Autonomy,Reciprocity, and Responsibility: Darwall and Levinas on the Second Person

Abstract

Stephen Darwall’s The Second‐Person Standpoint converges with Emmanuel Levinas’s concern about the role of the second‐person relationship in ethics. This paper contrasts their methodologies (regressive analysis of presuppositions versus phenomenology) to explain Darwall’s narrower view of ethical experience in terms of expressed reactive attitudes. It delineates Darwall’s overall justificatory strategy and the centrality of autonomy and reciprocity within it, in contrast to Levinas’s emphasis on the experience of responsibility. Asymmetrical responsibility plays a more foundational role as a critical counterpoint to ‘mean‐spirited’ reciprocity than Darwall’s laudable distinction between accountability and revenge, and responsibility even founds this distinction. The experience of being summoned to asymmetrical responsibility amplifies the meaning of ‘authority’, which is a presupposition for Darwall. Finally, asymmetrical responsibility helps develop decentred reasoning, invites risk beyond the boundaries of reciprocity at moments when autonomy appears endangered, reconciles respect and care at the experiential level, and presses to extend the scope of moral obligation.     

Robert Rollock on covenant and sacrament

Abstract

This contribution presents two, less-well-known texts from the Latin corpus of the Scottish theologian, Robert Rollock (d.1599). Rollock significantly informed the evolution of thinking on the divine covenants by virtue of his relatively unprecedented, mature doctrine of a pre-Fall ‘covenant of works’ between God and humankind. Historians of Reformed theology have long recognized Rollock’s importance in this regard, but their familiarity with his doctrine has stemmed almost entirely from Tractatus de vocatione efficaci(1597). The Scot advanced his covenant doctrine in other, earlier texts, including a brief catechism on the covenants (1596) and a series of short tracts published with his Romans commentary (1593). The tracts are particularly noteworthy since, given the popularity of Rollock’s biblical commentaries in his day, these texts were very likely read more widely than his later catechism or Tractatus; they likely served as the principal vehicle through which his covenantal ideas were disseminated. Two tracts, De foedere Dei and De sacramento, are offered here in English translation, thus affording readers access to Rollock’s earliest covenantal ideas, influential in Reformed thought.     

The Compatibility of Hegelian Recognition and Morality with the Ethics of Care

I draw connections between Hegel’s concepts of recognition and morality and demonstrate how they are compatible with an ethic of care. I explore Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and demonstrate the role that intersubjective recognition plays in the development and sustainment of ethical communities. I demonstrate how his emphasis on the community and interpersonal relationships play an important role in his moral theory. I then contrast Hegelian and Kantian views of morality and argue that Hegel’s account places greater emphasis on attending to the needs of others and showing genuine concern for their well-being. By highlighting the intersubjective nature of recognition between self-consciousnesses, and the interconnectedness of agents in an ethical community, I maintain Hegel’s morality is compatible with an ethic of care because it emerges out of intersubjective mutual recognition and its foundation is built upon responding to the needs of particular others and protecting the bonds of the community.     

Ethical Obligations and Clinical Goals in End-of-Life Care: Deriving a Quality-of-Life Construct Based on the Islamic Concept of Accountability Before God (Taklīf)

End-of-life medical decision making presents a major challenge to patients and physicians alike. In order to determine whether it is ethically justifiable to forgo medical treatment in such scenarios, clinical data must be interpreted alongside patient values, as well as in light of the physician's ethical commitments. Though much has been written about this ethical issue from religious perspectives (especially Christian and Jewish), little work has been done from an Islamic point of view. To fill the gap in the literature around Islamic bioethical perspectives on the matter, we derive a theologically rooted rubric for goals of care. We use the Islamic obligation for Muslims to seek medical treatment as the foundation for determining the clinical conditions under which Muslim physicians have a duty to treat. We next link the theological concept of accountability before God (taklīf) to quality-of-life assessment. Using this construct, we suggest that a Muslim physician is not obligated to maintain or continue clinical treatment when patients who were formerly of, or had the potential to be, mukallaf (the term for a person who has taklīf), are now not expected to regain that status by means of continued clinical treatment.     

METANOIA AND HEALING: TOWARD A GREAT PLAINS LAND ETHIC

A Great Plains land ethic is shaped by an intimate knowledge of and appreciation for the evolution, ecology, and aesthetics of the plains landscape. The landscape evokes a sense of wonder and mystery suggested by the word "sacrament." The biblical concept of "covenant" points to God as a community-forming power, a creative process that has evolved into the earth community to which we humans belong. In contrast to an anthropocentric ethic which emphasizes human dominion over nature, a Theo-centric land ethic seeks a balance, reflected in Genesis 1–3, between humans who are members of the earth community and moral agents accountable to God for the earth. A land ethic identifies concrete practices of metanoia and healing: agricultural practices to address the loss and degradation of soil; conservation and protection of water sources; utilization of wind and solar energy; and prescribed burning to restore processes vital to the prairie ecosystem. The concept of subsidiarity suggests that practices of metanoia and healing are a combination of wise public policy balanced by personal, family, church, business, and community responsibility.     

Qur'anic Covenants Reconsidered: mīthāq and ʿahd in Polemical Context

This article examines the Qur'an's use of 'covenant' (Arabic ?ahd and mīthāq). Recent scholarly attention to covenants in the Qur'an has hitherto largely hinged on modern questions of inclusivism, pluralism, or notions of Islamic salvation history. Most studies have focused on Q 7.172 (and its interpretations), which is usually treated as the most important covenantal verse in the Qur'an. The analysis here is intended to be not an exhaustive study of covenant in the Qur'an, but an attempt to re-orient the discussion in terms of the qur'anic usage as distinct from later categories, and to move away from the tendency to prioritize Q 7.172 as the central covenant verse. The article pays particular attention to the way in which the Qur'an re-contextualizes 'covenant' for its own theological ends, and argues that the Qur'an uses this motif for a multiplicity of purposes. To this end it highlights three elements of the Qur'an's covenant theology: (1) its prophetological connotations, (2) its association with legal injunctions and the Decalogue, and (3) its eschatological implications. All three components often serve polemical functions. The article also makes some brief observations concerning the relationship between the Qur'an's use of covenant and its Late Antique context.     

Marital Therapy Caught Between Person and Public: Christian Traditions on Marriage

This article addresses a crisis in marital therapy caught between concern for individual well-being and marriage as a social institution. Marital therapy would be enriched by conversation with three models of marriage: Roman Catholic subsidiarity theory, Protestant covenant view, and liberation theology and corresponding languages of social goods, covenant, and mutual responsibility. The authors urge therapists to see marriage as private and social at the same time and to help couples explore the meaning of marital commitment, the connection between personal well-being and marriage's wider social goods, and the dynamics of shared power and radical mutuality in marriage.     

Caring and Evil

Nel Noddings, in Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984), presents and develops an ethic of care as an alternative to an ethic that treats justice as a bask concept. I argue that this care ethic is unable to give an adequate account of ethical relationships between strangers and that it is also in danger of valorizing relationships in which carers are seriously abused.     

A path to the Oasis: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sharī‘ah</Emphasis> and reason in Islamic moral epistemology

I propose a framework for comparative Islamic—Western ethics in which the Islamic categories Islam, Iman, and Ihsan are juxtaposed with the concepts of obligation, value, and virtue, respectively. I argue that shari’a refers to both the obligation component and the entire structure of the Islamic ethic; suggesting a suspension of the understanding of shari’a as simply Islamic “law,” and an alternative understanding of usul al-fiqh as a moral epistemology of obligation. I will test this approach by addressing the question of reason in Islamic moral epistemology via an examination of an argument advanced by a founding usul scholar Muhammad bin Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī (150 A.H./767 C.E.).     

Transference and covenant in pastoral care

Transference raises issues in pastoral care which covenant addresses. Through transference one tames the terrors of life and death. Transference also provides a basis for healing in pastoral relationships. Transference must be managed so that it does not result in idolatry but rather points the helpee beyond attachment to the minister and toward dependence upon God. Covenant provides theological guidance for transcending transference. This covenant involves the pastor-helpee relationship, commitment to God as a third party, and accountability to the covenant community.This article was presented in an earlier version as the Spring Faculty Lecture at Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary on March 1, 1979.     

Responsible to whom? Responsible for what? Some ethical issues in community intervention

Conclusion Each ethical decision is a blend of general principles and contextual features. Many require compromises between competing values, must be made in the absence of perfect information, and require the courage to confront mistakes.In community intervention, we have seen that adopting a collaborative paradigm imposes the freedom to determine to whom we are responsible for our actions. A rationale was offered for giving priority to the most vulnerable group, even though this strategy leaves us with an accountability gap in which the group to whom we owe primary loyality is least likely to be able to call us to account.When we reject the professional-client paradigm in community psychology, we lose the formal contract as a device for setting the terms and limiting the scope of our responsibility. We do the best reconnaissance we can, but even with careful data-gathering we are condemned to act on the basis of imperfect information. We must follow through on unforseen consequences even when we have no formal role to mandate our perseverence.The community as a setting for psychological intervention faces us, then, with ethical challenges: we work for the well-being of groups too broad to give informed consent to our interventions; we act in collaboration with others, but collaborative action does not free us from professional obligation; we reconnoiter, but reconnaissance does not provide us with perfect information; we may advise while others act, but we cannot walk away from the consequences of their actions. Ethical decision making, in the community as elsewhere, is a creative act in which we invent our profession choice by choice. Editor's Note: The subject of ethics, in the specific context of Community Psychology, deserves our attention. This paper provided us with an opportunity for such attention. My own reactions to it were of sufficient range to lead me to invite commentary from individuals with a range of views. Thanks is extended to the eight authors whose comments immediately follow.The cases in this paper were first presented in talks given to the Canadian Psychological Association and the Ontario Psychological Association. On both occasions, Carole Sinclair made valuable comments on the material; Elaine Campbell and David Colquhoun also contributed to the present formulation of these issues. In the editorial process, three anonymous reviewers made many valuable suggestions. The paper was written while the author was Invited Professor at the University of Montreal.     

Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics

This paper highlights and discusses some key positions on free will and moral responsibility that I have defended. I begin with reflections on a Strawsonian analysis of moral responsibility. Then I take up objections to the view that there is an asymmetry in freedom requirements for moral responsibility and moral obligation: obligation but not responsibility requires that we could have done otherwise. I follow with some thoughts on the viability of different sorts of semi-compatibilism. Next, I turn to defending the ??luck objection?? to a popular libertarian account of the control that responsibility requires. This is, roughly, the objection that when our decisions are indeterministically caused, their occurrence is a matter of responsibility-undermining luck. Finally, I comment on Frankfurt examples.     

The Structure of Max Weber's Ethic of Responsibility

Max Weber's distinction in "Politics as a Vocation" between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility is best understood as a distinction between mutually exclusive ethical worldviews. Interpretations that correlate the two ethics with Weber's distinction between value-rational social action and instrumental-rational social action are misleading since Weber assumes that both types of rational social action are present in both ethics. The ethic of conviction recognizes a given hierarchy of values as the context for moral endeavor. The ethic of responsibility acknowledges value obligations, but assumes the absence of any given hierarchy of values and the inevitability of value conflict as the context for moral endeavor. When interpreted in the context of his multilayered understanding of value conflict, Weber's ethic of responsibility emerges as a coherent ethical perspective.     

Ethical contexts of healing: Character and ritual

Conclusion Jesus was asked by what authority did he heal. I suggest that the authority of the healing ministry of Jesus occurred because his work was a part of the inbreaking of God's Reign, was consistent with call to covenantal obedience within the Jewish community and because his life was the incarnation of God's righteousnes. The authority of the contemporary Christian therapist is different in degree not in kind. Our authority emerges when healing occurs that is consistent with the Sermon on the Mount, when the people of God have blessed our service and when our lives approximate the ethic of the Reign of God. It is my hope that an ethic of God's Reign, a normative people and our personal character as disciples of Christ might more significantly shape the therapeutic process.This is the third article in a series published in Pastoral Psychology. The first two appeared in the previous two issues.     

On Paraconsistent Ethics

Abstract

Advances in modern logic allow us to admit that some ethical dilemmas are veridical contradictions. First, I offer two examples of such paradoxes and discuss their general form. Then the notion of paraconsistency is introduced to provide a coherent understanding of these as contradictions without lapsing into absurdity. With the groundwork in place, some features of an ethic embedded in paraconsistent logic are then shown to include a class of necessary and impossible acts called hypererogatory. Finally, some advantages of upholding such an ethic are discussed. This is a proposal to revaluate the form, rather than the content, of our normative judgements.     

III—Moral Obligation: Form and Substance

Beginning from an analysis of moral obligation's form that I defend in The Second-Person Standpoint as what we are answerable for as beings with the necessary capacities to enter into relations of mutual accountability, I argue that this analysis has implications for moral obligation's substance . Given what it is to take responsibility for oneself and hold oneself answerable, I argue, it follows that if there are any moral obligations at all, then there must exist a basic pro tanto obligation not to undermine one another's moral autonomy.     

Responsabilité Sociale, Gestion de la Diversité et Lutte Contre les Discriminations: Des Perspectives Convergentes

Signatory States of international agreements have to report regularly to international bodies on the measures and monitoring they apply to comply with and enforce their commitments on human rights and the fight against racism and discrimination. All the same, national governments do not always adequately assess the prevailing measures and practices in organisations in all sectors of society within their jurisdiction. This article discusses the accountability and social responsibility of organisations in terms of non-discrimination, which are rarely questioned despite legal obligations to comply with charters and legislation on employment equality and equity, as in Canada. The issue of the current effectiveness of rights, which underlines the legitimacy and “ethics” of institutions, companies and governments, requires that obligation in the strict legal sense fits in with a broader and normative perspective, approach and discussion. Today, this issue is prominent at both national and international levels in the social and scientific debate on “citizen companies”, indicators of respect for human rights, social and environmental reports, “ethical” investments, diversity management, equity and access to equality, and the fight against systemic discrimination.     

How the Good Obligates in Hegel's Conception of Sittlichkeit: A Response to Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation

Abstract

In Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Robert Stern argues that Hegel has a social command view of obligation. On this view, there is an element of social command or social sanction that must be added to a judgment of the good in order to bring about an obligation. I argue to the contrary that Hegel's conception of conscience, and thus the individual's role in obligation, is more central to his account than the social dimension. While agreeing with Stern that Hegel's conception of Sittlichkeit does preserve a role for obligation, and that the social plays an important part in that account, I argue that there is no extra social component that converts the morally good into obligation. Rather, Hegel's conception of Sittlichkeit as the “living good” means that judgments of the moral facts are simultaneously judgments of obligation.     

Two faces of desert

There are two broadly competing pictures of moral responsibility. On the view I favor, to be responsible for some action is to be related to it in such a way that licenses attributing certain properties to the agent, properties like blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Responsibility is attributability. A different view understands being responsible in terms of our practices of holding each other responsible. Responsibility is accountability, which “involves a social setting in which we demand (require) certain conduct from one another and respond adversely to one another’s failures to comply with these demands” (Watson, Philos Top 24:227–248, 1996). My concern here is the relation between moral responsibility and desert. Plausibly, if someone is morally responsible for something wrong then they deserve blame, and it is on the basis of them being morally responsible and its being wrong that they deserve blame. In this paper, I try to make progress toward understanding why it would follow that being morally responsible for something supports a desert claim. I propose to do this by exploring how the “two faces” of responsibility should proceed. An important upshot is that we gain a new currency by which to evaluate extant theories of responsibility that might favor one or the other conception: do they carry plausible desert commitments? To illustrate this benefit, I argue that accountability theory carries implausible implications for deserved praise.     

Cosmic Commons: Contact and Community

Abstract

As we Homo sapiens on planet Earth prepare for possible contact with extraterrestrial life (ET)—especially extraterrestrial intelligent (ETI) life—we need to consider ethics. What will be the ethical posture we adopt as Earth meets space? This article advocates an ethic of praxis based upon the concept of a Cosmic Commons. Intelligent extraterrestrial beings, from their experiences in biotic and abiotic environments, should share with us a universal regard for intelligence (intellilife), respect for biotic evolution, and a sense of responsibility for shared common space in our places in the universe. As we venture from Earth into space, what will be required? Not anxiety over human dis-placement to new worlds; nor should we invest our efforts in irresponsibly exploiting the natural goods of other planets. Rather, we need an ethical transformation of terrestrial human thought and conduct prior to, during, and as a consequence of extraterrestrial explorations and engagements. We need an anticipatory Cosmic Charter.