Legal and Ethical Issues in the Court-Mandated Treatment of Batterers

Summary

In the following article, we will explore the nature of the therapeutic relationship as it relates to batterers' treatment programs. We will consider the impact of obligations created by forces outside the relationship, such as those imposed by legal proceedings. We will discuss the concepts of confidentiality, privilege, and agency and their impact on the therapeutic relationship and the extent to which the therapists' understanding of the role these concepts play may be altered by court orders that impose treatment on a client/patient. Finally, we examine the issues and choices a therapist must make when engaging in court-ordered treatment of batterers, and the implications of those choices for both therapist and client; we will also suggest guidelines to help therapists sort through the often conflicting goals of therapy and the legal process.     

A Likely Explanation: IBE as a Guide to Better (but not more probable) Hypotheses

Abstract

Several friends of inference to best explanation have claimed in recent work that explanatory virtues, such as consilience, simplicity and increased precision, play an important heuristic role in assigning probabilities to available hypotheses and that it is this role that justifies continued efforts to investigate the scope, nature and epistemic value of the inference rule. In this paper I argue that understanding explanatory virtues as a guide to probability assignments creates a critical dilemma for advocates of IBE that has not previously been made sufficiently explicit and which has significant implications for the prospects of the rule. I conclude that the viability of IBE requires that explanatory virtues be related to a non-probabilistic conception of success.     

Second Nature,Critical Theory and Hegel’s Phenomenology

ABSTRACT

While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase ‘second nature’ in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures ‘natural consciousness’, ‘natural notion’, and ‘inorganic nature’, in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the ‘official’ version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an ‘unofficial’ version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a ‘second nature’.     

The Play Relationship and the Therapeutic Alliance

Abstract

This article examines the function of play in normal development and within the treatment relationship in both child and adult psychotherapy. Noting its developmental function and the natural role that play has as a mode of communication with children, the author emphasizes the centrality of play in the construction of the therapeutic alliance. The therapeutic alliance is characterized here as a libidinal attachment, a new object relationship through which developmental experiences involving play may be revivified and, ultimately, may lead to the forging of more enduring and successful adaptations. Two detailed clinical vignettes furnish illustrations of the ways in which play themes and scenarios develop in therapy, and how their association to the therapeutic alliance and transference relationship may be understood and interpreted.     

On Targeting Emotion Regulation Deficits in Eating Disorders through Defense Analysis

ABSTRACT

Psychodynamic approaches to the treatment of individuals with eating disorders are underrepresented in research and in academia. This will increasingly deprive patients of a viable therapeutic alternate to the dominant behavioral family-based models. As psychodynamic approaches may have unique benefits, there is value in resolving this loss. Recent models of dynamic therapies for eating disorders within modern, empirically derived theory show promise for future psychodynamic viability. An attachment-focused approach targeting disordered attachment patterns that are common in individuals with eating disorders has recently been introduced. To complement this model, this article proposes an approach for individuals with eating disorders that is hypothesized to target emotion regulation deficits that are also commonly found in individuals with eating disorders. Observed parallels between the implicit branch of the emotion regulation system and that of contemporary constructs of defense mechanisms guide this proposal. Developmental considerations reveal important connections between this biologically based model and a two-person model based in attachment theory. In this way, this proposal offers a flexible psychodynamic approach that integrates with the existing literature. Further development of this approach could one day help patients to have a greater range of therapeutic options for recovery from eating disorders.     

Reimagining Humpty Dumpty with Play’s Therapeutic Action

ABSTRACT

At the center of the Humpty Dumpty fable there is a fall. The efforts to re-integrate Humpty Dumpty after the fall were unsuccessful. Using the metaphor as a frame, the author explores the role of play therapy and by extension, incorporates parents into the work with the child, to facilitate repair from traumatic experience. The repair to the intergenerational relationship in the clinical work described relied on the use of a non-linear dynamic system’s view of the therapeutic action of play benefitting the development of the child. The privileging of the play space in child mental health comes at a time in our cultural dialogue that under appreciates its’ value.     

Sledging in Sport—Playful Banter,or Mean-spirited Insults? A Study of Sledging’s Place in Play

Abstract

Sledging, or ‘trash talk’ or ‘chirping’, as it’s known in other parts of the world, has long been part of competitive sport. However, more recent times have seen the issue of sledging, and its place in sport, debated with many athletes, fans and academics arguing that sledging has moved outside the notion of ‘sportsmanship’ and gone beyond light hearted, good natured banter. They argue it is now characterized as hurtful, insulting, offensive and intimidating – a tactic that has moved beyond fair play and, in many instances, no longer acceptable. This paper seeks to explore this issue in greater depth. In particular, this paper seeks to ask, ‘is sledging part of play, or is it a characteristic of play’s corruption?’ The argument proceeds by adopting a conception of play grounded in the work of Johan Huizinga. Play may be understood as a core component of even professional sport, not least in that play lies at the moral core of the ‘spirit of sport’ in fairplay and respect for one’s opponents. Using examples to illuminate the changing nature of play and sledging, it will be argued that sledging in its modern form leads to the corruption of this ‘spirit of sport’. The insights of sports and philosophy academics and scholars are drawn upon, as are the insights of surveyed sports fans and amateur athletes who highlight their views on sledging and its place in modern sport. By doing so, sledging’s role in sport and its most dominant characteristics, according to those to watch professional sport and play at the community level, become clear, helping to articulate the difference between a form of sledging that is still playful and a part of play, and sledging that is characteristic of play’s corruption.     

The Second Nature of Human Beings: an Invitation for John McDowell to discuss Helmuth Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology

Abstract

John McDowell argues for minimal empiricism via using the notion of second nature of human beings. I should like to invite him to discuss Helmuth Plessner's Philosophical Anthropology in order to elaborate a more substantial conception of second nature. McDowell seems to think that it is adequate for his more epistemological aim to remind us of second nature as though it were to be taken for granted. But I think, following Plessner, that this right reminder needs a therapeutic elaboration in Kant's sense of propaedeutics. What had been called our second nature found itself being questioned in order to limit the range of ways of treating the self we can authorize.     

The Problem of Obligation,the Finite Rational Will,and Kantian Value Realism

Abstract

Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant's contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern's interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, Stern contends that Kant was a moral realist of sorts, holding certain substantive views that are best characterized as realist commitments about value. In this paper, I raise two central objections to Stern's reading of Kant. The first objection concerns what Stern identifies as Kant's solution to the problem of moral obligation. Whereas Stern sees the distinction between the infinite will and the finite will as resolving the problem of moral obligation, I argue that this distinction merely explains why moral obligations necessarily take the form of imperatives for us imperfect human beings, but does not solve the deeper problem concerning the obligatory nature of morality—why we should take moral norms to be supremely authoritative laws that override all other norms based on our non-moral interests. The second objection addresses Stern's claim that Kantian autonomy is compatible with value realism. Although this is an idea with which many contemporary readers will be sympathetic, I suggest that the textual evidence actually weighs in favor of constructivism.     

On patients’ unique self-knowledge

Abstract

Patients contribute to analytic endeavors through a knowledge of their own unique ways of organizing their experience, of building an intersubjective space with significant others, of the type of life that they consider worth living, and primarily of their specific passions and yearnings. The more that therapists allow the patients’ unique self-knowledge to influence their therapeutic perceptions and decisions, the further they will advance patients’ status as co-experts working together with the therapist to create and formulate new, richer knowledge. In the present article, it is suggested that one of the main reasons why patients’ self-knowledge is excluded from the therapeutic dialogue is that the persuasive power of the therapists’ rich and deep knowledge challenges the patients’ self-authority. Through an illustrative vignette, therapists are recommended to use a metacommunication intervention to restore the balance that has been undermined between the therapist’s authority and the patient’s self-authority.     

Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem

This article proposes a new theory of rational decision, distinct from both causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT). First, some intuitive counterexamples to CDT and EDT are presented. Then the motivation for the new theory is given: the correct theory of rational decision will resemble CDT in that it will not be sensitive to any comparisons of absolute levels of value across different states of nature, but only to comparisons of the differences in value between the available options within states of nature; however, the correct theory will also resemble EDT in that it will rely on conditional probabilities (not unconditional probabilities). The new theory gives a prominent role to the notion of a “benchmark” for each state of nature, by comparison with which the value of the available options in that state of nature are measured, and so it has been called the Benchmark Theory (BT). It is argued that BT gives the right verdict on the cases that seem to be counterexamples to CDT and EDT. Finally, some objections to BT are considered and answered.     

Identity-Neutral and Identity-Constitutive Reasons for Preserving Nature

abstract Environmental ethicists will often say that in dealing with natural entities we need the guidance of an ethic rooted in ‘the intrinsic value of nature’. They will add that subjectivist value theories are unable to account for the normativity of intrinsic value discourse. This preoccupation with normativity explains why many environmental ethicists favour value objectivism. As I see it, value theories must address not only the problem of normativity but also the problem of motivation. In fact, my approach to the question as to which type of value theory does most justice to our intuition regarding the value of nature is primarily in terms of the motivational perspective. I argue that neither the usual objectivist theories nor their subjectivist counterparts can accommodate and explain the fact that those who agree that nature has intrinsic value may well differ in motivation to support its preservation. I suggest that such difference in kinds of motivation is related to distinct kinds of value judgement in which belief in the intrinsic value of nature is expressed. To clarify my view I discuss the subjectivist value theory of Gerald Gaus[1]. Gaus regards the distinction between personal and impersonal value judgements to be deeply embedded in his theory. His internalism about the relation between reason and motivation however, leads him to the mistaken conclusion that independent impersonal value judgements do not provide reasons for action. Next, I introduce the distinction between identity‐neutral and identity‐constitutive reasons. This distinction allows me to formulate more clearly the differences between the kinds of reasons provided by personal and impersonal value judgements. The resulting theory explains how it is that people who do not (personally) value nature may still be motivated to support nature preservation. It also explains why not everyone who endorses natural values will join movements for the preservation of nature.     

The Clinical Challenge of Mentalization-based Therapy with Children Who are in “Pretend Mode”

ABSTRACT

The “pretend mode” is one of the so-called “pre-mentalizing modes of thinking”, which were first introduced by Target and Fonagy over 20 years ago. In a series of papers about play and reality, “pretend mode” thinking was understood as a mode of pre-mentalizing thinking which is typical in the early years, but which can reappear in a more problematic way in adults. Although the concept of pretend mode was first introduced in a developmental context, as a clinical term it has primarily been discussed in the context of adult or adolescent psychotherapy. This paper suggests that the pretend mode is a valuable clinical concept for therapists working with school-age children, but that its use in this context needs some clarification. After reviewing how pretend mode has been understood as a normal part of early development, this paper goes to demonstrate the various roles of pretend mode in clinical work with school-age children and sets out a number of clinical strategies that may be used in therapeutic work.     

We Have Failed

SUMMARY

This article explores the changing nature of the psy-chotherapeutic world in relationship to the values crisis evident in our lack of reaction to the Gulf War. It attempts to examine the underlying valuelessness of the new post-modem psychotherapeutic systems with special attention to the impact of that changing value structure on humanistic psychotherapy, the mental health community and the significance of this shifting as it relates to the Gulf War. The author examines these philosophic systems that underlie various post-modern approaches and their challenge to universal humanism and humanistic values. Finally the reader is encouraged to reassess the underlying value base of their therapeutic, methodological, and philosophical systems.     

Assessing the risk of self-harm in adolescents: A psychoanalytical perspective

SUMMARY

This paper explores the way psychodynamic factors can be used to extend and improve the quality of the assessment of adolescents at risk of self-harm. Conventional risk factors are clearly of value to identify those young people who require admission or other interventions. However, a consideration of the internal and external factors and their interaction, as manifest in the transference and in a consideration of the history and present circumstances, allows shape and depth to be added to the assessment. In this way an assessment can be a therapeutic intervention in its own right, and can play a part in reducing the risk. This approach is described and illustrated with clinical examples.     

From relation to the field: Modes of unconscious fantasy elaborations1

Abstract

Relational and field theories have much in common, despite divergent foundations. In this paper, several areas of divergence are selected, including the structure of the field as a relational matrix or as an unconscious joint fantasy of the couple; the fate and form of insight; and the nature of the unconscious as relational or ubiquitous. Differences in cognitive and attentional sets are identified and linked to different modes of insight. Using a clinical vignette, these divergences will be illustrated with an attempt to compare and contrast the two approaches through a discussion of how each lens highlights, expands, or forecloses different features of the analytic process. A mode of conceiving the unconscious as unstructured and multiple in potential is offered to reconcile divergent assumptions in therapeutic action. A consideration of Sandor Ferenczi’s clinical emphasis on relaxed technique, elasticity, and especially mutuality suggests that he would have been a field theorist were he among us today.     

Mothers and Children Together

Summary

Treatment groups for both mothers and children together who have experienced mother assault is a unique therapeutic milieu which has been underutilized in the treatment field. This article presents a 10-week feminist-informed family systems group model as part of a treatment approach for children exposed to family violence and can be used with families of children from pre-school to adolescence. This model provides a context in which the experience of family violence can be debriefed, and issues related to trauma, safety, secrecy, and post-abuse family restructuring can be addressed by family members together. In addition, play and art therapy based interventions are presented and are tailored for the beginning, middle, and end of the group process.     

Sport-Based Life Skills Programming in the Schools

SUMMARY

The philosophy of sport and physical activity being readily available for all youth has a long history. Research suggests that sport is a significant factor in the development of adolescents' self-esteem, identity and feelings of competence. Using sport to promote competence in youth has tremendous benefits and risks. The greatest risk is the belief held by many that we can make a difference by just ‘throwing the ball and letting them play.’ This paper will focus on the role that sport can play in facilitating positive youth development. We delineate the environments in which sport best contributes to positive youth development and the role schools, and the psychologists who work in these schools, can play in this process. In addition, we will provide examples of several sport-based programs designed to enhance positive development, the components that make these programs successful and issues related to the design, implementation and evaluation of these programs.     

Jung's concept of the archetype: An existential phenomenological reflection

Abstract

The concept of the archetype became the central focus of Jung's analytic psychology. This paper will present some phenomenological reflections on this concept. It will first reason that the archetype is not a phenomenologically acceptable concept by drawing upon the absolutely unconscious nature of the archetypes, their independence from the individual's intentionaliry, and their separateness from Dasein. The paper will then argue that what Jung refers to as “archetypal” images, ideas, and experiences do have phenomenological value. As data pursuant to a phenomenological analysis, they may lead to a better understanding of those psychological experiences that may be common to all of humanity.