Quantifying disablers in reasoning with universal and existential rules

People accept conclusions of valid conditional inferences (e.g., if p then q, p therefore q) less, the more disablers (circumstances that prevent q to happen although p is true) exist. We investigated whether rules that through their phrasing exclude disablers evoke higher acceptance ratings than rules that do not exclude disablers. In three experiments we re-phrased content-rich conditionals from the literature as either universal or existential rules and embedded these rules in Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences. In Experiments 2 and 3, we also used abstract rules. The acceptance of conclusions increased when the rule was phrased with “all” instead of “some” and the number of disablers had a higher impact on existential rules than on universal rules. Further, the effect of quantifier was more pronounced for abstract rules and when tested within subjects. We discuss the relevance of phrasing, quantifiers and knowledge on reasoning.     

Redefining membership in animal groups

Groups of animals—flocks, herds, shoals, and swarms—are often dynamical entities. Relative positions of group members change, and most groups divide and re-form on multiple timescales. Few studies, however, have attempted to define when an animal is or is not within a group. Most authors adopt arbitrary distance thresholds, such as the elective group size (EGS), which assume that animals closer than some threshold distance are in the same group. In the present article, we define a group-membership criterion derived from dynamical statistical considerations and based on detailed trajectories of all members of a moving group. We demonstrate the use of our criterion to track the comings and goings in shoals of zebrafish (Danio rerio) and the gradual dissolution of the shoal across multiple exposures to a testing tank. We present a novel measure of group cohesion based on our group membership criterion and demonstrate that excursions away from the shoal explain some previous observations of the dynamics of shoaling. Finally, we show that excursions away from a shoal are accompanied by an increase in swimming speed. Applying similar criteria to data from other species may clarify some of the common features of animal collective motion.     

Love In-Between

In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know (the other, the relation, oneself) more. We build on Irigaray’s account of love to present a phenomenology of loving interactions and then our enactive account. Finally, we draw some implications for ethics. These concern language, difference, vulnerability, desire, and self-transformation.

     

Knowledge and Appraisal in the Cognition—Emotion Relationship

Abstract

Recently there has been considerable theoretical and empirical work attempting to identify specific cognitive dimensions that shape the emotional response. However, this work has almost universally neglected an important theoretical distinction between two types of cognition relevant to emotion: knowledge and appraisal. Knowledge has to do with the facts of an adaptational encounter, whereas appraisal defines the personal significance of an encounter for well-being. In the shaping of an emotion, knowledge is a distal variable which requires an additional process of appraisal to produce an emotion; appraisal is a proximal variable which directly influences whether an emotion will be generated, and if so, its kind and intensity.

In this article we examine the distinctions between knowledge and appraisal that are relevant to the emotion process, and how the failure to consider them muddies theoretical and empirical work. We examine a number of putative appraisal dimensions prominent in current theoretical systems, examine why they often constitute knowledge rather than appraisal, and discuss some of the appraisal dimensions in the emotion process. In addition, the major techniques used to study the cognition-emotion relationship are examined and their potential for providing evidence of appraisal rather than knowledge is evaluated.     

Understanding causal conditionals: A study of individual differences

Previous studies have suggested that a minority of university students, of lower cognitive ability, are inclined to interpret abstract conditional statements, if p then q, as if they were conjunctions: p and q. In the present study we administered the conditional truth table task to a large sample of students (n = 160), but using realistic, everyday causal conditionals. We also measured their general intelligence. While individual differences were found, these were not consistent with some participants adopting a conjunctive interpretation of such statements. Rather, it appears that students of lower cognitive ability are rather likely to assume that a conditional implies its converse, so that it means also if q then p. The results are discussed with reference to the suppositional theory of conditionals and our more general account of hypothetical thinking.     

Illusory inferences with quantifiers

The psychological study of reasoning with quantifiers has predominantly focused on inference patterns studied by Aristotle about two millennia ago. Modern logic has shown a wealth of inference patterns involving quantifiers that are far beyond the expressive power of Aristotelian syllogisms, and whose psychology should be explored. We bring to light a novel class of fallacious inference patterns, some of which are so attractive that they are tantamount to cognitive illusions. In tandem with recent insights from linguistics that quantifiers like “some” are treated as wh-questions, these illusory inferences are predicted by the erotetic theory of reasoning, which postulates that a process akin to question asking and answering is behind human inference making.     

How to reason without words: inference as categorization

The idea that reasoning is a singular accomplishment of the human species has an ancient pedigree. Yet this idea remains as controversial as it is ancient. Those who would deny reasoning to nonhuman animals typically hold a language-based conception of inference which places it beyond the reach of languageless creatures. Others reject such an anthropocentric conception of reasoning on the basis of similar performance by humans and animals in some reasoning tasks, such as transitive inference. Here, building on the modal similarity theory of Vigo [J Exp Theor Artif Intell, 2008 (in press)], we offer an account in which reasoning depends on a core suite of subsymbolic processes for similarity assessment, discrimination, and categorization. We argue that premise-based inference operates through these subsymbolic processes, even in humans. Given the robust discrimination and categorization abilities of some species of nonhuman animals, we believe that they should also be regarded as capable of simple forms of inference. Finally, we explain how this account of reasoning applies to the kinds of transitive inferences that many nonhuman animals display.     

Ineffably Effable: The Pinnacle of Mystical Ascent in Gregory of Nyssa's De vita Moysis

In his commentary on the Song of Songs, Gregory of Nyssa describes a three‐step progression of the soul to God, an ascent which ends in the darkness of God's ineffability. Though some of Gregory's most prominent interpreters understand Moses' ascent into the darkness to be the definitive encounter with God in De vita Moysis as well, it is here argued that in De vita Moysis Gregory of Nyssa makes the culminating moment, not the apophatic experience of the darkness, but the encounter with the celestial tabernacle, Christ. Gregory thereby suggests that the mystical ascent to God ends in the encounter of God as both unknowable and known, transcendent but also incarnate.     

Children’s judgements of the obligation to help: The role of relationships

ABSTRACT

Children at ages 7 (N = 24, M _age = 6.96, SD _age =.20), 9 (N = 29, M _age = 8.76, SD _age =.44), and 11 (N = 25, M _age = 10.76, SD _age =.66), and adults (N = 30) made judgements about the obligation to help when it conflicts with a personal desire. Across ages, the obligation to help was judged to be strongest when there were positive or neutral past interactions with the person in need of help, compared to mean past interactions. Expectation of a future friendship predicted the obligation to help, even after controlling for age and sex. However, we found no effect of children helping gender in-group members more. Evidence for altruism was not found: expected positive emotions did not predict the obligation to help. We conclude that an expectation of future relationship is the strongest predictor of helping obligation.     

Prolegomena to Concise Theories of Action

A new methodology for developing theories of action has recently emerged which provides means for formally evaluating the correctness of such theories. Yet, for a theory of action to qualify as a solution to the frame problem, not only does it need to produce correct inferences, but moreover, it needs to derive these inferences from a concise representation of the domain at hand. The new methodology however offers no means for assessing conciseness. Such a formal account of conciseness is developed in this paper. Combined with the existing criterion for correctness, our account of conciseness offers a framework where proposed solutions to the frame problem can be formally evaluated.     

Logical dynamics of belief change in the community

In this paper we explore the relationship between norms of belief revision that may be adopted by members of a community and the resulting dynamic properties of the distribution of beliefs across that community. We show that at a qualitative level many aspects of social belief change can be obtained from a very simple model, which we call ‘threshold influence’. In particular, we focus on the question of what makes the beliefs of a community stable under various dynamical situations. We also consider refinements and alternatives to the ‘threshold’ model, the most significant of which is to consider changes to plausibility judgements rather than mere beliefs. We show first that some such change is mandated by difficult problems with belief-based dynamics related to the need to decide on an order in which different beliefs are considered. Secondly, we show that the resulting plausibility-based account results in a deterministic dynamical system that is non-deterministic at the level of beliefs.     

Information becomes evidence when an explanation can incorporate it into a causal framework

Recognizing information as evidence is central to the development of scientific reasoning. When does information about an event come to be treated as evidence relevant to explaining the event? We asked whether this was increasingly likely to happen when an explanation becomes available that can incorporate both the event and the information into a single causal framework. In three studies, we presented participants with events for which there were two possible and plausible explanations (a baseline and one of two alternative explanations), as well as with two pieces of background information. While all explanations could account for the event, only one alternative explanation (the “target” explanation) could incorporate both the event and the background information into a single causal framework. The results indicated that information is more likely to be seen as evidentially relevant to an event when there is an explanation available that can accommodate both the event and the information into a single casual framework than when such an explanation is lacking. Furthermore, the presence of this information renders the target alternative increasingly plausible. That is, it is the interdependence of explanation or theory and evidence that allows us to realize that some information is likely to be evidential. However, for this to happen, the relation between explanation and information must be made salient, either by explicitly asking about it (as we did in Study 1) or by fleshing out the target explanation (as we did in Study 3).     

Intuition, reason, and metacognition

Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N = 60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N = 48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N = 128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N = 64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement.     

The Causal Structure of Utility Conditionals

The psychology of reasoning is increasingly considering agents' values and preferences, achieving greater integration with judgment and decision making, social cognition, and moral reasoning. Some of this research investigates utility conditionals, ‘‘if p then q’’ statements where the realization of p or q or both is valued by some agents. Various approaches to utility conditionals share the assumption that reasoners make inferences from utility conditionals based on the comparison between the utility of p and the expected utility of q. This article introduces a new parameter in this analysis, the underlying causal structure of the conditional. Four experiments showed that causal structure moderated utility‐informed conditional reasoning. These inferences were strongly invited when the underlying structure of the conditional was causal, and significantly less so when the underlying structure of the conditional was diagnostic. This asymmetry was only observed for conditionals in which the utility of q was clear, and disappeared when the utility of q was unclear. Thus, an adequate account of utility‐informed inferences conditional reasoning requires three components: utility, probability, and causal structure.     

Beyond the twee: Thuy’s practical expression of living the Mercy Education Value of hospitality

This article utilises hermeneutic phenomenology as a theoretical framework for reflecting upon and interpreting the Mercy Education Value of hospitality. It describes an incident involving the author’s encounter with a member of staff upon his new appointment in a Catholic secondary college formed in the Mercy Tradition. Through this article, the possibilities opened by such an encounter for hermeneutic phenomenology are explored using van Manen’s lifeworld existentials as guides to reflection upon the described incident. The four lifeworld existentials are lived space (spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time (temporality) and lived other (relationality). In using these as guides to reflection, it is argued that some insights into the Mercy value of hospitality may be gleaned, namely that to be Mercy involves: (1) exceeding the carefully and socially programmed how are you – fine exchange; (2) an encounter with the other – the stranger – in whom is to be found the person of Jesus Christ, in which both participants are transformed; and (3) taking a risk – pushing boundaries so as to enter into relationship with the other.     

Joy in the Midst of Suffering: Clowning as Care of the Spirit in Palliative Care

SUMMARY

We find joy in the midst of suffering at Daw House, a palliative care unit. Stories, ranging from moments of gentle tenderness to wild hilarity, speak of profound joy and of the courage of those who participate. We articulate some of the why and how of caring clowning. Clown Doctors aim to affirm people as people with richly storied lives, to give permission for both laughter and tears, and to bring consolation to the spirit. The art of clowning means that we seek to elevate people, to sensitively tailor music, touch, and colour to the interests of those we encounter, to invite a sense of wonder and spontaneity and to work to transform situations through the imagination.     

Rapid-response versus free-time selection tasks using different logical connectives

When reasoning with conditional statements (i.e., if [not] p then [not] q), people tend to display matching bias: Options that match the entities named in the rule are selected even when logically inappropriate. Three different Wason selection tasks were administered under free-time and rapid-response formats. For the latter, individual cards were presented for one second, and required a response within a further one second. Previous research using these formats (Roberts & Newton, 2001) has shown that this increases matching bias, in line with the action of preconscious heuristic processes which direct attention towards relevant aspects of a problem, but whose action can be overturned if there is sufficient time to apply analytic reasoning processes. The selection tasks administered included a standard abstract conditional task, a disjunctive version (i.e., either [not] p or [not] q), and a conditional task in which the cards showed explicitly negated values. Both conditional tasks demonstrated matching bias, but under rapid-response presentation, matching bias only increased for the standard conditional and disjunctive tasks. Overall, the data support Evans’ (e.g., 2006) heuristic-analytic framework albeit with some caveats, and it is suggested that the broad question, of whether individual selection task formats show or do not show matching bias, requires more detailed investigation.     

THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN FAITHS AND AN ‘AESTHETIC ATTITUDE’

This paper contains a discussion of the idea of using what could loosely be called an ‘aesthetic attitude’ (stemming largely from Kantian notions of disinterest and explicitly articulated by such writers in the 20^th century as Edward Bullough and Jerome Stolnitz) in the context of the encounter between religions. The ‘problem’ that is addressed is formulated as an attempt to find a space in which the participation of those with committed faith positions (e.g. conservative evangelicals) in sympathetic and empathetic meeting with other faiths can be facilitated. To this end, the paper is critical of the use of spirituality (or inter‐spirituality) as an oft‐suggested mode by which religions meet and ‘converse’ in depth‐encounters. That is, it is argued that the language of inter‐spirituality that is employed by some interfaith writers often betrays liberal assumptions that are unsettling for more committed religious persons. Thus, it is suggested that by changing the language of encounter from ‘inter‐spirituality’ to a more aesthetic (or playful) mode of discourse, one is creating a different, but nonetheless experientially recognisable, space of empathetic meeting and encounter that might be deemed ‘safer’.     

The Police Officer's Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot

We review sociological, correlational, and experimental research that examines the effect of a target's race on the decision to shoot. Much of this work involves computer‐based simulations of a police encounter, in which a participant must decide whether or not to shoot a potentially hostile target who is either Black or White. Experimental work with undergraduate participants reveals a clear pattern of bias (a tendency to shoot Black targets but not Whites), which is associated with stereotypes linking Blacks with the concept of danger. Subsequent work with police officers presents a more complex pattern. Although police are affected by target race in some respects, they generally do not show a biased pattern of shooting. We suggest that police performance depends on the exercise of cognitive control, which allows officers to overcome the influence of stereotypes, and we conclude with potential implications of this research for law enforcement.     

Conditionals,Context, and the Suppression Effect

Modus ponens is the argument from premises of the form If A, then B and A to the conclusion B (e.g., from If it rained, Alicia got wet and It rained to Alicia got wet). Nearly all participants agree that the modus ponens conclusion logically follows when the argument appears in this Basic form. However, adding a further premise (e.g., If she forgot her umbrella, Alicia got wet) can lower participants’ rate of agreement—an effect called suppression. We propose a theory of suppression that draws on contemporary ideas about conditional sentences in linguistics and philosophy. Semantically, the theory assumes that people interpret an indicative conditional as a context‐sensitive strict conditional: true if and only if its consequent is true in each of a contextually determined set of situations in which its antecedent is true. Pragmatically, the theory claims that context changes in response to new assertions, including new conditional premises. Thus, the conclusion of a modus ponens argument may no longer be accepted in the changed context. Psychologically, the theory describes people as capable of reasoning about broad classes of possible situations, ordered by typicality, without having to reason about individual possible worlds. The theory accounts for the main suppression phenomena, and it generates some novel predictions that new experiments confirm.