The effects of adults' affective expression and direction of visual gaze on 12‐month‐olds' visual preferences for an object following a 5‐minute, 1‐day,or 1‐month delay

Between 12‐ and 14 months of age infants begin to use another's direction of gaze and affective expression in learning about various objects and events. What is not well understood is how long infants' behaviour towards a previously unfamiliar object continues to be influenced following their participation in circumstances of social referencing. In this experiment, we examined infants' sensitivity to an adult's direction of gaze and their visual preference for one of two objects following a 5‐min, 1‐day, or 1‐month delay. Ninety‐six 12‐month‐olds participated. For half of the infants during habituation (i.e., familiarization), the adults' direction of gaze was directed towards an unfamiliar object (look condition). For the remaining half of the infants during habituation, the adults' direction of gaze was directed away from the unfamiliar object (look‐away condition). All infants were habituated to two events. One event consisted of an adult looking towards (look condition) or away from (look‐away condition) an object while facially and vocally conveying a positive affective expression. The second event consisted of the same adult looking towards or away from a different object while conveying a disgusted affective expression. Following the habituation phase and a 5‐min, 1‐day, or 1‐month delay, infants' visual preference was assessed. During the visual preference phase, infants saw the two objects side by side where the adult conveying the affective expression was not visible. Results of the visual preference phase indicate that infants in the look condition showed a significant preference for object previously paired with the positive affect following a 5‐min and 1‐day delay. No significant visual preference was found in the look condition following a 1‐month delay. No significant preferences were found at any retention interval in the look‐away condition. Results are discussed in terms of early learning, social referencing, and early memory.     

Exploratory behavior as a function of environmental novelty and complexity in male and female rats

Laboratory rats show a positive response to low- and nonstressful novel events. The novel event may involve a number of aspects of the stimulus field. It is usually associated with a change in amount of environmental complexity. Most studies concerning novelty-related behavior involve the introduction of novel objects or the rearrangement of familiar objects. The present purpose was to measure exploratory behavior in response to environments of increased and decreased complexity. Both directions of environmental change are conditions of novelty. A two-way manipulation of increasing and decreasing the complexity of the environment was used. Rats of both sexes showed increased exploration to exposure to novelty, no matter which manipulation was applied; however, female and male rats behaved differently to the two types of novelty. Males responded more to novelty from the introduction of an unfamiliar object. The results indicate novel stimulation, whether of increasing or decreasing complexity, has reward properties. Perhaps the male-specific behavior directed toward unfamiliar objects may serve an adaptive function.     

Three-month-old infants attribute goals to a non-human agent

The present research examined whether 3-month-old infants, the youngest found so far to engage in goal-related reasoning about human agents, would also act as if they attribute goals to a novel non-human agent, a self-propelled box. In two experiments, the infants seemed to have interpreted the box’s actions as goal-directed after seeing the box approach object A as opposed to object B during familiarization. They thus acted as though they expected the box to maintain this goal and responded with increased attention when the box approached object B during test. In contrast, when object B was absent during familiarization and introduced afterwards, the infants’ responses were consistent with their having recognized that they had no information to predict which of the two objects the box should choose during test and therefore responded similarly when the box approached either object. However, if object B was absent during familiarization and object A was in different positions but the box persistently approached it, thus demonstrating equifinal variations in its actions, the infants again acted as though they attributed to the box a goal directed towards object A and expected the box to maintain this goal even when object B was introduced and hence responded with prolonged looking when the box failed to do so during test. These results are consistent with the notion that (a) infants as young as 3 months appear to attribute goals to both human and non-human agents, and (b) even young infants can use certain behavioral cues, e.g. equifinal variations in agents’ actions, to make inferences about agents’ goals.     

Recognizing the role of perception in action at 6 months

The present research examined whether infants as young as 6 months of age would consider what objects a human agent could perceive when interpreting her actions on the objects. In two experiments, the infants took the agent's actions of repeatedly reaching for and grasping one of two possible objects as suggesting her preference for that object only when the agent could detect both objects, not when the agent's perceptual access to the second object was absent, either because a large screen hid the object from the agent ( Experiment 1 ), or because the agent sat with her back toward the object ( Experiment 2 ). These results suggest that young infants recognize the role of perception in constraining an agent's goal‐actions.     

How do 8‐month‐old infants recognize causality in object motion and that in human action?1

Abstract: In Experiment 1, 8‐month‐old infants were first habituated to the event in which a moving object collided with another behind an occluder, then they were shown the two test events with no occluder: the contact event, in which the two objects actually collided, and the non‐contact event, in which the second object started to move without contact with the first. The infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. In Experiment 2, in which the first object was a human actor, however, infants looked at the non‐contact event reliably longer than the contact event. In Experiment 3, in which both objects were human actors stood face‐to‐back, infants looked at the non‐contact event longer, whereas in Experiment 4, in which human actors faced toward each other, infants looked at both events equally. In Experiment 5, in which the first actor told the second to go, 10‐month‐old infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. These results suggest that 8‐ and 10‐month‐old infants appreciate different causal principles between objects and humans, and that, in doing this, they may acknowledge the possibility of communication between humans.     

Infants generate goal-based action predictions

Predicting the actions of others is critical to smooth social interactions. Prior work suggests that both understanding and anticipation of goal-directed actions appears early in development. In this study, on-line goal prediction was tested explicitly using an adaptation of Woodward's (1998) paradigm for an eye-tracking task. Twenty 11-month-olds were familiarized to movie clips of a hand reaching to grasp one of two objects. Then object locations were swapped, and the hand made an incomplete reach between the objects. Here, infants reliably made their first look from the hand to the familiarized goal object, now in a new location. A separate control condition of 20 infants familiarized to the same movements of an unfamiliar claw revealed the opposite pattern: reliable prediction to the familiarized location, rather than the familiarized object. This study suggests that by 11 months infants actively use goal analysis to generate on-line predictions of an agent's next action.     

Head and eye movements affect object processing in 4‐month‐old infants more than an artificial orientation cue

This study investigates the effects of attention‐guiding stimuli on 4‐month‐old infants' object processing. In the human head condition, infants saw a person turning her head and eye gaze towards or away from objects. When presented with the objects again, infants showed increased attention in terms of longer looking time measured by eye tracking and an increased Nc amplitude measured by event‐related potentials (ERP) for the previously uncued objects versus the cued objects. This suggests that the uncued objects were previously processed less effectively and appeared more novel to the infants. In a second condition, a car instead of a human head turned towards or away from objects. Eye‐tracking results did not reveal any significant difference in infants' looking time. ERPs indicated only a marginally significant effect in late slow‐wave activity associated with memory encoding for the uncued objects. We conclude that human head orientation and gaze direction affect infants' object‐directed attention, whereas movement and orientation of a car have only limited influence on infants' object processing.     

The early origins of goal attribution in infancy

We contrast two positions concerning the initial domain of actions that infants interpret as goal-directed. The 'narrow scope' view holds that goal-attribution in 6- and 9-month-olds is restricted to highly familiar actions (such as grasping). The cue-based approach of the infant's 'teleological stance', however, predicts that if the cues of equifinal variation of action and a salient action effect are present, young infants can attribute goals to a 'wide scope' of entities including unfamiliar human actions and actions of novel objects lacking human features. It is argued that previous failures to show goal-attribution to unfamiliar actions were due to the absence of these cues. We report a modified replication of Woodward (1999) showing that when a salient action-effect is presented, even young infants can attribute a goal to an unfamiliar manual action. This study together with other recent experiments reviewed support the 'wide scope' approach indicating that if the cues of goal-directedness are present even 6-month-olds attribute goals to unfamiliar actions.     

Inferring the goals of a nonhuman agent

Johnson, Slaughter, and Carey [Dev. Sci. 1 (1998) 233.] used infants' ability to follow the ‘gaze’ of novel objects to claim that infants' recognition of mentalistic agents is not isomorphic with person recognition but rather based on a set of nonarbitrary object recognition cues including the presence of a face and the ability to interact contingently with other agents. The current studies extend these findings with data based on infant imitation and the production of communicative gestures. The first study replicated Meltzoff's [Dev. Psychol. 31 (1995) 838.] reenactment of goals paradigm with a novel, nonhuman agent. Fifteen-month-olds were found to reenact both the completed and uncompleted/unseen goals of a novel object that had a face and interacted contingently with the experimenter and infant. Concurrently, infants directed many communicative gestures at the object. A second study excluded the possibility that the communicative gestures apparently directed at the object in Study 1 were in fact imitations of the experimenter's own behavior. The suggestion that novel, nonhuman objects are capable of eliciting such divergent behaviors as gaze-following, goal reenactment, and communicative gestures from infants, supports the claim that all of these behaviors are mediated by a central conceptual notion of mentalistic being, at least by the ages studied, and that that concept is not isomorphic with the concept person.     

Cognitive development in object manipulation by infant chimpanzees

This study focuses on the development of spontaneous object manipulation in three infant chimpanzees during their first 2 years of life. The three infants were raised by their biological mothers who lived among a group of chimpanzees. A human tester conducted a series of cognitive tests in a triadic situation where mothers collaborated with the researcher during the testing of the infants. Four tasks were presented, taken from normative studies of cognitive development of Japanese infants: inserting objects into corresponding holes in a box, seriating nesting cups, inserting variously shaped objects into corresponding holes in a template, and stacking up wooden blocks. The mothers had already acquired skills to perform these manipulation tasks. The infants were free to observe the mothers' manipulative behavior from immediately after birth. We focused on object–object combinations that were made spontaneously by the infant chimpanzees, without providing food reinforcement for any specific behavior that the infants performed. The three main findings can be summarized as follows. First, there was precocious appearance of object–object combination in infant chimpanzees: the age of onset (8–11 months) was comparable to that in humans (around 10 months old).Second, object–object combinations in chimpanzees remained at a low frequency between 11 and 16 months, then increased dramatically at the age of approximately 1.5 years. At the same time, the accuracy of these object–object combinations also increased. Third, chimpanzee infants showed inserting behavior frequently and from an early age but they did not exhibit stacking behavior during their first 2 years of life, in clear contrast to human data.     

“I don't know but I know who to ask”: 12‐month‐olds actively seek information from knowledgeable adults

Active social communication is an effective way for infants to learn about the world. Do pre‐verbal and pre‐pointing infants seek epistemic information from their social partners when motivated to obtain information they cannot discover independently? The present study investigated whether 12‐month‐olds (N = 30) selectively seek information from knowledgeable adults in situations of referential uncertainty. In a live experiment, infants were introduced to two unfamiliar adults, an Informant (reliably labeling objects) and a Non‐Informant (equally socially engaging, but ignorant about object labels). At test, infants were asked to make an impossible choice—locate a novel referent among two novel objects. When facing epistemic uncertainty—but not at other phases of the procedure—infants selectively referred to the Informant rather than the Non‐Informant. These results show that pre‐verbal infants use social referencing to actively and selectively seek information from social partners as part of their interrogative communicative toolkit. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://youtu.be/23dLPsa-fAY     

THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN RETRACTED: Enumeration of objects and substances in non‐human primates: experiments with brown lemurs (Eulemur fulvus)

Both human infants and adult non‐human primates share the capacity to track small numbers of objects across time and occlusion. The question now facing developmental and comparative psychologists is whether similar mechanisms give rise to this capacity across the two populations. Here, we explore whether non‐human primates’ object tracking abilities are subject to the same constraints as those of human infants. In particular, we examine whether one primate species, the brown lemur (Eulemur fulvus), also fails to represent and enumerate objects when they behave non‐rigidly or non‐cohesively. We presented lemurs with a series of expectancy violation studies involving simple 1 + 1 addition events in which we varied the entities to be enumerated. Like infants, lemurs successfully enumerated the two objects when those objects were rigid, cohesive individuals, but failed to enumerate similar‐looking non‐rigid piles of sand. In contrast to human infants, however, lemurs successfully enumerated non‐cohesive objects that broke into multiple pieces. These results are discussed in light of recent theories about object processing in human infants and adults.     

Do you see what I see? Infants’ reasoning about others’ incomplete perceptions

Twelve‐month‐olds realize that when an agent cannot see an object, her incomplete perceptions still guide her goal‐directed actions. What would happen if the agent had incomplete perceptions because she could see only one part of the object, for example one side of a screen? In the present research, 16‐month‐olds were first shown an agent who always pointed to a red object, as opposed to a black or a yellow object, suggesting that she preferred red over the other colours. Next, two screens were introduced while the agent was absent. The screens were (1) red or green on both sides; (2) red on the front (infants’ side) but green on the back (the agent’s side) or vice versa; or (3) only coloured red or green on the front. During test, the agent, who could see only the back of the screens, pointed to one of the two screens. The results revealed that while infants expected the agent to continue acting on her colour preference and point to the red rather than the green screen during test, they did so in accord with the agent’s perception of the screens, rather than their own perceptions: they expected the agent to point to the red screen in (1), but to the green‐front screen in (2), and they had no prediction of which screen the agent should point to in (3). The implications of the present findings for early psychological reasoning research are discussed.     

Seeing behind the surface: communicative demonstration boosts category disambiguation in 12‐month‐olds

In their first years, infants acquire an incredible amount of information regarding the objects present in their environment. While often it is not clear what specific information should be prioritized in encoding from the many characteristics of an object, different types of object representations facilitate different types of generalizations. We tested the hypotheses that 1‐year‐old infants distinctively represent familiar objects as exemplars of their kind, and that ostensive communication plays a role in determining kind membership for ambiguous objects. In the training phase of our experiment, infants were exposed to movies displaying an agent sorting objects from two categories (cups and plates) into two locations (left or right). Afterwards, different groups of infants saw either an ostensive or a non‐ostensive demonstration performed by the agent, revealing that a new object that looked like a plate can be transformed into a cup. A third group of infants experienced no demonstration regarding the new object. During test, infants were presented with the ambiguous object in the plate format, and we measured generalization by coding anticipatory looks to the plate or the cup side. While infants looked equally often towards the two sides when the demonstration was non‐ostensive, and more often to the plate side when there was no demonstration, they performed more anticipatory eye movements to the cup side when the demonstration was ostensive. Thus, ostensive demonstration likely highlighted the hidden dispositional properties of the target object as kind‐relevant, guiding infants’ categorization of the foldable cup as a cup, despite it looking like a plate. These results suggest that infants likely encode familiar objects as exemplars of their kind and that ostensive communication can play a crucial role in disambiguating what kind an object belongs to, even when this requires disregarding salient surface features.     

The link between infant attention to goal‐directed action and later theory of mind abilities

Various studies have shown that infants in their first year of life are able to interpret human actions as goal‐directed. It is argued that this understanding is a precondition for understanding intentional actions and attributing mental states. Moreover, some authors claim that this early action understanding is a precursor of later Theory of Mind (ToM) development. To test this, we related 6‐month‐olds’ performance in an action interpretation task to their performance in ToM tasks at the age of 4 years. Action understanding was assessed using a modified version of the Woodward‐paradigm ( Woodward, 1999 ). At the age of 4 years, the same children were tested with the German version of the ToM scale developed by Wellman and Liu (2004 ). Results revealed a correlation between infants’ decrement of attention to goal‐directed action and their ability to solve a false belief task at the age of 4 years with no modulation by language abilities. Our results indicate a link between infant attention to goal‐directed action and later theory of mind abilities.     

Child‐directed teaching and social learning at 18 months of age: evidence from Yucatec Mayan and US infants

In several previous studies, 18‐month‐old infants who were directly addressed demonstrated more robust imitative behaviors than infants who simply observed another's actions, leading theorists to suggest that child‐directed interactions carried unique informational value. However, these data came exclusively from cultural communities where direct teaching is commonplace, raising the possibility that the findings reflect regularities in infants' social experiences rather than responses to innate or a priori learning mechanisms. The current studies consider infants' imitative learning from child‐directed teaching and observed interaction in two cultural communities, a Yucatec Mayan village where infants have been described as experiencing relatively limited direct instruction (Study 1) and a US city where infants are regularly directly engaged (Study 2). Eighteen‐month‐old infants from each community participated in a within‐subjects study design where they were directly taught to use novel objects on one day and observed actors using different objects on another day. Mayan infants showed relative increases in imitative behaviors on their second visit to the lab as compared to their first visit, but there was no effect of condition. US infants showed no difference in imitative behavior in the child‐directed vs. observed conditions; however, infants who were directly addressed on their first visit showed significantly higher overall imitation rates than infants who observed on their first visit. Together, these findings call into question the idea that child‐directed teaching holds automatic or universal informational value.     

Actors and actions: The role of agent behavior in infants' attribution of goals

Twelve-month-old infants attribute goals to both familiar, human agents and unfamiliar, non-human agents. They also attribute goal-directedness to both familiar actions and unfamiliar ones. Four conditions examined information 12-month-olds use to determine which actions of an unfamiliar agent are goal-directed. Infants who witnessed the agent interact contingently with a human confederate encoded the agent's actions as goal-directed; infants who saw a human confederate model an intentional stance toward the agent without the agent's participation, did not. Infants who witnessed the agent align itself with one of two potential targets before approaching that target encoded the approach as goal-directed; infants who did not observe the self-alignment did not encode the approach as goal-directed. A possible common underpinning of these two seemingly independent sources of information is discussed.     

One‐year‐old infants use teleological representations of actions productively

Two experiments investigated whether infants represent goal‐directed actions of others in a way that allows them to draw inferences to unobserved states of affairs (such as unseen goal states or occluded obstacles). We measured looking times to assess violation of infants' expectations upon perceiving either a change in the actions of computer‐animated figures or in the context of such actions. The first experiment tested whether infants would attribute a goal to an action that they had not seen completed. The second experiment tested whether infants would infer from an observed action the presence of an occluded object that functions as an obstacle. The looking time patterns of 12‐month‐olds indicated that they were able to make both types of inferences, while 9‐month‐olds failed in both tasks. These results demonstrate that, by the end of the first year of life, infants use the principle of rational action not only for the interpretation and prediction of goal‐directed actions, but also for making productive inferences about unseen aspects of their context. We discuss the underlying mechanisms that may be involved in the developmental change from 9 to 12 months of age in the ability to infer hypothetical (unseen) states of affairs in teleological action representations.     

The origins and evolution of links between word learning and conceptual organization: new evidence from 11‐month‐olds

How do infants map words to their meaning? How do they discover that different types of words (e.g. noun, adjective) refer to different aspects of the same objects (e.g. category, property)? We have proposed that (1) infants begin with a broad expectation that novel open‐class words (both nouns and adjectives) highlight commonalities (both category‐ and property‐based) among objects, and that (2) this initial expectation is subsequently fine‐tuned through linguistic experience. We examine the first part of this proposal, asking whether 11‐month‐old infants can construe the very same set of objects (e.g. four purple animals) either as members of an object category (e.g. animals) or as embodying a salient object property (e.g. four purple things), and whether naming (with count nouns vs. adjectives) differentially influences their construals. Results support the proposal. Infants treated novel nouns and adjectives identically, mapping both types of words to both category‐ and property‐based commonalities among objects.     

Location of a missing object and detection of its absence by infants: Contribution of an eye‐tracking system to the understanding of infants' strategies

Previous research has demonstrated infants' capacity to discriminate between situations in which all the objects successively hidden behind a screen are present, or not, after the removal of the screen. Two types of interpretation have been proposed: counting capacity or object memorization capacity. In the usual paradigm, the missing object in the impossible event is usually the last object which is placed behind the screen. Following this, a third interpretation can be offered: infants' exploration is first directed to this object's location, and its presence or absence is noticed. Two experiments using Wynn's (Nature 1992; 358 :749) paradigm were performed to test the third hypothesis. The first experiment involved four objects (teddy bears) placed in four squares. Infants looked longer at the impossible event (3 objects, the last one missing) than at the possible event (4 objects) when the impossible event was presented first. No difference in looking duration was observed for the opposite order. In the second experiment, the four objects were disposed in a line and an eye‐tracking system was used. No difference in the number of looks was observed between the impossible event (3 objects, the second one missing) and the possible event (4 objects). Therefore, it appears that at least in this complex situation (4 objects used instead of 2 usually), the location of the missing object is a key factor for event discrimination. Eye‐tracking also indicated in the second experiment that infants looked less at the second location during an impossible event (object missing) than during the possible event (object present), indicating that the impossibility of the event was not a determining factor for looking durations. Altogether, the data indicate the potential usefulness of eye‐tracking analysis in this type of situation. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.