The nativist-empiricist controversy in the context of recent research on spatial and quantitative development

Demonstrations of cognitive competence in preschool children and infants played an important role in the waning influence of Piagetian theory and the rise of nativism. Arguments and data favoring modularity have further buttressed the case for nativism. This article reviews evidence concerning early competence and modularity in the spatial and quantitative domains, as well as the role of experience in development. This evidence provides little reason to support nativist claims in either domain.     

ORGANISMIC PROCESSES FOR NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORIES: A DIALECTICAL CAUSAL ACCOUNT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The paper criticizes some epistemological presuppositions of Piaget's and of neo-Piagetian's work, in particular, the psycho-Logical principle. This principle is contrasted with a more valid psycho-dialectical one. It is suggested that a dialectical-constructivist (i.e., causal-dynamic) perspective offers a causal theoretical framework for cognitive development that is superior to that of Piaget and many neo-Piagetians. I outline criteria for evaluating causal developmental theories, and point out deficiencies in Piaget's and neo-Piagetian's stage theories vis-à-vis the criteria. An organismic theory of constructive operators - a dialectical/causal theory - is introduced as a remedy for these deficiencies. I focus on a modular model of mental attention that is constituted by four dynamically interacting functional systems. These systems together explain the ‘beam’ of mental attention and its phenomenological/behavioural effects. I claim that the stages of cognitive development are caused by growth of mental attention. The validity of this model is supported by data on a motor performance task (Rho task). The Rho data show: (a) the existence of stage-wise plateaus in children's performance at ages congruent with the redefined Piagetian stages; (b) the psychological structures which, driven by mental attention (M-capacity), are responsible for performance on the task, appear to be located in the left hemisphere of the brain. These findings, predicted by the dialectical theory of mental attention, highlight its causal-predictive power.     

THE CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE: PIAGET AND THE BAOULÉ*

There are two aspects of Piaget's theory that can be at least partly distinguished: (1) The stage theory, or the development of particular concepts through a series of hierarchical stages; (2) The metatheory, or the interactionist model of adaptation (assimilation and accommodation) that explains the mechanisms of cognitive development. Most cross-cultural research has been based on the first of these aspects, using and adapting “Piagetian tasks ”in various conceptual areas. Some findings of this line of enquiry, and the methodological problems encountered, are briefly reviewed. It is argued that no specific task, nor a combination of them, can be taken to measure a general cognitive level; the tasks measure the attainment of particular concepts rather than “intelligence”. New evidence is presented on the reliability and validity of Piagetian tasks used in a cross-cultural setting. In the second model, intelligence is broadly defined as adaptation to the environment; in this conception it would be reasonable to expect divergent paths of cognitive development in different cultures. In other words, one might need a different Piagetian psychology in each culture, but based on universal deep mechanisms. As a modest contribution to a more “emic ”study of intelligence, the concept of intelligence as defined by the Baoulé of Ivory Coast, n'glouèlě is presented and discussed. Ratings on n'glouèlě and its different components are related to performance on Piagetian tasks in a sample of 8- to 9-year-old rural Baoulé children. The thrust of the paper is to point out once more the cultural relativity of any conception of intelligence, be it from a Piagetian or any other perspective.     

Language and thought: the fundamental significance of conversational awareness for cognitive development

According to Piagetian accounts of cognitive development, children’s responses on many tasks reflect the lack of evidence for an operational competence that is conceptual rather than linguistic. In this paper, I show that such accounts assume that young children are endowed with substantial conversational wizardry, allowing them to interpret questions about cognitive tasks as intended by the experimenter. Once it is explicitly recognized that children may be less advanced in their conversational awareness than is commonly assumed, their competence can be assessed more accurately. Recent and new evidence from a variety of sources, such as research on conservation, suggestibility in memory, and theory of mind understanding in deaf and hearing children, converges to indicate that competence is inadequately characterized by a dichotomy between pre-operational and operational logic and that what is developing in children’s cognition is a complex interplay between both conversational and conceptual processes. This evidence is not merely relevant to methodological concerns. It demands a radical shift in cognitive developmental theory and research to account for the importance of children’s conversational awareness.     

Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.     

Agent-causation and agential control

According to what I call the reductive standard-causal theory of agency, the exercise of an agent's power to act can be reduced to the causal efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. According to a non-reductive agent-causal theory, an agent's power to act is irreducible and primitive. Agent-causal theories have been dismissed on the ground that they presuppose a very contentious notion of causation, namely substance-causation. In this paper I will assume, with the proponents of the agent-causal approach, that substance-causation is possible, as I will argue against that theory on the ground that it fails as a theory of agency. I will argue that the non-reductive agent-causal theory fails to account for agency, because it fails to account for agential control: it cannot explain why the stipulated irreducible relation between the agent and an action constitutes the agent's exercise of control over the action. This objection, I will argue, applies to the agent-causal theory in particular, and to the non-reductive approach in general.     

Theoretical influences on research on language development and intervention in individuals with mental retardation

In this article, we consider the theoretical debates and frameworks that have shaped research on language development and intervention in persons with mental retardation over the past four decades. Our starting point is the nativist theory, which has been espoused most forcefully by Chomsky. We also consider more recent alternatives to the nativist approach, including the social-interactionist and emergentist approaches, which have been developed largely within the field of child language research. We also consider the implications for language development and intervention of the genetic syndrome-based approach to behavioral research advocated by Dykens and others. We briefly review the impact and status of the debates spurred by the nativist approach in research on the course of language development in individuals with mental retardation. In addition, we characterize some of the achievements in language intervention that have been made possible by the debates spurred by nativism and the various alternatives to it. The evidence we consider provides support for all three alternatives to the nativist approach. Moreover, successful interventions appear to embody elements of several of these approaches as well as other theoretical approaches (e.g., behaviorism). We conclude that language intervention must be theoretically eclectic in its approach, with different strategies appropriate for teaching different features of language, at different points in development, and for children displaying different characteristics or learning histories.     

Clearing Up Obstructions: An Image Schema Approach to the Concept of ‘Datong’ 大通 in Chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi

In much of modern scholarship, the notion of datong 大通 in Zhuangzi’s famous zuowang 坐忘 (sitting in disregard) passage is often interpreted as either Dao or a mental/spiritual state of an ideal person, a person who has obtained Dao. In either case, however, the association between datong and such interpretation lacks detailed justification resulting from an insufficiently understood relation between datong and its immediately preceding statements. Different from the more common readings, I propose a cognitive approach based on an image schema related to non-obstruction. In order to demonstrate the philosophical importance of this schema, I will first briefly point out the problems of previous scholarship regarding the zuowang passage. Second, I will introduce the image schema related to non-obstruction based on a number of examples taken from the Zhuangzi. Finally, I will apply this methodology and introduce a cognitive experience-based interpretation of the zuowang passage.     

For the Sake of the Final End

The question of the viability of theological eudaimonism as an interpretation of the moral life has generated increasing debate in recent years. This essay aims to advance the debate about theological eudaimonism (and eudaimonism more generally) by addressing a closely related but insufficiently discussed issue: the nature of human agency and its relationship to value. The most commonly raised objection to eudaimonism is that it is objectionably agent-oriented. I argue that worries about objectionable self-orientation often stem from importing foreign pictures of agency into the eudaimonist tradition. I make this case through an analysis of Nicholas Wolterstorff’s recent critique of eudaimonism. Wolterstorff presupposes a common contemporary conception of agency. Drawing on Thomas Aquinas and Elizabeth Anderson, I show that other conceptions of agency are available. Clarity about the nature of human agency and its relationship to value will bring greater clarity to the debate about eudaimonism and self-orientation.     

GOD EMBODIED IN,GOD BODYING FORTH THE WORLD: EMERGENCE AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

Abstract. I expand on Philip Clayton's application of emergence—in the context of a metaphysical position he calls emergent monism—to conceiving God's relationship to the world. Like Clayton, I adopt a panentheistic perspective, but in a way that I argue is consistent with classical philosophical theism and its grammatical analysis of Christian discourse about divine transcendence. In order to exploit further the analogical potential of an emergentist account of human mentality and agency, I argue that the standard panentheistic metaphor The world is the body of God should be complemented by the metaphor God is the body of the world.     

Destination memory and cognitive theory of mind in normal ageing

Destination memory is the ability to remember the destination to which a piece of information has been addressed (e.g., “Did I tell you about the promotion?”). This ability is found to be impaired in normal ageing. Our work aimed to link this deterioration to the decline in theory of mind. Forty younger adults (M age = 23.13 years, SD = 4.00) and 36 older adults (M age = 69.53 years, SD = 8.93) performed a destination memory task. They also performed the False-belief test addressing cognitive theory of mind and the Reading the mind in the eyes test addressing affective theory of mind. Results showed significant deterioration in destination memory, cognitive theory of mind and affective theory of mind in the older adults. The older adults’ performance on destination memory was significantly correlated with and predicted by their performance on cognitive theory of mind. Difficulties in the ability to interpret and predict others’ mental states are related to destination memory decline in older adults.     

The nature of cognitive development

Theories of cognitive development have led to enduring and fierce arguments that have been long on rhetoric but short on evidence. Constructivist theory has roots in Piagetian notions of cognitive development as proceeding from self-directed action during infancy. Nativist theories subsequently became popular by producing claims of cognitive precocity, but left open many central questions concerning mechanisms of development. Now, a new view of constructivism is experiencing a renaissance, having achieved greater psychophysical, computational and neural plausibility.     

Moral “I”: The Feminist Subject and the Grammar of Self-Reference

Much recent feminist theory tacitly subscribes to some version of what cognitive and evolutionary scientists are successfully undermining as untenably Cartesian, namely, the view that moral agency is achieved through the transcendence of physical causality guaranteed by self-consciousness. Appealing to Wittgenstein's insights concerning self-reference, I argue that abandoning Cartesian dualism implies abandoning neither subject nor moral agency but rather opens up nonandrocentric possibilities unavailable to the traditional model of mind.     

The case for a dual-process theory of transitive reasoning

Ever since its popularisation by Piaget around 60 years ago, transitive reasoning (deductively-inferring A > C from premises A > B and B > C) has been of psychological interest both as a mental phenomenon and as a tool in areas of psychological discourse. However, the focus of interest in it has shifted periodically first from child development, to learning disability, to non-humans and currently to cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Crucially, such shifts have always been plagued by one core question – the question of which of two competing paradigms (extensive-training paradigm versus non-training paradigm) is valid for assessing transitive reasoning as originally conceived in Piagetian research. The continued avoidance of this question potentially undermines several important findings recently reported: Such as about exactly what is involved in deducing transitive inferences, which brain regions are critical for reaching transitive inference, and what links exist between weakened deductive transitivity and mental illnesses like schizophrenia. Here, we offer the view that both of the competing paradigms are indexing transitivity, but each one tends to tap a different aspect of it. Then, we summarise studies from child and adult cognitive psychology, disabilities research, and from cognitive neuroscience. These, together with studies of non-human reasoning, seem to afford a theory of transitive reasoning that has two major components; one deductive but the other associative. It is proposed that only a dual-process theory of transitivity (having analytic versus intuitive routes approximate to deductive versus associative processing respectively) can account both for the variety of findings and the apparently-disparate paradigms. However, fuzzy-trace theory (“Gist” processes and representations), if not already embodying such a dual-process theory, will need to be incorporated into any complete theory.     

On the Validity of Simulating Stagewise Development by Means of PDP Networks: Application of Catastrophe Analysis and an Experimental Test of Rule-Like Network Performance

This article addresses the ability of Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) networks to generate stagewise cognitive development in accordance with Piaget's theory of cognitive epigenesis. We carried out a replication study of the simulation experiments by McClelland (1989) and McClelland and Jenkins (1991) in which a PDP network learns to solve balance scale problems. In objective tests motivated from catastrophe theory, a mathematical theory of transitions in epigenetical systems, no evidence for stage transitions in network performance was found. It is concluded that PDP networks lack the ability to recover the positive outcomes of analogous catastrophe analyses of real cognitive developmental data. In an attempt to further characterize the learning behaviour of PDP networks, we carried out a second simulation study using the discrimination-shift paradigm. The results thus obtained indicate that PDP learning is compatible with the learning of stimulus-response relationships, not with the acquisition of mediating rules such as conceived in (neo-)Piagetian theory. In closing, we speculate about the feasibility of simulating stagewise development with alternative network architectures.     

Rethinking the ontogeny of mindreading

We propose a mentalistic and nativist view of human early mental and social life and of the ontogeny of mindreading. We define the mental state of sharedness as the primitive, one-sided capability to take one's own mental states as mutually known to an interactant. We argue that this capability is an innate feature of the human mind, which the child uses to make a subjective sense of the world and of her actions. We argue that the child takes all of her mental states as shared with her caregivers. This allows her to interact with her caregivers in a mentalistic way from the very beginning and provides the grounds on which the later maturation of mindreading will build. As the latter process occurs, the child begins to understand the mental world in terms of differences between the mental states of different agents; subjectively, this also corresponds to the birth of privateness.     

Setting the bar for cognitive agency: Or,how minimally autonomous can an autonomous agent be?

Embodied cognition comes in many variants. Yet, in most if not all of these variants the notion of agency, or more precisely autonomous agency, occupies center stage. However, whereas in its original context of application autonomy applies strictly to the human sphere, cognitive theory must needs generalize this concept so as to render it applicable to a much wider range of entities and processes. Theorists of embodied cognition must therefore strive to articulate a valid sense of minimal autonomy applicable to animals and, arguably, to artificial agents as well. In this paper I discuss two major attempts to articulate a conception of minimal autonomy which I describe, respectively, as the adaptive-behavior approach (ABA) and the systemic-constructivist approach (SCA). The differences between these two leading views on minimal autonomy reveal fundamental disagreements not only with respect to the nature of autonomous agency but also with respect to embodiment and the relevance of biological life to the making of mental life.     

Modularity,mental retardation and speed of processing

This paper briefly outlines Anderson's (1992) theory of the minimal cognitive architecture underlying intelligence and development and briefly discusses its application to understanding mental retardation and specific cognitive deficits. An experiment on the relationship between face perception and mental retardation serves as an illustration of how the theory might be informative about the relationship between intelligence and cognitive architecture.     

皮亚杰理论近期的若干发展──差别观点的贡献

皮亚杰认知发展理论的一个新趋势是从智力发展的认识论过渡到智力发展的心理学,差别心理学的近期实验研究为这一过渡提供了方法。后皮亚杰学派理论对差别心理的强调在教育学和临床心理学中有着重要意义。     

Naturalizing Ethics: the Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency

Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology,developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency.