Against Right Reason

I argue against ‘right reason’ style accounts of how we should manage our beliefs in the face of higher‐order evidence. I start from the observation that such views seem to have bad practical consequences when we imagine someone acting on them. I then catalogs ways that Williamson, Weatherson, and Lasonen‐Aarnio have tried to block objections based on these consequences; I argue all fail. I then move on to offer my own theoretical picture of a rational ‘should believe,’ and show that, if such a picture is right, it can neatly explain why right reason isn't. I close by arguing that the extent to which anti‐luminosity arguments motivate right reason has been overstated; the positive picture developed here, despite rejecting right reason, is nonetheless consistent with luminosity failures.     

市场经济、道德权利与产权伦理

产权伦理是现代市场经济的一个根本性的精神基础,是建立有效的产权制度及其运行机制的重要条件;同时,它是人类道德体系的核心价值理念之一,是基于权利,义务与道德的内在逻辑构建起来的。产权伦理的研究具有重要的理论价值和现实意义,可以构成一门具有特殊的学科特质,研究方法和理论内容的伦理学学科。     

Practical Reason and Ethics Above the Line

In John McDowell's recent Woodbridge Lectures at Columbia University, he characterizes Wilfrid Sellars's master thought, in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, as drawing a line between two types of characterizations of states that occur in people's mental lives: Above the line are placings in the logical space of reasons, and below it are characterizations that do not do that (McDowell, 1998, p. 433). In this essay, I ask what would be required for ethics to be above the line. More precisely, what would be necessary to characterize episodes as actions, and persons as agents, so as for them to be answerable to moral criticism in light of rationally relevant considerations. The requirements are twofold: that practical reason motivate in virtue of the content of its deliverances; and that there be a will which is sensitive to those deliverances, and which chooses freely. A widespread procedural account of practical reason is examined and found insufficient to place ethics above the line; and a suspicion is raised that McDowell himself, and Jonathan Dancy, do not have a robust enough conception of will to avoid the below the line ethics they accuse their opponents of defending.     

Epistemological Strata and the Rules of Right Reason

It has been commonplace in epistemology since its inception to idealize away from computational resource constraints, i.e., from the constraints of time and memory. One thought is that a kind of ideal rationality can be specified that ignores the constraints imposed by limited time and memory, and that actual cognitive performance can be seen as an interaction between the norms of ideal rationality and the practicalities of time and memory limitations. But a cornerstone of naturalistic epistemology is that normative assessment is constrained by capacities: you cannot require someone to do something they cannot or, as it is usually put, ought implies can. This much we take to be uncontroversial. We argue that differences in architectures, goals and resources imply substantial differences in capacity, and that some of these differences are ineliminable. It follows that some differences in goals and architectural and computational resources matter at the normative level: they constrain what principles of normative epistemology can be used to describe and prescribe their behavior. As a result, we can expect there to be important epistemic differences between the way brains, individuals, and science work.     

The Health Professional Ethics Rubric: Practical Assessment in Ethics Education for Health Professional Schools

A barrier to the development and refinement of ethics education in and across health professional schools is that there is not an agreed upon instrument or method for assessment in ethics education. The most widely used ethics education assessment instrument is the Defining Issues Test (DIT) I & II. This instrument is not specific to the health professions. But it has been modified for use in, and influenced the development of other instruments in, the health professions. The DIT contains certain philosophical assumptions (??Kohlbergian?? or ??neo-Kohlbergian??) that have been criticized in recent years. It is also expensive for large institutions to use. The purpose of this article is to offer a rubric??which the authors have named the Health Professional Ethics Rubric??for the assessment of several learning outcomes related to ethics education in health science centers. This rubric is not open to the same philosophical critiques as the DIT and other such instruments. This rubric is also practical to use. This article includes the rubric being advocated, which was developed by faculty and administrators at a large academic health science center as a part of a campus-wide ethics education initiative. The process of developing the rubric is described, as well as certain limitations and plans for revision.     

Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action

Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly in doing what no fully virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. In this paper, various proposals for how to revise VR in order to avoid these counter-examples are considered. I will argue that in so far as the revised accounts really do manage to steer clear of the counter-examples to VR, something which it turns out is not quite true for all of them, they instead fall prey to other damaging objections. I end by discussing the future of virtue ethics, given what has come to light in the previous sections of the paper. In particular, I sketch the outlines of a virtue ethical account of rightness that is structurally different from VR. This account also faces important problems. Still, I suggest that further scrutiny is required before we are in a position to make a definitive decision about its fate.     

美德伦理学论正确的行动

美德伦理学通常被指责为不能提供正确行动的独立标准。面对这一责难,美德伦理学产生了两种回应。一些美德伦理学家认为,伦理学应当用美德概念替代正确行动的概念;另一些美德伦理学家主张,正确行动的概念可以还原为美德概念,并提供了正确行动的美德伦理学解释。前者的回应是不合理的,后者提供的解释是不成功的。美德伦理学的结构决定了它不能提供正确行动的独立解释。其根源就在于美德伦理学与规则伦理学是伦理学的不同组成部分。美德伦理学主要是一种道德修养理论,不适合于论说对行动的道德评价。     

伦理视野中的政府权力观

政府是一个具有巨大权力的机构,其权力观直接决定着政府权力的指向,造就相应的社会生产力和政治文化心态,影响着社会的稳定性、效率以及社会运行的良性与否,因此,我们在审视政府、考察政府权力的效能时,对政府权力的伦理追究也就成了超越技术层面追问之后的必然.     

理性·人权·民意--西方限制立法的自然法哲学之维

对立法进行必要的和合理的限制 ,符合已然形成的以国家—市民社会二元结构为表现形式的政治现实 ,是关乎现代立宪主义政治制度设计能否实现的重大理论和现实问题。从终极意义上讲 ,自然法是立法的准绳和价值判断标准 ,因而对立法的限制主要体现为自然法对立法的限制。具体来说 ,要对立法进行限制进而使之符合正当性、合目的性、合法性的判断要求 ,应从合乎理性、保障人权和遵从民意等维度对立法进行限制     

The Apple of Kant's Ethics: i-Maxims as the Locus of Assessment

I want to distinguish between maxims at three levels of abstraction. At the first level are what I shall call individual maxims, or i-maxims: maxim tokens as adopted by particular rational beings. At the second level are abstract maxims, or a-maxims: abstract principles distinct from any individual who adopts them. At the third level are maxim kinds, or k-maxims: sets of various action-guiding principles that are grouped on the basis of their content. In this paper, I argue for the thesis that i-maxims are the locus of assessment in Kant's ethics.     

The Ethics of Effective Teaching: Challenges from the Religious Right and Critical Pedagogy

Abstract. This essay asks: What are the ethics of engaging self‐identified “conservative” students in topics and processes of learning that may unravel their world‐view and possibly their personal lives? We should take their concerns, fear, and distrust seriously and not simply dismiss them as ignorant. We should strive to be “trustworthy” educators, guiding students through the consequences of transformative education. This paper argues that conservative students are critically examining and reacting to the liberal academy by leveling critiques similar to those found within feminist, post‐colonial and post modern pedagogies. This essay reviews contemporary postmodern, postcolonial, and feminist pedagogies, which analyze bias and power in the classroom and have sought to represent marginalized voices in the classroom in order to challenge the way education often simply serves and protects the interests of the privileged. Pedagogies centered on subject or disciplinary method cannot secure a trustworthy pedagogy since method, thinking skills, and subjects are themselves bias‐laden. But critical pedagogy offers insights to help us achieve the goal of becoming trustworthy educators for students coming from a wide spectrum of religious perspectives.     

伦理学视野中的企业社会责任理由解读

企业社会责任是指企业在突破仅对股东负责的传统理念限制后,以社会本位为着眼点,对非股东的利害关系人之权益承担的一定责任。企业社会责任具有特定的内涵与种类。企业应当承担社会责任,这不仅仅是社会正义的要求,同时,社会责任的承担对企业而言,并非只是负担。利税不能成为企业回避社会责任的借口。     

我国资源物权立法的生态伦理考量

人际伦理观下的资源物权立法的理论与实践局限,导致了人与资源的紧张关系。资源物权立法应凸现生态伦理观的价值取向,并具体贯彻生态限制、可持续发展的资源利用、环境权限制以及强化资源物权的生态义务等原则。加强生态伦理观的价值取向在我国资源物权立法中的渗透力度,确立有关资源物权立法的一般生态原则,为防止生态伦理成为生态乌托邦,特别应将资源物权的生态义务类型化、内化。     

Intrinsic Ethics Regarding Integrated Assessment Models for Climate Management

In this essay we develop and argue for the adoption of a more comprehensive model of research ethics than is included within current conceptions of responsible conduct of research (RCR). We argue that our model, which we label the ethical dimensions of scientific research (EDSR), is a more comprehensive approach to encouraging ethically responsible scientific research compared to the currently typically adopted approach in RCR training. This essay focuses on developing a pedagogical approach that enables scientists to better understand and appreciate one important component of this model, what we call intrinsic ethics. Intrinsic ethical issues arise when values and ethical assumptions are embedded within scientific findings and analytical methods. Through a close examination of a case study and its application in teaching, namely, evaluation of climate change integrated assessment models, this paper develops a method and case for including intrinsic ethics within research ethics training to provide scientists with a comprehensive understanding and appreciation of the critical role of values and ethical choices in the production of research outcomes.     

The Role of Neuropsychological Assessment in the Functional Outcomes of Children with ADHD

The value of evidence-based services is now recognized both within clinical communities and by the public at large. Increasingly, neuropsychologists must justify the necessity of often costly and time-consuming neuropsychological assessments in the diagnosis and treatment of common childhood disorders, such as Attention-deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Published medical guidelines and prominent researchers, however, have argued against the need for formal neuropsychological assessment of ADHD. The present review examines the literature on developmental outcomes in childhood ADHD, with emphasis on the utility of formal neuropsychological assessment among children diagnosed and treated in primary care settings. The review yields three central findings: 1) adherence to published diagnostic guidelines for ADHD is poor among pediatric and primary care physicians; 2) ADHD most often co-exists with other disorders, thus diagnoses made without formal psychometric assessment can be incomplete or incorrect, ultimately increasing treatment costs; and, 3) untreated children with ADHD, and those who have untreated comorbidities, are at greater risk for poor outcomes in social, academic, vocational, and practical settings. The available literature suggests that neuropsychological assessment provides information that can potentially reduce risks for poor outcomes and improve quality of life among children with ADHD. Controlled studies directly examining the impact of neuropsychological assessments in improving outcomes among children with ADHD are needed.     

Passion and Reason: Aristotelian Strategies in Kierkegaard's Ethics

Both Aristotle and Kierkegaard show that virtues result, in part, from training which produces distinctive patterns of salience. The frame problem in AI shows that rationality requires salience. Salience is a function of cares and desires (passions) and thus governs choice in much the way Aristotle supposes when he describes choice as deliberative desire. Since rationality requires salience it follows that rationality requires passion. Thus Kierkegaard is no more an irrationalist in ethics than is Aristotle, though he continues to be charged with irrationalism. The compatibility of an Aristotelian reading of Kierkegaard with the suspension of the ethical and general problems with aretaic ethical theories are treated briefly. The author argues that it is possible to preserve a realist ethics in the face of the tradition relativism which threatens the version of virtue ethics here attributed to Kierkegaard.