Pierre Hadot on Habit,Reason, and Spiritual Exercises

This essay is a reappraisal of Pierre Hadot's concept of spiritual exercises in response to recent criticisms of his work. The author argues that contrary to the claims of his critics, Hadot articulates a compelling argument that spiritual exercises that employ imaginative, rhetorical, and cognitive techniques are both necessary for and successful at producing a subject in which reason is integrated into human character. Such exercises are critical for overcoming the effects of habit, as a result of which everyday conduct resists rational control, and Hadot provides a nuanced account of how particular practices affect different aspects of emotion, behavior, and thought. The concept of spiritual exercises remains a viable component of theoretical frameworks for the study of religious ethics, though the author concludes that Hadot's position on habit and its role in ethical practice requires further investigation.     

Spiritual exercises and poetry: Pierre Hadot and Du Fu

This paper discusses poetry as a site of what Pierre Hadot calls “spiritual exercises,” with particular reference to China's greatest poet, Du Fu (712–70 C.E.). While Hadot's work has bridged gaps between (i) philosophy and religion and (ii) theory and practice, this paper suggests that spiritual exercises can also blur the modern separation between form and content. It argues for the possibility of poetry as philosophy; that is, philosophy in a less-recognized form. If poetry can be spiritual exercise and if spiritual exercise with its goal of self-transformation is the core of philosophy, then we may be able to treat poetry as one form of philosophy. The paper also demonstrates the relevance of Hadot's work for ancient Chinese and comparative philosophy more broadly.     

Exploring Spiritual Beliefs in Relation to Adlerian Theory

According to M. T. Burke et al. (1999), 1 key counselor competency regarding spirituality is the ability to explore one 's own religious and spiritual beliefs as a means to enhance sensitivity, understanding, and acceptance of such beliefs (as cited in G. Miller, 1999). In addition, an important part of professional development is said to involve ideological consistency between one's values and theoretical stance (T. M. Skovholt & M. H. Ronnestad, 1992). This article describes 1 counselor's exploration of her spiritual beliefs in relation to Adler's (H. L. Ansbacher & R. R. Ansbacher, 1956) theory of counseling and human development in an effort to move toward ideological consistency and to enhance competence in addressing spiritual dimensions of clients' development.     

Paideia: Philosophy educating humanity through spirituality

The purpose of this paper is to provide the groundwork for a formal philosophical justification of the study of spirituality as a necessary co-requisite to the study of education. Consequently, much of the paper makes little direct reference to children's spirituality as such; instead it argues that spirituality per se is bound up with the education of self and personhood, irrespective of whether one is a child or an adult. Following MacIntyre's critique of morality, I contend that spiritual discourse and practice have become so fragmented as to be virtually meaningless; I maintain, therefore, that spirituality is an area ripe for, but largely neglected by philosophical inquiry. Drawing on the work of Hadot I argue for a reassessment of the importance of the spiritual exercises favoured by the four major philosophical schools of antiquity.     

Manic depression and religious experience: The use of religion in therapy

In the article, I explore the use of spiritual strategies in the treatment of manic depression in religiously oriented psychiatric inpatients. Manic depression, a disorder primarily of mood, is characterized by bouts of mania alternating with depression. Religious themes and mystical experiences pervade the language of manic depressive illness, e.g., sensing one is God, being given a divine mission, receiving divine messages, having ecstatic experiences, and so on. Debate exists concerning the effectiveness of spiritual interventions in manic patients. I suggest that a trained religious leader may be able to work therapeutically with such patients, provided that two goals are kept in mind: emphasizing beliefs that facilitate positive coping and challenging irrational religious beliefs (i.e., beliefs that lead to negative coping). When examined psychoanalytically, patients’ religious symbols and beliefs reveal deeply held beliefs about themselves. In particular, splitting and idealization and devaluation can be seen in their religious belief system. The role of culture in promoting maladaptive belief systems must not be overlooked. In employing spiritual interventions in patients diagnosed with manic depression, potential dangers are imposing one's values on patients and overstating the importance of spirituality.     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement

Self‐consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self‐knowledge, norms of belief, self‐consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self‐conscious adherence to epistemic norms requires the ability to self‐consciously hold a belief without endorsing that belief as true, as well‐supported by the evidence, or as meeting some other epistemic standard, and there are cases in which no such commitment is rationally required. This ability is necessary if there is to be any such thing as a fully self‐conscious process of changing one's mind.     

White Habits,Anti-Racism,and Philosophy as a Way of Life

This paper examines Pierre Hadot’s philosophy as a way of life in the context of race. I argue that a “way of life” approach to philosophy renders intelligible how antiracist confrontation of racist ideas and institutionalized white complicity is a properly philosophical way of life requiring regulated reflection on habits—particularly, habits of whiteness. I first rehearse some of Hadot’s analysis of the “way of life” orientation in philosophy, in which philosophical wisdom is understood as cultivated by actions which result in the creation of wise habits. I analyze a phenomenological claim about the nature of habit implied by the “way of life” approach, namely, that habits can be both the cause and the effect of action. This point is central to the “way of life” philosophy, I claim, in that it makes possible the intelligent redirection of habits, in which wise habits are more the effect than simply the cause of action. Lastly, I illustrate the “way of life” approach in the context of anti-racism by turning to Linda Martín Alcoff's whiteness antieliminativism, which outlines a morally defensible transformation of the habits of whiteness. I argue that anti-racism provides an intelligible context for modern day forms of what Hadot calls “spiritual exercises” insofar as the “way of life” philosophy is embodied in the practice of whites seeing themselves seeing as white and seeing themselves being seen as white.     

Foundationalism,Coherentism and Rule-Following Scepticism

Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's beliefs and applications. Holists will thus be coherentists about how one's usage is justified: showing that one's usage of a term is justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's beliefs and applications. Semantic reductionists, on the other hand, will understand such justification in a classically foundationalist fashion. Now Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of scepticism about meaning and the possibility of demonstrating the correctness of one's usage. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands justification in classically foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments, if good, lead not to a type of scepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about the justification of our usage, and thus a holist about semantic facts.     

Do young boys and girls have distinct and different approaches and needs in relation to spiritual development?

Difficulties are outlined in how to consider whether boys and girls have distinctive approaches and needs in relation to spiritual development, especially the lack of any agreed definition of spiritual development and the nature of the research literature relating to gender. I explore this without presupposing, or excluding, any particular definition, arguing that, whatever one's assumptions and beliefs about spirituality, these influence, and are influenced by, assumptions and beliefs about gender, and vice versa. I present empirical evidence on aspects associated with personal well‐being indicating outcomes strongly differentiated by gender. I examine research evidence in relation to gender within a range of areas commonly associated with spirituality and highlight some gaps. I argue that considering spiritual development through the lens of gender and gender through that of spiritual development can illuminate one's understanding of both concepts. I suggest some possible implications for future research and for teachers of young children.     

The Philosophical Role of Illness

This article examines the philosophical role of illness. It briefly surveys the philosophical role accorded to illness in the history of philosophy and explains why illness merits such a role. It suggests that illness modifies, and thus sheds light on, normal experience, revealing its ordinary and therefore overlooked structure. Illness also provides an opportunity for reflection by performing a kind of suspension (epoché) of previously held beliefs, including tacit beliefs. The article argues that these characteristics warrant a philosophical role for illness. While the performance of most philosophical procedures is volitional and theoretical, however, illness is uninvited and threatening, throwing the ill person into anxiety and uncertainty. As such it can be viewed as a radical philosophical motivation that can profoundly alter our outlook. The article suggests that illness can change the ways in which we philosophise: it may shape philosophical methods and concerns and change one's sense of salience and conception of philosophy.     

Open‐Mindedness as Engagement

Open‐mindedness is an under‐explored topic in virtue epistemology, despite its assumed importance for the field. Questions about it abound and need to be answered. For example, what sort of intellectual activities are central to it? Can one be open‐minded about one's firmly held beliefs? Why should we strive to be open‐minded? This paper aims to shed light on these and other pertinent issues. In particular, it proposes a view that construes open‐mindedness as engagement, that is, a willingness to entertain novel ideas in one's cognitive space and to accord them serious consideration.     

Fallibility and Trust

I argue that while admission of one's own fallibility rationally requires one's readiness to stand corrected in the light of future evidence, it need have no consequences for one's present degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that one's fallibility in a given area gives one no reason to forego assigning credence 1 to propositions belonging to that area. I can thus be seen to take issue with David Christensen's recent claim that our fallibility has far‐reaching consequences for our account of rational belief and epistemic rationality. My arguments inter alia rely on the idea that in basing one's beliefs on one's evidence, one trusts both that one's evidence has the right pedigree and that one gets its probative force right, where such trust can rationally be invested without the need of any further evidence.     

Counselors' Perceptions of Spirituality in the Therapeutic Process

The authors investigated the attitudes of 147 Licensed Professional Counselors (LPCs) in 2 southeastern states concerning spirituality in the therapeutic process. Results indicate that LPCs recognize the importance of being aware of their own spiritual beliefs. Spirituality is also viewed as a universal phenomenon that can act as a powerful psychological change agent. Respondents believe that spirituality is not experienced differently by women and men, although spirituality is believed to be expressed differently as a function of gender. Age of the client emerged as a salient variable. One's place in the aging process and one's perception of the aging process were perceived to affect the client's spiritual search. The results have implications for the training of counselors.     

Religious Affiliation and Attitudes Towards Gay Men: On the Mediating Role of Masculinity Threat

Previous research suggests that people from some religious backgrounds hold more negative attitudes towards gay men than others do. The current research focuses on psychological variables as an alternative explanation to religious affiliation, testing whether masculinity beliefs regarding gay men and their perceived threat to one's masculinity can explain such between‐group differences in negative attitudes. With a sample of 155 male heterosexual university students (Muslims and Christians in Germany), we found that Muslims held more negative attitudes towards gay men than Christians did. Yet, this relation was partially mediated by beliefs about the masculinity of gay men and the experience of masculinity threat imposed by gay men, substantially reducing the effect of religious affiliation on antigay attitudes. In sum, similar psychological processes explained antigay attitudes of both Muslims and Christians. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ricoeur’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">askēsis</Emphasis>: textual and gymnastic exercises for self-transformation

This essay examines what the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur can contribute to current debates on the role of spiritual exercise, or askēsis, in philosophical life. The influential work of Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault has sparked a widespread interest in the ancient model of philosophy, variously described as a way of life, art of living, or care of the self. Ricoeur’s potential contribution to this conversation has been overlooked, largely because he does not discuss these themes explicitly or often. However, Ricoeur’s early phenomenology of embodiment in The Voluntary and the Involuntary offers valuable insights regarding the exercises of self-transformation. After a brief survey of Ricoeur’s concept of askēsis, this essay draws on Ricoeur to demonstrate the merits of physical exercise, or gymnastic, in ethical and spiritual formation. Gymnastic, Ricoeur shows, can be a form of spiritual exercise. The final section of the paper then makes a similarly counterintuitive claim: namely, that reading is an embodied practice that can facilitate the ethical formation of the lived body.     

Can We Be Self‐Deceived about What We Believe? Self‐Knowledge,Self‐Deception,and Rational Agency

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first‐order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self‐knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self‐knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes one's belief that p and so self‐knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second‐order beliefs could ever be false. I develop two counter‐examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first‐ and second‐order beliefs in standard cases of self‐knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self‐deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter‐examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second‐order beliefs about the content of one's first‐order beliefs. The authority of self‐knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p.     

The benefits of being disadvantaged: performance‐related circumstances and consequences of intergroup comparisons

People are likely to evaluate their group's standing on an ability dimension by comparing the performance level of their own group with that of an outgroup. However, in addition to contrasting performance outcomes, they may also compare the specific circumstances under which both groups have performed. From a related attributes perspective, we argue that the outcome of such a comparison is a crucial determinant of the extent to which the relative success or failure of one's group can be ascribed to its superior or inferior ability respectively, and hence of the degree to which the relative position of one's group on the performance dimension in question can be perceived as legitimate and stable (i.e. as justified and unlikely to change). Accordingly, the present research shows that information concerning performance‐related circumstances has an impact on a wide range of reactions to the relative performance of one's group, varying from the experience of positive and negative affect, to motivational responses such as changes in collective efficacy beliefs for performance improvement, individual effort on behalf of the ingroup, and the tendency to hinder the future performance of an outgroup. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

PHILOSOPHY AS EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF LIVING

This essay describes an approach to designing a course in philosophy as a way of life (PWOL) around a set of immersive “spiritual exercises” through which students might examine their desires, engaging students in a process of testing their own experience against philosophical theories and theories against their own experience. These are used to tie together the units of a course covering classical Western and Eastern philosophical traditions, and to supplement traditional philosophical analysis of texts and arguments with ways of exploring what it might be like to live as a Platonist, Stoic, or Confucian. The essay details several exercises, engages perspectives on PWOL from Pierre Hadot and John Cooper, and addresses the question of how to assess immersive exercises.     

Issues and Insights: Working With God: Managing Conservative Christian Beliefs That May Interfere With Counseling

Counselors who work with conservative Christians may ask how to respect a client's values when “God” seems to be saying something contrary to what the counselor believes is in the client's best interests. In a managed care era of decreasing choice about one's counselor, referral of such clients to a conservative Christian counselor is not always an option. “Working with God” when counseling conservative Christian clients requires counselors to understand conservative Christian beliefs. This article portrays conservative Christianity as a culture and articulates conservative Christian beliefs that may challenge the counseling process, suggesting options within the framework of these beliefs.