When family considerations influence work decisions: Decision-making processes

The work–family literature has provided an abundance of evidence that various family factors are linked to various work decisions, suggesting that the “family-relatedness” of work decisions is a prevalent phenomenon (Greenhaus & Powell, 2012). However, the cognitive processes by which such linkages occur have received little attention. We offer a framework by which to examine individuals' decision-making processes when they take family considerations into account in their work decisions. The framework suggests stages through which individuals proceed when making a work decision that takes family considerations into account and cognitive processes that influence how they proceed through each stage.     

The family-relatedness of work decisions: A framework and agenda for theory and research

Due to global trends such as the increased labor force participation of women, the growing presence of dual-earner couples and single parents in the labor force, and changing values regarding the importance of life balance, individuals' work decisions are being increasingly influenced by family considerations. However, the “family-relatedness” of work decisions, or the extent to which family situations are considered in these decisions, has not been systematically examined. We propose a framework to examine the family-relatedness of work decisions and a broad agenda for future theory and research to test and extend the framework.     

The psychological construal of health behaviors

IntroductionIn order to optimize the effectiveness of behavior change interventions, we need to understand how the construal level – how we mentally represent or construe events or behaviors – influences health-related choices.ObjectiveTo examine the impact of mental construal on health decisions. Based on the Construal Level Theory, we predicted that people would give more weight to “cognitive considerations” when making a choice after being primed with the high-level perspective, whereas they would give higher weights to “sensory considerations” after being primed with the low-level perspective.MethodIn the first experiment, ninety-nine participants were primed with either high-level or low-level perspective across decision scenarios about vaccination and physical safety. The second experiment investigated nutrition decisions, which asked seventy participants to taste food that either had no label or was labelled “organic”. Organic label should prime high-level construal as it implies outcomes (e.g., product quality and healthiness) that are more distant in time and uncertain, in contrast with sensory dimensions (e.g. taste and appearance), which are immediately present. Participants rated cognitive and sensory considerations as well as action intentions.ResultsThe first study revealed that after the priming with the high-level construal, cognitive considerations became more important than sensory considerations in predicting protective action intentions, whereas after priming with the low-level construal, sensory considerations became more important. The second study revealed that only sensory considerations predicted decisions to consume the non-labelled product and only the cognitive score predicted decisions to consume the organic-labelled product.ConclusionWe demonstrated a moderating effect of construal-level mindset in health-protective decisions. We also discuss the implications for health promotion and policy, such as optimizing the effectiveness of behavior change interventions.     

"Leaky" Rationality: How Research on Behavioral Decision Making Challenges Normative Standards of Rationality

ABSTRACT— For more than 30 years, decision-making research has documented that people often violate various principles of rationality, some of which are so fundamental that theorists of rationality rarely bother to state them. We take these characteristics of decision making as a given but argue that it is problematic to conclude that they typically represent departures from rationality. The very psychological processes that lead to "irrational" decisions (e.g., framing, mental accounting) continue to exert their influence when one experiences the results of the decisions. That is, psychological processes that affect decisions may be said also to "leak" into one's experience. The implication is that formal principles of rationality do not provide a good enough normative standard against which to assess decision making. Instead, what is needed is a substantive theory of rationality—one that takes subjective experience seriously, considers both direct and indirect consequences of particular decisions, considers how particular decisions fit into life as a whole, and considers the effects of decisions on others. Formal principles may play a role as approximations of the substantive theory that can be used by theorists and decision makers in cases in which the formal principles can capture most of the relevant considerations and leakage into experience is negligible.     

Emotional Engineers: Toward Morally Responsible Design

Engineers are normally seen as the archetype of people who make decisions in a rational and quantitative way. However, technological design is not value neutral. The way a technology is designed determines its possibilities, which can, for better or for worse, have consequences for human wellbeing. This leads various scholars to the claim that engineers should explicitly take into account ethical considerations. They are at the cradle of new technological developments and can thereby influence the possible risks and benefits more directly than anybody else. I have argued elsewhere that emotions are an indispensable source of ethical insight into ethical aspects of risk. In this paper I will argue that this means that engineers should also include emotional reflection into their work. This requires a new understanding of the competencies of engineers: they should not be unemotional calculators; quite the opposite, they should work to cultivate their moral emotions and sensitivity, in order to be engaged in morally responsible engineering.     

Dependent Companions

My primary concern will be to cast light upon the relation between animal guardians ('pet owners') and pets as a deep relation. I will proceed with a degree of indirectness by explaining why animal guardians can have an epistemically-privileged position when it comes to end-of-life decisions concerning pets. My contention is that they are best placed to grasp the relevant narrative considerations upon which end-of-life deliberation in marginal cases ought to depend. Such narrative-appreciation is built into the practice of treating animals as pets. By virtue of having such a narrative appreciation, animal guardians can be best placed to grasp the life-role of pain and suffering.     

Explanatory pluralism in cognitive science

This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that "framework debate" in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science.     

Input integration and input weighting in decisions on allocations of gains and losses

Although the concept of relevance (or weight) of inputs plays a central role in equity theory, it has not been clearly defined. The present investigation attempts to answer the question of when, and which, inputs are taken into account in allocation decisions. Subjects were given a stimulus story in which two fictitious persons had, through joint work, produced a monetary gain or loss; further, information was provided on the relative effort (amount of time worked intensively) and /or ability (as determined by a test) that each stimulus person had contributed. Subjects were asked how they would allocate the gain or loss. Empirical evidence for the following three codeterminants of allocation decisions was obtained: (1) the type of input—personal and behavioural characteristics are [relevant] for allocation if they are perceived as (a) causallv important for outcome production, (b) variable, and (c) under the person's volitional control; (2) the type of outcome to be allocated—more equal allocations are observed when loss as opposed to gain must be allocated; and (3) the constellation of individual inputs on given dimensions—information is given on several input dimensions, a dimension which should be [irrelevant] according to criteria (a), (b), and (c) does codetermine allocations when recipients have contributed equally with respect to this dimension. The latter finding is discussed from the perspective of [cognitive algebra].     

The psychology of memory,extended cognition,and socially distributed remembering

This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, by which neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agree with it completely: but they describe it as “a non-revolutionary approach” which leaves “the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.” In response, we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny’s account of the “scaffolded mind” (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technological and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more “revolutionary” metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with a more principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.     

Using an Emotion Regulation Framework to Understand the Role of Temperament and Family Processes in Risk for Adolescent Depressive Disorders

Although recent evidence implicates the importance of the family for understanding depressive disorders during adolescence, we still lack a coherent framework for understanding the way in which the myriad of developmental changes occurring within early adolescents and their family environments actually operate to increase adolescents’ vulnerability to, or to protect them from, the development of depressive disorders. In this review we propose a framework that places the mechanisms and processes of emotion regulation at the centre of these questions. We argue that emotion regulation can provide an organising rubric under which the role of various factors, such as adolescent and parent temperament and emotion regulation, and parental socialization of child emotion, as well as the interaction amongst these factors, can be understood to account for the role of the family in adolescents’ risk for depression. In particular, we posit that adolescent emotion regulation functions as a mechanism through which temperament and family processes interact to increase vulnerability to developing depression.     

A Multistage,Multiprocess Analysis of Consumer Judgment: A Selective Review and Conceptual Framework

Although numerous dual‐process models have been brought to bear on the cognitive operations that underlie consumer judgment, they are typically limited in their ability to capture the processes that occur at different stages of cognitive activity and to specify how these processes interface. In many (if not most) cases, a mix of both automatic and controlled processes underlies judgments and decisions. We suggest a theoretical framework that potentially provides an integration of these processes and review representative research and theory that might be conceptualized in terms of this framework.     

Conflict detection during moral decision-making: evidence for deontic reasoners’ utilitarian sensitivity

Moral dilemmas often force us to decide between deontological (harming others is wrong) and utilitarian (harming others can be acceptable depending on the consequences) considerations. Cognitive scientists have shown that utilitarian responders typically engage demanding deliberate thinking to override a conflicting intuitive deontological response. A key question is whether deontic responders also take utilitarian considerations into account and detect that there are conflicting responses at play. The present study addressed this issue by contrasting people's processing of moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions. Results showed that deontic responders were slower and less confident about their decision when solving the conflict (vs. no-conflict) dilemmas. This suggests that they are considering both deontic and utilitarian aspects of their decision and indicates that a deontic decision is more informed and less oblivious than it might appear.     

The Impact of Depression on Self–Other Discrepancies in Decision Making

Although there is a small but growing body of literature on how people make risky decisions for others and predict others' decisions, results seem to be contradictory. The authors contribute to the understanding of these mixed results by investigating how depression affects self–other discrepancies in decision making and the psychological processes that underlie these discrepancies. In an experiment, depressed and nondepressed individuals read a series of scenarios involving decisions about health, money, and interpersonal relationships. They then indicated which of two options they would choose for themselves or for another person, or predicted which option this person would choose for himself or herself. Finally, participants reported benefits and drawbacks of the decisions (i.e., cognitions) and feelings about risk. Depressed individuals were less prone to bias when they predicted others' decisions than nondepressed individuals. Feelings about risk played a key role in determining the direction and the magnitude of this bias. In contrast, both depressed and nondepressed individuals showed bias when they made decisions for others. This bias affected their decisions in opposing ways and was determined by cognitions. This bias is consistent with literature showing that depression is associated with an increased sensitivity to social risks. The authors provide a theoretical explanation of self–other discrepancies in decision making in depressed and nondepressed individuals and conclude that the results support the assumption that depression is associated with psychological processes whose role is to increase sensitivity to social threats rather than with a more general negative bias in cognitive functioning. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowing when to move on: cognitive and perceptual decisions in time

We investigated people's ability to decide how much time to spend on the task at hand. To make such decisions well, one must take into account, among other things, the cost of failing and how one's task performance changes as a function of time. We first investigated timing decisions when the underlying task was perceptual. Decisions were highly efficient and suggested that people can make good use of perceptual knowledge and abstract reward information. Previous studies have found that perceptual decisions are generally optimal, but that cognitive decisions are generally suboptimal--a perception-cognition gap. Does a similar gap exist for timing decisions? We compared timing decisions for a perceptual task with timing decisions for more cognitive tasks. Performance was highly similar across the tasks, which suggests that knowledge can be acquired, and used to make timing decisions, in an equally efficient way regardless of whether that knowledge is derived through perceptual or cognitive experience.     

“Not a Source but a Re-source”: The Ethics of Reading, Teaching, and Interpreting Beyond the Boundaries

Critical interest in Aboriginal and other non-mainstream works challenges established notions of literariness and canonicity, spilling over into the classroom and curriculum development, where instructors of various disciplines must make decisions about what they will teach, and how and why they will teach it. The ramifications of such decisions are multifaceted and often compounded by fear, raising concerns regarding the scope and the ways in which teachers or post-secondary instructors are accountable for the ethical treatment of texts by so-called minority writers and to the broadening demographic of students. Teachers/instructors must themselves construct an ethical framework for inclusion of texts for study, and often do so with only tenuous support. For example, what are the rights of educators to engage with texts that fall outside of their cultural experience? If instructors are not exempt from the ethical considerations facing researchers, how do they become accountable without excluding or appropriating contentious materials in the scope of their work? Liberatory pedagogical practices in the classroom provide the backdrop against which an ethics of inclusion can develop and consequently inform the development of curricula and the creation of syllabi, as well as the facilitation of classroom dynamics in an atmosphere of cultural richness and diversity.     

Frames and brains: elicitation and control of response tendencies

Using magnetic resonance imaging, De Martino and colleagues investigated the neural signature that is associated with decisions between small sure amounts of money and large riskier amounts when the framing of the outcomes is varied. We interpret their results within a dual-system framework, in which different frames evoke distinct emotional responses that different individuals can suppress to various degrees. The study advances the integration of brain imaging results into cognitive theory.     

Linking work conditions to unpleasant affect: Cognition,categorization and goals

Current approaches to work stress do not address in detail the mental processes by which work events cause unpleasant affect. We propose a cognitive account that incorporates: (1) the distinction between controlled and automatic information processing; (2) the categorization of emotionally relevant stimuli; (3) the role of mental models in coping choice; (4) the enactment of beneficial job conditions through coping; and (5) reciprocal influences between cognition and affect. We conclude by discussing how this account can help explain a range of findings in the work stress literature and how a cognitive approach to work stress informs practice.     

A hierarchical bayesian model of human decision-making on an optimal stopping problem

We consider human performance on an optimal stopping problem where people are presented with a list of numbers independently chosen from a uniform distribution. People are told how many numbers are in the list, and how they were chosen. People are then shown the numbers one at a time, and are instructed to choose the maximum, subject to the constraint that they must choose a number at the time it is presented, and any choice below the maximum is incorrect. We present empirical evidence that suggests people use threshold-based models to make decisions, choosing the first currently maximal number that exceeds a fixed threshold for that position in the list. We then develop a hierarchical generative account of this model family, and use Bayesian methods to learn about the parameters of the generative process, making inferences about the threshold decision models people use. We discuss the interesting aspects of human performance on the task, including the lack of learning, and the presence of large individual differences, and consider the possibility of extending the modeling framework to account for individual differences. We also use the modeling results to discuss the merits of hierarchical, generative and Bayesian models of cognitive processes more generally.     

贫富阶层刻板印象对源记忆的影响

源检测框架下,在记忆的提取阶段激活刻板印象会导致错误记忆,通过激活贫富刻板印象,考察对源检测记忆的影响,结果发现被试表现出刻板印象一致的错误记忆,通过多项式加工树模型的分析发现,被试在来源判断时利用刻板印象知识表现出猜测反应.