On <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Social Construction of Reality</Emphasis>: Reflections on a Missed Opportunity

The paper recalls my response to Berger’s and Luckmann’s book on reading it shortly after its initial publication. It seeks to convey why it was that I failed to make use of the book at that time, even though I recognised it as an outstanding contribution to my intended field of research, and how later I came to see that this may have been a lost opportunity. The story touches upon diverse important issues including the relationship between epistemology and the sociology of knowledge; the epistemic authority of the natural sciences; the relevance of causal accounting as topic and resource in sociology; the importance of Durkheim in the sociology of knowledge; and the great value of Berger’s and Luckmann’s book as a corrective to the undue individualism that has long been a feature of the social sciences in the English-speaking world. Even so, the paper is more recollection than analysis, and unreliable recollection at that, after many decades in which there has been time to forget, or even to reconstruct, a very great deal.     

A reanalysis of the influence of a "friendly visitor" program

A paper in the American Journal of Community Psychology (AJCP), by Reinke, Holmes, and myself, reported the results of a study of the influence of a friendly visitor program on the cognitive functioning and morale of elderly individuals. The program was reported to have had a significant multivariate effect on a combination of cognitive and morale measures and significant univariate effects on memory, self-perceived health, and activity director's ratings. Being intrigued by the memory finding, I conducted a follow-up study to further investigate the effect of a visitation program on cognitive functioning. In this second study the dependent measures included all of the cognitive variables included in the original study as well as some additional memory variables. The visitation program in the follow-up study had no effect on any of these measures. As a result of my failure to obtain a significant memory effect such as that reported in Reinke et al. (1981), I reanalyzed the data from the original study. In my reanalysis, the only significant effect was a borderline univariate effect for self-perceived health; the multivariate effect did not approach significance. On the basis of my inability to produce the results reported in Reinke et al. when I reanalyzed the original data, I must conclude that the friendly visitor program did not have the effects attributed to it in the original report.     

Breathing Together: Reply to Harris and Shaw

These two very different but complementary discussions address two different “registers” of my thinking in my paper on patients who “live in airless intrapsychic worlds.” Harris is most interested in the meta-theoretical and historical contexts and frames of my theory and clinical approach, viewing my contribution as an example of various broad trends in contemporary relational psychoanalytic thought. Shaw, by contrast, engages with my particular insights and clinical/theoretical framework for understanding and working with patients whose struggles very much resemble and overlap with the struggles of the adult children of “traumatically narcissistic” parents, which his seminal work has focused on. In my Replies I voice my appreciation of each of their unique perspectives on my ideas, and engage with each of them regarding certain differences in our theoretical and clinical sensibilities.     

Naturalism Need Not Be "Made Safe": A Response to William Rottschaefer's Misunderstandings

In this article, I respond to William Rottschaefer's analysis of my writings on religion and science, especially my Religion, Science and Naturalism (1996). I show that I am not trying "to make naturalism safe," as Rottschaefer contends, but rather attempting to explore options available when one endorses naturalistic approaches. I also explain why I object to the label "supernaturalistic naturalism" used by Rottschaefer. Possible limitations to naturalistic projects are discussed, not as limitations imposed but rather as features uncovered.     

Epistemic issues in the free will debate: can we know when we are free?

In this paper, I argue that the views of Robert Kane on the one hand and John Fischer and Mark Ravizza on the other both lead to the following conclusion: we should have very low confidence in our ability to judge that someone is acting freely or in a way for which they can be held responsible. This in turn means, I claim, that these views, in practice, collapse into a sort of hard incompatibilist position, or the position of a free will denier. That would at least be an unintended consequence, and it might be regarded as a virtual reductio. Versions of the objection could likely be made against a number of other accounts of free will, but I will limit my focus to Kane and Fischer. Along the way, by way of response to some possible objections to my argument, I make some comments about epistemic closure principles.     

NONDOMINATION AND NORMATIVITY

Abstract:  In an earlier paper, "The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy," I argued that in an important class of cases, republican political theory, as formulated by Philip Pettit, does not have determinate implications for policy. Pettit has replied that my argument was based on a conception of freedom as nondomination that is not his own. In the present paper, I explore the two ways of understanding republican freedom. I first suggest that they may not, in the end, be very different. I then note that if a sharp difference is restored, my conception may have some desirable features.     

Geometry, intuition and experience: From kant to husserl

I take this opportunity to thank my colleagues at ZiF for their very helpful comments and criticisms during the academic year. For the preparation of this paper, I am especially indepted to Michael Hallett, who not only improved my English but also saved me from a number of errors.     

Thinking Morality Interpersonally: A Reply to Burgess-Jackson

In a comment on my paper “Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory” ( Walker 1992 ), Keith Burgess-Jackson argues that I have misdiagnosed the problem with modem moral theory. Burgess-Jackson misunderstands both the illustrative—“theoretical-juridical”—model I constructed there and how my critique and alternative model answer to specifically feminist concerns. Ironically, his own view seems to reproduce the very conception of morality as an individually internalized action-guiding code of principles that my earlier essay argued is the conception central to modern moral theories.     

Hybrid Identifications,Mixed Feelings: Reply to Commentaries

In responding to the insightful papers of Suchet and White I explore further my own hybrid identifications in regard to the socially constructed category of race. The paper explores the dangers of both idealization and denigration of otherness. It shows how a traumatic confrontation with otherness may destabilize later identifications in favor of earlier more archaic ones. Melanie Suchet, in her very gracious response to my paper, comments that I refuse to “reside in the comfortable.” However, any wish I may have had to reside in the comfortable was derailed by the thought-provoking comments of both Melanie Suchet and Cleonie White. Both authors prompted me to confront myself and to examine a number of painful issues. These included not only a resistance to owning my own vicarious traumatization but the fact that I was subject to the return of the repressed as the personal meanings of the signifier black shifted and changed in the course of my paper. But most significantly, both authors confronted me with the challenge of Otherness.     

How Being Female Influenced My Professional Experiences and Growth

In this paper I describe some of my professional experiences as a female, both as a graduate student and throughout my career. My own experience was unique because I began graduate school a few months after arriving in the U.S. with limited knowledge of English in a very competitive and demanding program , in addition to the fact that I was a faculty wife in that department.     

In the Pursuit of Absence: Reimagining Early Loss within the Psychotherapy Relationship

In this paper I examine absence—absence as an internal relationship, absence as an enactment, absences characteristic of psychotherapy, absence as a theory, and absence as something people do to each other, including patients, therapists, families, and societies. To illustrate these ideas, I discuss my work with Gemma. When absence enters our relationship in a very present way, the powerful emotions that absence eludes come alive for us. Forced to confront my own absences, I begin doing a better job of holding her in mind, which ultimately helps her to hold me in mind and make better use of me.     

Man on Wire: Walking the Therapeutically Transformative Tightrope of the Analyst’s Cancer

Almost nothing was clear to me when I was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. I knew that I intended to inform all of my patients about my illness. But how could the focus remain on their needs when my mortality was so at risk? Unexpectedly, I discovered that I coped with my fears most effectively in my office. It was the one place where I could maintain a grasp on a holistic sense of myself and hold conflicting intense emotions. Additionally striking was the corresponding capacity of my patients to remain in treatment while addressing the unpredictable dyadic changes generated by my sickness. In this paper, I address this point of intersubjective transformation—the interactive contributions that generated each treatment’s unique rhythm. I also discuss the temporality of illness and how my continuing reconfigurations of self-experience impacted my ability to maintain authenticity and analytic balance both during and after treatment.     

On Kant's Conception of Inner Sense: Self‐Affection by the Understanding

Among the extensive literature on the first Critique, very few commentators offer a thorough analysis of Kant's conception of inner sense. This is quite surprising since the notion is central to Kant's theoretical philosophy, and it is very difficult to provide a consistent interpretation of this notion. In this paper, I first summarize Kant's claims about inner sense in the Transcendental Aesthetic and show why existing interpretations have been unable to dissolve the tensions arising from the conjunction of these claims. Secondly, I present my own reconstruction of Kant's model of inner sense, relying essentially on Kantian considerations found in the B‐version of the Transcendental Deduction. My main idea is that inner sense, for Kant, is a passive faculty that gets affected by the understanding performing its figurative synthesis on material given in outer sense. In the remainder of the paper, I highlight a few consequences of my interpretation and outline ways to deal with some objections.     

Creativity,Spontaneity, Impasse,and Leaps of Faith: Reply to Commentaries

In my reply to the commentaries, I address several points of convergence with and divergence from Drs. Danielle Knafo and Philip A. Ringstrom. I clarify my view that while shame can drive the creative process, the thrust of my paper is about ways in which shame can close down access to one's creative potential, as well as creating obstacles to vitality and intimacy in relationships. I expand on how it was indeed a visceral, embodied sense of my own shame which served as an “informant,” as Ringstrom suggests, of Julia's chronic experience of shame, opening a door to our exploration of the repetitive enactments between us. Grounding my understanding of therapeutic action and enactments in a relational perspective, I describe how I view enactments as inevitable and co-created, and reflecting on them collaboratively as a potentially useful opportunity in analytic work. I resonate with Ringstrom and Knafo's belief in the creativity inherent in the psychoanalytic process, and the importance of spontaneity and risk taking, particularly in negotiating impasses in treatment. Finally, I describe Julia's poetic reflections upon reading the paper.     

My Enfant Terrible is Twenty: A Discussion of Slavin's and Gentile's Retrospective Reconsideration of “Love in the Afternoon”

The following is a response to papers by Jonathan H. Slavin, Ph.D., ABPP, and Jill Gentile, Ph.D., which both discuss my 1994 paper “Love in the Afternoon: A Relational Reconsideration of Desire and Dread in the Countertransference,” almost twenty years after its original publication in Psychoanalytic Dialogues. I begin with some retrospective thoughts of my own about this controversial paper, and then respond to interpretations of the paper offered by Slavin and Gentile. I conclude with my own thoughts about their original ideas and elaborations on the subject of erotic countertransference.     

Blessed are the uncertain,for they will experience excess

In this paper I look at the possibility that uncertainty may not merely be a stage in the research process, but an outcome in itself. Exploring how university education and scholarship collided with my own personal experiences and identity I discuss how a combination of poststructural theory and my encounters with peace, conflict and religion enabled me to value uncertainty, and I make the case that uncertainty can open up the future to the gift of chance. By intertwining discussions of both lived experience and academic work, the organisation of the paper reflects how the two became inextricably linked, continuously folding into each other, so that my sense of self influenced my research, and conversely, my research influenced my sense of self. The outcome is a discussion of how I incorporated uncertainty into my research and personal life, which I explore using the example of religion, and how I lost and gained my faith, rejecting my previous Christianity while reconstructing a kind of faith found in uncertainty, a sense of place and ethical space to come.     

The irrelevance of folk intuitions to the "hard problem" of consciousness

Recently, a number of philosophers have turned to folk intuitions about mental states for data about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I argue that current research along these lines does not tell us about these subjects. I focus on a series of studies, performed by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery, to make my argument. Folk judgments studied by these researchers are mostly likely generated by a certain cognitive system - System One - that will generate the same data whether or not we experience phenomenal consciousness. This is a problem for a range of current experimental philosophy research into consciousness or our concept of it. If experimental philosophy is to shed light into phenomenal consciousness, it needs to be better founded in an understanding of how we make judgments.