Sikh millennials of the ‘kirtan generation’ in the making of an ‘American Sikhism’

ABSTRACT

This essay focuses on the millennial generation of Sikhs in the United States. Based on extended ethnographic research in Sikh communities, the author explores the role of Sikh millennials in the making of an ‘American Sikhism’, the contours of which are taking shape having followed after the explosive growth of gurdwara communities – and the educational, social, and other resources they provide – which were largely made possible by the affluence of Sikh communities beginning with the previous ‘Brain Drain’ generation. In particular, the author discusses this ‘kirtan generation’ of Sikhs, educated in gurdwara schools, and their growing leadership of Sikh communities.     

On the Alleged Ambiguity of ‘Now’ and ‘Here’

It is argued that, in order to account for examples where the indexicals `now' and `here' do not refer to the time and location of the utterance, we do not have to assume (pace Quentin Smith) that they have different characters (reference-fixing rules), governed by a single metarule or metacharacter. The traditional, the fixed character view is defended: `now' and `here' always refer to the time and location of the utterance. It is shown that when their referent does not correspond to the time and/or location of the utterance, `now' and `here' work in an anaphoric way, inheriting their reference from another noun phrase. The latter may be explicit or implicit in the discourse. It is also shown that `now' and `here' can inherit their reference from a presupposed or tacit reference. In that case, they are coreferential with what will be labeled a `tacit initiator'. This anaphoric interpretation has the merit of fitting within the Kaplanian distinction between pure indexicals (`now', `here', `today', etc.) and demonstratives (`this', `that', `she', etc.).     

Reiteration: The ‘Imperative of the Word’ and Echoing the ‘Significative Terms’

Abstract

The act of reiteration is viewed as a therapeutic reply that is especially responsive in the face of what Lacan (1977) and Heidegger (1927/1962) respectively refer to as “empty speech” and “idle talk.” By hearing and selecting those key signifiers and phrasings that bear the client's story of distress, the act of reiteration allows us to focus and address the “subject who speaks” rather than the commonsense storyline itself. As an active and continuing punctuation of the client's direct discourse at the level of the word, the act of reiteration is only the first moment of a more complete narrative reply. But in keeping the therapist ever grounded in the client's direct expressions, it is this first moment of reiteration that leaves the therapist positioned to be responsive to the client's discourse of “rhetorical displacements,” of intimation and allusion, as these “echo” from “elsewhere.”     

Eliminativism and the ambiguity of ‘belief’

It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms theoretical and belief are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of theoretical that is of use to the eliminativist, and in this sense some kinds of belief (dispositional states, infra-conscious states and the Freudian unconscious) are indeed theoretical and hence possible candidates for elimination, while others (consciously occurring thoughts like judgements and perceptualGestalten) are not theoretical and hence not candidates for elimination.     

Mathematical modeling of the effects of ‘capability’ and ‘intent’ on the stability of a competitive international system

In international relations theory, there is a long history of Richardson-like modeling of the evolution of military capability. Usually, such models are deterministic and predictive and do not allow for the representation of the transition from competitive peace to shooting war. More recently, models have been developed which attempt to represent the evolution of relationship between nations. The relationship between nations, varying from friendship to hostility, is taken to be synonymous with the intent of nations towards each other, varying from good will to malice. Generally, these relationship models do not include capability though common sense would indicate that capability and mutual intent should profoundly influence each other. A model is presented here which combines these two fundamental attributes of international relations and attempts to represent the outbreak of war in the world system by the onset of deterministic chaos in the extended model.On leave 1994–95 at U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C. 20451, U.S.A.     

The emotional geographies of the ‘livingdying’

This paper engages with Madge's (2016; 2018) notion of the ‘livingdying’ through an analysis of three recent autobiographies of death and dying. Dying: A Memoir by Australian author, Cory Taylor (2016), In Gratitude by British writer, Jenny Diski (2016), and The Bright Hour by American memoirist, Nina Riggs (2017), provide insight into the sometimes contradictory emotional responses to the different spaces traversed by the ‘livingdying’. We identify how the emotions of fear and anxiety, sadness and grief, anger and frustration, and isolation and loneliness infuse the liminal spaces that the ‘livingdying’ occupy. In doing so we highlight how the normative dualism of ‘the living’ and ‘the dying’ shapes emotional vulnerabilities. Finally, hoping to further advance Madge's (2016; 2018) provocation to acknowledge, account for and honour the intrinsic entanglement of living and dying and life and death, we propose a reframing of her notion of ‘livingdying’ that includes the ‘ordinary’ living, that is, those not dealing with a terminal illness.     

Kierkegaard and the ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’

This article discusses the claim made by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling that the story of Abraham involves a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’. It tries to show that this claim is intelligible and plausible when considered within the context of a philosophical position which views morality as a system of duties.     

‘Critical psychotherapy,’ ‘postpsychotherapy,’ and the cult of technicism

This paper about the terms ‘critical psychotherapy’ and ‘postpsychotherapy’ argues that the terms ‘critical psychology,’ ‘critical psychiatry,’ and ‘postpsychiatry’ are already in use, and we can see the new terms – ‘critical psychotherapy’ and ‘postpsychotherapy’ – as additions to this already existing family of terms. However, this paper also argues that what is of most importance is not the case for using these new terms, but the tendencies and features these terms might be taken to refer to. The paper begins with an experience the author had while working as a counsellor some years ago. The terms listed above are explored, as are the roots of ‘critical psychotherapy’ in psychoanalysis, before providing an example of how a philosopher’s work might be relevant to psychotherapists.     

Understanding the ‘active’ in ‘enactive’

Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This coupling is no accident. The appeal to action is seen either as a way of explaining representation or explaining it away. This paper argues that the appeal to action as a way of explaining, supplementing, or even supplanting, representation can lead to a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the concept of action to which we appeal cannot, on pain of circularity, be a representational concept. Such an appeal would presuppose representation and therefore can neither explain it nor explain it away. On the other hand, I shall argue, if the concept of action to which we appeal is not a representational one, there is every reason for supposing that it will not be the sort of thing that can explain, or supplement, let alone supplant, representation. The resulting dilemma, I shall argue, is not fatal. But avoiding it requires us to embrace a certain thesis about the nature of action, a thesis whose broad outline this paper delineates. Anyone who wishes to employ action as a way of explaining or explaining away representation should, I shall argue, take this conception of action very seriously indeed. I am going to discuss these issues with respect to a influential recent contribution to this debate: the sensorimotor or enactive model of perception developed by Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë.     

Why ‘non-mental’ won’t work: on Hempel’s dilemma and the characterization of the ‘physical’

Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis.

Increasing the writing productivity of ‘blocked’ academicians

Individual case histories of six academicians who sought treatment for complaints of an inability to do professional writing are presented. All were exposed to a treatment program of at least a year's duration that included weekly therapy sessions and attendance at group support meetings as regular treatment components. Use of a contracted, external contingency was manipulated experimentally in an ABAB design. The results (measured in terms of numbers of verified pages of writing) indicate that while general treatment components were adequate to produce sporadic writing, use of an external contingency was necessary for the establishment of stable levels of productivity over extended periods of scheduled writing days and at follow-ups a year beyond treatment. Two of the writers required recontracting for a second external contingency before that stability was achieved. A third, who was referred as potentially suicidal over her writing problems, was treated with a lengthy program of successive approximations to formal composition. Taken together, the data of these subjects suggest that writing ‘blocks’ can be treated effectively with conventional behavioral techniques, especially that of contingency management.     

First-person thought and the use of ‘I’

The traditional account (TA) of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of ‘I’ conflict with its conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person thought cannot be maintained.     

The clinical revolution of the ‘wise baby’

In an historical context focused on a close examination of the complex relationship between Freud and Ferenczi, the author shows Ferenczi's contribution to the evolution of psychoanalysis. He describes how his ideas and his therapeutic sensitivity anticipated modern clinical thought (for example, Winnicott and Bion), especially the understanding of borderline and narcissistic pathology. The paper considers the following topics: transference and countertransference; early affectivity; the different psychic trauma; phenomena connected with dissociation; the healing factor of the analysis.