The allure of connectionism reexamined

There is currently a debate over whether cognitive architecture is classical or connectionist in nature. One finds the following three comparisons between classical architecture and connectionist architecture made in the pro-connectionist literature in this debate: (1) connectionist architecture is neurally plausible and classical architecture is not; (2) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model pattern recognition capacities than is classical architecture; and (3) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model the acquisition of pattern recognition capacities by learning than is classical architecture. If true, (1)–(3) would yield a compelling case against the view that cognitive architecture is classical, and would offer some reason to think that cognitive architecture may be connectionist. We first present the case for (1)–(3) in the very words of connectionist enthusiasts. We then argue that the currently available evidence fails to support any of (1)–(3).     

The folk psychology of souls

The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is "like" to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive "system" dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment.     

The need to win is not adaptive: the need to win, coping strategies, hope and self-esteem

In a previous paper we reported the factor analytic development of a scale that differentiates people, among other things, in terms of their need to win (WIN), their need to perform well (PW) and their preference for difficult tasks (DIFF). This paper presents correlations between WIN, PW and DIFF and various personality/coping measures. The correlations indicate that people with a strong need to win as compared with people who like to perform well or like difficult tasks tend to have poorer coping skills (e.g., tend to engage in denial and become behaviorally and mentally disengaged when stressed), tend to see the world as more hostile (e.g., “it is a dog-eat-dog world”), tend to have an entity view of intelligence/skills (e.g., intelligence is fixed), tend to view the route to success as coming from such things as modeling and appearance. In addition, people with a need to win tend to have poorer self-esteem (SE) and tend to be lower in hope (HOPE) than people who like to perform well (PW) and people who like difficult tasks (DIFF). These results are consistent with the idea that people with a need to win tend to have an ego orientation whereas people who like to perform well and who like difficult tasks tend to have a mastery orientation.     

The "big win" and resistance to extinction when gambling

One hypothesis for the reason a person might become a pathological gambler is that the individual initially experiences a big win, which creates a fallacious expectation of winning, which may then lead to persistent gambling despite suffering large losses. Although this hypothesis has been around for several decades, only one controlled empirical study has addressed it, and that study reported null results. In the present experiment, the authors tested the "big win" hypothesis by having 4 groups of participants with little to no experience gambling play a computer-simulated slot machine for credits that were exchangeable for cash. One group experienced a large win on the very 1st play. Another experienced a large win on the 5th play. A 3rd group experienced 2 small wins on the 2nd and 5th plays. No other winning outcomes were programmed. The 4th group never experienced a win. The authors observed a significant effect of group. Participants who experienced a large win on the 1st play quit playing the simulation earlier than participants who experienced a large win on the 5th play. These results appear to question the "big win" as an explanation for pathological gambling. They are more consistent with a behavioral theory of gambling behavior. The present study should also promote the use of laboratory-based research to test long-standing hypotheses in the gambling literature.     

The battle for Broca's region

The intense effort to characterize Broca's region has produced many views on its anatomy and function. Here, we present the leading approaches and consider ways to adjudicate among them empirically. Anatomically, we focus on the cytoarchitecture of Brodmann areas 44 and 45, which constitute Broca's region. Functionally, we discuss four views: action perception, working memory, syntactic complexity and syntactic movement. We compare these views, reflect on how they can be distinguished experimentally and review relevant aphasia and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. Although no single hypothesis accounts for all of the data, the role of Broca's region in language comprehension is best explained by the syntactic movement account. This conclusion opens the door for an attempt to define general principles for the neural representation of linguistic knowledge.     

The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and behavior

The paper theoretically elaborates and empirically investigates the “competitive arousal” model of decision making, which argues that elements of the strategic environment (e.g., head-to-head rivalry and time pressure) can fuel competitive motivations and behavior. Study 1 measures real-time motivations of online auction bidders and finds that the “desire to win” (even when winning is costly and will provide no strategic upside) is heightened when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 2 is a field experiment which alters the text of email alerts sent to bidders who have been outbid; the text makes competitive (vs. non-competitive) motivations salient. Making the desire to win salient triggers additional bidding, but only when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 3, a laboratory study, demonstrates that the desire to win mediates the effect of rivalry and time pressure on over-bidding.     

Different is good: connectionism and dynamic systems theory are complementary emergentist approaches to development

Connectionist and dynamic systems approaches to development are similar in that they are both emergentist theories that take a very different perspective from more traditional symbolic systems. Moreover, they are both based on similar mathematical principles. Nevertheless, connectionism and dynamic systems differ in the approach they take to the study of development. We argue that differences between connectionist and dynamic systems approaches in terms of the basic components of the models, what they see as the object of study, how they view the nature of knowledge and their notions of developmental change mean that they each stand to make different and unique contributions to a more complete theory of development. We present an example from our work on how children learn to learn words that illustrates the complementary nature of connectionist and dynamic systems theories.