汉语母语者英语动词三种屈折变化形式加工机制的差异

采用ERP技术考察了汉语母语者,英语动词三种屈折变化形式加工机制的差异。结果发现,英语动词进行式的屈折变化形式- ing的错误使用诱发了P600成分;完成式的屈折变化形式- ed的错误使用诱发了N400成分;完成式中没有明显屈折变化标识的不规则词的错误使用没有诱发典型的ERP成分。研究结果表明：对于缺乏英语使用环境、母语为汉语的晚期英语学习者来说,屈折变化形式- ing,完成式规则动词的变化形式- ed和没有明显形态变化标识的不规则动词的变化形式具有不同的加工机制,前者可能处于由陈述性记忆系统向程序性记忆系统加工的转变过程中,而后两者更多地由陈述性系统进行加工。这种加工机制的差异可能与动词屈折变化规则的复杂程度有关。     

Grammatical priming effects between pronouns and inflected verb forms

Summary Deciding on the lexical status of a word can be facilitated by a preceding, semantically related word. Three experiments are reported demonstrating a different kind of facilitation due to the grammatical relation between function words and content words in Serbo-Croatian. A pronoun facilitated or inhibited the lexical decision on a following verb depending on whether the person of the verb, as represented by its inflected ending, agreed with the person of the pronoun. Also, verbs primed subsequent pronouns but the pattern of results for the verbal priming of pronouns was markedly different from that for the pronominal priming of verbs. The results suggest that the organization of the internal lexicon is sensitive to grammatical relations as well as semantical relations between words.     

Children's linguistic intuitions about factive presuppositions

Third and sixth graders' understanding of factive presupposition was investigated via two tasks: One required an abstract truth value judgment of the verb complement; the other called for a more informal judgment of consistency (or contradiction) between the target sentence and the negation of its complement. When compared with corresponding adult data, the present results indicate that the development of factive presupposition continues through late childhood. A further task examined a nonlogical pragmatic variable related to factive meaning. The final task investigated whether children's judgments of overall certainty are governed by factive or pragmatic aspects of meaning. Comparisons across the four tasks indicate that factive presupposition only gradually emerges as a distinct logical component of verb meaning. It is argued that young children's initial discriminations between factive and nonfactive verbs reflect the subjective confidence conveyed by the verb rather than the logical property of factivity, but that later in acquisition, factivity acquires a status superseding that of other facets of meaning.     

The development of young infants' intuitions about support

Previous research has shown that 3-month-old infants, like adults, expect a box to be stable when it is in full contact with a platform, and to fall when it loses all contact with the platform. Do young infants also have expectations about what should happen when the box is only in partial contact with the platform? The present research was designed to address this question. In Experiment 1, 6.5-month-old infants saw two test events: a full-contact and a partial-contact test event. In both events, the infants watched the extended finger of a gloved hand push a box along the top of a platform. In the full-contact event, the box was pushed until its leading edge reached the end of the platform. In the partial-contact event, the box was pushed until only 15% or 70% of its bottom surface remained on the platform. The infants looked reliably longer at the partial-than at the full-contact event when 15%, but not 70%, of the box rested on the platform. These results suggested that the infants were able to judge how much contact was needed between the box and the platform for the box to be stable. A control condition provided evidence for this interpretation. In Experiment 2, 5.5- to 6-month-old infants were found to look equally at the full- and the partial-contact events, even when only 15% of the box's bottom surface remained on the platform. This result suggested that prior to 6.5 months of age infants perceive any amount of contact between the box and the platform to be sufficient to ensure the box's stability. Interpretations of this developmental sequence are considered in the Conclusion.     

Grammatical class effects in brain-damaged patients: functional locus of noun and verb deficit

Two patients are described with grammatical class dissociation: CG, a semantic-dementia patient who presented a disproportionate impairment of nouns compared to verbs; SA, a patient with a left parietal lesion who presented impaired sentence production and a disproportionate deficit for verbs compared to nouns. The results are discussed within the current models on semantic memory and lexical access.     

Speaker intuitions

I compare the tasks that Noam Chomsky and W. V. Quine assign the grammarian and point out that in many cases where Chomsky sees a question of fact Quine sees only a question of convenience. I argue that these differences are attributable, at least in part, to a difference in view concerning the data. Chomsky relies mostly on a speaker's reports of his linguistic intuitions. Quine finds this source methodologically moot. I develop a series of arguments that draw on Quine's theory of radical translation to defend Quine's doubts.     

Acquiring new spatial intuitions: learning to reason about rotations

There are certain simple rotations of objects that most people cannot reason about accurately. Reliable gaps in the understanding of a fundamental physical domain raise the question of how learning to reason in that domain might proceed. Using virtual reality techniques, this project investigated the nature of learning to reason across the domain of simple rotations. Learning consisted of the acquisition of spatial intuitions: there was encoding of useful spatiotemporal information in specific problem types and a gradual accumulation of this understanding across the domain. This pattern of learning through the accumulation of intuitions is especially interesting for rotational motion, in which an elegant domain-wide kinematics is available to support insightful learning. Individual ability to reason about rotations correlated highly with mastery motivation, skill in fluid reasoning, and skill in reasoning about spatial transformations. Thus, general cognitive advantages aided the understanding of individual rotations without guaranteeing immediate generalization across the domain.     

The visual metacognition questionnaire: a measure of intuitions about vision

Recent research has revealed a series of striking limits to visual perception. One important aspect of these demonstrations is the degree to which they conflict with intuition; people often believe that they will be able to see things that experiments demonstrate they cannot see. This metacognitive error has been explored with reference to a few specific visual limits, but no study has yet explored people's intuitions about vision more generally. In this article we present the results of a broad survey of these intuitions. Results replicate previous overestimates and underestimates of visual performance and document new misestimates of performance in tasks that assess inattention blindness and visual knowledge. We also completed an initial exploratory factor analysis of the items and found that estimates of visual performance for well-structured information tend to covary. These results represent an important initial step in organizing the intuitions that may prove important in a variety of settings, including performance of complex visual tasks, evaluation of others people's visual experience, and even the teaching of psychology.     

Empirical metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy

Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion of Jackson’s claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking Jackson’s abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical.

What young children do and do not know about the spelling of inflections and derivations

Morphemes have a powerful impact on the spellings of words in English. We report on two experiments examining young children's knowledge of the effect of suffix morphemes on spelling. In Experiment 1, 5- to 8-year-olds demonstrated awareness of the role of inflections, but not derivations in spelling. Experiment 2 examined whether children might show an understanding of the impact of derivations on spelling when they are provided with the specific spelling pattern. There was support for this idea; 7- to 10-year-old children took advantage of the derivations that were given to spell other derivations, but not the endings of control words. The results of these experiments suggest that young children are aware of the role that suffixes play in determining spelling, but that there are limits, such as those imposed by spelling difficulty, that constrain the execution of this knowledge. These findings provide new insights into current theoretical debates on spelling development.     

Development of infants’ intuitions about support relations: sensitivity to stability

Can infants perceive stability when a supported box is put on a supporting box in a balanced position? In Experiment 1, 41 infants saw three events. In a stable event, the supported box was put on a wide supporting box in a balanced position. In an unstable event, the supported box was put on a narrow supporting box in a balanced position. In an impossible event, the supported box was put on the extreme end of a wide supporting box. Infants 4 to 6.5 months old looked equally at all three events. Infants 6.5 to 10 months old looked slightly longer at the impossible event than at the other events. Infants 10 to 13 months old looked reliably longer at the unstable and impossible events than at the stable event. The results of Experiment 2 indicate that these differences in looking times did not come from differences in stimulus configurations between the events. These results suggest that infants above 10 months old are sensitive to stability of support relations.     

Philosophical expertise beyond intuitions

In what sense, if any, are philosophers experts in their domain of research and what could philosophical expertise be? The above questions are particularly pressing given recent methodological disputes in philosophy. The so-called expertise defense recently proposed as a reply to experimental philosophers postulates that philosophers are experts qua having improved intuitions. However, this model of philosophical expertise has been challenged by studies suggesting that philosophers’ intuitions are no less prone to biases and distortions than intuitions of non-philosophers. Should we then give up on the idea that philosophers possess some sort of expertise? In this paper, I argue that instead of focusing on intuitions, we may understand the relevant results of philosophical practice more broadly and investigate the other kind(s) of expertise they would require. My proposal is inspired by a prominent approach to investigating expert performance from psychology and suggests where and how to look for expertise in the results characteristic of philosophical practice. In developing this model, I discuss the following three candidates for such results: arguments, theories, and distinctions. Whether philosophers could be shown to be expert intuiters or not, there are interesting domains where we could look for philosophical expertise, beyond intuitions.     

III. Kantian intuitions

By way of a reply to Charles Parsons's paper in the Nagel Festschrift, Kant's notion of intuition (Anschauung) is examined. It is argued that for Kant the immediate relation which an intuition has to its object is a mere corollary to its singularity. It does not presuppose (as Parsons suggests) any presence of the object to the mind. This is shown, e.g., by the Prolegomena § 8, where the objects of intuitions a priori are denied by Kant to be so present. They yield knowledge, not in virtue of their immediacy but in virtue of their ideality.     

A defense of intuitions

Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists’ challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts.

Recognizing impossible object relations: intuitions about support in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Using looking-time measures, the authors examined untrained chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) ability to distinguish between adequate and inadequate support. In 3 experiments, the chimpanzees' sensitivity to different support relations between 2 objects was assessed. In each experiment, the chimpanzees saw a possible and an impossible test event, presented as digital video clips. Looking times in the 3 experiments suggest that chimpanzees use amount of contact between 2 objects, but not type of contact, to distinguish between adequate and inadequate support relations. These results indicate that chimpanzees have some intuition about support phenomena but their sensitivity to relational object properties may differ from that of human infants (Homo sapiens) in this domain.