Why Social Science is Biological Science

The social sciences need to take seriously their status as divisions of biology. As such they need to recognize the central role of Darwinian processes in all the phenomena they seek to explain. An argument for this claim is formulated in terms of a small number of relatively precise premises that focus on the nature of the kinds and taxonomies of all the social sciences. The analytical taxonomies of all the social sciences are shown to require a Darwinian approach to human affairs, though not a nativist or genetically driven theory by any means. Non-genetic Darwinian processes have the fundamental role on all human affairs. I expound a general account of how Darwinian processes operate in human affairs by selecting for strategies and sets of strategies individuals and groups employ. I conclude by showing how a great deal of social science can be organized in accordance with Tinbergen’s approach to biological inquiry, an approach required by the fact that the social sciences are all divisions of biology, and in particular the studies of one particular biological species.     

THREE THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE

In The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, Steven Pinker maintains that at present there are three competing views of human nature—a Christian theory, a “blank slate” theory (what I call a social constructivist theory), and a Darwinian theory—and that the last of these will triumph in the end. I argue that neither the outcome of such competition nor the particular content of these theories is as clear as Pinker believes. In this essay I take a critical as well as a constructive look at the challenge presented by a Darwinian theory of human nature—a challenge to the social sciences and the humanities and also to theology and more specifically to a Christian understanding of human nature.     

FROM PESSIMISM TO HOPE: A NATURAL PROGRESSION

Mutual critique by scientists and religious believers mostly entails the pruning of untenable religious beliefs by scientists and warnings against scientific minimalism on the part of believers. John F. Haught has been prominent in formulating religious apologetics in response to the challenges posed by evolutionary theory. Haught's work also resonates with a parallel criticism of the conventional scientific metaphysics undergirding neo‐Darwinian theory. Contemporary systems ecology seems to indicate that nothing short of a complete reversal of the Enlightenment assumptions about nature is capable of repositioning science to deal adequately with the origin and dynamics of living systems. A process‐based alternative metaphysics substantially mitigates several ostensible conflicts between science and religion.     

Genes, Brains and Gendered Behavior: Rethinking Power and Politics in Response to Condit, Liesen, and Vandermassen

In response to the commentaries by Condit, Liesen, and Vandermassen, I argue that we lack a more nuanced understanding of women’s political behavior (and therefore politics in general) because of the sustained barrier between the social and natural sciences, historical missteps, researcher bias, and perhaps an inclination to ask the wrong questions. By taking a Darwinian feminist approach to exploring gendered political behavior, and with the tools of behavior genetics and cognitive neuroscience, we can better understand the psychological and behavioral repertoires of men and women as well as predict political outcomes.     

Gendered Political Behavior: A Darwinian Feminist Approach

Darwinian feminists use an evolutionary framework to examine behaviors that promote survival and reproductive success. Subsequent power relations between women and men arise from conflicting reproductive strategies and social scientists ought to reconfigure their understanding of the psychological and behavioral repertoires of women and men based on their dynamic interactions throughout human evolution. This paper is an addition to the feminist literature on women’s contribution to evolution through an exploration of autonomy and leadership in egalitarian society and uses a Darwinian feminist approach to understand gendered political behavior.     

A Dialectic on Validity: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going

It has been suggested that the primary issue in considerations of validity today is the discrepancy between currently accepted theory and the practice of validation. The reason for this discrepancy may be that although considerable discussion has taken place in educational measurement and psychometrics regarding changes in our conceptions of validity, that has not been the case more generally in the social and behavioral sciences. A dialectic on the current status of validity theory for social and behavioral scientists is presented to help bridge this gap.     

The Defining Constituents of Adult Attachment and Their Assessment

Reviewing the major issues regarding the definition of adult attachment and the nature of the attachment representations, this paper points out that attachment theory approaches intimate interpersonal processes using three fundamental dichotomies: self versus other, autonomy versus relatedness, and dependent versus depended-on positions. When these three dichotomies are intersected, eight components emerge to define the attachment representation: the autonomy and relatedness requests and autonomy and relatedness provisions of self and other. Moreover, as the main methodologies assessing adult attachment are also reviewed, it is argued that these have not yet provided an exhaustive empirical assessment of these eight components individually. It is suggested that such an approach to assessment may yield interesting findings.     

Social signals: from theory to applications

The Special Issue Editorial introduces the research milieu in which Social Signal Processing originates, by merging computer scientists and social scientists and giving rise to this field in parallel with Human–Computer Interaction, Affective Computing, and Embodied Conversational Agents, all similarly characterized by high interdisciplinarity, stress on multimodality of communication, and the continuous loop from theory to simulation and application. Some frameworks of the cognitive and social processes underlying social signals are identified as reference points (Theory of Mind and Intersubjectivity, mirror neurons, and the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of communication), while three dichotomies (automatic vs. controlled, individualistic vs. intersubjective, and meaning vs. influence) are singled out as leads to navigate within the theoretical and applicative studies presented in the Special Issue.     

Social signals: from theory to applications

The Special Issue Editorial introduces the research milieu in which Social Signal Processing originates, by merging computer scientists and social scientists and giving rise to this field in parallel with Human-Computer Interaction, Affective Computing, and Embodied Conversational Agents, all similarly characterized by high interdisciplinarity, stress on multimodality of communication, and the continuous loop from theory to simulation and application. Some frameworks of the cognitive and social processes underlying social signals are identified as reference points (Theory of Mind and Intersubjectivity, mirror neurons, and the ontogenesis and phylogenesis of communication), while three dichotomies (automatic vs. controlled, individualistic vs. intersubjective, and meaning vs. influence) are singled out as leads to navigate within the theoretical and applicative studies presented in the Special Issue.     

On Latour’s Social Theory and Theory of Society,and His Contribution to Saving the World

Latour is widely considered a critic and renewer of research in the social sciences. The ecologically minded Left has also acclaimed him as a theorist interested in bringing nature back both into sociological theory and into society and politics. To enable a more detailed discussion of Latour’s claims, I will here outline his theory and the ways in which it is related to classical theory, such as Durkheim, and the methodology of the interpretive paradigm, such as Schütz. My thesis is that Latour’s empirical studies may be read as unfolding the methodological consequences of the interpretive paradigm, and that his early work is a brilliant proof of Durkheim’s theory of the morphology of social facts. Latour has now elaborated the insights he gained from concrete laboratory studies toward a general theory of the social, of society, and of politics. These generalizations have made his theory at least partly problematic. The political implication of Latour’s theory of society is a generalization of the call for equality to encompass everything; in other words, Latour criticizes the exclusion of nonhuman entities from political representation. The paper closes by discussing the political consequences of this proposal.     

From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory

Interest in the concept of identity has grown exponentially within both the humanities and social sciences, but the discussion of identity has had less impact than might be expected on the quantitative study of political behavior in general and on political psychology more specifically. One of the approaches that holds the most promise for political psychologists is social identity theory, as reflected in the thinking of Henri Tajfel, John Turner, and colleagues. Although the theory addresses the kinds of problems of interest to political psychologists, it has had limited impact on political psychology because of social identity theorists' disinclination to examine the sources of social identity in a real world complicated by history and culture. In this review, four key issues are examined that hinder the successful application of social identity theory to political phenomena. These key issues are the existence of identity choice, the subjective meaning of identities, gradations in identity strength, and the considerable stability of many social and political identities.     

Evolution and medicine: the long reach of "Dr. Darwin"

In this review we consider the new science of Darwinian medicine. While it has often been said that evolutionary theory is the glue that holds the disparate branches of biological inquiry together and gives them direction and purpose, the links to biomedical inquiry have only recently been articulated in a coherent manner. Our aim in this review is to make clear first of all, how evolutionary theory is relevant to medicine; and secondly, how the biomedical sciences have enriched our understanding of evolutionary processes. We will conclude our review with some observations of the philosophical significance of this interplay between evolutionary theory and the biomedical sciences.     

REJOINDER: Picasso's Guernica Creativity as a Darwinian Process: Definitions,Clarifications, Misconceptions,and Applications

The author responds to four commentaries on Simonton (this issue). The response deals with two sets of issues. First are criticisms of the Darwinian theory of creativity, especially as applied to Picasso's sketches for the Guernica. These criticisms range from the presumed role of associative processes to the essential nature of any Darwinian model. The second set of issues pertains to diverse methodological objections with respect to measurement and data analysis. The author responds to each and every point. The author concludes not only that Picasso's creative process is best described as Darwinian, but also that the Darwinian theory of creativity has been notably strengthened by the current exchange.     

THEOLOGY AND THE SCIENCE WARS: WHO OWNS HUMAN NATURE?

Lluís Oviedo examines in his article the current conflict over human nature and the role of the sciences in the debate, suggesting that there may be a role for theology to play as well. In this essay I examine and respond to some aspects of Oviedo's article and suggest that the nature of the conflict needs to be nuanced to understand it as a conflict not between scientific and philosophical/social‐scientific views of human nature but among scientists, social scientists, and philosophers over the role of science in thinking about human nature. I analyze some of the obstacles for theology's becoming involved and propose that thinking about what are distinctively theological questions as opposed to scientific ones may be an appropriate starting point.     

The Essentiality of “Culture” in the Study of Religion and Politics

This article reviews various theoretical approaches political scientists employ in the analysis of religion and politics and posits culture as a conceptual bridge between competing approaches. After coming to the study of religion slowly in comparison with other social science disciplines, political science finally has a theoretically diverse and thriving religion and politics subfield. However, political scientists’ contributions to the social scientific study of religion are hampered by a lack of agreement about whether endogenous or exogenous theoretical approaches ought to dominate our scholarship. I assert that the concept of culture—and more specifically, subculture—might help create more connections across theoretical research traditions. I emphasize how the concept of religion‐based subculture is inherent in psychological, social psychological, social movement, and contextual approaches to religion and politics scholarship, and I explore these theoretical connections using the example of religion‐based “us versus them” discourses in contemporary American politics.     

Evolutionary psychology and rational-emotive theory: Time to open the floodgates

Main tenets, issues, and controversies for evolutionary psychology (EP), particularly its cognitive aspects, are introduced, clarified, and applied to the theory and philosophy of rational-emotive therapy (RET). Specifically, key concepts in EP are applied to Ellis' genetic postulate for cognitive demandingness and grandiosity, and are incorporated into Ruth's (1992) RET evolutionary proposal. The following issues are examined for demanding and grandiose thinking: nature (genetic) vs. nurture (learned), plasticity vs. unmodifiability, acquisition ease and modification-elimination difficulty, natural inseparability of cognition and emotion, natural inseparability of cognitive content and process, social selection pressures and the human psyche, competitive individualism vs. natural self-interest, evolutionary counter-balancing and false mutually exclusive dichotomies, epigenetic rules and Darwinian algorithms, current adaptions vs. ancestral remnants, child and adult adaption, Darwinism vs. Lamarckism, and ethical considerations.William J. Ruth, Ph.D., Staff Psychologist and Practicum Supervisor. School PsychologistPrivate Practice and Independent Research, Hartsdale, NY.     

Importing Freud: First‐wave psychoanalysis,interwar social sciences,and the interdisciplinary foundations of an American social theory

For all that has been written about Freud, one of the most significant sites for his initial importation into the U.S. remains largely unexamined: namely, within and through the social sciences. During these early years, social scientists were attracted to psychoanalysis for reasons that were not only personal and idiosyncratic, but also intellectual, social, and professional. Focusing on the University of Chicago's Division of Social Sciences and using oral histories, students records, course materials, as well as published sources, this essay explores this varied attraction and its substantive impact upon American social theory vis‐à‐vis the ideals and ideology of “social adjustment.” © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Evaluating Elizabeth Grosz's Biological Turn

Elizabeth Grosz's interpretation of Darwinian evolutionary theory to ground a feminist ontology of biology has been particularly controversial. Most critics have understood Grosz as supporting her theory with empirical evidence, and they criticize her for being either inaccurate or uncritical of and overly dependent on science. I argue that Grosz reads Darwin as a philosopher in a Deleuzian and Irigarayan sense, and that Grosz's project is therefore better understood in terms of its ethical and political goals rather than in terms of empirical adequacy. Employing this evaluative framework leads to a novel route for critique of Grosz's ontology in terms of its reliance on the Darwinian distinction between organism and environment. I conclude that Grosz's work is valuable for the way it maintains ethical and political considerations in feminist ontological debates, and that introducing a more sensitive understanding of the organism–environment relation will lead us closer to a truly feminist ontology of biology.     

Mind,Consciousness, and Free Will

This commentary discusses how philosophy and science can collaborate to understand the human mind, considering dialogues involving three philosophers and three cognitive scientists. Their topics include the relation of philosophy and science, the nature of mind, the problem of consciousness, and the existence of free will. I argue that philosophy is more general and normative than science, but they are interdependent. Philosophy can build on the cognitive sciences to develop a theory of mind I call “multilevel materialism,” which integrates molecular, neural, mental, and social mechanisms. Consciousness is increasingly being understood as resulting from neural mechanisms. Scientific advances make the traditional concept of free will implausible, but “freeish” will is consistent with new theories of decision making and action resulting from brain processes. Philosophers should work closely with scientists to address profound problems about knowledge, reality, and values.     

Counterfactual reasoning and the problem of selecting antecedent scenarios

A recent group of social scientists have argued that counterfactual questions play an essential role in their disciplines, and that it is possible to have rigorous methods to investigate them. Unfortunately, there has been little (if any) interaction between these social scientists and the philosophers who have long held that rigorous counterfactual reasoning is possible. In this paper, I hope to encourage some fresh thinking on both sides by creating new connections between them. I describe what I term “problem of selecting antecedent scenarios,” and show that this is an essential challenge in real-life counterfactual reasoning. Then, I demonstrate that the major extant theories of counterfactuals (especially the Lewis/Stalnaker theory and Igal Kvart’s rival account) are unable to solve this problem. I show that there are instances of real-life counterfactual reasoning in the social sciences that are counterexamples to both of these accounts. And finally, I develop a new theory of how to select antecedent scenarios that overcomes these difficulties, and so would be part of a more adequate theory of counterfactuals (and counterfactual reasoning).