Does Conventional Implicit Association Test of Shyness Measure “Self‐Shyness” or “Others‐Shyness”?

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures implicit associations between attitude targets and attributes. Its structure and procedure facilitate investigation of the strength of associations between one target and attributes relative to that between the other target and the same attributes when two targets are contradictory (e.g., black/white and comfortable/uncomfortable). This structure can cause conceptual complexity about what the IAT measures, particularly when a counter category is not needed. Thus, using the Single‐Target Implicit Association Test (ST‐IAT), which allowed only one target category for pairing with attributes, this paper delineated the association measured in the conventional IAT for shyness: “self‐shy” or “others‐shy.” Seventy‐seven Japanese university students completed the self‐report shyness scale, the conventional IAT, and two ST‐IATs (i.e., self/others as target). Results showed that implicit shyness produced in the conventional IAT significantly and positively correlated with that in the self‐targeted ST‐IAT. Moreover, implicit shyness in the conventional IAT was significantly accounted for by those produced by the ST‐IAT with self as target and those calculated in the ST‐IAT with others as target in opposite directions.     

Are Intuitions Quasi‐Perceptual “Presentations”?

John Bengson has offered a detailed theory of the nature and epistemology of intuition according to which intuitions are quasi‐perceptual conscious experiences that “present” their contents as true. The paper offered here argues that Bengson’s terminology of “presentations” is difficult to interpret. Bengson does not provide a clear meaning for “presentation” or “presentational state,” and this makes it impossible to evaluate his proposal that intuitions are presentations. This paper argues, furthermore, that intuitions are not phenomenal mental states and therefore have no perception‐like phenomenology or epistemology. It concludes that Bengson’s theory fails to metaphysically, epistemologically, or methodologically legitimize intuitions.     

CO‐CREATING CO‐CREATORS? THE “HUMAN FACTOR” IN EDUCATION

This article presents an example of the contributions the field of science and religion could offer to educational theory. Building on a narrative analysis of Philip Hefner's proposal to use “created co‐creator” as central metaphor for theological anthropology, the importance of culture is brought to the fore. Education should support a needed revitalization of our cultural heritage, and thus enable humanity to (re‐)connect with the global ecological network and with the divine as grounding source of this network. In the concluding reflections of this article, the possibility of a secular interpretation of “created co‐creator,” in which “God” is reduced to “evolution,” is assessed.     

“Being Religious” or “Being Spiritual” in America: A Zero‐Sum Proposition?

Recent discussions of religious attitudes and behavior tend to suggest—and in a few cases, provide evidence—that Americans are becoming “more spiritual” and “less religious.” What do people mean, however, when they say they are “spiritual” or “religious”? Do Americans see these concepts as definitionally or operationally different? If so, does that difference result in a zero‐sum dynamic between them? In this article, we explore the relationship between “being religious” and “being spiritual” in a national sample of American Protestants and compare our findings to other studies, including Wade Clark Roof’s baby‐boomer research (1993, 2000), 1999 Gallup and 2000 Spirituality and Health polls, and the Zinnbauer et al. (1997) study of religious definitions. In addition to presenting quantitative and qualitative evidence about the way people think about their religious/spiritual identity, the article draws implications about modernity, the distinctiveness of religious change in the recent past, and the deinstitutionalization of religion.     

Affective Synchrony in Dual‐ and Single‐Smoker Couples: Further Evidence of “Symptom‐System Fit”?

Couples in which one or both partners smoked despite one of them having a heart or lung problem discussed a health-related disagreement before and during a period of laboratory smoking. Immediately afterwards, the partners in these 25 couples used independent joysticks to recall their continuous emotional experience during the interaction while watching themselves on video. A couple-level index of affective synchrony, reflecting correlated moment-to-moment change in the two partners' joystick ratings, tended to increase from baseline to smoking for 9 dual-smoker couples but decrease for 16 single-smoker couples. Results suggest that coregulation of shared emotional experience could be a factor in smoking persistence, particularly when both partners in a couple smoke. Relationship-focused interventions addressing this fit between symptom and system may help smokers achieve stable cessation.     

Do the “Eyes” Have It? A Program Evaluation of Jane Elliott's “Blue‐Eyes/Brown‐Eyes” Diversity Training Exercise1

The effectiveness of Jane Elliott's well‐known “blue‐eyes/brown‐eyes” exercise in reducing college students’ stereotyping and prejudice was assessed. College students were randomly assigned to either the exercise group or a comparison group. Blue‐eyed and brown‐eyed exercise participants were given discriminatory versus preferential treatment, respectively; a procedure purportedly designed to sensitize participants to the emotional and behavioral consequences of discrimination. Participation in the exercise was found to be associated with White students (a) indicating significantly more positive attitudes toward Asian American and Latino/Latina individuals, but only marginally more positive attitudes toward African American individuals; and (b) reporting anger with themselves when noticing themselves engaging in prejudiced thoughts or actions—negative affect that theoretically could prove to be either helpful or detrimental in promoting long‐term reduction of stereotyping and prejudice.     

WHAT IS “SECULAR”? TECHNO‐SECULARISM AND SPIRITUALITY

Abstract. I argue that there is no “roaring reality of rampant secularism” with “technological application as its chief agent,” as claimed by John Caiazza (2005). Two phenomena, techno‐religion and a spirituality of technology, suggest a different picture of reality: Technology may be an alternative spirituality rather than an ally of a secularism that makes “nutcrackers of the soul” out of people who should be “dancers” (Nietzsche). An analysis of secularism and its manifold causes indicates that secularism is a fruit of both science and religion. The secular is a companion of religion rather than its enemy. Hence, I recommend a heuristic instead of an ontological use of the concept of secularism. In a technological age, religion is changing rather than being displaced. These changes are illustrated by the increase of private religiosity, megachurches, and cyber‐spirituality. Energized by the tension between finitude and creativity, technology shares in the marks of spirituality (Philip Hefner) and in the potential for good and evil. In this situation, fundamentalism and dogmatism in religion, science, and technology are a greater threat than secularism.     

Is the “hot‐hands” phenomenon a misperception of random events?

T. Gilovich, R. Vallone, and A. Tversky (1985) asked whether the so-called hot-hands phenomenon – a temporary elevation of the probability of successful shots – actually exists in basketball. They concluded that hot-hands are misperceived random events. This paper re-examines the truth of their conclusion. The present study's main concern was the sensitivity of the statistical tests used in Gilovich et al.'s research. Simulated records of shots over a season were used. These represented many different situations and players, but they always contained at least one hot-hand period. The issue was whether Gilovich et al.'s tests were sensitive enough to detect the hot-hands embedded in the records. The study found that this sensitivity depends on the frequency of hot-hand periods, the total number of shots in all hot-hand periods, the number of shots in each hot-hand period, and the size of the increase in the probability of successful shots in hot-hand periods. However, when the values of those variables were set realistically, on average the tests could detect only about 12% of the hot-hands phenomena.     

“I Hope I'm Not Disturbing You,Am I?” Another Operationalization of the Foot‐in‐the‐Mouth Paradigm1

A study by Howard (1990 ) proposed a compliance technique built on a social routine. We tested a technique based on an alternative routine. Our hypothesis was that asking people about their availability before making a request would result in increased compliance. A group of 1,791 participants were asked to answer a questionnaire by phone for a consumer survey. The results showed that compliance rates were higher when the requester inquired about respondents' availability and waited for a response than when he pursued his set speech without waiting and inquiring about respondents' availability. The results are discussed based on 2 complementary consistency mechanisms ( Aune & Basil, 1994 ; Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971 ).     

“Avant‐Garde of What?”: Surrealism Reconceived as Political Culture

However we may judge avant-garde art when we meet it, for us the phenomenon and idea are so present and evident that we do not stop, even momentarily, to wonder if we might be dealing with an illusion or an appearance rather than a reality, with a myth or a superstition rather than a concept.     

“Could this happen to me?”: Threat‐related state orientation increases position identification with victims of random, “senseless” violence

Two experiments examined the role of threat‐related action‐state orientation in how observers become psychologically involved with victims of violence. Observing incidents of random, “senseless” violence is uniquely threatening to observers because they violate just world beliefs and appear like they could happen to anyone. Because stronger threat‐related state‐oriented individuals are less effective in down‐regulating such threats to the self, they should perceive stronger self‐concerned position identification (i.e., “this could happen to me”) when confronted with random, “senseless” violence. In contrast, no such effects should occur for observers' person identification (i.e., their other‐concerned empathy for the victim). The results of two experiments supported these ideas and ruled out potential alternative explanations based on individuals' just world beliefs, need for cognition, and their attribution strategies. We discuss the importance of threat‐related self‐regulation processes with regard to self‐ and other‐concerned mechanisms through which observers come to care for victims of violence. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do We “do”?

A normative framework for modeling causal and counterfactual reasoning has been proposed by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993; cf. Pearl, 2000). The framework takes as fundamental that reasoning from observation and intervention differ. Intervention includes actual manipulation as well as counterfactual manipulation of a model via thought. To represent intervention, Pearl employed the do operator that simplifies the structure of a causal model by disconnecting an intervened-on variable from its normal causes. Construing the do operator as a psychological function affords predictions about how people reason when asked counterfactual questions about causal relations that we refer to as undoing, a family of effects that derive from the claim that intervened-on variables become independent of their normal causes. Six studies support the prediction for causal (A causes B) arguments but not consistently for parallel conditional (if A then B) ones. Two of the studies show that effects are treated as diagnostic when their values are observed but nondiagnostic when they are intervened on. These results cannot be explained by theories that do not distinguish interventions from other sorts of events.     

Families of Adolescent Drug Abusers Are “Rigid”: Are These Families Either “Disengaged” or “Enmeshed,” or Both?

The FACES instrument, based on Olson's Circumplex Model of family functioning, was administered to 96 adolescent drug-abuse clients and their parents. The majority of these families categorized themselves as "disengaged" (rather than "enmeshed") on the cohesion dimension, and as "rigid" (rather than "chaotic") on the adaptability dimension. These findings were unexpected as they were substantially different from published findings on families with other types of problems. Family therapists, utilizing Olson's Clinical Rating Scale for the Circumplex Model, characterized significantly more of these same families as "enmeshed," rather than "disengaged." Possible explanations for the difference between the therapists' perceptions and the families' self-perceptions are discussed.     

“Statistical,” “Practical,” and “Clinical”: How Many Kinds of Significance Do Counselors Need to Consider?

The present article reviews and distinguishes 3 related but different types of significance: “statistical,” “practical,” and “clinical.” A framework for conceptualizing the many “practical” effect size indices is described. Several effect size indices that counseling researchers can use, or that counselors reading the literature may encounter, are summarized. A way of estimating “corrected” intervention effects is proposed. It is suggested that readers should expect authors to report indices of “practical” or “clinical” significance, or both, within their research reports; and it is noted that indeed some journals now require such reports.     

Re‐Imagining Theological Education for the Twenty‐First Century: “What Has Theological Ed to do with Higher Ed?”

Abstract : In re‐imagining theological education for the twenty‐first century, Stortz examines two late‐twentieth‐century proposals for seminary education: ecumenical consortia and “clustering,” or merging seminaries within the same communion. Given the relative failure of such proposals, she explores a “back to the future” move—a return of seminaries to the church‐related colleges from which many of them sprung. The move might prove mutually beneficial on three fronts: helping the respective institutions with twin emphases on formation and professionalization, sorting through mission and identity issues, and facilitating a greater awareness of the global context which both theological and higher education serve.     

“Who identifies with which group?” The motive‐feature match principle and its limitations

The functional approach to identification suggests that people with a particular motive tend to identify with groups that fulfill this motive. Thus, identification should be strongest when individual motives and group features match. The present paper explores the predictive power of this motive‐feature match principle. Participants judged themselves on five motives (self‐esteem, distinctiveness, belongingness, uncertainty reduction, and power), rated several groups on features relevant to fulfillment of these motives (e.g., the group's power as to the power motive), and indicated their identification with each group. Although the most predicted Motive x Feature interactions on identification emerged, the overall fit between data and predictions was moderate. The reductionist nature of the motive‐feature match principle is discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Do “Religion” and “Spirituality” Differ? Lay Definitions Among Older Adults

Research and public interest in religion and spirituality is on the rise. Consequently, there is an increasing need for rigorously obtained information on what individuals mean when they use these terms. This study examined how 64 older adults living in three retirement communities (including one Christian‐based community), a relatively understudied population, conceptualize religion and spirituality. Participants defined “religion” and “spirituality,” and their narrative definitions were coded and compared using a framework derived from Hill et al.'s (2000) conceptualization of religion and spirituality. Despite considerable overlap, participants' definitions differed on several dimensions. Participants were more likely to associate religion than spirituality with personal beliefs, community affiliation, and organized practices. Moreover, spirituality appeared to be a more abstract concept than religion, and included nontheistic notions of a higher power.