Should Psychology Ignore the Language of the Brain?

ABSTRACT— Claims that neuroscientific data do not contribute to our understanding of psychological functions have been made recently. Here I argue that these criticisms are solely based on an analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. However, fMRI is only one of the methods in the toolkit of cognitive neuroscience. I provide examples from research on event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that have contributed to our understanding of the cognitive architecture of human language functions. In addition, I provide evidence of (possible) contributions from fMRI measurements to our understanding of the functional architecture of language processing. Finally, I argue that a neurobiology of human language that integrates information about the necessary genetic and neural infrastructures will allow us to answer certain questions that are not answerable if all we have is evidence from behavior.     

Applying the Psychology of Science to the Science of Psychology: Can Psychologists Use Psychological Science to Enhance Psychology as a Science?

ABSTRACT— Added to the already tremendous diversity of subdisciplines of psychological science is the psychology of science. Although research on the psychology of science began in 1874, the field has seen a substantial expansion of activity in recent years. One particular subset of this research literature has special importance: namely, inquiries into the psychology of doing great science. These investigations may be assigned into four groups: cognitive, differential, developmental, and social. Each of these deal with critical questions that can, if answered, contribute directly to the improvement of psychology as a science. Potential applications include (a) the identification of scientific talent in psychology, (b) the education of future investigators in psychological science, and (c) the evaluation of psychology's progress as a scientific endeavor.     

Discursive Psychology and the “New Racism”

This paper addresses a range of theoretical issues which are the topic of recent social psychological and related research concerned with the “new racism.” We critically examine examples of such research in order to explore how analyst concerns with anti-racist political activism are surreptitiously privileged in explanations of social interaction, often at the expense of and in preference to the work of examining participants' own formulations of those same activities. Such work is contrasted with an ethnomethodologically-informed, discursive psychology which seeks to the explore how participants' talk is responsively oriented to foreclosing the same sort of critique implicitly made available in new racism research as a way for speakers to account for their own and others' activities within the controversy which that same body of research seeks to settle. More specifically, we examine how the rhetorical context of controversy surrounding race and racism is imminent to the situated activities whereby speakers provide for its relevance and not, as assumed in new racism research, some independent factor affecting that interaction. Finally, we conclude with an analysis of an episode of talk recorded in a social science interview having as its topic the nature of cross-cultural contact in which the participants take up the issue of racism as a way of managing the conflicting demands with which they are confronted in accounting for their involvement as Western expatriates living in the Middle East. Throughout our analysis of these materials, the issue of racism is approached for how it features as a participant concern, raised by speakers in the course of attending to the immediate situated interactional business in which they are engaged. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Psychology and Culture: Back to the Future?

Psychology has a poor record in addressing cultural phenomena. One response is to turn to ancient concepts from local traditions and to use these as alternative analytic categories to explain behavior. However, there are problems with such an approach. These concepts will be read from the vantage point of the present and interpreted differently so as to propose different diagnoses (and solutions) for contemporary social problems. As an alternative, rather than using ancient resources as analytic categories in the explanation of behavior, we could instead examine how they are used as categories of practice as people actively make sense of their social context and themselves. Attending to such contemporary ‘lay’ usage (and the contestation it entails) allows for a more dynamic conception of cultural processes than is typical in psychology. More generally, I believe that it is possible to use our psychological constructs so that we can see the distinctive particularities of the phenomena before us in new and interesting ways, and in ways that respect their cultural specificity. This claim is illustrated through reference to recent work using the concept of social identity to illuminate aspects of Hindu pilgrimage.     

Kierkegaard and Psychology as the Science of the “Multifarious Life”

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the actuality of some considerations around psychology made by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). According to him psychology is about the “multifarious” life, which is a term that pinpoints the challenges psychology still have when it comes to including changes and genetic perspectives on its understanding of actual living. Yet Kierkegaard discusses psychology in relationship to metaphysics, which is an almost forgotten perspective. His understanding opens up for narrowing the definition of psychology down to the science of subjectivity, which at the same time elevates psychology to being the only science that focuses on the actual human life. Yet Kierkegaard’s most important contribution to psychology is to maintain a radical distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and in this respect the psychology of today is challenged.     

Psychology impaired?

This article comments on M.J. Layman and J.R. McNamara's (1997) article about remediation for ethics violations. The author addresses the practice of regarding ethical violation, and its subset, boundary violation, and its subset, sexual misconduct, as synonymous. When professional impairment (disability) is seen as equivalent to sexual misconduct, the resulting generalized confusion impedes much needed progress in critical areas. The profession awaits structured assistance from the American Psychological Association to clarify and provide leadership in policy development.     

How European is the European Journal of Developmental Psychology?

This paper tries to make clear why a European journal of developmental psychology makes sense. First it is explained that so-called European culture is a complicated matter: historically and culturally many fault lines are to be detected, from the borders of the Roman empire to the iron curtain. These fault lines separate different cultural areas within Europe.

Developmental thinking came into existence within the eighteenth century (Enlightenment), especially with the work of Rousseau, which offered the theoretical building blocks for Western education and for modern Piagetian developmental psychology. Empirical developmental research found its origins in Germany, especially in Jena, with the work of William Preyer. The Jena ideas were brought to the USA by Stanley Hall. And in the twentieth century the Rousseau–Piaget tradition was brought to the USA by John Flavell.

A European Society for Developmental Psychology and its flagship the European Journal of Developmental Psychology should devote itself to the study of the European roots of developmental psychology as well as contributing to European developmental psychology, which in an open, new Europe moves across the original fault lines.     

Can Psychology Ethics Effectively Be Integrated into Introductory Psychology?

This study evaluated the integration of psychology ethics into an introductory psychology course. Students in two general psychology sections were exposed to an infusion of psychology ethics in teaching, research, and clinical practice, whereas students in two sections were exposed to traditional course content. Students completed a pre and post-test assessment including a psychology ethics questionnaire and open-ended responses to three ethics case studies. Students in the ethics group displayed a statistically significant increase in scores on both measures from pre to post-test. However, students in the traditional group showed no improvement in scores.     

Scientists in the Swamp: Narrowing the Language–Practice Gap in Community Psychology

As a confluence of unique values and activities, the collective practice of community psychology is difficult to characterize in a simple way. Increasingly, however, professional contexts are laden with pressure to define any practice—from library work to medical interventions—in the orderly, compact language of traditional science. This trend has historically been resisted in the field by those sensing a fundamental lack of fit between the fluid, emergent aspects of community psychological practice and the fixed, precise language of classic science. In response to this “language–practice gap,” some have attempted to adapt the traditional language of science to better fit the field's practice, while others have explored alternative languages of practice seemingly more indigenous to the messy “swamp” of actual communities. While the former effort leaves some theoretical contradictions intact, the latter tends to discount scientific identity entirely. This paper proposes a potential step forward by resituating questions of disciplinary language and identity within a current philosophical discourse where the nature of social science itself remains sharply contested. This suggests shifting attention away from “should we be a science?” to “what kind of science might we be after all?”; in turn, alternative languages may be re‐cast as legitimate contributors to a kind of science more authentic to human communities—even a viable “science in the swamp.” One such language–philosophical hermeneutics—is presented as a particularly valuable supplement to traditional science. Illustrations highlight ways that hermeneutics may advance the formal language of the field towards a closer fit of what actually happens in practice, while preserving and even bolstering the empirical rigor and scientific identity of the field.     

The Future of Psychology： Evolutionary Approach to Scientific Psychology

＂Evolutionary psychology is an approach to psychology, in which knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are put to use in research on the structure of the human mind＂ （Cosmides ＆ Tooby, 2001, p.1）. The approach can be used to study and to provide broad theoretical framing of nearly all of the issues and topics within the traditionally defined fields of psychology. The 19 papers included in this special issue on evolutionary psychology are written by leading scholars in the field and address topics that can be organized by the familiar divisions of cognitive, developmental, and social psychology.     

Could Presentism in the Histories of Psychology Actually be Futuristic?

Disputes about the origins of psychology in the history of the discipline are functional not for our understanding of the past, but as normative signs that regulate the construction of ideas in the future. We introduce the notion of open-ended normativity that regulates the development of a given discipline towards its future. Hence the question of the cultural origins of psychology becomes contested in the 21st century as an important topic. It proves that the history of psychology is an active participant in the making of psychology, as it is creating its future.     

And the Winner is… Awards for the Integration of Science and Practice in Psychology

Psychotherapists from all fields perform difficult and challenging work, trying to help their clients gain insight into their problems and make lasting changes in their thoughts and behaviors. Unfortunately, too often the work of a psychotherapist is minimized, neglected, or disregarded. Where departmental or conference awards may be presented regularly, public recognition for evidence-based and clinically-relevant published work is lacking. The present paper aims to acknowledge the most valuable recent accomplishments in the field of mental health assessment and treatment. Nominations were accepted for works published during 2017, papers of enduring value, and most valuable psychologist, and votes were cast by a panel of judges. These valuable contributions are recommended for all psychotherapists who hope to improve their work with clients.     

Comments on “Presentism and Diversity in the History of Psychology”

There is a need to understand what motivates claims of priority over insights, concepts or methods of psychology. Such claims are prompted by a sense of pride in saying that “my” ancestors got it before “their” ancestors. The right of any culture, or anybody for that matter, to define the label “psychology”, or to decide what psychology is or should be about is questionable.     

Psychology and mind-body segregation: Are we part of the problem?

Despite advances in behavioral medicine and health psychology, the health care system and medical education continue to show resistance to a truly biopsychosocial model of medical practice. Psychologists in medical settings have generally been identified as challenging the concept of mind-body duality and the segregation of biologic and psychosocial sciences in medicine. However, examples are presented of how psychologists contribute to and perpetuate mind-body segregation via exclusive theoretical conceptualizations, arbitrary definitions of professional behavior, and dogmatic constraints on the limits of psychology's field of knowledge.     

Do We Need a Psychology of Women in the Islamic World?

In these brief remarks I use the present collection of papers to this special issue on women in the Muslim World to address broader questions about a psychology of women in Islam. I discuss what might constitute Muslim culture, arguing that the combination of the themes of religiosity, collectivism, tightness, conservatism, gender differentiation and patriarchy, and honor offer a good starting point as a taxonomy for a distinct Islamic culture. Next, I discuss the present contributions to this special issue in the broader context of challenges faced by women in Muslim cultures, which are often among the most gender unequal in the world. Finally, I offer some suggestions for advancing cultural research on women in the Islamic World.     

Time for Paradigmatic Substitution in Psychology. What are the Alternatives?

This article focuses on the “machine paradigm” in psychology and its consequences for (mis)understanding of human beings. It discusses causes of the mainstream epistemology in Western societies, referring to philosophical traditions, the prestige of some natural sciences and mathematical statistics. It emphasizes how the higher psychological functions develop dialectically from a biological basis and how the brain due to its plasticity changes with mental and physical activity. This makes a causal machine paradigm unfit to describe and explain human psychology and human development. Some concepts for an alternative paradigm are suggested.     

Is Folk Psychology Different?

In this paper, I seek to refute arguments for the idea that folk psychological explanation, i.e., the explanation of actions, beliefs and desires in terms of one another, should be understood as being of a different character than ordinary scientific explanations, a view defended most prominently in analytical philosophy by Donald Davidson and John McDowell. My strategy involves arguing both against the extant arguments for the idea that FP must be construed as giving such explanations, and also against the very notion of such a different kind of explanation. I argue first that the in some sense a priori and conceptual nature of folk psychological principles does not support the idea that these are other than empirical generalisations, by appeal to recent nativist ideas in cognitive science and to Lewis's conception of the meaning of theoretical terms. Second, I argue that there is no coherent sense in which folk psychological explanations can be seen as normative. Thirdly, I examine the putatively holistic character of the mental and conclude that that too fails to provide any cogent reasons for viewing folk psychological explanations as different from other kinds of explanation.