The human motor control system's response to mechanical perturbation: should it, can it, and does it ensure stability?

From among the diverse meanings of stability, the one the author adopts here is that the effects of a perturbation are opposed, and therefore small effects remain small. Except in linear systems, however, instability need not lead to unbounded motion and may actually be desirable when maneuverability is important. Moreover, properties of nerves, muscles, and tendons present serious challenges to stabilization. A review of observations from the motor control literature reveals that responses to perturbations in many common situations assist rather than resist the perturbation and are therefore presumably destabilizing. The observations encompass situations of position maintenance as well as impending or ongoing movement. The author proposes that the motor control system responds to a sudden perturbation by a pattern of muscle activity that mimics an accustomed voluntary movement, oblivious of stability considerations. What prevents runaway motion in the face of short-term instability appears to be voluntary intervention.     

Rebutting accusations: When does it work,when does it fail?

Three studies address the question of how observers react to rebuttal statements and which variables are crucial in determining observers' evaluations of the initiator of the rebuttal. The first study showed that devaluation of the initiator of the rebuttal was higher when observers were confronted with the isolated rebuttal than when observers first learned about an existing accusation and then about the corresponding rebuttal. The second study qualified this finding by revealing that the devaluating effect of an isolated rebuttal was especially pronounced if the event in question was of high impact for observers. The third study included an additional variable, namely, the credibility of the source of the accusation. The drop in devaluation from rebuttal-only to accusation + rebuttal conditions was obtained only for high impact observers when the accusation came from a noncredible source. The findings are explained within a framework of attributional and belief perseverance notions. Implications are discussed.     

The folk strike back; or,why you didn’t do it intentionally,though it was bad and you knew it

Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain.

Emotional intelligence: what is it,and do Anglican clergy have it?

The development of the term “emotional intelligence” (EI), its conceptualisation and three attempts to measure it are outlined. The Assessing Emotions Scale is used as part of a longitudinal study with Anglican clergy in England and Wales in their 14th year in ordained ministry. Clergy by their role are expected to be pastors, counsellors and visitors. Contrary to expectations, the clergy scored lower on EI than any other group reported by the authors of the Assessing Emotions Scale.     

I’m curious,I’m open to it,I test it,I trust it! A focus groups study to understand a-priori trust in automated buses

Trust is regarded as one of the main predictors for adopting automated buses (ABs). However, theories about trust (development) in technology generally vary and an in-depths study about trust in ABs specifically is still outstanding. The present study fills this gap by presenting results from focus group interviews to trust (development) in shared automated buses prior to exposure. The objectives of this study are to contrast participants’ naïve concepts of trust with theory and to identify underlying factors influencing a-priori trust in ABs. Results show that the N = 21 focus group participants use different strategies to familiarise themselves with the new technology of ABs, e.g., comparisons with familiar technologies, fundamental tendencies to approach or avoid, additional information seeking, or anthropomorphisation. These strategies largely support existing theories on trust (development) in technology. Differences between naïve interpretations of trust and its theoretical assumptions were found in focus group debates where more control over technology limited uncertainty and led to more trust. While theories suggest control and trust to be incompatible opposites, participants see control as a way to enhance trust. We provide starting points for further theory development and expansion and stress the importance of explanations in emerging technologies for trust and acceptance building.     

The capacity for music: what is it, and what's special about it?

We explore the capacity for music in terms of five questions: (1) What cognitive structures are invoked by music? (2) What are the principles that create these structures? (3) How do listeners acquire these principles? (4) What pre-existing resources make such acquisition possible? (5) Which aspects of these resources are specific to music, and which are more general? We examine these issues by looking at the major components of musical organization: rhythm (an interaction of grouping and meter), tonal organization (the structure of melody and harmony), and affect (the interaction of music with emotion). Each domain reveals a combination of cognitively general phenomena, such as gestalt grouping principles, harmonic roughness, and stream segregation, with phenomena that appear special to music and language, such as metrical organization. These are subtly interwoven with a residue of components that are devoted specifically to music, such as the structure of tonal systems and the contours of melodic tension and relaxation that depend on tonality. In the domain of affect, these components are especially tangled, involving the interaction of such varied factors as general-purpose aesthetic framing, communication of affect by tone of voice, and the musically specific way that tonal pitch contours evoke patterns of posture and gesture.     

Unification: What is it,how do we Reach and why do we Want it?

This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual harm, i.e., a state of mind we should try to avoid by all means. By calling unification an intellectual benefit, we claim that this form of understanding has an intrinsic value for us. I argue that unification really has this alleged intrinsic value. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Propositional unity: what’s the problem, who has it and who solves it?

At least since Russell’s influential discussion in The Principles of Mathematics, many philosophers have held there is a problem that they call the problem of the unity of the proposition. In a recent paper, I argued that there is no single problem that alone deserves the epithet the problem of the unity of the proposition. I there distinguished three problems or questions, each of which had some right to be called a problem regarding the unity of the proposition; and I showed how the account of propositions formulated in my book The Nature and Structure of Content [2007 Oxford University Press] solves each of these problems. In the present paper, I take up two of these problems/questions yet again. For I want to consider other accounts of propositions and compare their solutions to these problems, or lack thereof, to mine. I argue that my account provides the best solutions to the unity problems.     

Will it be me? Identity,concern and perspective

Self-reflexive or egocentric concern has been taken to present a serious problem for reductionist and eliminativist metaphysical accounts of personal identity. Philosophers have tended to respond in one of three ways: by continuing the search for a metaphysical account of identity that (prudentially if not morally) justifies egocentric concern; by accepting that egocentric concern can hold between persons who are not numerically identical; or by advocating the abandonment of egocentric concern altogether. All these approaches, however, distinguish between metaphysical ‘facts’ and affective responses to them. Exploring a well-known example from Bernard Williams, I argue that egocentric concern presents itself as irreducibly first-personal and as making its own set of numerical personal identity claims on the phenomenal level. Williams' example also points to the need to complicate the first/third person schema by factoring in a further distinction between present-tense and implicitly atemporal perspectives on the self. Once this move is made, we can see that the identity claims figured in first-person present-tense experience and those arrived at through metaphysical deliberation need to be distinguished. We should resist the temptation to privilege one perspective over the other in all instances, or to collapse them into a unitary account of selfhood.     

What is merit,that it can be transferred?

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - A concept of merit is used for spiritual accounting in many religious traditions, seemingly a substantial point of connection between religion and...     

‘I dreamt about it,just like this,exactly the way it is’: Haunting emotional geographies in Buenos Aires

This article deepens feminist scholarship on emotional geographies of fear via an engagement with haunting and memorialization in Buenos Aires, Argentina, during and after the 1976–1983 military dictatorship. I take the recuperated Space for Memory Virrey Cevallos as a case study of emotional geographies of fear to assess how fear becomes temporally and spatially fixed in the landscape. I argue that recuperation and memorialization disrupt the haunting of this emotional geography of fear, and that attention to everyday experiences of fear nuances broader discourses on justice. I develop my analysis with testimonies from neighbors of Virrey Cevallos to follow the endurance of fear leading up to the site's recuperation as a national Space for Memory. Tracing a timeline of this geography from the dictatorship to the present shows the haunting effects of fear, and asks how memorialization, as a material and temporal intervention in emotional geographies of fear, addresses the (dis)continuities of this geography. This research shows that everyday emotional geographies of fear are intertwined with the (dis)continuities of time. Further, this case study suggests that disrupting haunting requires an intervention that bridges the legacies of the past with reparative justice that attends to place.     

Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent? Well,it Depends…

Philosophia - Mereology, the theory of parts and wholes, is sometimes used as a framework for categorisation because it is regarded as ontologically innocent in the sense that the mereological...     

When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

1/f noise in human cognition: Is it ubiquitous, and what does it mean?

Researchers in psychology are paying increasing attention to temporal correlations in performance on cognitive tasks. Recently, Thornton and Gilden (2005) introduced a spectral method for analyzing psychological time series; in particular, this method is tailored to distinguish transient serial correlations from the persistent correlations characterized by 1/f noise. Thornton and Gilden applied their method to word-naming data to support the claimed ubiquity of 1/f noise in psychological time series. We argue that a previously presented method for distinguishing transient and persistent correlations (e.g., Wagenmakers, Farrell, & Ratcliff, 2004) compares favorably with the new method presented by Thornton and Gilden. We apply Thornton and Gilden’s method to time series from a range of cognitive tasks and show that 1/f noise is not a ubiquitous property of psychological time series. Finally, we assess the theoretical developments in this area and argue that the development of well-specified models of the principles or mechanisms of human cognition giving rise to 1/f noise is long overdue.     

Believing in the purpose of events—why does it occur,and is it supernatural?

What is the cognitive basis for the common belief that random events have a purpose, and are these beliefs a form of supernatural thinking, as Bering has suggested? Two questionnaire studies with Finnish volunteer participants (N = 2650, 1830 females, mean age 26) used structural equation modelling (SEM) to test the hypotheses that beliefs in the purpose of events are part of the same phenomenon as paranormal beliefs and that confusions of core knowledge of the psychological, biological and physical domains predict both sets of beliefs. In Study 1, participants were not given a definition of purpose, and in Study 2, purpose was explicitly defined as entailing planning by a supernatural agent. The results from both studies supported the predictions. The results indicate that construing events in terms of purpose is not a universal tendency but an individual cognitive bias that can be accounted for by false analogies from intuitive psychology, biology and physics. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

If it goes up, must it come down? Chronic stress and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis in humans

The notion that chronic stress fosters disease by activating the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis is featured prominently in many theories. The research linking chronic stress and HPA function is contradictory, however, with some studies reporting increased activation, and others reporting the opposite. This meta-analysis showed that much of the variability is attributable to stressor and person features. Timing is an especially critical element, as hormonal activity is elevated at stressor onset but reduces as time passes. Stressors that threaten physical integrity, involve trauma, and are uncontrollable elicit a high, flat diurnal profile of cortisol secretion. Finally, HPA activity is shaped by a person's response to the situation; it increases with subjective distress but is lower in persons with posttraumatic stress disorder.     

Is it possible to be too happy? Happiness,personality, and psychopathology

The types of relationship between happiness, personality and psychopatholgy are assessed in an available sample (n = 321, adults, both sexes). Empirical results from two happiness scales and two questionnaires, one of personality (NEO-PI-R) and other of personality disorders (Loranger's scale), do not confirm the Diener's threshold hypothesis, that makes a distinction between optimum and maximum happiness; or the Seligman's supposition, that assumes that happiness has no limits; The main results are: a) negative affect (Neuroticism) is negatively related to happiness across its full range; b) Extraversion and Openness to experience are positively related to happiness across its full range; c) in the rest of the basic personality factors, relationships are not linear, though not in the sense anticipated by Diener, and d) in personality disorders, the tendencies observed diversify according to the type of disorder, and the type of happiness factor. On most occasions, the close relationship between personality disorders and the Neuroticism dimension is verified in a consistent manner. These results are discussed within the context of clinical psychology, and the general theory about happiness.     

Does IOR occur in discrimination tasks? Yes, it does, but later

When a stimulus appears in a previously cued location several hundred milliseconds after the cue, the time required to detect that stimulus is greater than when it appears in an uncued location. This increase in detection time is known as inhibition of return (IOR). It has been suggested that IOR reflects the action of a general attentional mechanism that prevents attention from returning to previously explored loci. At the same time, the robustness of IOR has been recently disputed, given several failures to obtain the effect in tasks requiring discrimination rather than detection. In a series of eight experiments, we evaluated the differences between detection and discrimination tasks with regard to IOR. We found that IOR was consistently obtained with both tasks, although the temporal parameters required to observe IOR were different in detection and discrimination tasks. In our detection task, the effect appeared after a 400-msec delay between cue and target, and was still present after 1,300 msec. In our discrimination task, the effect appeared later and disappeared sooner. The implications of these data for theoretical accounts of IOR are discussed.