Debunking arguments and metaphysical laws

Philosophical Studies - I argue that one’s views about which “metaphysical laws” obtain—including laws about what is identical with what, about what is reducible to what,...     

The Essence of Psycho-Analysis as Opposed to What Is Secondary

This paper's purpose is to differentiate what is essential to psycho-analysis to what is actually not part of psycho-analysis at all but something peripheral that has become associated with it. The paper makes therefore a differentiation between what is secondary to psycho-analysis and what is primary.     

Is happiness having what you want, wanting what you have, or both?

Rabbi Hyman Schachtel (1954) proposed that "happiness is not having what you want, but wanting what you have" (p. 37). In two studies, we tested Schachtel's maxim by asking participants whether or not they had and the extent to which they wanted each of 52 material items. To quantify how much people wanted what they had, we identified what they had and the extent to which they wanted those things. To quantify how much people had what they wanted, we identified how much they wanted and whether or not they had each item. Both variables accounted for unique variance in happiness. Moreover, the extent to which people wanted what they had partially mediated effects of gratitude and maximization on happiness, and the extent to which they had what they wanted partially mediated the effect of maximization. Results indicate that happiness is both wanting what you have and having what you want.     

Postmodern Thought and Christian Education

This article examines the impact of postmodern thought on Christian education. It briefly defines postmodern perspectives and their impact on reasoning in a Christian context and examines specific postmodern positions on the notion of truth and its validity or rationality. Education has been impacted by postmodern thought by an opening of thinking about the ways of knowing which include more than empirical or technical ways of knowing. Postmodernism argues that meaning is negotiated rather than being exact and limiting. As popular trends and popular culture bring postmodern thought to everyone, the impact on the thinking of Christian students and educators is examined to encourage discovery of what fits in Christian thought and what does not. The impact of what postmodern thought means and does in higher education is discussed as a challenge for all educators. A comparison in a Christian context, of modern and postmodern positions, examines what is good from modernism and what is not, as well as what is good about postmodernism in order to know what to keep and what to discard. As postmodernism opens the way for acceptance of multiple perspectives, Christian educators are challenged to examine their own systems of thought and to know how best to deliver instruction in a Christian context.     

Factors and fictions in person perception: A reply to lamiell,Foss, and Cavenee1

The systematic distortion hypothesis states that under difficult memory conditions judges infer what “must” have happened from their general model of what the world is like and/or find it easier to retrieve conceptually affiliated memory items. The hypothesis further states that lay conceptual schemes “tend to be innacurate with respect to how behaviors covary, confusing ‘what is like what’ with ‘what goes with what’” (Shweder & D'Andrade, 1979), and that interbehavior correlations derived from memory-based ratings cannot be considered valid evidence for the objective existence of proposed personality traits, factors or syndromes. The systematic distortion hypothesis is clarified with reference to the Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee “critique” (1980). That “critique,” it is argued, is neither a test of the systematic distortion hypothesis nor a critique. What Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee demonstrate is that the validity of the systematic distortion hypothesis does not depend upon the unrealistic assumption that observers are capable of reporting only what they expect to see.     

Why There Still Are No People

This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that morality cannot survive the loss of persons.     

The pragmatic circle

Classical Gricean pragmatics is usually conceived as dealing with far-side pragmatics, aimed at computing implicatures. It involves reasoning about why what was said, was said. Near-side pragmatics, on the other hand, is pragmatics in the service of determining, together with the semantical properties of the words used, what was said. But this raises the specter of ‘the pragmatic circle.’ If Gricean pragmatics seeks explanations for why someone said what they did, how can there be Gricean pragmatics on the near-side? Gricean reasoning seems to require what is said to get started. But then if Gricean reasoning is needed to get to what is said, we have a circle.     

The Convergent Conceptions of Being in Mainstream Analytic and Postmodern Continental Philosophy

This article argues that there is ultimately a very close convergence between prominent conceptions of being in mainstream Anglo‐American philosophy and mainstream postmodern Continental philosophy. One characteristic idea in Anglo‐American or analytic philosophy is that we establish what is meaningful and so what we can say about what is, by making evident the limits of sense or what simply cannot be meant. A characteristic idea in Continental philosophy of being is that being emerges through contrast and interplay with what it is not, with what has no being at all and so is beyond sense. The two traditions consequently conceive being in significantly related ways. As a result, what the Continental tradition gets at with “the meaning of being as such and in general,” and how it gets at it, has much in common with what the Anglo‐American tradition gets at, and how it gets at it, by establishing “what can be meaningfully said.”     

Core and Periphery in American Catholic Identity

Catholicism, like all old religious traditions, contains numerous teachings, rules, devotions, and practices. Catholics today ask themselves what is essential in Catholicism and what is optional. We carried out two surveys of American Catholics, asking them to rate numerous elements as to what is core and what is peripheral. The surveys agreed that sacraments and helping the poor are seen as central, while some specific teachings such as belief that only men can be priests and opposition to the death penalty are peripheral. These findings indicate where Catholics' central commitments lie and what elements of the faith are seen as optional and open to re-thinking.     

责任的二重性及责任意识的培养——基于心理学的视野

责任就是做好分内应做之事,既包括职务客观要求的“应做之事”,也包括个体主观认同的“分内之事”,体现出客观与主观二重性。这一特性决定了责任意识包含对应做之事进行客观认识的“责任认知”与对分内之事进行主观认同的“责任情感”二个方面。培养责任认知可以按照传统的教育方法,但责任情感的培养却需另辟蹊径。该文基于心理学的研究成果,从责任分散效应、责任归因理论与角色扮演理论等出发提出了培养责任意识的几条途径。     

Premarital sex: attitudes and behavior by dating stage

Using data gathered from a sixty-three item dating and mate-selection questionnaire completed by two hundred and eighty student and nonstudent respondents, this study investigates the differences between what people believe is proper premarital sexual behavior, what they do and what they think others are doing at five stages of dating. It was found that persons are most restrictive in what they believe is proper conduct, more permissive in their reported behavior, and most permissive in their perception of what others are doing. During the early stages of dating, males and females differ widely in their outlook as to what is proper behavior and also in their reported behavior. Other studies which failed to take dating stage into consideration may have missed important gender differences in the early period of dating.     

Saying what you mean, meaning what you say: language, interaction and interpretation

As analysts, we strive to say what we mean, which involves understanding the other person's communication, finding the appropriate form of words to articulate what we have understood, and expressing them in the tone of voice which can be heard. Meaning what we say refers to the authenticity of our response, that what we say is sincere. My theme touches on different ways of saying what we mean and how this can affect the meaning of what we say. Some of the issues are aesthetic, some grammatical. How some sentence structures lead to closing off communication while others open it.     

Paralysis at the Adolescent Gate: Peter Pan Meets Godzilla

When a 13-year-old develops a disturbance so great that he is unable to go to school, is disinclined to see his friends or go out, and is deeply sad and anxious, clinicians tend to turn to his history to understand what is happening. In the case of Peter, what emerges is that it is not his history but rather what he perceived to be his future that led to his breakdown. This article explicates how the perception of what was to come dovetailed with where he was in his development, and how these coalesced to create an emotional paralysis.     

You Don't Say?

This paper defends a purely semantic notionof what is said against various recent objections. Theobjections each cite some sort of linguistic,psychological, or epistemological fact that issupposed to show that on any viable notion of what aspeaker says in uttering a sentence, there ispragmatic intrusion into what is said. Relying on amodified version of Grice's notion, on which what issaid must be a projection of the syntax of the utteredsentence, I argue that a purely semantic notion isneeded to account for the linguistically determinedinput to the hearer's inference to what, if anything,the speaker intends to be conveying in uttering thesentence.     

Expression and Indication in Ethics and Political Philosophy

We sometimes have reasons to perform actions due to what they would communicate. Those who have discussed such reasons have understood what an action ‘communicates’ as what it conventionally expresses. Brennan and Jaworski argue that when a convention ensures that expressing the appropriate thing would be costly, we should change or flout the convention. I argue that what really matters is often what attitudes we indicate rather than conventionally express, using social science to show that indicating our attitudes is often unavoidably costly, and sometimes worth the cost. I use this account to defend communicative arguments for egalitarian distributive policies.

     

The perfect murder: A philosophical whodunit

In his Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues from the possibility of cases of fission and/or fusion of persons that one must reject identity as what matters for personal survival. Instead Parfit concludes that what matters is “psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the right kind of cause,” or what he calls an R-relation. In this paper, I argue that, if one accepts Parfit’s conclusion, one must accept that R-relations are what matter for moral responsibility as well. Unfortunately, it seems that accepting that the R-relation is what matters for both survival and moral responsibility leads to a contradiction. My goal, however, is not merely to point out a problem in Parfit’s account. Instead, I believe that once we understand the basic intuitions which lead to this contradiction, it is clear that there is no fully satisfactory way to account for what matters with respect to survival and moral responsibility.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.     

What's true and whose idea was it?

In this paper, the author explores the idea that psychoanalysis at its core involves an effort on the part of patient and analyst to articulate what is true to an emotional experience in a form that is utilizable by the analytic pair for purposes of psychological change. Building upon the work of Bion, what is true to human emotional experience is seen as independent of the analyst's formulation of it. In this sense, we, as psychoanalysts, are not inventors of emotional truths, but participant observers and scribes. And yet, in the very act of thinking and giving verbally symbolic 'shape' to what we intuit to be true to an emotional experience, we alter that truth. This understanding of what is true underlies the analytic conception of the therapeutic action of interpretation: in interpreting, the analyst verbally symbolizes what he feels is true to the patient's unconscious experience and, in so doing, alters what is true and contributes to the creation of a potentially new experience with which the analytic pair may do psychological work. These ideas are illustrated in a detailed discussion of an analytic session. The analyst makes use of his reverie experience-for which both and neither of the members of the analytic pair may claim authorship-in his effort to arrive at tentative understandings of what is true to the patient's unconscious emotional experience at several junctures in the session.     

Actions That We Ought,But Can't

It is commonly assumed that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, that is, that if we ought to do something, then it must be the case that we can do it. It is a frequent quip about this thesis that any account must specify three things: what is meant by the ‘ought’, what is meant by the ‘implies’, and what is meant by the ‘can’. ¹ Something is missed, though, when we state the thesis in its shortened, three‐word form. We overlook what it means to do something. It is, I think, not mere coincidence that nobody has discussed this issue: It is very difficult to specify what it means to do something in the relevant sense. This paper is devoted to fleshing out one way of doing something that is a problem for the thesis.     

The motivation question

Philosophical Studies - How does it happen that our beliefs about what we ought to do cause us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do? This is what John Broome calls the “motivation...