Cognitive models of class structure and explanations of social outcomes

In this paper we argue that people's explanations of a wide range of social outcomes occur within a framework of expectations derived from beliefs about the pervasive influence of social class on individuals' life-chances. This claim is tested by examining the effect of varying the social class origins of vignette characters on judgments and explanations concerning their outcomes. Four domains of social activity are examined: occupational attainment, educational achievement, relationship success, and unemployment. In all of these areas, the class background of the characters was found to be associated with different outcome expectations, future expectations, judgments of responsibility and differences in the ways in which outcomes were explained. The results are consistent with the claim that people have cognitive models in which social class background is associated with particular social outcomes across a range of activities, and that these models are reasonably accurate representations of the relationships between social class and life-chances. This suggests that contrary to theories which have stressed the individualistic nature of belief systems in western societies, social class forms an important part of the popular representation of the influences on occupational, educational and relationship success.     

The grounding problem and presentist explanations

Opponents of presentism have often argued that the presentist has difficulty in accounting for what makes (presently) true past-tensed propositions (TptP) true in a way that is compatible with her metaphysical view of time and reality. The problem is quite general and concerns not only strong truth-maker principles, but also the requirement that truth be grounded in reality. In order to meet the challenge, presentists have proposed many peculiar present aspects of the world as grounds for truths concerning the past, such as uninstantiated haecceities, Meinongian non-existents, ersatz times, and dispositional and distributional properties. The main problem with all such solutions is that any explanation of what grounds a TptP that involves the past is eo ipso a better explanation than any that involves only the present. Thus, the quest for an account of grounding for TptP that is compatible with the presentist ontology and ideology is doomed to be explanatorily deficient with respect to eternalism. In a recent article, Ben Caplan and David Sanson have claimed that presentists should change their strategy and, rather than seeking for exotic grounds for TptP, should adopt a more liberal view of explanation. That is, they should allow themselves to resort to “past directed” explanations, even if they do not accept the past in their ontology and ideology. I argue that such a proposal is not compatible with the tenet that there is a substantial distinction between the ideology of such a version of presentism and that of eternalism. Therefore, the presentist cannot endorse such “deflationist” explanations as an easy way out to the problem of the grounding of TptP.     

Conceptual structure and social functions of behavior explanations: beyond person--situation attributions

The traditional approach to studying behavior explanations involves treating them as either person causes or situation causes and assessing them by using rating scales. An analysis of people's free-response behavior explanations reveals, however, that the conceptual distinctions people use in their explanations are more complex and sophisticated than the person-situation dichotomy suggests. The authors, therefore, introduce a model of the conceptual structure of folk behavior explanations (the network of concepts and assumptions on which explanations are based) and test it in 4 studies. The modes and features of behavior explanations within this conceptual structure also have specific social functions. In 2 additional studies, the authors demonstrate that people alter distinct features of their explanations when pursuing particular impression-management goals and that listeners make inferences about explainers' goals on the basis of these features.     

The demand for contrastive explanations

Philosophical Studies - A “contrastive explanation” explains not only why some event A occurred, but why A occurred as opposed to some alternative event B. Some philosophers argue that...     

Causal explanations of male and female academic performance as a function of sex-role biases

The study was designed to assess whether attributions of causality vary as a function of sex-role attitudes. Thirty-two male and thirty-two female undergraduates were presented with one of four story completions about a medical student in which sex of the student and success versus failure were varied. Subjects were asked to account for the medical student's success (or failure) in terms of ability, motivation, ease of the goal, and luck. Results suggest that attributions do vary as a function of sex-role attitudes, as measured by the Attitudes Toward Women Scale. Subjects with liberal attitudes were less likely to offer sex-biased attributions about lack of motivation. Subjects' attributions with respect to lack of ability suggest, however, that sex-typed notions about competence may still be deeply ingrained despite recent social changes.The author would like to thank Cheryl Sharp and Robin Koenig for their assistance in compiling the data for this project, as well as Robert Heaton, James Gumina, and Louise Bickman for their editoral comments.     

Reasons explanations (of actions) as structural explanations

Non-causal accounts of action explanation have long been criticized for lacking a positive thesis, relying primarily on negative arguments to undercut the standard Causal Theory of Action (Wilson and Shpall , in: Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016). Additionally, it is commonly thought that non-causal accounts fail to provide an answer to Donald Davidson’s (1963) challenge for theories of reasons explanations of actions. According to Davidson’s challenge, a plausible non-causal account of reasons explanations must provide a way of connecting an agent’s reasons, not only to what she ought to do, but to what she actually does. That is, such explanations must be truth-apt, not mere rationalizations. My aim in this paper is to show how a non-causal account of action can provide explanations that are truth-apt and genuinely explanatory. To make this argument, I take as a given an account of the practical syllogism (the syllogistic form of practical reasoning) discussed by Michael Thompson (Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2008) and Eric Wiland (Reasons, Continuum, New York, 2012), according to which the practical syllogism is truly practical rather than propositional in nature. Next, I present my primary positive thesis: reasons for actions have explanatory power in virtue of being parts of a structure—the practical syllogism—that contains the action being explained. I then argue that structural action explanations can meet Davidson’s challenge and that they genuinely explain actions. Finally, I conclude by addressing some objections to my argument.

     

Average explanations

Good scientific explanations sometimes appear to make use of averages. Using concrete examples from current economic theory, I argue that some confusions about how averages might work in explanations lead to both philosophical and economic problems about the interpretation of the theory. I formulate general conditions on potentially proper uses of averages to refine a notion of average explanation. I then try to show how this notion provides a means for resolving longstanding philosophical problems in economics and other quantitative social sciences.Some of the ideas in this essay were presented at the Philosophy of Economics II Conference at Tilburg University. I thank the participants for helpful remarks.     

The proper role of history in evolutionary explanations

Evolutionary explanations are not only common in the biological sciences, but also widespread outside biology. But an account of how evolutionary explanations perform their explanatory work is still lacking. This paper develops such an account. I argue that available accounts of explanations in evolutionary science miss important parts of the role of history in evolutionary explanations. I argue that the historical part of evolutionary science should be taken as having genuine explanatory force, and that it provides how-possibly explanations sensu Dray. I propose an account of evolutionary explanations as comparative-composite explanations consisting of two distinct kinds of explanations, one processual and one historical, that are connected via the explanandum's evolvability to show how the explanandum is the product of its evolutionary past. The account is both a reconstruction of how evolutionary explanations in biology work and a guideline specifying what kind of explanations evolutionary research programs should develop.     

The structure of executive function in 3-year-olds

Although the structure of executive function (EF) during adulthood is characterized by both unity and diversity, recent evidence suggests that preschool EF may be best described by a single factor. The latent structure of EF was examined in 228 3-year-olds using confirmatory factor analysis. Children completed a battery of executive tasks that differed in format and response requirements and in putative working memory and inhibitory control demands. Tasks appeared to be age appropriate, with adequate sensitivity across the range of performance and without floor or ceiling effects. Tests of the relative fit of several alternative models supported a single latent EF construct. Measurement invariance testing revealed less proficient EF in children at higher sociodemographic risk relative to those at lower risk and no differences between boys and girls. At 3 years of age, when EF skills are emerging, EF appears to be a unitary, more domain-general process.