关于公民道德建设的几个理论问题

为加强公民道德建设需要在理论上探讨和澄清一些问题 :当前社会主义道德体系和长期革命斗争与建设中形成的优良传统道德的关系 ;公民道德建设应当建立在社会主义经济基础之上 ,而非人性基础之上 ;公民道德建设需要对我国改革开放以来的道德理论状况做出正确的评价 ,以利完善社会主义道德体系     

建构适应社会主义市场经济的道德体系论要

体现社会主义本质、符合市场经济运作规则、贴近现实社会生活、推进“以德治国”方略实施 ,是建构适应社会主义市场经济道德体系的依据和现实基点。在此基础上的道德体系建设应将社会最高道德原则和主要道德生活领域的基本道德原则加以区分 ,并建构完善、具体、具有可操作性的道德规范体系 ,丰富道德范畴 ,注重道德实践、品质形成环节、机制的研究。同时要处理好市场原则与道德原则、道德规范体系的理想性与现实性、多元道德与主导道德、完善法治体系与完善德治体系、相对稳定性与与时俱进性等五个方面的关系 ,使道德体系的建设落在实处     

论主流意识形态对道德建设的引导作用--我国新时期道德构建应以社会主义荣辱观为核心

社会主义市场经济需要与之相适应的道德水准,但社会主义市场经济本身并不必然带来与之相适应的道德体系,与经济转型和社会转型相伴随的社会思潮的多元化,在一定程度上模糊了道德体系的核心价值标准,使人们的荣辱观在某些方面背离了社会主义市场经济发展的方向,从而在很大程度上阻碍了社会主义市场经济的健康发展.社会主义荣辱观的提出,为强化主流意识形态的影响力,及时构建适应社会主义市场经济要求的道德体系提供了核心价值标准,具有重大意义.     

建立与社会主义法律规范体系相协调的社会主义道德规范体系

在我国大力发展社会主义市场经济的现阶段,道德与法律具有相互协调的可能性:一方面,社会主义基本制度是道德与法律相协调的现实基础;另一方面,自身功能具有互补性是社会主义道德和法律相协调的内在依据.社会主义道德规范体系建设要坚持从宏观、中现、微观三个层面全面贯彻与法律规范体系相协调的指导思想,从立法、执法、司法、法律评价和完善四个环节确保道德规范体系与法律规范体系相协调.     

论社会主义道德价值观的一元指导

社会主义荣辱观是社会主义道德价值观的核心组成部分。本文对社会主义道德价值观进行了详细阐释,回顾了中国现代道德价值观的形成过程,分析了当代社会主义道德价值观面临的挑战,通过对社会主义道德价值观在我国发展历史的回顾和对西方的价值观的客观分析,从理论上论证了社会主义道德价值观的一元指导是我国社会的必然选择。     

革命英雄主义是军人道德的基本特征

中国人民解放军是中国共产党领导的、用马列主义、毛泽东思想武装起来的新型人民军队。在长期的艰苦卓绝的革命斗争中,我军形成和发展了以共产主义思想为核心的具有丰富内容的完整的军人道德体系。这种社会主义的军人职业道德,是人类历史上最高尚最先进的军人道德。革命英雄主义、无产阶级的爱国主义和国际主义、革命人道主义、服从命令遵守纪律是军人道德的主要规     

论行政伦理规范体系建设的主题及价值目标

当前我国行政伦理规范体系建设的软肋在于忽视道德对权力的有效约束,或者说,是社会主义行政伦理建设滞后。这必然导致权力行使的傲慢与冷漠,出现与社会主义本质要求不相适应的行政行为与现象。道德的本质和功能决定道德可以约束权力。因此,在行政伦理规范体系建设的过程中,既要对法制监督、社会监督等"硬监督"体系予以足够重视,还要重视发挥道德的"软监督"作用,引入和培育道德因素,发挥道德对公共生活和公共秩序的引导、调适和规范功能,促使权力主体由他律走向自律,实现权力主体他律和自律的统一。因此,建设市场经济体制下社会主义行政伦理规范体系,促进政治法律制度和行政人员的道德化,对于推进我国政治文明建设具有重要意义和作用。     

社会主义市场道德体系的建构

社会主义市场道德体系的建构史宇澄建立社会主义市场道德体系,首先必须明确其原则和宗旨。建立市场道德体系的原则和宗旨,就在于用社会主义的道德原则和规范去制约,去匡正市场中已经出现的错误的价值导向,使正在发育的社会主义市场逐步形成经济运行和伦理运作双向约束...     

道德调节的特征、界限和可能性

目前,苏联社会中存在的道德腐败主要表现在两方面。首先,前些年由于多种原因,背离社会主义道德评价、脱离道德意识和道德行为最高原则的完整的社会体系已经形成。相互纵容、要     

社会主义道德和共产主义道德的基本特征及其当代启示——重温马克思、恩格斯、列宁的有关经典论述

马克思主义经典作家从形成、实质、基础、功能、价值等五大层面来阐述了社会主义和共产主义道德的基本特征,认为,社会主义和共产主义道德是在与旧道德斗争中不断自我完善的道德,是主张将人的世界和人的关系回归于人自身并崇尚真正平等、自由以及权利和义务相统一的道德,是真正的全人类道德.这些经典阐述对在社会主义市场经济条件下认清现实道德建设的复杂性,自觉地把握道德建设的规律,发挥道德建设对于社会生活的积极作用,以及实现以人为本、科学发展和社会和谐、民生改善等方面具有多维启示.     

道德的市场与企业道德行为的合理性

古典政治经济学的经济人命题和社会达尔文主义的生物学竞争理论为道德和市场的二元分裂提供了理论支持,从而在经济领域形成了一个企业活动非道德性的神话。经济实践活动面临的各种伦理道德问题,彰显企业非道德神话的谬误。鲍曼认为当代市场经济社会是一个"道德的市场",企业作为道德人士比作为自利的"经济人"更能理想地实现自己的效用;从博弈论的观点来看,企业的道德性行为也是合乎理性的。当代市场活动对伦理道德的需求,宣告了企业非道德性神话的破灭。     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.     

Moral Taint: On the Transfer of the Implications of Moral Culpability

Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person — and his moral culpability for that harm — impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim.     

Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.     

培育道德精神:道德教育之本

道德精神,就是人们敬畏道德、向往道德、享受道德、坚守道德的心理意识,也就是儒家所说的"诚"的精神.培育人们的道德精神是道德教育的内在要求和根本旨归.当今社会,培育人们的道德精神是十分重要的.     

Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology.