从世界到生活形式--维特根斯坦前后期哲学转变原因探析

一般认为,维特根斯坦前后期哲学转变的原因是语言观的变化。本文结合维特根斯坦跨越两种哲学传统的背景,认为哲学转变的根本原因是由于前期本体论的内在缺陷而导致的本体论变化,维特根斯坦前期哲学本体论只局限于可说的“世界”,而不可说的神秘之物则被排除在世界之外,这与维特根斯坦珍视神秘之物的初衷相悖,这种内在矛盾促成了前期本体论向后期本体论的转变,这一转变的重大意义在于后期本体论消泯了可说与不可说的界限,是人类社会实践的坚实基础。     

哲学问题与生活方式--析叔本华的意志和维特根斯坦的语言游戏

本文通过分析叔本华的意志和维特根斯坦的语言游戏探讨了哲学问题与生活方式之间的关系问题,认为叔本华和维特根斯坦分别提出意志和语言游戏的目的是要通过改变人们的生活方式来消除传统的哲学问题。他们的这一探索对于我们重新认识哲学的性质、意义和功能具有重要意义。     

生活形式与伦理反应——基于实践指引的维特根斯坦行动伦理探析

维特根斯坦的“生活形式”显明了日常实践的一个基本组织特性,即一种广泛运作在话语实践中的自主调适是促成日常生活的整体趋向性与个体行动的情境自主性之间的平衡的重要条件;基于此,“生活形式”无疑标示着一种实践策略,它旨在印证一种“日常—生活—实践”之联动场域的内在规范;进一步地,这一实践化的伦理品格呈现在日常实践的两种组织层面,即基于规则叙事的情境认定和基于意向叙事的行动导向,二者合力在时间构型中将话语实践的自主调适深化为一种非范导的、动态自主的“伦理反应”,后者为一种基于实践指引的行动伦理权衡提供了新的思考契机。     

维特根斯坦的“千高原”——《哲学研究》的一种现象学素描

存在之思即存在-语言-真理的三维拓扑结构。存在之思在传统存在学(实体或主体-逻辑地说-正确性)的领地内已思虑殆尽,它在经历存在学后还能后存在学地、非存在学地思存在吗?后期维特根斯坦(以《哲学研究》为代表)为我们提供了一种崭新的后存在学的存在之思:生活形式-语言游戏-生活形式在语言游戏中的自行显示(缩写为LSZ);每一LSZ即为一块高原,诸高原相互间有着交错复杂、亲疏不等和方向各异的诸家族相似性,我们将它们喻为维氏千高原。     

从"对象"到"看"--维特根斯坦语言观的一个转变

本文试图从“对象”和“看”这两个概念出发来讨论维特根斯坦语言观的一个转变,在此讨论中,维特根斯坦有关“对象”和“看”的论述被置于其前后期思想的大背景中来加以考察。文章首先考察了维特根斯坦前期思想在“对象”这个概念上所面临的困难与错误,这种困难与错误构成了对其前期图像论语言观的挑战。接着,文章考察了维特根斯坦对图画所做的分析,认为图画的要点不在于它所指称的对象,而在于它如何被看,而如何被看实际上是“看”这个词的如何被使用。在此考察中,其后期游戏论的语言观得到了探讨。     

巴比塔——论人类道德生活的形式

寻找通向天堂捷径的设想和人类的历史同样古老,许多民族的神话中都有这一类故事。这类行为常被认为有一点“不敬”,却没有什么不光彩。像—切深刻的神话一样,它代表了规划所具有的魅力,这种魅力不是由于人类的幼稚,而是人类生活的一种常态。没有任何失败可以剥夺这种计划的感召力。而且,它还象征着这种事业的结局。     

“语言游戏”与“空”——维特根斯坦与龙树之间

维特根斯坦的“语言游戏说”与龙树的“空”之间存在着不少深刻的一致性，本文拟从语言的性质、悖论问题、哲学的目的三方面来对此进行阐述，并试图说明他们的差异及互补的可能，及其对当代佛学研究的启示。     

意义的体系——维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》与形式语义学

人们把一般形式语义学的起源追溯到弗雷格、塔尔斯基、蒙塔古和戴维森等哲学家。但是人们忽略了维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》。维特根斯坦在这本著作中提出了一种特定的关于语言、意义和世界的看法,它牵涉到普遍论、内涵指称论和组合原则等重要的哲学假定,而这样的哲学假定也是形式语义学先驱的著作中所假定的。因此,维特根斯坦的意义理论对于形式语义学的基本原则和哲学假定的确立是至关重要的。斯托克霍夫教授的研究不是历史性的,而是系统地比较了维特根斯坦的意义理论和形式语义学的先驱的著作。     

怀疑、先天综合判断和确定性——从康德与维特根斯坦的角度看

本文将认为,就针对怀疑论的反驳来看,理性派（笛卡尔）的反驳是虚假的;经验派（摩尔）的反驳带有任意性。唯有康德跟维特根斯坦的反驳具有特别的意义。维特根斯坦通过语言游戏理论对怀疑论的反驳在实质上跟康德极为类似,两人观点的不一致之处以及康德理论所忽略的东西,都可以通过维特根斯坦对康德理论的修正得到理解。     

维特根斯坦的“确定性”与“生活形式”

“确定性”与客观性、必然性、普遍性等概念一样,是与知识有关的一种重要性质,因而是认识论必需要研究的一个问题。维特根斯坦在他生命的最后一年半时间中集中研究了这一问题。他写下的有关这方面的思考笔记,死后以《确定性》为名出版。在这本书中,维特根斯坦的思考所直接针对的对象,是摩尔在反驳怀疑论中所提出的一些观点和论证。摩尔这方面的思想可归结为如下几个方面：a．他列举一些所谓“常识”（Commonsense）性的命题,如：我有两只手;我是一个人;地球在许多年以前就已经存在;等等,宣称“我确定地在此时知道（know）这些命…     

Forms of Our Life: Wittgenstein and the Later Heidegger

The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associated rather with the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Rush Rhees's identification of the limitations of the notion of a “language game” to illuminate the relation between language and reality leads to his discussion of what is involved in the “reality” of language: “anything that is said has sense‐if living has sense, not otherwise.” But what is it for living to have sense? Peter Winch provides an interpretation and application of Rhees's argument in his discussion of the “reality” of Zande witchcraft and magic in “Understanding a Primitive Society”. There he argues that such sense is provided by a language game concerned with the ineradicable contingency of human life, such as (he claims) Zande witchcraft to be. I argue, however, that Winch's account fails to answer the question why Zande witchcraft can find no application within our lives. I suggest that answering this requires us to raise the question of why Zande witchcraft “fits” with their other practices but cannot with ours, a question of “sense” which cannot be answered by reference to another language game. I use Joseph Epes Brown's account of Native American cultures (in Epes Brown 2001) as an exemplification of a form of coherence that constitutes what we may call a “world”. I then discuss what is involved in this, relating this coherence to a relation to the temporal, which provides an internal connection between the senses of the “real” embodied in the different linguistic practices of these cultures. I relate this to the later Heidegger's account of the “History of Being”, of the historical worlds of Western culture and increasingly of the planet. I conclude with an indication of concerns and issues this approach raises, ones characteristic of “Continental” rather than Wittgensteinian philosophy.     

Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Technology: Tool Use,Forms of Life,Technique, and a Transcendental Argument

The work of Ludwig Wittgenstein is seldom used by philosophers of technology, let alone in a systematic way, and in general there has been little discussion about the role of language in relation to technology. Conversely, Wittgenstein scholars have paid little attention to technology in the work of Wittgenstein. In this paper we read the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty in order to explore the relation between language use and technology use, and take some significant steps towards constructing a framework for a Wittgensteinian philosophy of technology. This framework takes on board, and is in line with, insights from postphenomenological and hermeneutic approaches, but moves beyond those approaches by benefiting from Wittgenstein’s insights into the use of tools, technique, and performance, and by offering a transcendental interpretation of games, forms of life, and grammar. Focusing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language in the Investigations, we first discuss the relation between language use and technology use, understood as tool use, by drawing on his analogy between language and tools. This suggests a more general theory of technology use, understood as performance. Then we turn to his epistemology and argue that Wittgenstein’s understanding of language use can be embedded within a more general theory about technology use understood as tool use and technique, since language-in-use is always already a skilled and embodied technological practice. Finally, we propose a transcendental interpretation of games, forms of life, and grammar, which also gives us a transcendental way of looking at technique, technological practice, and performance. With this analysis and interpretation, further supported by comments on robotics and music, we contribute to using and integrating Wittgenstein in a more systematic way within philosophy of technology and engage with perennial questions from the philosophical tradition.     

The Literary Wittgenstein Philosophy and Literature: A Book of Essays

Books reviewed:
The Literary Wittgenstein edited by John Gibson and Wolfgang Huerner, Routledge, London, 2004 (pp. xi + 356). Philosophy and Literature: A Book of Essays , M. W. Rowe, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004 (pp xii + 238). Reviewed by M. H. Weston, University of Essex University of Essex Wivenhoe Park Colchester CO4 3SQ     

基于文化哲学范式的生命概念初探

文化哲学范式中的生命指人所具有的、不断与生态环境进行物质和能量交换的、创造价值和意义的、在实践中持久生成的动态生态系统。“生”即“生成”,“命”即“定命”,故其本质是“生成的定命”。人类生命的属人特征是其独特的二重性即矛盾性本体论结构——既A(自然特性、物种本能)又非A(文化属性、社会属性)。人类生命有三重向度:生物性生命、社会性生命、精神性生命,完整的生命是这三者的和谐统一体。     

Logic and Philosophy of Logic in Wittgenstein

This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.     

生活哲学:一种哲学观

哲学观问题日益引起学者们的关注。本文从分析生活概念入手,尝试性地提出一种哲学观——生活哲学观,此种哲学观认为,哲学是人生活的一种形式,其功能在于保持人的生成意识。     

Wittgenstein and the Human Form of Life

Book reviewed:
Oswald Hanfling, Wittgenstein and the Human Form of Life. Reviewed by Olli Lagerspetz The Department of Philosophy Åbo Academy Fabriksgatan 2 20500 Åbo, Finland olagersp@abo.fi     

维特根斯坦与奎因:兼容而不对立的两种哲学

维特根斯坦和奎因都鄙视形而上学的和认识论的思辨,并且都花大力气批评传统的哲学概念和理论。但是他们在此批评之后继续从事哲学的路径是不同的。维特根斯坦把哲学等同于对传统哲学思维的批判,并且仅此而已。奎因则通过把哲学问题重塑为科学问题来尽其所能地挽救以往的哲学,并且对他重塑之后的问题做出回答。与人们对维特根斯坦和奎因的通常看法相反,我认为他们从事的哲学研究是互补的、并不是不兼容的。他们只是在表面上看是对立的;而实际上赞同其一方并不意味着拒绝另一方。     

Wittgenstein and Irigaray: Gender and Philosophy in a Language (Game) of Difference

Drawing Wittgenstein's and Irigaray's philosophies into conversation might help resolve certain misunderstandings that have so far hampered both the reception of Irigaray's work and the development of feminist praxis in general. A Wittgensteinian reading of Irigaray can furnish an anti-essentialist conception of “woman” that retains the theoretical and political specificity feminism requires while dispelling charges that Irigaray's attempt to delineate a “feminine” language is either groundlessly Utopian or entails a biological essentialism.