The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth

People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject to an illusion-an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge, such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports real-time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1-6. Then we show differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different knowledge domains in Studies 7-10. Finally, we explore the mechanisms behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies 11 and 12. Implications for the roles of intuitive theories in models of concepts and cognition are discussed.     

Folkscience: coarse interpretations of a complex reality

The rise of appeals to intuitive theories in many areas of cognitive science must cope with a powerful fact. People understand the workings of the world around them in far less detail than they think. This illusion of knowledge depth has been uncovered in a series of recent studies and is caused by several distinctive properties of explanatory understanding not found in other forms of knowledge. Other experimental work has shown that people do have skeletal frameworks of expectations that constrain richer ad hoc theory construction on the fly. These frameworks are supplemented by an ability to evaluate and rely on the division of cognitive labour in one's culture, an ability shown to be present even in young children.     

The Curse of Expertise: When More Knowledge Leads to Miscalibrated Explanatory Insight

Does expertise within a domain of knowledge predict accurate self‐assessment of the ability to explain topics in that domain? We find that expertise increases confidence in the ability to explain a wide variety of phenomena. However, this confidence is unwarranted; after actually offering full explanations, people are surprised by the limitations in their understanding. For passive expertise (familiar topics), miscalibration is moderated by education; those with more education are accurate in their self‐assessments (Experiment 1). But when those with more education consider topics related to their area of concentrated study (college major), they also display an illusion of understanding (Experiment 2). This “curse of expertise” is explained by a failure to recognize the amount of detailed information that had been forgotten (Experiment 3). While expertise can sometimes lead to accurate self‐knowledge, it can also create illusions of competence.     

USING ANALOGIES TO TEACH CONCEPTUAL APPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES

Teachers traditionally have used analogies as explanatory tools in bridging the gap between new and preexisting knowledge. In two studies, I examine the impact of analogies in teaching undergraduates conceptual applications of developmental psychology theories. In Study 1, I generate analogies reflecting each theory; in Study 2, I use both teacher- and student-generated analogies. Students' attitudes toward analogy-enhanced instruction were predominantly favorable. Teacher-generated-analogy (TGA) and student-generated-analogy (SGA) learning conditions performed significantly better than a no-analogy control group in understanding and applying developmental theories. Because learning becomes more active and interactive when students create their own analogies and share them with classmates and the instructor as part of in-class discussion and critique, the SGA learning condition similarly outperformed the TGA learning condition. In line with a constructivist model of teaching and learning, psychological explanations, educational applications, and implications for future research are discussed.     

Learning the Relevance of Relevance and the Trouble with Truth: Evaluating Explanatory Relevance across Childhood

ABSTRACT

In four experiments, we investigate how the ability to detect irrelevant explanations develops. In Experiments 1 and 2, 4- to 8-year-olds and adults rated different types of explanations about “what makes cars go” individually, in the absence of a direct contrast. Each explanation was true and relevant (e.g., “Cars have engines that turn gasoline into power”), true and irrelevant (e.g., “Cars have radios that play music”), or a false statement that would be relevant if it were true (e.g., “Cars have rockets that speed them up”). Participants of all ages spontaneously indicated that false explanations were less helpful than relevant explanations. However, there was a developmental shift for irrelevant explanations: 4-year-olds only detected irrelevant explanations that did not involve internal features of cars (e.g., “Cars have parking lots that they park in”). Crucially, this shift between age 4 and 5 cannot be explained by 4-year-olds’ lack of knowledge since 4-year-olds correctly indicated that relevant explanations were more helpful than irrelevant feature explanations when given a direct contrast in Experiment 3. These results are further clarified in Experiment 4, in which we provided a different explanatory goal (“where to find cars”) and found that even young children have a nuanced understanding of explanatory relevance that is sensitive to differing explanatory goals. Together, these four experiments suggest an early-emerging ability to understand relevance, but a shift between age 4 and 5 in the ability to spontaneously use this understanding when evaluating individual explanations in isolation.     

Transitional knowledge in the acquisition of concepts

These studies explore children's conceptual knowledge as it is expressed through their verbal and gestural explanations of concepts. We build on previous work that has shown that children who produce a large proportion of gestures that do not match their verbal explanations are in transition with respect to the concept they are explaining. This gesture/speech mismatch has been called “discordance.” Previous work discovered this phenomenon with respect to 5- to 7-year-old children's explanations of conservation problems. Study 1 shows: (1) that older children (10 to 11 years old) exhibit gesture/speech discordance with respect to another concept, understanding the equivalence relationship in mathematical equations, and; (2) that children who produce many discordant responses in their explanations of mathematical equivalence are more likely to benefit from instruction in the concept than are children who produce few such responses. Studies 2 and 3 explore the properties and usefulness of discordance as an index of transitional knowledge in a child's acquisition of mathematical equivalence. Under any circumstance in which new concepts are acquired, there exists a mental bridge connecting the old knowledge state to the new. The studies reported here suggest that the combination of gesture and speech may be an easily observable and significantly interpretable reflection of knowledge states, both static and in flux.     

儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习

儿童的选择性学习是目前认知发展领域的热点问题。儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习(即选择性因果学习)对于回答儿童如何获取知识这个经典问题具有重要意义。儿童的选择性因果学习表现在对他人解释的辨别、评估与采纳上。他们会主动向可靠的信息提供者寻求解释, 并在接收回答后表现出选择性跟进反应。对于他人的回答, 年幼儿童不仅能根据言语线索辨别出解释性陈述, 还能依据解释的结构特征选择更好的陈述加以采纳, 年长儿童甚至可以从不同模式的解释中灵活地学习更适宜的因果知识。未来研究应深入关注解释的其它特征在儿童选择性因果学习中的作用, 进一步探讨选择性因果学习的认知机制。     

A contrastive account of explanation generation

In this article, we propose a contrastive account of explanation generation. Though researchers have long wrestled with the concepts of explanation and understanding, as well as with the procedures by which we might evaluate explanations, less attention has been paid to the initial generation stages of explanation. Before an explainer can answer a question, he or she must come to some understanding of the explanandum—what the question is asking—and of the explanatory form and content called for by the context. Here candidate explanations are constructed to respond to the particular interpretation of the question, which, according to the pragmatic approach to explanation, is constrained by a contrast class—a set of related but nonoccurring alternatives to the topic that emerge from the surrounding context and the explainer’s prior knowledge. In this article, we suggest that generating an explanation involves two operations: one that homes in on an interpretation of the question, and a second one that locates an answer. We review empirical work that supports this account, consider the implications of these contrastive processes, and identify areas for future study.     

Children's conceptions of mental illness: A naïve theory approach

This paper reports two studies that investigated children's conceptions of mental illness using a naïve theory approach, drawing upon a conceptual framework for analysing illness representations which distinguishes between the identity, causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of an illness. The studies utilized semi‐structured interviewing and card selection tasks to assess 6‐ to 11‐year‐old children's conceptions of the causes and consequences (Study 1) and the curability and timeline (Study 2) of different mental and physical illnesses/ailments. The studies revealed that, at all ages, the children held coherent causal–explanatory ideas about the causes, consequences, curability, and timeline of both mental and physical illnesses/ailments. However, while younger children tended to rely on their knowledge of common physical illnesses when thinking about mental illnesses, providing contagion and contamination explanations of cause, older children demonstrated differences in their thinking about mental and physical illnesses. No substantial gender differences were found in the children's thinking. It is argued that children hold coherent conceptions of mental illness at all ages, but that mental illness only emerges as an ontologically distinct conceptual domain by the end of middle childhood.     

Young Children Prefer and Remember Satisfying Explanations

Research with preschool children has shown that explanations are important to them in that they actively seek explanations in their conversations with adults. But what sorts of explanations do they prefer, and what, if anything, do young children learn from the explanations they receive? Following a preliminary study with adults (N = 67) to establish materials for use with children, we addressed this question using a seminaturalistic methodology. Four- and 5-year-olds (N = 69) were dissatisfied when receiving nonexplanations to their explanatory questions, but they were satisfied when receiving explanations, and their satisfaction varied appropriately across several levels of explanatory information. Moreover, using recall as a measure of learning, whereas children typically failed to recall nonexplanations, their recall of explanatory information was consistently high and also varied appropriately across differing levels of information provided. These results confirm that children not only actively seek informative explanations in their everyday conversational interactions with adults, but they selectively retain the answers they receive.     

Investigating the origins of political views: biases in explanation predict conservative attitudes in children and adults

We tested the hypothesis that political attitudes are influenced by an information‐processing factor – namely, a bias in the content of everyday explanations. Because many societal phenomena are enormously complex, people's understanding of them often relies on heuristic shortcuts. For instance, when generating explanations for such phenomena (e.g., why does this group have low status?), people often rely on facts that they can retrieve easily from memory – facts that are skewed toward inherent or intrinsic features (e.g., this group is unintelligent). We hypothesized that this bias in the content of heuristic explanations leads to a tendency to (1) view socioeconomic stratification as acceptable and (2) prefer current societal arrangements to alternative ones, two hallmarks of conservative ideology. Moreover, since the inherence bias in explanation is present across development, we expected it to shape children's proto‐political judgments as well. Three studies with adults and 4‐ to 8‐year‐old children (N = 784) provided support for these predictions: Not only did individual differences in reliance on inherent explanations uniquely predict endorsement of conservative views (particularly the stratification‐supporting component; Study 1), but manipulations of this explanatory bias also had downstream consequences for political attitudes in both children and adults (Studies 2 and 3). This work contributes to our understanding of the origins of political attitudes.     

A variant of the anomalous motion illusion based upon contrast and visual latency

We examined a variant of the anomalous motion illusion. In a series of experiments, we ascertained luminance contrast to be the critical factor. Low-contrast random dots showed longer latency than high-contrast ones, irrespective of whether they were dark or light (experiments 1 -3). We conjecture that this illusion may share the same mechanism with the Hess effect, which is characterised by visual delay of a low-contrast, dark stimulus in a moving situation. Since the Hess effect is known as the monocular version of the Pulfrich effect, we examined whether illusory motion in depth could be observed if a high-contrast pattern was projected to one eye and the same pattern of low-contrast was presented to the other eye, and they were binocularly fused and swayed horizontally. Observers then reported illusory motion in depth when the low-contrast pattern was dark, but they did not when it was bright (experiment 4). Possible explanations of this inconsistency are discussed.     

The explanatory potential of artificial societies

It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Despite that, many feel that such simulations somehow contribute to our understanding. This paper tries to clarify this intuition by investigating whether artificial societies provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our understanding, considerably differ from potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum. The paper discusses how these two kinds explanatory strategies differ, and how potential functional explanations can be appraised.     

Children's understanding of the Ulysses conflict

Two studies explored children's understanding of how the presence of conflicting mental states in a single mind can lead people to act so as to subvert their own desires. Study 1 analyzed explanations by children (4--7 years) and adults of behaviors arising from this sort of 'Ulysses conflict' and compared them with their understanding of conflicting desires in different minds, as well as with changes of mind within an individual across time. The data revealed that only the adults were able to adequately explain the Ulysses conflict. Study 2 asked children (4--7 years) and adults to choose among three explicitly presented competing explanations for self-subverting behaviors. The results suggest that an understanding of the influence of conflicting mental states on behaviors does not occur until at least 7 years of age.     

The effect of competitive and cooperative contexts on comparative optimism

Several common characteristics are shared by competition and comparative optimism; and comparative optimism has often been observed in competitive environments like entrepreneurial fields or areas that require skills. Competitive context could be an explanatory factor for comparative optimism neglected to date. The aim of this article is to test the links between competition (vs. cooperation) and comparative optimism. In Study 1, participants in different academic majors with a more or less competitive nature (respectively, medical studies and human sciences studies) answered questions about their future and that of others. In Study 2, for the participants in the less competitive course of study (human sciences studies), we presented their studies as being either competitive or cooperative. The impact of this context was tested as a function of the closeness or distance between the participants and the comparison targets. The results of both studies showed that competition increased the expression of comparative optimism. In Study 2, this effect emerged more when the comparison target was distant than when it was close, with proximity hindering the competitive relationship between the self and others. The feeling of competition with others contributed to a better understanding of comparative optimism and initiated new explanations for its emergence.     

What matters in scientific explanations: effects of elaboration and content

Given the breadth and depth of available information, determining which components of an explanation are most important is a crucial process for simplifying learning. Three experiments tested whether people believe that components of an explanation with more elaboration are more important. In Experiment 1, participants read separate and unstructured components that comprised explanations of real-world scientific phenomena, rated the components on their importance for understanding the explanations, and drew graphs depicting which components elaborated on which other components. Participants gave higher importance scores for components that they judged to be elaborated upon by other components. Experiment 2 demonstrated that experimentally increasing the amount of elaboration of a component increased the perceived importance of the elaborated component. Furthermore, Experiment 3 demonstrated that elaboration increases the importance of the elaborated information by providing insight into understanding the elaborated information; information that was too technical to provide insight into the elaborated component did not increase the importance of the elaborated component. While learning an explanation, people piece together the structure of elaboration relationships between components and use the insight provided by elaboration to identify important components.     

Stereoscopic depth and the occlusion illusion

In the occlusion illusion, the visible portion of a partly occluded object appears larger than a physically identical nonoccluded region. Stereoscopic displays allowed for a direct test of the apparent-distance hypothesis. In Experiments 1A and 1B, we measured both the perceived size and the perceived depth of partly occluded targets when the binocular disparity of both targets and occluders was varied. Stereoscopic occlusion greatly increased perceived target size but not perceived target distance. A reduced illusion was still present when the target was stereoscopically in front of the abutting rectangle, however. Experiments 2A and 2B showed similar results, even when the occluding figures were illusory rectangles that formed no explicit T-junctions. Experiment 3 showed that an unexpected negative size illusion on control trials was primarily due to adaptation to the occlusion illusion on other trials. The present findings eliminate apparent-distance explanations of the occlusion illusion but are consistent with other hypotheses, such as partial modal completion and selective dimensional expansion.     

Shrinkage in the apparent size of cylindrical objects

A novel illusion in apparent size is reported. We asked observers to estimate the width and depth of vertically oriented elliptic cylinders depicted with texture or luminance gradients (experiment 1), or the height of horizontally oriented elliptic cylinders depicted with binocular disparity (experiment 2). The estimated width or height of cylinders showed systematic shrinkage in the direction of the gradual depth change. The dissimilarity of 2-D appearance amongst our stimuli implies a large variation in spatial-frequency components and brightness contrasts, eliminating the possibility that these parameters contributed to the illusion. Also, the mechanism inappropriately triggered by pictorial depth cues (eg size scaling) may be irrelevant, because the illusion was obtained even when binocular disparity alone specified the shape of the cylinders. The illusion demonstrated here suggests that our visual system may determine the size of 3-D objects by accounting for their depth structures.