WHAT KIND OF PHILOSOPHER WAS LOCKE ON MIND AND BODY?

The wide range of conflicting interpretations that exist in regard to Locke's philosophy of mind and body (i.e. dualistic, materialist, idealistic) can be explained by the general failure of commentators to appreciate the full extent of his nominalism. Although his nominalism that focuses on specific natural kinds has been much discussed, his mind‐body nominalism remains largely neglected. This neglect, I shall argue, has given rise to the current diversity of interpretations. This paper offers a solution to this interpretative puzzle, and it attributes a view to Locke that I shall describe as nominal symmetry.     

A DEFENSE OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION: REFLECTIONS ON PETER HARRISON'S “AFTER SCIENCE AND RELIGION” PROJECT

Recent scholars have called into question the categories “science” and “religion” because they bring metaphysical and theological assumptions that theologians should find problematic. The critique of the categories “science” and “religion” has above all been associated with Peter Harrison and his influential argument in The Territories of Science and Religion (2015). This article evaluates the philosophical conclusions that Harrison draws from his antiessentialist philosophy in the two volumes associated with his “After Science and Religion Project.” I argue that Harrison's project is too skeptical toward the categories “science” and “religion” and places too much emphasis on naturalism being incompatible with Christian theology. One can accept the lessons of antiessentialism—above all, how meanings of terms shift over time—and still use the terms “science” and “religion” in responsible ways. This article defends the basic impulse of most scholars in science and religion who promote dialogue and argues for a more moderate reading of the lesson of Territories.     

WHAT IS A SCIENTIFIC WORLD VIEW,AND HOW DOES IT BEAR ON THE INTERPLAY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION?

Abstract. What is a scientific worldview, and why should we care? One worldview can knit together various notions, and therefore understanding a worldview requires analysis of its component parts. Stripped to its minimum, a scientific worldview consists strictly of falsifiable components. Such a worldview, based solely on ideas that can be tested with empirical observation, conforms to the highest levels of objectivity but is severely limited in utility. The limits arise for two reasons: first, many falsifiable ideas cannot be tested adequately until their repercussions already have been felt; second, the reach of science is limited, and ethics, which compose an inevitable part of any useful worldview, are largely unfalsifiable. Thus, a worldview that acts only on scientific components is crippled by a lack of moral relevance. Organized religion traditionally has played a central role in defining moral values, but it lost much of its influence after the discovery that key principles (such as the personal Creator of Genesis) contradict empirical reality. The apparent conundrum is that strictly scientific worldviews are amoral, while many long‐held religious worldviews have proven unscientific. The way out of this conundrum is to recognize that nonscientific ideas, as distinct from unscientific ideas, are acceptable components of a scientific worldview, because they do not contradict science. Nonscientific components of a worldview should draw upon scientific findings to explore traditional religious themes, such as faith and taboo. In contrast, unscientific ideas have been falsified and survive only via ignorance, denial, wishful thinking, blind faith, and institutional inertia. A worldview composed of both scientific components and scientifically informed nonscientific components can be both objective and ethically persuasive.     

EMERGENCE EVERYWHERE?! REFLECTIONS ON PHILIP CLAYTON'S MIND AND EMERGENCE

Abstract. Emergence is a powerful concept marked by great emotional, aesthetic, and intellectual appeal. It makes inroads into the understanding of the most diverse phenomena. Emergence appears to have the potential of explaining anything from the behavior of atoms, ant colonies, and traffic jams to insurance risks, human consciousness, and divine action. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence (2004) offers much‐needed clarification of the philosophical grounding of emergence theory. To a large extent, emergence hinges on the concept of levels and hierarchies in nature. The preferred metaphor is that of a ladder. Given the tendency of concepts like emergence to build ideology, a careful analysis of language and metaphor is called for, however. I argue that the preference for the ladder metaphor does not do justice to the differentiated relationality that is a distinct mark of emergence. This oversight may have detrimental consequences when emergence theory is transferred from natural to social and cultural processes. A hermeneutical analysis suggests that better metaphors and visualizations need to be found. As an invitation to consider alternatives, some examples of complex regular poly topes are offered.     

CAN AN UNDERSTANDING OF BASIC RESEARCH FACILITATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRACTITIONERS? REFLECTIONS AND PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES

I have written before about the importance of applied behavior analysis to basic researchers. That relationship is, however, reciprocal; it is also critical for practitioners to understand and even to participate in basic research. Although applied problems are rarely the same as those investigated in the laboratory, practitioners who understand their basic research background are often able to place their particular problem in a more general context and thereby deal with it successfully. Also the procedures of applied behavior analysis are often the same as those that characterize basic research; the scientist-practitioner will appreciate the relation between what he or she is doing and what basic experimenters do, and as a consequence, will be able to apply therapeutic techniques more creatively and effectively.     

GUILT AND THE SCIENCE OF EMOTION: HOW DOES PRAYER FIT?

This article engages sources regarding evolutionary development of guilt (Richard Joyce's The Evolution of Morality, Jesse Prinz's Gut Reactions, and others) and how they can be used to dialogue with material on the alleviation of guilt in the Christian tradition using examples in the work of Anselm of Canterbury and John Chrysostom. This raises a few key questions. If guilt is an evolutionary trait created to build reputation and relationship, how does this mesh with some theological approaches to solutions for guilt? To be more precise, guilt possibly evolved to create a motivation for beneficial communal actions, and necessitates belief in the authority of the rules that one breaks to induce it. That said, does religion play a role in awareness of one's guilt, while also providing a solution to that guilt? The possibilities are explored in this article as they relate to issues of repentance, atonement, and prayer.     

HOW SHOULD THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION BE WRITTEN? SOME REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE DISCIPLINE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THERECEPTION OF OUR WORK

How should history of education be written? To put the question is far more easier than to provide a concrete answer. In contemporary research, there continue to be pedagogistic complaints about finding answers to present-day educational problems via history. In our view, such an ahistorical utilitarianism as well as the legitimizing and/or mythologizing belief in a particular pedagogical system, in which the history of this field is so rich since the institutionalization of the discipline at the end of the nineteenth century, should be avoided at all costs. But the danger of presentism lurks around the corner as a sine qua non condition in any form of historical research. As can be found out via the comments on our own work, much of the criticism goes back to old conceptions of the discipline, conceived as “historical pedagogy” rather than as history of education. Apparently, in the field of pedagogy people are still convinced that the history of education, even if it does not provide edifying examples and useful lessons, must in any case have a training value for professionals – which in the light of modern, advanced research is rather a difficult idea to defend.     

HOW SHOULD WE BEHAVE? A REVIEW OF REASONS AND PERSONS BY DEREK PARFIT

In this book Parfit attempts to develop a rational, non-religious ethics. Instead of asking, “What does God tell us to do?” he asks, “What does reason tell us to do?” Given a set of simple assumptions, he considers whether it is possible to be consistently selfish or consistently good. Analyses of personal dilemmas (problems of self-control) and moral dilemmas (problems of social cooperation) show that neither consistent selfishness nor consistent goodness is logically possible. Instead, a fine balance must be maintained between, on the one hand, our immediate versus long-term good and, on the other, our own good versus that of other people. Ultimately Parfit fails to develop a formula by which such a balance may be struck. Parfit''s analysis is consistent with behavioral analysis in its reductionistic view of the self and the parallel it draws between relations with other people and relations with oneself at other times. Parfit''s analysis is inconsistent with behaviorism in its view of the mind as internal, available to introspection, and able to cause behavior. His nonfunctional mentalism leads Parfit to inconsistencies and blocks the path to a consistent ethics. Teleological behaviorism''s view of the mind in terms of patterns of overt behavior is not hampered by these inconsistencies and may lead to a functional rather than purely rational ethics.     

REFLECTIONS ON JANET ZUCKERMAN AND LISA HORELICK’S “THE AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF THE ANALYST IN THE EXTRA-ANALYTIC MOMENT”

A review and amplification of the article by authors Horelick and Zuckerman regarding the clinical phenomena of encountering patients (analysands) outside of the physical boundaries of the consultation room. Their clinical examples and the literature used to buttress their position and in particular the open disclosure of the deeply personal reactions they experienced are examined and used as launching points for further understanding. Ferenczi, Balint, Freud and other luminaries are incorporated into the topic of extra-analytic encounter, in an attempt to further demystify this inevitable and unplanned moment of disclosure, which, much like resistance and countertransference offer more opportunity than obstacle.     

EFFECTS OF MORPHINE ON TEMPORAL DISCRIMINATION AND COLOR MATCHING: GENERAL DISRUPTION OF STIMULUS CONTROL OR SELECTIVE EFFECTS ON TIMING?

Discrepant effects of drugs on behavior maintained by temporal-discrimination procedures make conclusive statements about the neuropharmacological bases of timing difficult. The current experiment examined the possible contribution of a general, drug-induced disruption of stimulus control. Four pigeons responded on a three-component multiple schedule that included a fixed-interval 2-min, temporal discrimination, and color-matching component. Under control conditions, response rates and choice responses during the first two components showed evidence of control by time, and accuracy for color matching was high in the third component. Morphine administration flattened the distribution of fixed-interval responding and produced a general disruption of accuracy in the temporal-discrimination component, whereas accuracy in the color-matching component was relatively unaffected. Analysis of the psychophysical functions from the temporal-discrimination component indicated that morphine decreased accuracy of temporal discrimination by decreasing overall stimulus control, rather than by selectively affecting timing. These results suggest the importance of determining the neurophysiological bases of stimulus control as it relates to temporal discrimination.     

MEASUREMENT ERROR IN RESEARCH ON HUMAN RESOURCES and FIRM PERFORMANCE: HOW MUCH ERROR IS THERE AND HOW DOES IT INFLUENCE EFFECT SIZE ESTIMATES?

Studies of the relationship between human resource (HR) practices and firm performance typically use a single respondent to assess firm level HR practices or HR effectiveness. However, previous research in other substantive areas suggests that rater differences are a potentially important source of measurement error. We demonstrate analytically the potential consequences of both random and systematic measurement error in research on HR and firm performance. However, our main focus is on random error and we show how generalizability theory can be applied to obtain better estimates of reliability by simultaneously recognizing multiple sources (e.g., items, raters) of random measurement error. These more inclusive reliability estimates, in turn, offer the possibility of more precisely quantifying substantive relationships in the HR and firm performance literature. In our sample, reliabilities (as estimated by generalizability coefficients) for single-rater assessments of HR variables were generally below .50. This degree of measurement error, if present in substantive studies on HR and firm performance, could lead to considerable bias, given that an unstandardized regression coefficient is corrected for measurement error in the independent variable by dividing by its reliability coefficient (not its square root). We also found only limited convergent validity between HR and line managers ratings of a second type of HR measure, HR effectiveness. In general, our findings suggest that future researchers need to devote greater attention to measurement error and construct validity issues. Our study provides an example of how generalizability theory can be useful in this pursuit.