freud's assertions about religion have been questioned. The psychoanalytic contributions of W. D. Fairbairn (1954), and D. W. Winnicott (1971) as well as the work of feminist scholars (N. Chodorow, 1974, 1989; C. Gilligan, 1993) and multicultural theorists (A. Roland, 1996) have profoundly shaken the metapsychological substructure upon which Freud rested his critique of spiritual faith. This paper describes how a gradual historical evolution has occurred in psychoanalytic theory, so that the work of such theorists as A. M. Rizutto (1979), M. H. Spero (1992), and H. Kohut (1984, 1985) now delineates the adaptive and creative place that religious experience can have in human development and psychological life.     

‘The newspaper reader’: On the meaning of concrete objects in a psychoanalytic treatment1

The author investigates the meaning of concrete objects in the psychoanalytic treatment of a severely disturbed patient for the development of his inner world and the analytic process. She includes a survey of relevant theoretical concepts with an emphasis on Winnicott and Bion. It is shown that the objects served basic defensive functions both within the analytic relationship and for the precarious intrapsychic state of the patient. The author describes the technical dealing that led to a structural change. From the comparison of the initial dream and a later dream, Mr N's inner development from total inclusion in the object to triadic reality of separated, repaired objects becomes discernible. The author shows how this progress was facilitated by his use of concrete objects as links between his psychotic and non‐psychotic parts, as well as by the specifi c way the analyst handled the paradoxical transference‐ countertransference. She also illustrates the thesis that the developmental steps described are crucial for the capability to digest psychic pain by symbolization instead of discharging it in a destructive‐violent way.     

Art alone endures.

Sigmund Freud, a passionate collector of antiquities, often treated these objects as animate beings. He described such blurring of boundaries between persons and things in the protagonist of W. Jensen's novella, Gradiva. Freud began collecting when his father died, but his unusual attitude toward artefacts was established much earlier, presumably as a consequence of repeated early disappointments in human caretakers. It is postulated that this adaptive maneuver was not simply a displacement of love and hate, but a turning away from vulnerability in relationships, toward attachments over which he might retain effective control. The Freud Collection is largely focused on Greco-Roman and Egyptian objects. Freud's profound interest in classical civilization was established in childhood; he was particularly concerned with the struggle between Aryan Rome and Semitic Carthage, a conflict in which he identified with both sides. This ambivalence reflected growing up within a marginal Jewish family in a Germanic environment. Commitment to classical ideals represented an optimal manner of bridging these contrasting worlds. Egyptian artefacts were, for Freud, links to the prehistory of the Jewish people; they also represent an era when maternal deities found their proper place in man's pantheon--an echo of Freud's prehistoric past.     

“Transferring” and transference

This paper is part of my research into psychotic transference and is also related to the psychotic aspect of any adult or infantile patient in analysis. In my research, I studied the origin of the concept of transference in Charcot's time before Freud, and the transformation of this concept in psychoanalysis. Freud thought that psychotic patients were not able to establish a transference relationship, but some of his early papers show the opposite. In fact, Freud himself and then several other analysts were able to develop a personal experience regarding the possibility of contact and transferring feelings and delusional experiences in a therapeutic context – individual, group, or institution. I provide some clinical examples in this paper, as well as some theoretical, personal views regarding intrapersonal and interpersonal transference. Like Freud and Melanie Klein, I believe that transference starts with life, but that in psychoanalysis it has a particular meaning.     

Winnicott’s foundation for the basic concepts of Freud’s metapsychology?1

In a recent paper, Fulgencio shows how Winnicott rejected the basic speculative concepts of Freud’s metapsychology – Trieb, psychical apparatus and libido – and replaced them with non-speculative concepts that promoted a factual theorization. In this paper, the author examines some of Winnicott’s concepts and attempts to demonstrate how, rather than replacing Freud’s concepts, he provides a factual foundation for the metapsychology in the double dependence of the infant in care. Freud never actually disregards the necessity of early mothering but he takes it for granted. By differentiating between ego needs and id needs, ego-relatedness and id-relatedness, object-mother and environment-mother, Winnicott attempts to theorize what Freud takes for granted: the function of the holding environment as a framework for id-experiences and the function of object-presenting as a condition of reality-testing. Furthermore, by differentiating between pure male and pure female elements, he is also able to construct a highly speculative theorization in order to distinguish two basic principles: doing and being. Although the death drive is clearly rejected, this rejection follows from his theorization of double dependence. Consequently, the author suggests that Winnicott did not discard metapsychological concepts but theorized the conditions for using both these and the intrapsychic topography.     

Call of the Wild

Freud described "wild analysis" as an undisciplined version of psychoanalysis; but the new Penguin series of Freud's writings collects many of his papers under the title Wild Analysis, challenging the differentiation. This paper traces wild elements at the core of psychoanalytic thought, crediting Groddeck, Ferenczi, and Winnicott for bringing them to the open. The image of the wild analyst can serve us as the image of the deeply involved, personally motivated analyst, whose work is intense and emotionally risky. This is the opposite of the "civilized" analyst who uses well-defined existing paths, takes no personal risks, and therefore stays at an emotional distance from his/her patients. Every analyst's capacity to develop a unique analytic self, based on his/her genuine life experience and worldview, is endangered if stepping out of line is slandered as "wild analysis" or as insanity. The relevance of these issues for contemporary psychoanalytic thought and education is demonstrated.     

Winnicott's rejection of the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology1

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb(instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he first elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non‐speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.     

Toward a definition of psychoanalytic neutrality

The word and concept of neutrality play an important but confusing role in the history of psychoanalysis. Does neutrality imply indifference? The origin of this ambiguity is traced to the fact that Freud himself never used the word "neutrality" (Neutralitaet) in his own writings. (His term Indifferenz was translated as "neutrality" by Strachey.) The essence of the controversy that has simmered in the psychoanalytic literature ever since is contained in the question: "Is remaining true to the concept of neutrality somehow antithetical to the analyst's genuine involvement with the patient?" In this paper, I examine the feeling and power aspects of the word and suggest that the concept of neutrality becomes clinically useful when the analyst asks himself the question, "Neutral to what?" The analyst's awareness of his motives for recognizing and addressing certain conflicts and for overlooking others is heightened. With three clinical vignettes as illustrations, I explore the role of the concept of neutrality in deepening our understanding of (1) the analytic relationship; (2) The influence, on the conduct of the treatment, of the analyst's goals and theoretical persuasion regarding how the goals are to be achieved. As examples, I use the current debates over the relative value of the analyst's focusing his attention on: (a) the patient's mind in the hour rather than his life outside the hour and, (b) transference over nontransference interpretation. Finally, I emphasize the far-reaching implications of adding an explicit concept of "external reality" to A. Freud's exclusively intrapsychic definition of the "objective" analyst's position of neutrality as equidistant from id, ego, and superego. The addition of this fourth point to the analyst's "compass" widens the analytic field toward which the analyst is neutral. The concept of neutrality with respect to specifiable conflicts is thereby also broadened to include (a) interpersonal conflict within the psychoanalytic relationship and (b) conflict within the analyst. With these explicit additions, the concept of neutrality with respect to conflict becomes congruent with the current emphasis on the nonauthoritarian two-persons aspects of the psychoanalytic relationship, without detracting from the primary analytic goal of deeper understanding of intrapsychic conflict.     

Melanie Klein and Anna Freud: The discourse of the early dispute

Divisions in the field of the psychoanalysis of children can be traced to a dispute over the infantile super-ego between the theorists Melanie Klein and Anna Freud beginning in 1927. These divisions are understood within the analytic world as the result of scientific disputation between alternative valid theories. An examination of the language, claims, and epistemology of Klein's and Freud's publications in 1927 that marked the public commencement of the conflict, reveals a personalized discourse in which authority was derived from the allegiance, experience, and personal analytic standing of the contestants as much as from theoretical insight. The structure and rhetoric of the debate suggest that, rather than terminating the dispute, the publications of 1927 served to encourage professionalization in child analysis and establish Anna Freud and Melanie Klein as authoritative alternative theorists.     

Seduction and the vicissitudes of translation: the work of Jean Laplanche

This paper aims to analyze Jean Laplanche's revision of Freudian metapsychology, which emerged from a critical return to Freud's officially abandoned seduction theory of 1895-1897. Where Freud gradually replaced the model of traumatic seduction with a theory of infantile sexuality and its drives, Laplanche articulates both trauma and sexual drive in a new theory of primal seduction, the fundamental anthropological situation in which human subjectivity is formed. The author concludes by considering Laplanche's modeling of the psychoanalytic situation and his reformulation of transference in relation to mourning and sublimation within the framework of the general theory of seduction.