Schilder and Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity. A critique and apologia

In the late 1920s, the Viennese psychoanalyst Paul Schilder, after performing a conditioning experiment with human subjects, criticized I. P. Pavlov's concept of "experimental neurosis." Schilder maintained that subjective reports by conditioned human subjects were more informative than the objectively observed behavior of conditioned dogs. In 1932, Pavlov published a rejoinder to Schilder's critique in the Journal of the American Medical Association. Pavlov maintained that Schilder misunderstood the value and implications of the scientific, objective method in the study of experimental neurosis. In 1934, Schilder subjected Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity to an incisive critique in a 1935 article in Imago. Schilder objected to Pavlov's narrow, reductionist conceptualization of the conditional reflex. Schilder reiterated his view that the psychological, subjective explanation of the conditional reflex is preferable to the physiological, objective explanation, and that the inference of cortical phenomena from experimental findings might be improper. Neither Pavlov nor any of his disciples replied to Schilder. The author provides an apology for the Pavlovian position, suggesting that Schilder was unfamiliar with early and late writings of Pavlov.     

Roots of the Pavlovian Society''s Missions of the Past and Present: The Pavlov Dimension

This paper offers an interpretation of the relation between Pavlov's life and work and the missions of the Pavlovian Society, both past ("observation and observation") and present ("interdisciplinary research on the integrated organism"). I begin with an account of Pavlov's life and his influence on contemporary thought. I then indicate the relation of some of Pavlov's attitudes (e.g., his motto, his epistemological stance) to the Society's past mission. In the concluding and most controversial section, I argue for six guiding principles derived from Pavlov, to be applied to the Society's mission. These are: (a) a confident methodological behaviorism; (b) a significant role assigned to both physiological and psychological factors in the prediction and control of the integrated organism; (c) approximately equal taxonomic precision of physiological and psychological explanatory concepts; (d) distrust of teleological explanatory concepts; (e) rejection of psychology's instrumentalist "cognitive paradigm shift"; and (f) rejection of the representational theory of knowledge.     

Pavlov in America: a heterodox approach to the study of his influence

This work presents a critical analysis of Pavlov's influence that goes beyond the conventional view: that which reduces his influence in American psychology to the behaviorism of Watson and Hull. In order to understand the nature of the Russian physiologist's influence in American psychology, we propose a distinction between three approaches to it: 1) the symbolic approach, on representing a model of the possibility of constructing an objective psychology; 2) the methodological approach, given the importance of the technique of conditional reflexes; and 3) the theoretical approach, which is derived from his theory of higher nervous activity. This perspective permits us to suggest that most of Pavlov's influence on behaviorism was of a symbolic and methodological nature--though the methodological influence also reached other authors that did not belong to the behaviorist traditions, as was the case of Mateer. As far as the theoretical influence is concerned, our work proposes that it is more visible in authors such as Gantt and Liddell, or even in authors such as Boldirev, Director of the Pavlovian Laboratory at the Battle Creek Sanitarium in Michigan. The case of Gantt is especially interesting because, in addition to his important contributions, he played an essential role in the foundation of the Pavlovian Society, and the journal Conditional Reflex. What our work proposes is that to understand the nature of Pavlov's influence in American psychology it is necessary to take into account the very characteristics of that psychology: its pragmatic interests, its methodological rigor, the dominant systems of neo-behavioral theory and the changes that occurred after the Second World War.     

Pavlov and the Nobel Prize award

When Pavlov was first nominated for the Nobel Prize, he was well recognized by physiologists, especially those concerned with digestion. It appears unlikely that psychological interpretations of his conditional reflex findings had begun to penetrate deeply into the discipline of psychology. The selection in 1904 of Pavlov for the award in physiology or medicine attracted the attention of a broader range of scientists. American psychologists, in particular, probably became more aware of the advantages of incorporating his “objective” conditional reflex method into their investigations. General biographical aspects relating to the award and the effect of the award upon the acceptance of the conditional reflex method by American psychologists are developed in this presentation.     

Roots of the Pavlovian Society’s missions of the past and present: The Pavlov dimension

This paper offers an interpretation of the relation between Pavlov’s life and work and the missions of the Pavlovian Society, both past (“observation and observation”) and present (“interdisciplinary research on the integrated organism”). I begin with an acount of Pavlov's life and his influence on contemporary thought. I then indicate the relation of some of Pavlov's attitudes (e.g., his motto, his epistemological stance) to the Society's past mission. In the concluding and most controversial section, I argue for six guiding principles derived from Pavlov, to be applied to the Society’s mission. These are: (a) a confident methodological behaviorism; (b) a significant role assigned to both physiological and psychological factors in the prediction and control of the integrated organism; (c) approximately equal taxonomic precision of physiological and psychological explanatory concepts; (d) distrust of toleological explanatory concepts; (e) rejection of psychology’s instrumentalist “cognitive paradigm shift”; and (f) rejection of the representational theory of knowledge.     

Schilder and Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity

In the late 1920s, the Viennese psychoanalyst Paul Schilder, after performing a conditioning experiment with human subjects, criticized I. P. Pavlov’s concept of “experimental neurosis.” Schilder maintained that subjective reports by conditioned human subjects were more informative than the objectively observed behavior of conditioned dogs. In 1932, Pavlov published a rejoinder to Schilder’s critique in theJournal of the American Medical Association. Pavlov maintained that Schilder misunderstood the value and implications of the scientific, objective method in the study of experimental neurosis. In 1934, Schilder subjected Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity to an incisive critique in a 1935 article inImago. Schilder objected to Pavlov’s narrow, reductionist conceptualization of the conditional reflex. Schilder reiterated his view that the psychological, subjective explanation of the conditional reflex is preferable to the physiological, objective explanation, and that the inference of cortical phenomena from experimental findings might be improper. Neither Pavlov nor any of his disciples replied to Schilder. The author provides an apology for the Pavlovian position, suggesting that Schilder was unfamiliar with early and late writings of Pavlov.     

Pavlov as a psychologist

American psychologists are informed on Pavlov’s work on conditional reflexes but not on the full development of his theory of higher nervous activity. This article shows that Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity dealt with concepts that concerned contemporary psychologists. Pavlov used the conditioning of the salivary reflex for methodological purposes. Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity encompassed overt behavior, neural processes, and the conscious experience. The strong Darwinian element of Pavlov’s theory, with its stress on the higher organisms’ adaptation, is described. With regard to learning, Pavlov, at the end of his scholarly career, proposed that although all learning involves the formation of associations, the organism’s adaptation to the environment is established through conditioning, but the accumulation of knowledge is established by trial and error.     

Pavlov's position on the effects of decortication on conditional reflexes.

This paper examined D. Joravsky's (1989) hypothesis that I.P. Pavlov dogmatically refused to acknowledge that classical conditioning can be mediated by subcortical regions of the large cerebral hemispheres. Decortication literature from 1901 to 1936 was reviewed. The early studies available to Pavlov, who died in 1936, showed that decortication does not allow the establishment of new or retaining of old conditional reflexes (CRs). G.P. Zeleny?'s later experiments(1930) suggested that the establishment of primitive CRs in decorticated dogs was possible. Pavlov never denied this possibility but cautioned that Zeleny?'s experiments could have been methodologically flawed. Although Joravsky's original hypothesis on Pavlov's position on the relation between decortication and the establishment of CRs is by and large accepted, it must be stressed that Pavlov's theory of higher nervous activity was primarily concerned with the function of the brain in the higher organism's struggle for existence. Within this context the cortical, rather than subcortical, processes play the decisive role in the organism's adaptation to the changing external environment.     

Pavlov's view of the inheritance of acquired characteristics as it relates to theses concerning scientific change

Pavlov's position on the inheritance of acquired characteristics was used to test selected theses of Laudan et al. (1986) concerning scientific change. It was determined that, despite negative experimental findings, Pavlov continued to accept the possibility of the inheritance of acquired habits. This confirms the main thesis I that, once accepted, theories persist despite negative experimental evidence. Pavolv's adherence to the concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics might possibly be explained by his early experiences. Adolescent readings of a popularized version of Darwin's theory, which included the concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics, profoundly influenced Pavlov's subsequent intellectual life. Overwhelmed by the theory, as originally presented, Pavlov was unable to alter his views in light of contrary findings.     

Pavloviana in the USA: Archives of the history of American psychology,university of Akron

This paper represents one step in the effort to locate, examine, and make generally available archival materials related to the life and work of I. P. Pavlov and held outside the Soviet Union, in particular in the United States. The Archives of the History of American Psychology contain fairly extensive correspondence among American psychologists, with informative references to Pavlov, including letters written by K. S. Lashley, R. M. Yerkes, and J. B. Watson. References to Pavlov are also located in a variety of other sources, including reminiscenses of psychologists and R. M. Yerkes’“Obituary” of Pavlov written in 1916. Pictures of Pavlov and his close associates are reproduced from still photographs and motion picture films.     

Hypnosis and inhibition as viewed by heidenhain and pavlov

About 1880, Rudolf Heidenhain, then Professor of Physiology and Histology at the University of Breslau, experimentally studied hypnotic phenomena. Heidenhain explained hypnosis physiologically, in terms of cortical inhibition. Subsequently, I. P. Pavlov, who in 1877 and again in 1884 was Heidenhain’s student at Breslau, encountered hypnotic phenomena during conditional reflex experiments. In 1910, Pavlov described hypnotic states and explained them (as had Heidenhain three decades earlier), in terms of partial inhibition of the cortex. As the concepts of inhibition and excitation are cornerstones of Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity, it is of historical interest to search for influences that led Pavlov to incorporate the concept of inhibition into his theory. It is most likely that Pavlov first encountered the concept of central inhibition in the 1860s when reading I. M. Sechenov’sThe Reflexes of the Brain (1863/1866) and that the importance of the concept was augmented by Heidenhain’s use of it in explaining hypnotic phenomena.     

Interaction of dominant focus and conditional reflex as a functional unit of behavior organization

The interaction of two fundamental phenomena—the dominant focus and the conditional reflex—discovered and introduced by A. A. Ukhtomsky and I. P. Pavlov lay at the basis of behavior. According to E. A. Asratyan, the backward conditioned connection is a specialized dominant focus in the functional structure of the consolidated conditional reflex. It makes the behavior goal-directed and active. The dominant focus and conditioned reflex play the same role in the adaptive behavior of the individual as does variability and selection in the process of evolutional adaptation. That is why it is impossible to agree with Popper and Eccles that hypothesis theory has to replace Pavlov’s theory of the conditional reflex. Imprinting and psychonervous activity by images (I. S. Beritashvili) are two special exemplars of conditional reflexes after one coincidence. The so-called “elementary reasoning activity of animals” (according to L. V. Krushinsky) is a kind of the instinctive inherited behavior.     

How the challenge of explaining learning influenced the origins and development of John B. Watson's behaviorism

Before he invented behaviorism, John B. Watson considered learning one of the most important topics in psychology. Watson conducted excellent empirical research on animal learning. He developed behaviorism in part to promote research and elevate the status of learning in psychology. Watson was much less successful in the adequacy and originality of the mechanisms he proposed to explain learning. By assimilating the method of classical conditioning and adopting Pavlov's theory of stimulus substitution, Watson linked behaviorism with a new method that could compete with both Titchener's method of introspection and Freud's methods of psychoanalysis. Watson's interest in explaining psychopathology led to the discovery of conditioned emotional responses and a behavioristic explanation for the learning of phobic behavior. Watson established learning as a central topic for basic research and application in American psychology.     

A note on Skinner and Pavlov's physiology

These short notes describe the way in which Skinner considers and resolves his differences with Pavlov in the question of the relation between psychology and physiology as forms of knowledge. After establishing his viewpoint in the general epistemological issue, Skinner is concerned about linking his study of behavior to the work of Pavlov, who considered it to be of a physiological nature. Skinner contrasts Pavlov's empirical and theoretical work and characterizes the latter in terms of the notion of the "Conceptual Nervous System."     

The impact of Pavlov on the psychology of learning in English-speaking countries

The translation of Pavlov's lectures (Pavlov, 1927) provided English-speaking psychologists with access to the full scope of Pavlov's research and theoretical ideas. The impact this had on their study of the psychology of learning can be assessed by examining influential books in this area. This reveals that Watson (1924) had been highly effective in promoting the misleading idea that Pavlov was a fellow S-R theorist. This assumption was not questioned by Tolman (1932), Hilgard and Marquis (1940) or by Hull (1943). However, this mistake was not made by Skinner (1938), who also provided the strongest arguments against Pavlov's belief that behavioral effects required explanation in terms of physiological processes. Post-1927 most learning research in the English-speaking countries continued to use instrumental, rather than Pavlovian, conditioning procedures. Nevertheless, many of the issues addressed by this research were ones that Pavlov had been the first to raise, so that his major influence can be seen as that of defining a research program for subsequent students of learning.     

The Pavlov Department of Physiology: a scientific history

The scientific adventure of the Ivan Pavlov Department of Physiology is traced from Pavlov's and his students pioneer work on "psychic salivation" to the times of the Biological Station at Koltushi. The development of the Department after Pavlov's death is described and the research trends of the three present laboratories (Neurobiology of Integrative Brain Functions, Psychophysiology of Emotions, and Neurodynamic Correction of Psycho Neurological Pathology) are discussed.     

The depoliticization of Karl Lashley: A response to Dewsbury

In this response to Donald Dewsbury's article, I address Dewsbury's criticisms of my interpretation of Karl Lashley by, first, disputing Dewsbury's characterization of my historiographic stance. I then go on to address Dewsbury's specific points, particularly regarding Lashley's racism and hereditarianism, which I argue are central to an understanding of the context of his science. I conclude by criticizing Dewsbury's proposed personality theory of Lashley on the grounds that it depoliticizes Lashley by psychologizing him.     

A comparative analysis of the conditional reflex discoveries of pavlov and Twitmyer,and the birth of a paradigm

Research on conditional reflex (CR) in Pavlov’s Physiological Laboratory has preceded Twitmyer’s work on conditioning at the University of Pennsylvania by 3 or 4 years. The events in Pavlov’s laboratory lead toward the postulation of a new paradigm that rejected the Cartesians conceptualization of the reflex as a mechanistic response to stimuli by replacing it with the Darwinian notion of the organism’s adaptation to the environmental conditions. The Pavlovian paradigm rejected the Wundtian method in favor of the objective, conditional reflex method.     

Autonomy and Common Good: Interpreting Rousseau’s General Will

Rousseau’s project in his Social Contract was to construct a conception of human subjectivity and political institutions that would transcend what he saw to be the limits of liberal political theory of his time. I take this as a starting point to put forward an interpretation of his theory of the general will as a kind of social cognition that is able to preserve individual autonomy and freedom alongside concerns with the collective welfare of the community. But whereas many have seen Rousseau’s ideas as a prelude to communitarianism or authoritarianism, we should instead see his project as articulating an alternative model of moral-cognitivist reasoning. In order to provide a framework for this interpretation, I propose reading his conception of the general will through the theory of collective intentionality and social ontology. I end with a consideration of how this interpretation of the general will can provide a more satisfying understanding of political and practical rationality contemporary debates over republicanism and liberalism.     

Pavlov and the concept of association

I. P. Pavlov was profoundly influenced during his youth by the writings of D. I. Pisarev and I. M. Sechenov. Sechenov explained the voluntary act in terms of the formation of associations among sensory impressions and motor responses. Apparently under Pisarev’s influence, Pavlov studied the physiology of the circulatory and digestive systems. In explaining the formation of the conditional reflex (CR), Pavlov rejected the Wundtian, anthropomorphic conceptualization of CR as suggested by A. T. Snarskii. However, using the objective CR method, the Pavlovians experimentally investigated the formation in the cortex of neural connections, which were equated with associations.