Is Relativism Really Self-Refuting?

Philosophical Studies -     

What Is an Inconsistent Truth Table?

Do truth tables—the ordinary sort that we use in teaching and explaining basic propositional logic—require an assumption of consistency for their construction? In this essay we show that truth tables can be built in a consistency-independent paraconsistent setting, without any appeal to classical logic. This is evidence for a more general claim—that when we write down the orthodox semantic clauses for a logic, whatever logic we presuppose in the background will be the logic that appears in the foreground. Rather than any one logic being privileged, then, on this count partisans across the logical spectrum are in relatively similar dialectical positions.     

Metaphysical underdetermination: why worry?

Various forms of underdetermination that might threaten the realist stance are examined. That which holds between different ‘formulations’ of a theory (such as the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics) is considered in some detail, as is the ‘metaphysical’ underdetermination invoked to support ‘ontic structural realism’. The problematic roles of heuristic fruitfulness and surplus structure in attempts to break these forms of underdetermination are discussed and an approach emphasizing the relevant structural commonalities is defended.     

Justice: Metaphysical,After All?

Political liberals, following Rawls, believe that justice should be ‘political’ rather than ‘metaphysical.’ In other words, a conception of justice ought to be freestanding from first-order moral and metaethical views. The reason for this is to ensure that the state’s coercion be justified to citizens in terms that meet political liberalism’s principle of legitimacy. I suggest that privileging a political conception of justice involves costs—such as forgoing the opportunity for political theory to learn from other areas of philosophy. I argue that it is not clear that it provides any benefit in return. Whether a political conception of justice more adequately satisfies the liberal principle of legitimacy than a metaphysical conception of justice is an open question. To show this, I describe three ways in which political conceptions of justice have been developed within the literature. I then argue that while each might be helpful in finding reasons that reasonable citizens can accept, all face challenges in satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy. Political conceptions of justice confront the same set of justificatory problems as ‘metaphysical’ conceptions. The question of whether a political conception is preferable should receive greater scrutiny.     

James Fodor's Christian Theory of Truth: Is it Christian?

The 'task confronting contemporary theology', says James Fodor, 'is that of the rehabilitation or recovery of a distinctively Christian vision of truth' ( Christian Hermeneutics [Oxford, 1995] p. 72). In this paper I examine Fodor's attempt to construct a Christian or transformational theory of truth. I argue that his analysis of truth in terms of transformation leads to a concept of truth which is both subjective and relative. I argue further that Fodor's truth theory is either committed to a version of creative anti-realism, according to which the existence of basic structure of the world is determined by our linguistic activities, or it implies that although our language doesn't correspond to the world, we should go on making our theological truth claims anyway. I conclude that Fodor's Christian theory of truth is in most crucial respects not Christian at all.     

Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Williamson

This paper addresses an objection raised by Timothy Williamson to the 'restriction strategy' that I proposed, in The Taming of The True , in order to deal with the Fitch paradox. Williamson provides a newversion of a Fitch-style argument that purports to show that even the restricted principle of knowability suffers the same fate as the unrestricted one. I show here that the new argument is fallacious. The source of the fallacy is a misunderstanding of the condition used in stating the restricted knowability principle. I also rebut WilliamsonÕs criticism of my argument for the claim that any proposition of the form 'it is known thatφ' is decidable if φ is decidable     

Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational?

In a number of influential papers, Hartry Fieldhas advanced an account of truth and referencethat we might dub quasi-disquotationalism. According to quasi-disquotationalism, truth and reference are to be explained in terms of disquotationand facts about what constitute a goodtranslation into our language. Field suggeststhat we might view quasi-disquotationalism aseither (a) an analysis of our ordinarytruth-theoretic concepts of reference andtruth, or (b) an account of certain otherconcepts that improve upon our ordinaryconcepts. In this paper, I argue that (i) ifthe view is understood along the lines of (a)it fails, and (ii) if it is construed along thelines of (b) it is, at best, under-motivated.     

Are Metaphysical Claims Testable?

Philosophia - To consider metaphysical claims a priori and devoid of empirical content, is a rather commonplace received opinion. This paper attempts an exploration of a contemporary philosophical...     

From Essence to Metaphysical Modality?

Axiomathes - How can we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality? How can someone come to know that he could have been elsewhere right now, or an accountant rather than a philosophy teacher, but...     

Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?

In this paper, we argue that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’, which is the view that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary metaphysical possibility, is self‐defeating. To this end, we outline two reductio arguments against ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’. The first reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is true, it follows that conceivability both is and is not conclusive evidence for possibility. The second reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is true, it follows that it is possible that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is necessarily false, and hence that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is false. We then argue that adopting a weaker position according to which conceivability is merely prima facie evidence for possibility provides limited protection from our criticism of conceivability arguments. 1     

Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism

Fitch’s paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch’s result while still offering all that antirealists should care for.     

Trading Truth for Justice?

In this article I pursue two aims. First I advance an internal critique of hard-core retribution as it is usually advanced by victims of human rights violations. The focus of this penal approach on submitting all the military personnel guilty of human rights violations to harsh punishments risks jeopardizing the (clearly retributive) demand of punishing all those involved in the abuses. Particularly when extensive time has elapsed after the misdeeds, the most rational policy seems to be a negotiation model that offers gross human rights abusers punishment reductions in exchange for valuable information about the facts. Defending such a penal negotiation model constitutes the second aim of this article. I conclude that in order to satisfy the (hard-core) retributive demand of punishing all those (both military and civilian) guilty of human rights abuses, it is required not to submit all military personal indicted to retributive punishments.     

Personality and Community Involvement: Is churchgoing different?

A random sample of 1033 adults in an Australian community survey completed a form containing the abbreviated Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire together with an index of community involvement in a range of secular groups and church attendance. The data indicate that different personality characteristics are associated with church attendance on the one hand and with secular areas of community involvement on the other hand.     

Religion and Science: What Is at Stake?

Abstract : “Religion and Science: What Is at Stake” looks at the latest information available on global warming from the International Panel on Climate Change and puts it in the context of the current culture war between progressives and conservatives. We worry that the science will become captive to ideological concerns that are theological, economic, and therefore political. The ideological domination of science may make a sustainable response to global warming even more difficult. It is vitally important that Christian theologians learn enough about the science to be articulate and support the scientists in their endeavors to promote our care of the creation.     

“It Is Not Wit,It Is Truth:” Transcending the Narrative Bounds of Professional and Personal Identity in Life and in Art

Taking inspiration from the film Wit (2001), adapted from Margaret Edson’s (1999) Pulitzer Prize-winning play, this article explores the particularities of witnessing a cinematic cancer narrative juxtaposed with the author’s own cancer narrative. The analysis reveals the tenuous line between death and dying, illness and wellness, life and living and the resulting identities shaped in the process of understanding both from a personal and professional lens. By framing these representations of illness experience within the narrative constructions of drama, time, metaphor and morality, the personal stories of intellectual knowledge converging with intimate and embodied knowing are revealed.