Constructions of Agency in Accounts of Drunk Driving at the Outset of Semi-Mandatory Counseling

Convicted drunk drivers, in accounts of their offenses, rarely display qualities of agency that would contribute to a favorable outcome in counseling. Instead, the discursive and rhetorical aim of the accounts is often to evade responsibility and ownership of the offending behavior. Such disclaim of personal agency can be achieved in various ways in the narration of drunk driving (DD) incidences. This study examined how five aspects of agentic presentation (reflexivity, historicity, intentionality, causal attribution, and relationality) were present in or missing from such accounts. It was found that a tentative model of (non)agentic display based on those five aspects could differentiate between the cases in a meaningful way and contribute to an understanding of the clients’ ways of positioning themselves in semi-mandatory counseling as well as of their uses of the counseling context.     

Ways to Bolster Resilience in Traumatized Clients: Implications for Psychotherapists

This study aims to further theoretical and clinical discussions regarding the therapy of psychosis from a dialogical perspective and to contribute to the contemporary research literature that works toward developing methods for studying the dialogical processes in therapy. Three videotaped sessions of a therapy with a heterosexual couple, in which both partners had psychotic experiences, were analyzed using the Dialogical Investigations of Happenings of Change, a method developed with an aim to capture the dialogical qualities of multiactor conversations. The analysis illustrated shifts in the dialogical characteristics of the conversation through the sessions and associated shifts in the clients’ positioning, toward increased agency, as well as enrichment of the narratives regarding their difficulties. The gradual development toward more dialogical conversations, evidenced mainly in increased sharing of dominance and therapist responsiveness and participation, seemed to facilitate the joint construction of new words and meanings, the expression of strong feelings, the narration of difficult experiences, and increased agency. The findings support the view that a client's sense of agency, which can be particularly impoverished in psychosis, can be reconstructed in the context of dialogue, in which clients have a central place in telling their story.     

Sleeper Agents: The Sense of Agency Over the Dream Body

Human Studies - Although the sense of agency is often reduced if not absent in dreams, our agentive dream experiences can at times be similar to or enhanced compared to waking. The sense of agency...     

How does it feel to act together?

This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint action that people coordinate their plans and actions. I discuss the implications that these coordination requirements might have for the strength of the sense of agency an agent may experience for a joint action. Second, engagement in joint action may involve a transformation of agentive identity and a partial or complete shift from a sense of self-agency to a sense of we-agency. I discuss several factors that may contribute to shaping our sense of agentive identity in joint action.     

When our thoughts are not our own: Investigating agency misattributions using the Mind-to-Mind paradigm

At the core of the sense of agency for self-produced action is the sense that I, and not some other agent, am producing and directing those actions. While there is an ever-expanding body of empirical research investigating the sense of agency for bodily action, there has, to date, been little empirical investigation of the sense of agency for thought. The present study uses the novel Mind-to-Mind paradigm, in which the agentive source of a target thought is ambiguous, to measure misattributions of agency. Seventy-two percent of participants made at least one misattribution of agency during a 5-min trial. Misattributions were significantly more frequent when the target thought was an arousing negative thought as compared to a neutral control. The findings establish a novel protocol for measuring the sense of agency for thought, and suggest that both contextual factors and emotional experience play a role in its generation.     

Agency without autonomy: valuational agency

National minority women's defense of non-liberal minority cultures that encompass sexist customs and rules has greatly perplexed liberal theorists. Many attempted to resolve this puzzle by attributing constrained agency to such women and dismissing their defense as unreasonable. This article argues that this liberal assessment of minority women's position is philosophically indefensible and that the failure of mainstream liberalism to make sense of these women's response indicates not that these women's agency is compromised but rather that the liberal conception of agency as autonomy has limits in its cross-cultural applicability. An alternative conception of agency, valuational agency, that illuminates minority women's agency is proposed as a more plausible alternative for radically pluralistic societies.     

Experts and Deviants: The Story of Agentive Control

This essay argues that current theories of action fail to explain agentive control because they have left out a psychological capacity central to control: attention. This makes it impossible to give a complete account of the mental antecedents that generate action. By investigating attention, and in particular the intention‐attention nexus, we can characterize the functional role of intention in an illuminating way, explicate agentive control so that we have a uniform explanation of basic cases of causal deviance in action as well as other defects of agency (distraction), explain cases of skilled agency and sharpen questions about the role of thought in agency. This provides for a different orientation in the theory of action.     

Nested Deontic Modalities: Another View of Parking on Highways

A suggestion is made for representing iterated deontic modalities in stit theory, the “seeing-to-it-that” theory of agency. The formalization is such that normative sentences are represented as agentive sentences and therefore have history dependent truth conditions. In contrast to investigations in alethic modal logic, in the construction of systems of deontic logic little attention has been paid to the iteration... of the deontic modalities. L. Goble (1966, p. 197) N. Belnap and P. Bartha (1995) present a formalization of iterated deontic modalities in stit theory, the “seeing-to-it-that” theory of agency, due to Belnap, Perloff, and Xu (1996). In the present paper a simplification of Belnap and Bartha's approach is suggested. In order to support easy comparison with (1995), I shall take up Belnap and Bartha's discussion of R. Barcan Marcus' (1966) example Parking on highways ought to be forbidden. The simplified account underlines the power of stit theory and represents obligations, prohibitions and permissions as agentive sentences, as required by iteration. Therefore, in particular, the truth of obligations, prohibitions and permissions is it history dependent. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A model of the synchronic self

The phenomenology of the self includes the sense of control over one's body and mind, of being bounded in body and mind, of having perspective from within one's body and mind and of being extended in time. I argue that this phenomenology is to be accounted for by a set of five dissociable cognitive capacities that compose the self. The focus of this paper is on the four capacities that compose the synchronic self: the agentive(B) self, which underlies the sense of control over one's body; the boundary(B) self, which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's body; the agentive(M) self which underlies the sense of control over one's thoughts; and the boundary(M) self which underlies the sense of being bounded within one's mind. I model the agentive(B) and agentive(M) selves as parts of the motor control system and the boundary(B) self as the capacity to form and integrated map of the body. I point to the delusion of thought broadcast as a possible source of evidence for future research on the boundary(M) self.     

Intentional action and limitation of personal autonomy. Do restrictions of action selection decrease the sense of agency?

The experience of being an intentional agent is a key component of personal autonomy. Here, we tested how undermining intentional action affects the sense of agency as indexed by intentional binding. In three experiments using the Libet clock paradigm, participants judged the onset of their action (key presses) and resulting effect (auditory stimuli) under conditions of no, partial, or full autonomy over selecting and timing their actions. In all cases, we observed a moderate to strong intentional binding effect. However, we found no evidence for an influence of personal autonomy on intentional binding. These findings thus suggest that being unable to decide how and when to perform actions does not affect the perceived temporal binding between action and effect, a phenomenon suggested to be associated with the implicit sense of agency. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of research on personal autonomy and goal-directed behavior.     

Actions and outcomes: two aspects of agency

Agency can be construed as both the manner in which autonomous individuals embark on particular courses of action (or inaction), and the relationship between such agents and the outcomes of the courses of action on which they embark. A promising strategy for understanding both senses of agency consists in the combination of a modal logic of agency and branching time semantics. Such is the strategy behind stit theory, the theory of agentive action developed by Nuel Belnap and others. However, stit theoretic evaluations of the agentive relationship between agents and outcomes that are uncertain—due to either the presence of indeterminism, or the possible intervention of other agents—yield counterintuitive results. This paper develops a pair of alternative operators (the “act” operators) for modeling agency with respect to uncertain outcomes. Unlike the stit-theoretic model, the act-theoretic model of agency with respect to a particular state of affairs does not require that the state of affairs be realized in every possible history. If the state of affairs in fact obtains in the actual history, and its obtaining was dependent on the agent’s pursuing a particular course of action, then the agent is deemed agentive under act theory.     

A relational account of intellectual autonomy

According to relational views of autonomy, some social relations or forms of dependence are necessary for autonomous agency. Recent relational theorists have primarily focused on autonomy of action or practical autonomy, and the result has been a shift away from individualistic conceptions of autonomy in the practical realm. Despite these trends, individualistic conceptions are still the default when it comes to autonomy of belief or intellectual autonomy. In this paper, I argue for a relational account of intellectual autonomy. Specifically, I claim that intellectual autonomy requires a sense of one’s standing as an equal member of the epistemic community.     

The Misguided Marriage of Responsibility and Autonomy

Much of the literature devoted to the topics of agent autonomy and agent responsibility suggests strong conceptual overlaps between the two, although few explore these overlaps explicitly. Beliefs of this sort are commonplace, but they mistakenly conflate the global state of being autonomous with the local condition of acting autonomously or exhibiting autonomy in respect to some act or decision. Because the latter, local phenomenon of autonomy seems closely tied to the condition of being responsible for an act, we tend to think of the former, global phenomenon as a condition of responsibility as well. But one can act autonomously, or manifest autonomy with respect to some occurrent state, without satisfying the conditions for autonomous agency. Autonomous agency and responsible agency are logically distinct in part due to the varient conceptions of rationality each calls for. Both agent responsibility and holding a person responsible imply a fairly ``thick' form of rationality, where rationality embodies a normative component and is a matter of satisfying criteria that are objective in the sense that they are independent of what a person happens to want or to value. But autonomous agency calls for a quite different, ``thin' conception of instrumental rationality.     

Momentary Happiness: The Role of Psychological Need Satisfaction

Psychological well-being correlates positively with psychological need satisfaction—primarily the needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The current study explores momentary happiness (defined as experienced enjoyment minus experienced stress over the course of an hour) as a function of momentary psychological need satisfaction. Results demonstrate that hour-by-hour ratings of psychological need satisfaction were correlated with momentary happiness, with individual differences in life satisfaction moderating this relationship. Ratings of autonomy and relatedness correlated positively with momentary happiness, while competence was negatively correlated with momentary happiness. Thus, engagement in competence-promoting behaviors may come at an affective cost, at least in the moment. When autonomy and relatedness needs were met, individuals with high levels of life satisfaction experienced greater increases in happiness than individuals with low levels of life satisfaction. This finding supports a sensitization model of well-being. Results are discussed with respect to their implications for self-determination theory (SDT).     

Fathers and fetuses

Harris postulates that in certain instances it would be morally impermissible for a woman to have an abortion because it would be a wrongful harm to the father and a violation of his autonomy. He constructs and analyzes five cases chosen to elucidate the moral issues involved and concludes that, for a man to lay claim to the fetus being his in a sense that the mother is obligated to respect, the fetus must be the result of his having pursued a legitimate interest in procreation in a morally legitimate way. When a man has satisfied the requirements of autonomy both for himself and for his sexual partner in regard to the interest in procreation, the woman has a prima facie obligation to him not to harm the fetus. Therefore, unless there is some contravening moral consideration that overrides this obligation, the abortion of the fetus is morally impermissible.     

Children's Loss of Agency under Extreme Adversity

This study explores the notion of children's agency in situations of extreme adversity. The child participants (n=117) live in the midst of the HIV/AIDS pandemic; extreme poverty; and systemic educational malfunction. Four focus group interviews were conducted with the children to explore their experiences of potential barriers to education. The findings indicated that contextual factors had a profoundly negative impact on the children, with their agentive capacity being severely compromised through their exposure to multiple, complex layers of risk. There was very little evidence to suggest that children retain any sense of their own agency in such adversity. This has implications for their resilience and for the development of policy and intervention strategies that may meet these children's needs.     

The Agentive Modalities

A number of philosophical projects require a proper understanding of the modal aspects of agency, or of what I call ‘the agentive modalities.’ I propose a general account of the agentive modalities, one which takes as its primitive the decision‐theoretic notion of an option. I relate this account to the standard semantics for ‘can’ and to the viability of some positions in the free will debates.     

The Mafioso Case: Autonomy and Self-respect

This article argues that immoralists do not fully enjoy autonomous agency because they are not capable of engaging in the proper form of practical reflection, which requires relating to others as having equal standing. An adequate diagnosis of the immoralist’s failure of agential authority requires a relational account of reflexivity and autonomy. This account has the distinctive merit of identifying the cost of disregarding moral obligations and of showing how immoralists may become susceptible to practical reason. The compelling quality of reason should not be represented as the capacity to force them to abide by morality on pain of incoherence. Rather, its authority (and objectivity) is shown when it presents them with the prospect of a transition that makes sense for them to undertake.     

An exploration of an integrated counselling and coaching approach with distressed young people

This mixed methods study explored the effectiveness and experience of an integrated counselling and coaching approach with young people. An effectiveness study allocated 80 young people aged between 13 and 25 years from four Youth Information Advice and Counselling Services centres in England to two groups: an integrated counselling and coaching group, based on the Personal Consultancy (PC) model, and a humanistic counselling group. Self-report measures of distress were administered at baseline and endpoint. Findings of the quantitative analysis showed that although baseline distress levels between groups were equivalent, post-intervention levels were significantly lower in the integrated group. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of qualitative experiences from five young people from the integrated group explored possible reasons for these results. Five master themes emerged: making sense of past, present and/or future, developing a sense of agency, management of affect, enhancing interpersonal relationships and development of self. Findings indicated that young people responded well to the integrated treatment; attending to intra-psychic issues alongside their developmental challenges seemed to have a beneficial effect on their sense of agency in particular. In conclusion, PC may be an effective means of reducing distress in young people.     

Reiki as surrender: evidence of an external authority

In this article I explore the concept of surrender and its significance for Reiki practitioners. Reiki is a hands-on healing method with roots in spiritual practice. The term ‘surrender’ has been emphasised, not always explicitly, by Reiki practitioners in Britain. I posit that surrender within the Reiki context is indicative of an external authority and source of significance. This contributes to previous literature regarding internal self-authority or non-formative social authority and shows that an external authority provides a third form of influence for practitioners. I explicate the idea of surrender and demonstrate that the object of that surrender, understood as reiki energy, has agency and that the power of this agency is operationalised through authority. In effect, surrender illuminates a consideration of reiki as an agential external authority which is legitimised through practice and training, allowing for new forms of a transformed identity and a sense of freedom and autonomy from hegemonic discourses.