Memory for goal-directed sequences of actions: Is doing better than seeing?

Verb-object phrases are usually remembered better if they have been enacted during study than if theyhave been learned verbally or if one has observed another person enact the phrases. Researchers have explained this well-established enactment effect by assuming that enactment leaves an additional motor code enhancing memory. We assume instead that enactment provokes excellentitem-specific processing at t he expense of processing relations between items. Thus, if recall were to depend on this relational processing that is hindered by enactment, enactment should not be a more effective encoding strategy than observation. We tested this hypothesis by analyzing the recall of sequences of related actions. In two experiments, we found no recall advantage of enactment over observing another person perform, though both encoding tasks were superior to verbal learning. Organization was best after observation. These findings imply that learning by viewing is not inferior to learning by doing.     

Is it sometimes better to receive than to give? Preferences for receiver roles over proposer roles in consumer behavior ultimatums

In the context of purchasing ultimatums, consumers may dislike the freedom of choice that comes with proposing offers due to their awareness that the other party may have better information than they do and the fact that the attractiveness of outside alternatives is uncertain. Indeed, across three studies, we find that people prefer to receive rather than propose offers. In Study 1, proposers reached fewer agreements and experienced less favorable attitudes (e.g., satisfaction, fairness, recommendation intentions), particularly when their offers were rejected. In Study 2, proposers experienced more uncertainty and cognitive depletion as compared to receivers, again particularly if the proposed offer was rejected. In Study 3, role preferences were explained by the existence of higher regret in the proposer role, particularly if the proposed offer was rejected. We conclude with a consideration of the theoretical and practical implications of our research for scholars, customers, and service providers.     

Is property dualism better off than substance dualism?

It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.     

Is a closed mind better for students?

A commentary is given on the seven articles in this special issue. Ordered in terms of interest and importance this readers preference list begins with the broad review articles by Boekaerts, De Raad and Schouwenburg, and Messick, in this order. Next comes the curious article by Eysenck. It is curious because it so clearly reveals his continuing refusal to accept Conscientiousness or W as an independent factor of personality. How to open a closed mind? The three research articles left this reader in a state of depression, mostly because of the negative correlations found in two of the three studies between students self-ratings on Openness and their grades obtained in the early years of University schooling.     

Is imagery better than reality? Performance in imagined dart throwing

We investigated whether deviations from optimal performance are predicted in motor imagery. In Experiment 1, novices and experts imagined and executed dart throws. In imagination, they reported the final position of the dart. Experts performed better than novices in execution and imagination. Distance to the target and bias were smaller in imagination than in execution. In Experiment 2, we dissociated the roles of feedback from proximal and distal action elements for predictions. Three groups of novices estimated the dart’s final position in imagination, in execution without visual feedback, or in execution with delayed visual feedback. Estimates did not differ significantly between groups, indicating that (the lack of) feedback did not influence predictions. Deviations from optimal performance were lower in estimated than in actual performance. In conclusion, although predictive mechanisms may be similar in imagination and execution, the full extent of deviation from optimal performance is not predicted.     

Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings (CR), through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering (PDW), in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine (1) which scale best correlates with performance, and (2) whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus (1) PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and (2) we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies.     

Memory for faces: Are caricatures better than photographs?

Because photographs capture an individual at a moment in time, they contain fleeting features as well as more stable ones. Caricature line drawings, however, include stable features and emphasize distinctive ones. As such, caricatures are closer to schematic memory representations than are photographs. Three experiments using faces of public figures test the hypothesis that caricatures yield better performance than do photographs. Contrary to hypothesis, photographs lead to better performance than do line-drawing caricatures in three different tasks: name recall, face recognition, and name-face verification reaction time. Photographs are also rated as more characteristic or representative of their targets than are line-drawing caricatures.     

When is guessing incorrectly better than studying for enhancing memory?

Recently, Kornell, Hays, and Bjork (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 35:989-998, 2009) demonstrated that incorrect guessing can benefit subsequent memory to a greater degree than can an equivalent amount of study time. We explored this intriguing finding to determine which factors moderate the advantage of incorrect guessing relative to study. In contrast to the findings of Kornell et al., our Experiment 1 revealed that incorrect guessing resulted in worse performance than did studying and that the number of incorrect guesses did not moderate the effect. In contrast, Experiment 2 revealed that the timing of subsequent study moderated the effectiveness of incorrect guessing over study. Final test performance was greater for incorrectly guessed items than for prestudied items when a subsequent study opportunity occurred immediately after the pretrial, whereas the pattern reversed when subsequent study was delayed. This crossover interaction emerged largely because prestudy items showed a classic spacing effect, whereas the guess items did not. One plausible explanation for the absence of a spacing benefit for guess items is that delaying the subsequent study trial increases source-monitoring errors during retrieval, such that participants confuse their original guess with the correctly studied target. However, Experiment 3 provided evidence against this source-monitoring account. We concluded by discussing other possible accounts of why the timing of study could moderate the effectiveness of incorrect guessing.     

Evaluating performance over time: Is improving better than being consistently good?

In many decision contexts, people evaluate others based on intertemporal performance records and commonly face a choice between two distinct profiles: performance that is consistently high versus performance that improves over time to that high level. We proposed that these two profiles could be appealing for different reasons, and thus evaluators’ preferences will differ across decision contexts. In three studies, participants were presented with candidates (e.g., students, employees) displaying the two profiles, and evaluated each candidate in terms of performance, future expectations, and deservingness. The consistent candidate was rated higher on performance, but lower on future expectations, than the improved candidate. Consequently, in achievement-based decisions (e.g., selecting a student for a scholarship), the consistent candidate was viewed as most deserving, whereas in potential-based decisions (e.g., selecting an employee for promotion), the improved candidate was preferred. These effects were mediated by the relative weight that evaluators placed on performance and future expectations.     

Is positive thinking in anticipation of a performance situation better than distraction? An experimental study in preadolescents

The current study compares the effects of experimentally induced positive anticipatory thinking and distraction in preadolescents aged 12–13. Eighty‐seven participants were instructed to either engage in positive anticipatory thoughts or perform a distraction task while preparing to perform a sporting activity in front of their peers. Results revealed that trait social anxiety was associated with more negative estimates of sport performance and catastrophic thoughts relating to the impending sport activity. Additionally, compared to children who distracted, children in the positive anticipation condition showed significantly increased anxiety levels, more catastrophic thoughts and more negative predictions of sport performance and appearance, although these effects did not appear to interact with trait social anxiety. Finally, no significant manipulation effect on participants’ observable behavior was found. The findings further highlight the utility of distracting from an impending, anxiety‐provoking situation to keep anxious feelings to a low level.     

Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?

Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this topic. In the current paper, we ask what makes something a norm, with consideration both of norms in general and a specific example: norms for informal argumentation. We conclude that it is both possible and desirable to invoke norms for rational argument, and that a Bayesian approach provides solid normative principles with which to do so.     

Is preschool education more highly valued for boys than girls?

Questionnaires concerning reasons for enrolling one's child in nursery school were completed by 599 parents in a Midwestern city. Parents of girls and boys did not differ in mean ratings of reasons. However, a greater number of reasons were rated as more important by boys' parents than by girls' parents for both lower- and middle-class respondents. Proportionately more lower-class boys than lower-class girls were enrolled in the city's nursery schools. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that lower-class parents consider preschool education to be more important for boys than girls.     

Age of acquisition ratings score better on criterion validity than frequency trajectory or ratings “corrected” for frequency

From the very first studies on the effect of age of acquisition (AoA) on word processing, researchers have validated their AoA ratings by correlating them with other, more objective indices of the age at which children know words. Still, the ratings have been questioned, and alternative measures have been proposed. Two of these are differences in word frequency between language directed at young children and language directed at older children (frequency trajectory) and AoA ratings corrected for word frequency. Surprisingly, the criterion validity of these alternative measures has never been established, partly because one of the validation criteria (the age at which children are able to name pictures) has been questioned. In the present study, four databases are used that aimed to establish the order of English word acquisition, going from the very first words learned to words taught in secondary education. The criteria for word knowledge included word production, multiple-choice questions about the meaning of the words, and teacher judgments about when words should be taught in the school curriculum. For all databases, the frequency trajectory correlated substantially less with the criterion than AoA ratings. For all but one, the same was true for AoA ratings “corrected” for other variables. On the basis of these findings, researchers should be cautious interpreting null effects with the “improved” variables as evidence against a genuine AoA effect.     

Better than average? When can we say that subsampling of items is better than statistical summary representations?

Myczek and Simons (2008) have described a computational model that subsamples a few items from a set with high accuracy, showing that this approach can do as well as, or better than, a model that captures statistical representations of the set. Although this is an intriguing existence proof, some caution should be taken before we consider their approach as a model for human behavior. In particular, I propose that such simulation-based research should be based on a more expanded range of phenomena and that it should include more accurate representations of errors in judgments.     

Are two heads better than one? Experimental investigations of the social facilitation of memory

The hypothesis that two people collaborating in recall would remember more than a single person was examined in a series of four experiments. All the experiments used variations on the same ‘sequential’ design where, in social conditions, people recalled alone initially and then recalled jointly in pairs: as a control for reminiscence, some people recalled alone on two separate occasions. On the second recall in all of the experiments two people always recalled more than one, but this was simply due to the independent statistical summation of two people's memories: no evidence whatsoever was found for the pairs of people generating new information that was not available to either member of the pair. This surprising result was not attributable to artefacts linked to the complexity or familiarity of stimulus material, nor was it linked to variations in people's cognitive perspectives. No evidence of social facilitation of memories was therefore found: two people recalling together certainly pool their separate memories so as to outperform individuals but the social interaction does not appear to generate previously unavailable memories.     

Is knowledge of causes sufficient for understanding?

According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding.     

Destination memory in social interaction: better memory for older than for younger destinations in normal aging?

Destination memory, a memory component allowing the attribution of information to its appropriate receiver (e.g., to whom did I lend my pen?), is compromised in normal aging. The present paper investigated whether older adults might show better memory for older destinations than for younger destinations. This hypothesis is based on empirical research showing better memory for older faces than for younger faces in older adults. Forty-one older adults and 44 younger adults were asked to tell proverbs to older and younger destinations (i.e., coloured faces). On a later recognition test, participants had to decide whether they had previously told some proverb to an older/younger destination or not. Prior to this task, participants reported their frequency of contact with other-age groups. The results showed lower destination memory in older adults than in younger adults. Interestingly, older adults displayed better memory for older than for younger destinations. The opposite pattern was seen in younger adults. The low memory for younger destinations, as observed in older adults, was significantly correlated with limited exposure to younger individuals. These findings suggest that for older adults, the social experience can play a crucial role in the destination memory, at least as far as exposure to other-age groups is concerned.     

General and relationship-based perceptions of social support: are two constructs better than one?

Two hypotheses derived from a theory of perceived social support were investigated: (a) relationship-based perceptions of social support are distinct from general perceptions of support, and (b) measures of each construct contribute uniquely to the prediction of loneliness. Ninety-four male and 116 female undergraduates completed measures of loneliness and general perceived social support and the Quality of Relationships Inventory, a new instrument to assess relationship-based perceptions of social support, conflict, and depth in specific relationships. General and relationship-based perceptions of social support were found to be related, but empirically distinct, constructs. Relationship-based perceptions of support and conflict from mothers and friends each added to the prediction of loneliness after considering the contribution of general perceived social support. Implications of these findings for understanding the perceived social support construct are discussed.     

Is Mathematics a Domain for Philosophers of Explanation?

In this paper we discuss three interrelated questions. First: is explanation in mathematics a topic that philosophers of mathematics can legitimately investigate? Second: are the specific aims that philosophers of mathematical explanation set themselves legitimate? Finally: are the models of explanation developed by philosophers of science useful tools for philosophers of mathematical explanation? We argue that the answer to all these questions is positive. Our views are completely opposite to the views that Mark Zelcer has put forward recently. Throughout this paper, we show why Zelcer’s arguments fail.     

Is there room for criticism of studies of psychodynamic psychotherapy?

Comments on the original article, "The efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy," by J. Shedler (see record 2010-02208-012). Shedler declared unequivocally that "empirical evidence supports the efficacy of psychodynamic therapy" (p. 98). He did not mention any specific criticisms that have been made of evidence on psychodynamic psychotherapies or address possible distinctions between evidence for short-term versus long-term psychodynamic psychotherapies. Instead, he attributed dissenting views to biases in evidence dissemination and review, which he suggested are rooted in a "lingering distaste in the mental health professions professions for past psychoanalytic arrogance and authority" related to a "hierarchical medical establishment that denied training to non-MDs and adopted a dismissive stance toward research" (Shedler, 2010, p. 98). Shedler (2010) justified his blanket dismissal of criticisms of evidence supporting psychodynamic psychotherapy on the basis of several published meta-analyses. The validity of conclusions from metaanalyses depends on the quality of the evidence synthesized, the nature of the studies included, and the rigor of the statistical analyses employed. Many meta-analyses, however, are not performed rigorously, which can result in treatment efficacy estimates that obscure important intertrial differences and that are unlikely to be replicated in clinical practice.