Perceptual‐cognitive expertise in sport and its acquisition: Implications for applied cognitive psychology

We review contemporary research on perceptual‐cognitive expertise in sport and consider implications for those working in the field of applied cognitive psychology. We identify the important perceptual‐cognitive skills that facilitate anticipation in sport and illustrate how these skills interact in a dynamic manner during performance. We also highlight our current understanding of how these skills are acquired and consider the extent to which the underlying processes are specific to a particular domain and role within that domain. Next, we briefly review recent attempts to facilitate the acquisition of perceptual‐cognitive expertise using simulation training coupled with instruction and feedback on task performance. Finally, we discuss how research on elite athletes can help inform applied cognitive psychologists who are interested in capturing and enhancing perceptual‐cognitive expertise across various domains. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Experts Solve a Novel Problem in Experimental Design

Research on expert-novice differences has mainly focused on how experts solve familiar problems. We know far less about the skills and knowledge used by experts when they are confronted with novel problems within their area of expertise. This article discusses a study in which verbal protocols were taken from subjects of various expertise designing an experiment in an area with which they were unfamiliar. The results showed that even when domain knowledge is lacking, experts solve a novel problem within their area of expertise by dividing the problem into a number of subproblems that are solved in a specified order. The lack of domain knowledge is compensated for by using abstract knowledge structures and domain-specific heuristic strategies. However, the quality of their solutions is considerably lower than the quality attained by experts who were familiar with the type of problem to be solved. The results suggest that when experts are confronted with novel problems as compared with familiar problems, their form of reasoning remains intact, but the content of their reasoning suffers due to lack of domain knowledge.     

The effectiveness of a scientific reasoning intervention for conspiracy theory beliefs

Conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs have become an important policy-relevant research area since the events of the COVID-19 pandemic. Increasing interest has been directed towards strategies that might reduce people's susceptibility to conspiratorial beliefs. In this study, we examined whether encouraging a stronger orientation towards critical scientific appraisal of conspiratorial accounts could reduce CT acceptance. After completing baseline measures of COVID-19 related beliefs and analytical and scientific reasoning abilities, a total of 700 adults were randomly allocated to a control or scientific reasoning manipulation. People assigned to the scientific reasoning condition were found to display significantly lower CT belief endorsement post-intervention as compared to the control group. As well as having implications for the design of future intervention studies, the results of this study encourage a greater focus on specific reasoning skills that may be amenable to a psychoeducation approach, in order to further develop methods to prevent CT beliefs.     

Scientific reasoning in early and middle childhood: The development of domain‐general evidence evaluation,experimentation, and hypothesis generation skills

According to Klahr's (2000, 2005; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988) Scientific Discovery as Dual Search model, inquiry processes require three cognitive components: hypothesis generation, experimentation, and evidence evaluation. The aim of the present study was to investigate (a) when the ability to evaluate perfect covariation, imperfect covariation, and non‐covariation evidence emerges, (b) when experimentation emerges, (c) when hypothesis generation skills emerge, and (d), whether these abilities develop synchronously during childhood. We administered three scientific reasoning tasks referring to the three components to 223 children of five age groups (from age 4.0 to 13.5 years). Our results show that the three cognitive components of domain‐general scientific reasoning emerge asynchronously. The development of domain‐general scientific reasoning begins with the ability to handle unambiguous data, progresses to the interpretation of ambiguous data, and leads to a flexible adaptation of hypotheses according to the sufficiency of evidence. When children understand the relation between the level of ambiguity of evidence and the level of confidence in hypotheses, the ability to differentiate conclusive from inconclusive experiments accompanies this development. Implications of these results for designing science education concepts for young children are briefly discussed.     

Enhancing Athletic Performance Using Digital Video in Consulting

Video has been used successfully in psychosocial interventions to help train communication skills, document behaviors, and as a feedback tool for behavior modification strategies. The need for equipment portability, together with editing expertise, has limited video use in sport psychology. Newer digital video systems help overcome these problems, meaning that sport psychologists can readily use this technology in the field. We discuss and provide experiential observations of how digital video can be used to improve player, coach, and team performance. Also reviewed are new consultation opportunities for sport psychologists with video skills. These new areas center on perceptual skills training and talent identification using perceptual skills testing.     

The equivalence of learning paths in early science instruction: effect of direct instruction and discovery learning

In a study with 112 third- and fourth-grade children, we measured the relative effectiveness of discovery learning and direct instruction at two points in the learning process: (a) during the initial acquisition of the basic cognitive objective (a procedure for designing and interpreting simple, unconfounded experiments) and (b) during the subsequent transfer and application of this basic skill to more diffuse and authentic reasoning associated with the evaluation of science-fair posters. We found not only that many more children learned from direct instruction than from discovery learning, but also that when asked to make broader, richer scientific judgments, the many children who learned about experimental design from direct instruction performed as well as those few children who discovered the method on their own. These results challenge predictions derived from the presumed superiority of discovery approaches in teaching young children basic procedures for early scientific investigations.     

The link between deductive reasoning and mathematics

ABSTRACT

Recent studies have shown that deductive reasoning skills (including transitive and conditional inferences) are related to mathematical abilities. Nevertheless, so far the links between mathematical abilities and these two forms of deductive inference have not been investigated in a single study. It is also unclear whether these inference forms are related to both basic maths skills and mathematical reasoning, and whether these relationships still hold if the effects of fluid intelligence are controlled. We conducted a study with 87 adult participants. The results showed that transitive reasoning skills were related to performance on a number line task, and conditional inferences were related to arithmetic skills. Additionally, both types of deductive inference were related to mathematical reasoning skills, although transitive and conditional reasoning ability were unrelated. Our results also highlighted the important role that ordering abilities play in mathematical reasoning, extending findings regarding the role of ordering abilities in basic maths skills. These results have implications for the theories of mathematical and deductive reasoning, and they could inspire the development of novel educational interventions.     

Twenty-First Century Science as a Relational Process: From Eureka! To Team Science and a Place for Community Psychology

In this paper we maintain that twenty-first century science is, fundamentally, a relational process in which knowledge is produced (or co-produced) through transactions among researchers or among researchers and public stakeholders. We offer an expanded perspective on the practice of twenty-first century science, the production of scientific knowledge, and what community psychology can contribute to these developments. We argue that: (1) trends in science show that research is increasingly being conducted in teams; (2) scientific teams, such as transdisciplinary teams of researchers or of researchers collaborating with various public stakeholders, are better able to address complex challenges; (3) transdisciplinary scientific teams are part of the larger, twenty-first century transformation in science; (4) the concept of heterarchy is a heuristic for team science aligned with this transformation; (5) a contemporary philosophy of science known as perspectivism provides an essential foundation to advance twenty-first century science; and (6) community psychology, through its core principles and practice competencies, offers theoretical and practical expertise for advancing team science and the transformation in science currently underway. We discuss the implications of these points and illustrate them briefly with two examples of transdisciplinary team science from our own work. We conclude that a new narrative is emerging for science in the twenty-first century that draws on interpersonal transactions in teams, and active engagement by researchers with the public to address critical accountabilities. Because of its core organizing principles and unique blend of expertise on the intersection of research and practice, community psychologists are well-prepared to help advance these developments, and thus have much to offer twenty-first century science.     

Assessing ‘good’ qualitative research in the work psychology field: A narrative analysis

This paper considers how work psychologists define ‘good’ qualitative research in the work psychology domain. In addressing the assessment of quality in work psychology research, we draw on 22 in‐depth interviews with work psychologists about their current practices and expectations around qualitative research. Using narrative analysis, the various plots and narratives that constitute how interviewees understand good qualitative research are identified. The implications of the use of these narratives for both how quality is understood and the use of qualitative research in this area are addressed. Drawing on Weick's concept of sensemaking as a theoretical framework, it is argued that the narratives identified enable the construction of a hegemonic understanding of what is good methodological practice within the work psychology discipline. The implications of this for the work psychology field and the methodological practices of work psychologists are considered.     

A consideration of challenges to psychological assessment instruments used in forensic settings: Rorschach as exemplar

In this brief primer, we provide an outline of key issues that will help psychologists organize and prepare their expert testimony. These issues include the need to obtain essential sources of research, a review of the actual legal standards regarding admissibility of test data in expert testimony, the nature of the expert relative to the assessment instrument in expert testimony, the nature of legal versus scientific debate, and the examination of appropriate qualifications of expertise when offering legal testimony. In addition, we use a summary of information contained in several recent articles to address challenges directed against forensic psychological testing. We use the empirical literature on the Rorschach as an exemplar in discussing these issues, as the admissibility of the Rorschach in particular has been challenged, and the issues frequently focused on with the Rorschach are equally applicable to other psychological measures. In this article, we provide essential sources of Rorschach research regarding several empirical studies that summarize important information and directly address previous criticisms of the measure.     

Reductionism in the comments and autobiographical accounts of prominent psychologists

Many of the researchers in the field of psychological science use strategies and methods in which human actions and experiences are reduced to behavioral contingencies, statistical regularities, neurophysiological states and processes, and computational functions and models. However, many psychologists talk readily and easily about how their research might assist human agents to solve problems, cope, make decisions, self-regulate, and more generally "make a difference" and "take control." The authors considered informally selected comments by several eminent psychologists, and more formally, 73 autobiographical accounts of prominent psychologists to see what could be learned about the attitudes of these psychologists toward reductionism in their own work and in the field of psychology in general. In interpreting these comments and accounts, the authors posit a gap between many psychologists' contemplation of their work and their actual research practices. The authors also suggest that such a gap may be related to psychologists' educational experiences and their scholarly and professional socialization, as well as to their subdisciplinary attachments and contexts.     

Examining Reasoning Skill Differences Between Expert and Novice Counselors

There is increasing interest in identifying the complex cognitive skills that constitute counseling expertise. Research from cognitive psychology suggests significant differences between experts and novices in their reasoning. This study examines the reasoning of expert and novice counselors engaged in a diagnostic task. Cases varied on “problem structure”—the extent to which problem-relevant information was clear and apparent. While an expertise by problem structure interaction was hypothesized, most of the differences were found across case type. Results suggest that the structure of the diagnostic problem may be an important variable affecting reasoning. The importance of problem structure for future research and training is discussed.     

Methodology is more than research design and technology

The Society for Computers in Psychology has been at the forefront of disseminating information about advances in computer technology and their applications for psychologists. Although technological advances, as well as clean research designs, are key contributors to progress in psychological research, the justification of methodological rules for interpreting data and making theory choices is at least as important. Historically, methodological beliefs and practices have been justified through intuition and logic, an approach known asfoundationism. However,naturalism, a modern approach in the philosophy of science inspired by the work of Thomas S. Kuhn, indicates that all aspects of scientific practice, including its methodology, should be evaluated empirically. This article examines implications of the naturalistic approach for psychological research methods in general and for the current debate that is often framed as one of qualitative versus quantitative methods.     

Psychologists in Academic Health Settings: Key Contributors to Dynamic Interplay Among Research, Clinical Practice, and Policy Domains

Psychologists in academic health systems are in a unique position to impact the dynamic interplay among research, clinical practice, and policy domains. In addition to their specialty expertise in psychopathology, particular types of physical illness and disease, and health promotion, psychologists have substantial knowledge of human behavior, refined scientific skills, knowledge and experience in the effective delivery of clinical services, strengths in written expression, and a collaborative orientation. This combination of strengths makes psychologists extremely well-suited for (a) interdisciplinary efforts to develop and implement evidence-based assessment and intervention strategies with biological, psychological, behavioral, and social components, and (b) leadership and advocacy efforts that impact the quality and availability of health care services.     

Depth Psychology and Symbolic Anthropology: Toward a Depth Sociology of Psychocultural Interaction

Research on the moral faculty indicates that morality emerges naturally over the course of normal human development, similar to other competencies such as face perception, language, numerical reasoning, and some motor skills (running, jumping, etc.). One implication of this is that there should be a roughly normal distribution of moral skills. Thus, while most people develop competent moral skills, a few fail to develop these skills and a few develop them to an “expert” level. The skill development literature indicates that deliberate practice is necessary for the acquisition of expertise. Religious participation appears to provide the basic elements of deliberate “moral practice.” Empirical evidence is reviewed supporting the notion that religion provides the means and opportunity for the acquisition of moral expertise. A program of research into moral expertise is proposed with testable hypotheses presented.     

Analogy Generation in Science Experts and Novices

There is a critical inconsistency in the literature on analogical retrieval. On the one hand, a vast set of laboratory studies has found that people often fail to retrieve past experiences that share deep relational commonalities, even when they would be useful for reasoning about a current problem. On the other hand, historical studies and naturalistic research show clear evidence of remindings based on deep relational commonalities. Here, we examine a possible explanation for this inconsistency—namely, that remindings based on relational principles increase as a function of expertise. To test this claim, we devised a simple analogy-generation task that can be administered across a wide range of expertise. We presented common events as the bases from which to generate analogies. Although the events themselves were unrelated to geoscience, we found that when the event was explainable in terms of a causal principle that is prominent in geoscience, expert geoscientists were likely to spontaneously produce analogies from geoscience that relied on the same principle. Further, for these examples, prompts to produce causal analogies increased their frequency among nonscientists and scientists from another domain, but not among expert geoscientists (whose spontaneous causal retrieval levels were already high). In contrast, when the example was best explained by a principle outside of geoscience, all groups required prompting to produce substantial numbers of analogies based on causal principles. Overall, this pattern suggests that the spontaneous use of causal principles is characteristic of experts. We suggest that expert scientists adopt habitual patterns of encoding according to the key relational principles in their domain, and that this contributes to their propensity to spontaneously retrieve relational matches. We discuss implications for the nature of expertise and for science instruction and assessment.     

Does “putting on your thinking cap” reduce myside bias in evaluation of scientific evidence?

Abstract

The desire to maintain current beliefs can lead individuals to evaluate contrary evidence more critically than consistent evidence. We test whether priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduces this often-observed myside bias, when people evaluate scientific evidence about which they have prior positions. We conducted three experiments in which participants read a news-style article about a study that either supported or opposed their attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. We manipulated whether participants completed a test posing scientific reasoning problems before or after reading the article and evaluating the evidence that it reported. Consistent with previous research, we found that participants were biased in favor of evidence consistent with their prior attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. Priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduced myside bias only when accompanied by direct instructions to apply those skills to the task at hand. We discuss the processes contributing to biased evaluation of scientific evidence.     

核心知识系统及其对相关研究的启示

核心知识系统出现于人类个体发展和种系发展的早期,在人类复杂认知能力的发生发展中起着建构模块的作用。该文以表征物体和数量关系的两类核心知识系统的性质及二者在儿童的“数”概念形成和成人的数学思维中所起的作用为例,综述了以灵长类动物、婴儿、儿童和成人为被试的研究证据,并进而提出了核心知识系统给相关研究带来的若干启示。     

Cultivating expertise in informal reasoning.

People generally develop some degree of competence in general informal reasoning and argument skills, but how do they go beyond this to attain higher expertise? Ericsson has proposed that high-level expertise in a variety of domains is cultivated through a specific type of practice, referred to as "deliberate practice." Applying this framework yields the empirical hypothesis that high-level expertise in informal reasoning is the outcome of extensive, deliberate practice. This paper reports results from two studies evaluating the hypothesis. University student participants completed 12 weeks of deliberate practice in informal reasoning. Quantity of practice was recorded by computer, and additionally assessed via self-report. The hypothesis was supported: Students in both studies showed a large improvement, and practice, as measured by computer, was related to amount of improvement in informal reasoning. These findings support adopting a deliberate practice approach when attempting to teach or learn expertise in informal reasoning.     

Choosing between hearts and minds: Children's understanding of moral advisors

Moral development research has often focused on the development of moral reasoning without considering children's understanding of moral advisors. We investigated how children construe sources of moral advice by examining the characteristics that children deem necessary for reasoning about moral or scientific problems. In two experiments, children in grades K, 2, and 4 were presented with dilemmas of a moral nature or scientific nature and chose between two advisors. Second and fourth graders chose advisors differentially based on their expertise, while kindergartners did not discriminate between advisors. In a third experiment, older children indicated that only certain characteristics are needed to solve moral or scientific problems, and they endorsed these characteristics differentially based on the problem to be solved. Thus, by middle childhood, children construe moral knowledge as distinct from scientific knowledge and select advisors in each area accordingly.