Can a Robot Lie? Exploring the Folk Concept of Lying as Applied to Artificial Agents

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary people willing to ascribe deceptive intentions to artificial agents? (b) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (c) Do people blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than they presently receive.     

Lost in Space? Education and the Concept of Nature

Although the idea of nature has allbut disappeared from recent discussion ofeducation, it remains highly relevant to thephilosophy and practice of education, sincetacit notions of human nature and whatconstitutes underlying reality – the `natural'order of things – necessarily orientateseducation in fundamental ways. It is arguedthat underlying our various senses of nature isthe idea of nature as the `self-arising' whoseintrinsic integrity, mystery and valueimplicitly condition our understanding ofourselves and of the reality in which we live.I argue that the acknowledgement of nature soconceived opens up a perspective on educationthat requires us to review currently dominanttechnological notions of truth and knowledge,and also of what should characterize theprocess of education, reasserting the properplace of more intuitive, local and dialogicalknowledge and relationships.     

What is Wrong with the Concept of Religious Experience?

After briefly mentioning the reason why the concept of religious experience has become a key to understanding Western and non-Western religious phenomena in current religious studies, this paper argues that the concept itself is insufficient to represent the religious phenomena of Islam, because to speak about 'an experience of God' in the context of Islam is misleading. This paper also argues that to consider mystical experience as well as the prophetic revelation that is wah?y within the boundaries of religious experience is confusing. Since the transmission process and contents of wah?y are extraordinary and miraculous, it should not be treated as an ordinary religious occurrence and therefore should not be considered as a personal religious experience.     

How Can Modifications of Meaning Influence Argumentation? The Concept and Typology of Semantic Arguments

The aim of this article is to show how modifications of meaning can influence argumentation. I present the basic concept of so-called ‘semantic argumentation,’ its definition, and its different variants. I analyse the various kinds of argument in which meanings of terms are modified in support of a persuasive goal. The analysis of different semantic arguments reveals certain structures and patterns that are needed to construct a typology of such arguments. I thus outline a basic concept of argumentation based on modifications of meaning, before presenting various examples of such arguments together with an analysis of their structures, and then, finally, constructing a typology for them.

     

Commentary: What is the Meaning and Utility of the Psychopathy Concept?

The concept and measurement of psychopathy in young people is discussed with respect to five key issues: (1) the respective merits of self-reports and ratings by others; (2) whether callous/unemotional (CU) features may be more appropriately tapped by physiological measures; (3) the possible utility of genetic studies; (4) the distinctiveness of CU from other risk factors for antisocial behavior; and (5) the homogeneity of CU as a construct.     

Can the Paradox of Forgiveness Be Dissolved?

The “paradox of forgiveness” can be described as follows: Forgiving, unlike forgetting, is tied to reasons. It is a response to considerations that lead us to think that we ought to forgive. On the other hand, acts of forgiveness, unlike excuses, are responses to instances of culpable wrongdoing. If, however, the wrongdoing is culpable, there is (or seems to be) no reason to forgive it. So two mutually exclusive theses about forgiveness both seem to be equally warranted: Forgiveness is related to reasons, but there can be no reasons for forgiveness. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve this paradox. I argue that the paradox arises as a result of a too narrow conception of “reason” and that it can be dissolved if we acknowledge different kinds of reasons for forgiveness. More specifically, I examine three kinds of reasons for forgiving an act of wrongdoing: (1) Moral reasons that make forgiveness morally mandatory. (2) Prudential reasons for forgiveness. (3) Moral reasons that pertain to the character of the forgiver and that favor forgiveness without making it morally mandatory. I show that while the paradox of forgiveness arises when we consider reasons of the first kind, it can be dissolved with recourse to reasons of the second and third kind. The upshot of the argument is that we can be rational in deciding to overcome our feelings of resentment towards an act of unjustified and unexcused wrongdoing—and this is a strong point in favor of forgiveness.     

Can values moderate the attitudes of right-wing authoritarians?

This investigation explored how right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and endorsement of egalitarian beliefs may interact to determine attitudes toward immigrants, homosexuals, and African Americans. Study 1 (N = 239) found that RWA was negatively related to evaluations of immigrants for those who weakly endorsed egalitarian beliefs. In contrast, endorsement of egalitarian beliefs was associated with positive evaluations of immigrants for both low and high RWAs. RWA did not interact with egalitarianism to determine attitudes toward homosexuals or African Americans. Study 2 analyzed data from the 1992 National Election Study and replicated these effects in a young adult (age < or = 24) sample (n = 102) using moral traditionalism as a proxy for RWA. Partial support for the hypotheses also was found in the adult (age > or = 25) sample (n = 1,257). It is concluded that when tradition and/or social norms offer unclear positions, endorsement of egalitarian beliefs influences the attitudes of authoritarians.     

Can phronesis save the life of medical ethics?

There has been a growing interest in casuistry since the ground breaking work of Jonsen and Toulmin. Casuistry, in their view, offers the possibility of securing the moral agreement that policy makers desire but which has proved elusive to theory driven approaches to ethics. However, their account of casuistry is dependent upon the exercise of phronesis. As recent discussions of phronesis make clear, this requires attention not only to the particulars of the case, but also to the substantive goods at stake in the case. Without agreement on these goods attention to cases is unlikely to secure the productive consensus that Jonson and Toulmin seek.     

Can there be a science of the symbolic?

Science means not just 'knowing', but knowing verified by replicability. Science is particularly hard to bring to depth psychology because the individual uniquenesses that can't be repeated are what make people most deeply themselves. Everyone, including the analytic investigator, however, has a science, in the sense of a world-view that is replicated by experience. Jung offered hermeneutics as an alternative mode to science for getting to know the psychological subject. But as Heidegger emphasized, hermeneutics always begins with the projection of a world-view, i.e., the science of the would-be interpreter. In the analytic situation, dialogue is available to test the world-view and enlarge its horizon, in accord with Gadamer's expansion of hermeneutics, 'the classical discipline concerned with the art of understanding texts', into a method of inquiry open to the possibilities of otherness. An example is given from an analytic training seminar, in which the author began by projecting his version of the theory of psychological types onto the dream material a candidate offered in response to the seminar. A dialogue with the candidate ensued which enabled the teacher to correct his original, somewhat rigid, application of his scientific viewpoint. In such a dialogue, psyche emerges as the final interpreter of what is, generating hypotheses that can fruitfully be applied to the understanding of other cases.     

Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?

Philosophical Studies - For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary...     

Wei ZHANG,What Is Enlightenment: Can China Answer Kant's Question?

What is Enlightenment? Can China Answer Kant's question? This is the title and subtitle,respectively,of Wei Zhang's book.An ambitious project due to two factors:the difficulty of answering the question anywhere,not only in China,and the difficulty of translating that question into Chinese reality.The problem that Zhang will try to resolve is whether or not the May Fourth movement could be considered the Chinese Enlightenment.Prior to digging into that answer I will start by analyzing the first,titular question.     

Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory?

Philosophical Studies - The basic axioms or formal conditions of decision theory, especially the ordering condition put on preferences and the axioms underlying the expected utility (EU) formula,...     

Can Jean Piaget explain the possibility of knowledge?

The purpose of this article is to show that Piaget's use of the equilibrium principle cannot explain the possibility of correct understanding. That is, it cannot explain the possibility of knowledge, as opposed to simple change in belief. To make the argument, I begin by describing Piaget's explanatory model, which is known as the equilibrium principle. I then argue that correct understanding, or knowledge of any x as a case of y, requires a concept of correctness, i.e., the recognition that words and concepts apply under some conditions but not others. I try to show that because he uses the equilibrium principle as a basis for his explanation, Piaget cannot explain how a concept of correctness is acquired. Finally, I argue that to explain the possibility of knowledge, one must show how the conditions for word and concept application are determined by a community of language users. Again, I claim that Piaget's use of the equilibrium model precludes such an account.     

Can membership-functions capture the directionality of verbal probabilities?

Verbal probabilities are a common mean for communicating risk and uncertainties in many decision-making settings (e.g., finance, medicine, military). They are considered directional because they elicit a focus on either the outcome occurrence (e.g., there is a chance) or on its non-occurrence (e.g., it is unlikely). According to a quantitative perspective, directionality is dependent on the vague probabilistic meaning conveyed by verbal probabilities—e.g., p(outcome) > .50 = > focus on outcome occurrence. In contrast a more qualitative perspective suggests that directionality depends on contextual factors. The present study tested whether the directionality of verbal probabilities was determined by their vague probabilistic meaning, by contextually manipulated variables (i.e., representativeness and base rate), or by a combination of both. Participants provided their own expressions to describe the guilt of a suspect and then assessed the vague probabilistic meaning and directionality associated with those expressions. Results showed that directionality was mainly determined by the vague probabilistic meaning but also by the base rate of guilt. Although attention focus on the occurrence or the non-occurrence of the target outcome is dependent on vague probabilistic meaning, it cannot be fully accounted for by it.     

Can We Make Sense of the Notion of Trustworthy Technology?

In this paper we raise the question whether technological artifacts can properly speaking be trusted or said to be trustworthy. First, we set out some prevalent accounts of trust and trustworthiness and explain how they compare with the engineer’s notion of reliability. We distinguish between pure rational-choice accounts of trust, which do not differ in principle from mere judgments of reliability, and what we call “motivation-attributing” accounts of trust, which attribute specific motivations to trustworthy entities. Then we consider some examples of technological entities that are, at first glance, best suited to serve as the objects of trust: intelligent systems that interact with users, and complex socio-technical systems. We conclude that the motivation-attributing concept of trustworthiness cannot be straightforwardly applied to these entities. Any applicable notion of trustworthy technology would have to depart significantly from the full-blown notion of trustworthiness associated with interpersonal trust.     

Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition

The prominence of Bayesian modeling of cognition has increased recently largely because of mathematical advances in specifying and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models. Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse to psychological or neurological processes and representations. We note commonalities between this rational approach and other movements in psychology - namely, Behaviorism and evolutionary psychology - that set aside mechanistic explanations or make use of optimality assumptions. Through these comparisons, we identify a number of challenges that limit the rational program's potential contribution to psychological theory. Specifically, rational Bayesian models are significantly unconstrained, both because they are uninformed by a wide range of process-level data and because their assumptions about the environment are generally not grounded in empirical measurement. The psychological implications of most Bayesian models are also unclear. Bayesian inference itself is conceptually trivial, but strong assumptions are often embedded in the hypothesis sets and the approximation algorithms used to derive model predictions, without a clear delineation between psychological commitments and implementational details. Comparing multiple Bayesian models of the same task is rare, as is the realization that many Bayesian models recapitulate existing (mechanistic level) theories. Despite the expressive power of current Bayesian models, we argue they must be developed in conjunction with mechanistic considerations to offer substantive explanations of cognition. We lay out several means for such an integration, which take into account the representations on which Bayesian inference operates, as well as the algorithms and heuristics that carry it out. We argue this unification will better facilitate lasting contributions to psychological theory, avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued previous theoretical movements.     

A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of Neutrality in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights1

Abstract

The article examines the strategies the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) employs to apply the concept of neutrality in relation to Article 9 (freedom of religion or belief) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Having explored the theoretical background of the concept of neutrality and its specific application in the case law, the authors argue that neutrality is often used to display a bias towards a particular world view or societal paradigm, rather than representing unbiased perspectives of legal reasoning. The article studies the specific justifications for such biased approaches in the context of relevant ECHR cases and argues that in this way neutrality has discredited itself as a credible legal tool and as a form of legal argumentation. Furthermore the difficulty of handling the complexities of Article 9 claims by applying the principle of neutrality has led to a stronger trend of avoiding Article 9 by dealing with Article 9 claims through other Convention articles. Finally the authors discuss possible new approaches to legal reasoning which could take on board the dynamics of freedom of religion or belief through independent reasoning beyond the myth of neutrality.