A Stage Is a Stage Is a Stage: A Direct Comparison of Two Scoring Systems

L. Kohlberg (1969) argued that his moral stages captured a developmental sequence specific to the moral domain. To explore that contention, the author compared stage assignments obtained with the Standard Issue Scoring System (A. Colby & L. Kohlberg, 1987a, 1987b) and those obtained with a generalized content-independent stage-scoring system called the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System (T. L. Dawson, 2002a), on 637 moral judgment interviews (participants' ages ranged from 5 to 86 years). The correlation between stage scores produced with the 2 systems was .88. Although standard issue scoring and hierarchical complexity scoring often awarded different scores up to Kohlberg's Moral Stage 2/3, from his Moral Stage 3 onward, scores awarded with the two systems predominantly agreed. The author explores the implications for developmental research.     

Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

Domain-general and domain-specific developmental assessments: do they measure the same thing?

The concept of epistemological development is useful in psychological assessment only insofar as instruments can be designed to measure it consistently, reliably, and without bias. In the psychosocial domain, most traditional stage assessment systems rely on a process of matching concepts in a scoring manual generated from a limited number of construction cases, and thus suffer from bias introduced by an over-dependence on particular content. In contrast, the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System (HCSS) employs criteria for assessing the hierarchical complexity of texts that are independent of specific conceptual content. This paper examines whether the HCSS and a conventional stage assessment system, Kohlberg’s Standard Issue Scoring System (SISS), measure the same dimension of performance. We scored 378 moral judgment interviews with both scoring systems. We then conducted a multidimensional partial credit analysis to determine the extent to which the two scoring systems assess the same dimension of performance. The disattenuated correlation between performance estimates on the SISS and HCSS is .92. Based on this and other evidence, we conclude that a single latent trait — hierarchical complexity — is the predominant dimension assessed by the two systems.     

Structural flexibility of moral judgment.

One of the central assumptions of Kohlberg's theory of moral development--that moral judgment is organized in structures of the whole--was examined. Thirty men and 30 women were given 2 dilemmas from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, a 3rd involving prosocial behavior, and a 4th involving impaired driving. Half the Ss responded to the prosocial and impaired-driving dilemmas from the perspective of a hypothetical character, and half responded from the perspective of the self. No sex or perspective differences in moral maturity were observed. Ss scored highest in moral maturity on Kohlberg's dilemmas, intermediate on the prosocial dilemma, and lowest on the impaired-driving dilemma. In partial support of Kohlberg's contention that his test assesses moral competence, there was a negative linear relationship between scores on his test and the proportion of Stage 2 judgments on the 2 other dilemmas. An interactional model of moral judgment is advanced.     

Assessing Intellectual Development: Three Approaches, One Sequence

In this paper, I compare three developmental assessment systems, employed to score a set of 152 interviews of engineering students: the Perry Scoring System (W. G. Perry, 1970), the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System (T. L. Dawson, 2004, 1/31/03), and the Lexical Abstraction Assessment System (LAAS; T. L. Dawson & M. Wilson, in press). Overall, the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System and Perry Scoring System agree with one another within the parameters of interrater agreement commonly reported for either one of the systems, and the Perry system and the LAAS agree with one another about as well as the LAAS and the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System, upon which the LAAS is based.     

Moral Judgment Research and the Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education

Describing Kohlberg's interview test and his own Defining Issues Test (DIT), Rest assures us that we now have usable, reliable ways of assessing an individual's moral judgment development level. There is evidence for accepting a developmental sequence in moral judgment, from low stage thinking to higher stage thinking. Rest reviews the evidence for three aspects of morality as part of the cognitive domain, although numerous other factors beyond moral judgment influence concrete behavior. The author offers impressions about educational interventions. Moral judgment theory is considered the current best choice for “theoretical richness, practical implications, validated findings.”     

Hypnotic age regression and moral reasoning

Moral reasoning was assessed with two dilemmas from the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (1976) in 7 adults who were hypnotically age regressed to four ages: 15, 12, 9, and 6 years. Seven adults in a control group under task-motivation instructions were age regressed to the same ages and administered the dilemmas. Age-regressed moral maturity scores for both groups were compared to pretest scores, to data for actual 15-, 12-, 9-, and 6-year-olds from other studies, and to each other. Both groups were able to lower their moral reasoning scores when given age-regression instructions; however, hypnosis subjects not only scored lower than task-motivation subjects but also more closely resembled the levels of reasoning used by children at these ages. The results provide some support for a distinction between age regression through hypnosis and age regression through task-motivation instructions.     

An evolutionary perspective on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development

The purpose of this research was to test the proposition that moral development and social evolution have progressed together, each enabling the other. Stage 1 and Stage 2 reasons for behaving morally are to avoid punishment and achieve rewards. Since moral behavior at these stages is externally determined they do not form a basis for cooperative living. Stage 3 morality involves the reasoning that people are obligated to care for their family and friends; this would appear to be the morality of hunter and gatherer societies. Stage 4 morality involves the reasoning that people must obey authority in the form of traditional norms, written laws, and the legal system; this would appear to be the morality of nation states. Stage 5 morality involves the reasoning that people should obey democratically created rules which presumably create the greatest good for the greatest number and Stage 6 morality involves the reasoning that people should follow universal ethical principles like justice. These moralities would appear to be the morality of international social organizations. To test the hypothesis that moral development and social evolution progressed together, the Measures of Moral Reasoning Scale was created, consisting of six scales measuring Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning. As a measure of social evolution (i.e., inclusion), participants were asked how many of their resources they intended to invest in the following targets over their lifetimes: self, biological children, mate, biological parents, biological siblings, friends (but not relatives), American strangers, and non-American strangers. Supporting the hypothesis, Stage 1 and 2 measures correlated with the intent to invest in the self but not others; the Stage 3 measure correlated with the intent to invest in the participant’s children, mate, parents, siblings, and friends (a hunter-gatherer social organization); the Stage 4 measure correlated with investment in all of the above targets except self and non-American strangers (a nationalistic social organization); the Stage 5 measure correlated with investment in children, mate, parents, and American strangers (a nationalistic social organization), and the Stage 6 measure correlated with investment in all of the targets except self (a global social organization).

     

Gibbs on Kohlberg on Dewey: An essay review of John C. Gibbs's Moral Development and Reality

According to Daniel Lapsley in his foreword to John Gibbs's Moral Development and Reality: Beyond the Theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman (2003 Gibbs, J. 2003. Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), “Professor Gibbs argues that Kohlberg's stage theory fails largely because his best Piagetian insights were corrupted by his fascination with Dewey's writings on internalization and group conformity.” According to Gibbs, continues Lapsley, Kohlberg's “formulation of the preconventional, conventional, and postconventional typology can be traced to Dewey.” Lapsley observes that “to call Kohlberg's Deweyan commitments the “Procrustean bed” that distorts his developmental theory is a startling claim” (Gibbs, 2003 Gibbs, J. 2003. Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. viii). 1 All subsequent page number citations will be to Gibbs (2003 Gibbs, J. 2003. Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) unless otherwise indicated.

Indeed it is. I also believe it is false in a complex way, or at least seriously misleading. The theses of this paper are that: (1) Dewey's moral psychology includes, in any substantial way, neither (a) a three-stage developmental theory nor (b) internalization as part of that theory; that therefore either (2) Kohlberg misread Dewey, and/or (3) Gibbs misreads Kohlberg. This confusion suggests a look at what has been called a “neo-Kohlbergian approach” as a competing theory to Gibbs's “new view of life span moral judgment development” (pp. 74 – 75).     

Situational moral adjustment and the happy victimizer

In this study we examine the possibility that the happy victimizer phenomenon (HVP), which is generally thought to be restricted to a specific period in middle childhood, also appears among adults. In contrast to other studies that explain the HVP as a lack of moral motivation or an insufficiently developed moral self, we propose to explain HVP in terms of a specific moral stage, i.e., a specific kind of moral reasoning. In particular we identify HV-typical moral reasoning with a sub-form of Kohlberg Stage 2. Adult usage of this moral stage is then explained in terms of situation-specificity. We also try to elaborate the idea of situational adjustment and to reveal the processes of activation and usage of previously acquired moral stage principles. Our empirical study shows that adults use HV-typical principles in specific situations.     

An attempt to induce lower moral reasoning under hypnotic and task-motivated age regression

In this study, we attempted to partially replicate and extend the findings of the Page (1985) study of hypnotic age regression and moral reasoning. The Kohlberg (1976) Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) was used to assess the initial stage of moral reasoning in 32 adults who were preselected on the basis of their hypnotic susceptibility. Subjects were hypnotized and age regressed to two of four possible ages (16, 13, 10, and 7), or were given task-motivation instructions before being age regressed. All were then administered the MJI, which involves the resolution of certain dilemmas. Both groups were able to lower their moral reasoning scores when given age regression instructions, but no significant differences were found between groups. Thus the results of this study are inconsistent with those of Page (1985), but are consistent with those of O'Brien et al. (1977). Reasons for the failure to reaffirm the earlier results of Page (1985) are discussed.     

Moral motivation of college students through multiple developmental structures: Evidence of intrapersonal variability in a complex dynamic system

This study is based on a broad conception of moral motivation by applying self-determination theory and dynamic systems perspectives. Accordingly, not only moral action, but also moral judgment is motivated. We carried out a detailed exploration of intrapersonal variability as a central aspect of moral motivation. Kohlberg’s six stages of moral development are reconceptualized as dynamic process structures of motivation that operate together within person simultaneously in different degrees. A total of 546 college students responded to a new instrument to assess moral motivation using a recognition task. Findings provided support for the notion that individuals use multiple motivational structures in different degrees as they make moral judgments. The majority of correlations between within-person operation degrees of motivational structures were significant. Variations in these correlations are explained to a large extent by developmental proximity of stage pairs. Results revealed both variability and developmental order in moral motivation. Implications of a dynamic developmental perspective are discussed in terms of understanding the complexity of moral motivation in ways that are sensitive to both intrapersonal and contextual variability.     

A re-investigating of the religious orientation-moral reasoning relationship: a relational developmental systems perspective

This study re-investigates the relationship between religious orientation and Kohlberg’s moral reasoning among students at a midwestern (USA) university. Multiple regression analyses revealed that quest-oriented religiosity was significantly positively related to principled moral reasoning, as consistently found in previous studies, while intrinsic religious orientation showed no relation to principled moral reasoning. We discuss our findings through a lens of relational developmental systems theory, suggesting that a more integrative measure is needed to better understand the complex relationship between religious orientation and moral reasoning.     

A Virtue Approach Instead of a Kantian Approach as a Solution to Major Dilemmas in Meta-ethics? A Criticism of David Carr

This contribution is a criticism of some points David Carr brings forward both in his 1991 book (Educating the Virtues) but even more so in his 1996 article in this journal (After Kohlberg: Some Implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the Theory of Moral Education and Development). With the help of a virtue approach Carr tries to solve the moral objectivism-moral relativism dilemma and the deontologism-consequentialism dilemma in ethics. I will argue that his attempt, though very interesting, suffers from some serious flaws and that, either, Carr's position is much closer to a Kantian approach than Carr thinks, or Carr's position needs a good deal of clarification.     

Care and Justice Moral Orientation: A Scale for Its Assessment

A quantitative measure of adult moral orientation, based on the theoretical frameworks of Kohlberg and Gilligan, was developed to measure preference for "justice" or "care"-oriented moral thinking. The Moral Orientation Scale Using Childhood Dilemmas (MOS), a short, objective measure, presents adults with a series of dilemmas frequently faced by children, each followed by two care-oriented and two justice-oriented responses to the dilemma. The procedures for developing and scoring the measure are discussed, and validity and reliability data are presented. Used with both male and female social work and law students, as expected, the MOS shows males to be more justice-oriented in their moral reasoning than females who are shown to be more care-oriented. Moreover, in further agreement with Gilligan's theory that gender and experience, taken together, are related to moral reasoning style, male lawyers and female social workers are shown to have the strongest preferences.     

Moral judgment and antisocial behavior in early adolescence

This project was designed to assess the relationship of moral judgment to a naturalistic measure of antisocial behavior—delinquent and predelinquent behavior. As a prelude, observations were made which confirmed that delinquents not only have low scores on the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview, but also that Rest's Defining Issues Test distinguishes incarcerated delinquent from nondelinquent groups. In the present study, each of a group of boys with disruptive and antisocial behavior was matched with a counterpart on 14 variables so designed as to minimize the effect of factors other than the stage of development of moral judgment in members of the two groups on the outcome of the testing procedures. When the impact of these extraneous factors was so minimized, results of Rest's Defining Issues Test revealed significant differences between the groups, while Kohlberg's interview did not. Clinical implications of this project are discussed.     

Tom, Huck, and Oliver Stone as advocates in Kohlberg's just community: theory-based strategies for moral education

Kohlberg's studies of moral reasoning provide a good theoretical framework for describing the developmental process that may serve as the basis for programs of moral education for adolescents. Kohlberg viewed moral education, particularly during adolescence, as the stimulation of the natural developmental process which leads to mature moral reasoning. Building on Kohlberg's work, specifically his concept of the just community approach where the teacher and more advanced peers serve as advocates of mature moral reasoning, this article presents the educator with a theoretical rationale for implementing procedures that can foster moral development. A case is made for using contemporary films and literature as mechanisms for stimulating moral development among adolescents.     

Gender differences in moral development

Sixty-nine Midwestern middle-class children and adolescents were tested on justice and care orientations when reasoning abstract and interpersonal moral dilemmas. Nona Lyons' (“Two Perspectives on Self, Relationships and Morality,” Harvard Educational Review, 1983, 53, 125–145) scoring method was used to score subjects' responses. A 2(sex)×2(age) analysis of variance run on the total justice and care scores, as well as each individual dilemma, supported Carol Gilligan's (In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) theory that two distinct ways of thinking about moral problems exist — justice and care — and are differentially related to gender. Girls emphasized the morality of care significantly more than justice. Contrary to Gilligan (1982) and Lyons (1983), however, boys in both age groups emphasized the morality of justice and care equally. Data from the interpersonal dilemmas using Lyons's (1983) coding scheme are consistent with J. Piaget (The Moral Judgement of the Child, New York: Free Press, 1966) and Lawrence Kohlberg [“The Cognitive-Developmental Approach,” in D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969]: older subjects became more justice oriented and younger subjects emphasized the morality of care. Sex differences on Kohlberg's stage theory were not significant and the protagonist's gender in the Heinz dilemma had no effect on moral reasoning.